The Hutton Inquiry

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I have. That is very kind.

SIR KEVIN: It is.

SIR KEVIN: I am, yes.

SIR KEVIN: I have, yes.

SIR KEVIN: Two things. Firstly, I intended that Mr Hatfield should establish whether there was a disciplinary case that needed to be pursued by formal disciplinary procedures, in which case that would have been necessary and a very formal process would have followed from that. Secondly, depending on that judgment, for him to establish, as far as he could, the facts of what actually transpired between Andrew Gilligan and Dr Kelly at their meeting.

SIR KEVIN: Well, he was, and is, the Personnel Director in the Ministry of Defence; and, therefore, the individual most experienced in ensuring that the personnel aspects of handling individuals are followed correctly. Secondly, he was not, in any way, engaged in handling the policy issues surrounding the furore which had erupted about the 45 minute warning and the allegations made against the Government, and therefore was in a more dispassionate position, perhaps, than anyone else I could think of. Thirdly, he had himself, for five years, been Policy Director of the Department. In that capacity he was a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee himself, and therefore had a very wide experience of the operations of that world.

SIR KEVIN: Orally, basically the same as subsequently confirmed in writing, which was although he believed that Dr Kelly had been wrong and had been very unwise in first, agreeing to meet Andrew Gilligan, and secondly, in some of the things he had said, that nevertheless this did not constitute grounds for bringing a formal disciplinary case against Dr Kelly on the basis of his account -- and remember he had come forward voluntarily with that account; and that therefore the matter had been dealt with by him in the first half of the interview, and that no formal disciplinary proceedings would be brought. He would admonish Dr Kelly and warn him about contacts with the press in future, but that would be the end of it. He had effectively drawn the line under disciplinary procedures at that point. The second half of the interview was devoted to trying to establish the facts as to whether this was indeed, as Dr Kelly had said, a case where he had been considerably embellished by Andrew Gilligan and had not said the things attributed by Gilligan but he was otherwise the source, or whether he was not the source and it was someone else, or whether this whole idea of a single source was, as it were, untrue and that there were multiple sources involved.

SIR KEVIN: He was inclined to the view that although this exchange obviously had a bearing on the issue, that he could not himself establish that this was the source because he found too many discrepancies, not just over the accounts of the two but also of some of the objective circumstances, how long they had known each other, how long the meeting had lasted, the problem about the status of the individual claimed by Gilligan as against Dr Kelly's status. He felt that there were too many discrepancies to be able to reliably say that this was the source. I must say I was sceptical, but I think Mr Hatfield had done a very thorough job at that stage and could not be certain.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I reported first orally and then in a note to Sir David Omand.

SIR KEVIN: It was not. As I said in my letter, this was a hugely important issue, bearing on the credibility of the Government and its intelligence institutions. The slur cast on the Government was very severe. It had become the big public issue of the day. It had been focused on during the proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Indeed, it was one of the reasons he agreed or decided to have an investigation in the first place. Therefore this was a fundamental issue and question. That weekend, I knew that the Foreign Affairs Committee was due to finish its report. We were not quite sure where they were but it was certainly right at the end of it; and the BBC were due to hold a meeting of the Board of Governors to discuss the issue. So it was quite clear this was a burning issue and needed me to bring it forward on that Friday. I felt we were not in a position to go forward with any degree of certainty, which is why I put in a temporising letter.

SIR KEVIN: We expected this issue to break in the press at any moment; and from the start I was concerned about allegations of cover up, were that to be so. I recall, right at the beginning, being slightly concerned that the letter was written on 30th June and here we were already on 4th July, and therefore felt that it was necessary to be prepared, lest this should break. And I became even more concerned about that the following morning.

SIR KEVIN: My view developed over the weekend. As I say, I needed, on the Friday, to put in a very quick note. Overnight I had been turning this issue over in my head, as to whether this could be really the explanation for Gilligan's allegations. And on the Saturday morning the Times came forward with a report by Tom Baldwin which did seem, not just to me but to others -- and I was informed about this on Saturday morning -- to suggest, more strongly, that the source was indeed Dr Kelly, because the focus had shifted from an individual in the intelligence community or an individual who was one of the senior people responsible for production of the dossier itself to a field inspector; and that shift and the balance that must have been struck in the qualities of the individual to fit that case focused much more clearly on Dr Kelly than had previously been the case. As I say, I was advised that one of the members of the Defence Intelligence Staff said, "They have all but named Kelly" and this weighed heavily with me in feeling that I needed to provide a further report to Sir David Omand and the Prime Minister.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: I have one bundle, so even with my eyesight it is easy.

SIR KEVIN: I have it.

SIR KEVIN: Well, there are a number of points here. Firstly, I felt from the outset that an allegation made based on a single anonymous source could only be countered credibly and authoritatively and finally if that single anonymous source is identified and clarifies the issue personally. It so happened that Dr Kelly came forward and seemed very likely to be that source. There have, I know, been explanations or arguments advanced as to other ways of correcting or clarifying the public record. None of them could have been as complete as this method. The second reason is that I felt that once we were satisfied or could be satisfied this was indeed the explanation for Gilligan's story, there would be no reason whatsoever for Dr Kelly to feel that this was an undue piece of pressure placed on on him. We expected this to come out at any moment. I expected to see in the press, you know, "Kelly responsible for [this allegation]". Had Dr Kelly really been responsible for saying the things that were in that article, had he really said that Alastair Campbell and the Government had intervened in the intelligence judgments overturning the advice of the intelligence community, using information which they knew indeed to be untrue or no longer valid, then that would have been a very, very grave charge indeed. Had he actually said that, Dr Kelly would have been guilty of a very serious disciplinary offence. So I believe that he himself would have an interest in correcting the record and thereby removing this slur on him, as a respected technical source but not somebody who got caught up in making such politically damaging allegations. So I thought this was again a perfectly reasonable thing to be putting to Dr Kelly, as well as a necessary thing in terms of clarifying and clearing up the record. When I say "clarifying and clearing up the record", right at the beginning when I spoke to Geoff Hoon about this, he put it to me, and I agreed, that it is very difficult for good Government to proceed on the basis of judgments made in the public mind as a result of allegations in the press and repeated in Parliament, judgments based on anonymous sources. Good Government can only proceed if the evidence is made available and the people, through Parliament and through the press, are able to actually judge for themselves. That is what I meant about clearing up the record.

SIR KEVIN: I am sorry, I have probably said too much.

SIR KEVIN: The final point is that I had no particular view as to precisely when Mr Hatfield would actually put this point to Dr Kelly. I had assumed he would do it more or less straightaway. But it did need to be read in conjunction with the other point, that until we were satisfied or reasonably satisfied that it was Dr Kelly, clearly I understood that it would be very hard to expect him to put his name to this and wrong of us to do so.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Well, it was not great dismay because with the benefit of hindsight, as things worked out it looked as if this was the critical moment. But I mean, at this point this was simply a general guideline that I had given to Mr Hatfield. I was actually preparing for a speech I was giving to Chatham House that evening on lessons learned from the Iraq campaign and therefore was very busy, and I felt it was useful to put my views down because I might not see Mr Hatfield before the interview and have the opportunity to talk to him. Other things were going on at the same time as this, lots of other things. But I was not particularly surprised, because Mr Hatfield concentrated in his further report on still himself being uncertain as to whether this was, indeed, the source.

SIR KEVIN: I thought it was more likely than did Mr Hatfield. I shared the view of Martin Howard, who had been at that second interview expressly to help to pin down his judgment this was likely to be the explanation, and that indeed it was very, very likely that Dr Kelly had been misrepresented or had his views considerably embellished, as he himself had put it; and that did provide the explanation. I thought it was very unlikely that Andrew Gilligan would have had a series of meetings of senior or other types of officials in a central London hotel in that week immediately before his story. And I think it would have been very unlikely he would have said to the Foreign Affairs Committee it was a single source if he had several others to back it up. So I felt pretty clear in my own mind by this stage that this was likely to be the explanation. Again, I could not be certain. With the benefit of hindsight -- everybody thinks: it was obvious, but it did not seem as obvious as that at the time.

SIR KEVIN: I did. I think I had difficulty getting hold of David Omand. He was, I think, away at GCHQ; I think I did and had a brief conversation with him, but I had a longer one with Mr Powell.

SIR KEVIN: Yes. The discussion I had with Jonathan Powell was focused very much on his own concern that the Prime Minister, the next morning, would be appearing before the Liaison Committee, the Committee which pulls together all of the Parliamentary Committees of the house, of Parliament, the Chairmen of those Committees. In other words, an opportunity for senior Parliamentarians to put any issue they chose to the Prime Minister. And there was real concern in No. 10 he would be asked about this, that this would be one of the ways in which this issue came out. They were very concerned to have as much material as they could to help the Prime Minister. I discussed this with Jonathan Powell, saying, you know: we are still not certain, but we think it quite likely, probable, that this is the explanation. I had two texts sent across to No. 10, one a very minimalist text, one a fuller text of possible statements that might be made, without any prejudice to the precise timing of their issue. But really as background for No. 10 in deciding how to brief the Prime Minister; and as preparation for what I took to be further meetings we would have the following day.

SIR KEVIN: In neither case, if I may say so, was Dr Kelly going to be named in the statement.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, Jonathan Powell took the view that if we made a statement, we would need to be able to stand it up fully in public to explain why it was we were bringing forward this information and that we would need to explain that the status of the individual was such as to render it highly improbable that he could authoritatively have made the allegations that were central to Gilligan's broadcast, as well as the denial that he actually made those statements.

SIR KEVIN: I expected that during the course of Tuesday there would be a meeting, at which I had hoped to be present, in No. 10 with the Cabinet Office where we would discuss this further and decide what to do. The next prominent event from the Liaison Committee meeting was the beginning of the Intelligence and Security Committee hearings into the use of intelligence surrounding the Iraq campaign; and we were already, as it were, sitting on what we felt was a ticking bomb from the Foreign Affairs Committee, it now being virtually 10 days since we had had the letter. They had already reported and in their report they had asked, recommended, that Gilligan's contacts should be further investigated. I felt -- there was a collective feeling that we had a dual problem: 1. Bringing forward the information we had, because we believed it was at a state where it was justified to bring it forward, without naming Dr Kelly, while at the same time equally avoiding allegations of a cover-up or of misleading the Intelligence and Security Committee. That was a particular -- the latter point was a particular concern in the Cabinet Office, because officials, beginning with John Scarlett, were due to start testifying before the Intelligence and Security Committee on the Wednesday; and it would have therefore been very difficult for them to do so holding to themselves, as it were, the information we had and not sharing that with the Committee.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, it was my Lord, the beginning.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: No, I was not there. I was made aware of them through my private secretary in contact with David Omand and was aware that the thinking was that rather than issue a statement immediately, we would seek to give this information to the Chairman of the ISC, Ann Taylor, and invite the Committee to evaluate the position themselves and that we would also put this to the BBC, inviting them to tell us, since the individual had come forward, whether he was or indeed was not the source for Mr Gilligan's stories.

SIR KEVIN: My Lord, I do not think we had a precise intention as to what they should do with the information. It was an opportunity confidentially to bring this out into their deliberations. What they would have done with it, I assume they would have done no more than have listened to Dr Kelly, because what we were essentially asking was that he should simply say, in a way which could be put on to the public record, what he had said to us in his letter of 30th June.

SIR KEVIN: Those officials dealing with it -- I put it like this, my Lord, because I was not actually able to participate.

SIR KEVIN: Only Sir David Omand and those involved in those meetings, John Scarlett, can actually give an authoritative view about this. But my understanding clearly was it would have to be brought out into the public domain for that reason; and also because we found already that it would be quite difficult to keep the Foreign Affairs Committee away from this, once they heard about it. We did not feel that they -- they did not feel, my colleagues in the Cabinet Office and No. 10 at the meeting, they did not feel it would be credible to bring this before the ISC without at least informing the Foreign Affairs Committee that this was happening. So I think from the outset my colleagues felt that this would have to be brought into the public domain.

SIR KEVIN: But that it was better for the discussions to be held in the rather more considered atmosphere of the ISC than in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee, for example.

SIR KEVIN: I was aware by the time, I think, -- well, I was told by my private secretary at about 1 o'clock that the plan was for a letter to go to Ann Taylor with this information in it and another letter to go to the BBC, because the suggestion was that I should write them; and I said at the time that I was very happy with this procedure, it would have been in line with the discussion I would have had had I been at the meeting, but that I thought it was better for the Cabinet Office to communicate with Ann Taylor, as being the official body that links with the ISC rather than the Ministry of Defence, and I felt it was really for the Ministers to write to the BBC, not me. So I remember that rather clearly. By the time I got back to London there had been a further meeting involving the Prime Minister and there had also been the news that Ann Taylor was not prepared to take this into the Committee without a public statement being made first.

SIR KEVIN: I think about 2.15.

SIR KEVIN: I did not go straight to No. 10, I went to my office. I think there was a misunderstanding. I thought the meeting was at 2.30; in fact, the meeting finished at 2.30 in No. 10. I was in time only to be given some statement material that officials had been working on during my absence.

SIR KEVIN: It was in fact over. I was in time to see the Prime Minister saying: Sorry, we have just finished but Jonathan Powell will brief you.

SIR KEVIN: He said that we were back, as it were, to the idea of issuing a statement because Ann Taylor would not consider it without that; and that the statement material was there, and colleagues were beginning to draft on that basis; and he suggested, after briefing me on the approach that was being taken, that we went to the room where this was being done, which we subsequently did, and I --

SIR KEVIN: Well --

SIR KEVIN: Yes, as I say, because it was felt that we could not wait longer before we disclosed what we knew. Given the immediate pressure of the ISC meeting and the growing problem, the longer we failed to bring the information forward of, as it were, the risk of a cover-up from the Foreign Affairs Committee which was a real concern, as has been testified to subsequently by the Chairman of the FAC, had we sought not to tell them about this.

SIR KEVIN: I did, as I say. I think had I been at the meeting I would have joined the consensus. The fact was I was not.

SIR KEVIN: Well, my part was clearly to ensure that this was something that Dr Kelly would be prepared to put his name to, as it were, not on the statement but to defend in public, as and when it was necessary to do so, which had been made clear to Dr Kelly, in fact, by Mr Hatfield. I mean, I was not actually invited to challenge the judgment of a meeting that had been chaired by the Prime Minister but there was a concern, clearly, this should be something which was acceptable also to Dr Kelly. It was no good trying to issue a statement which he could not live with.

SIR KEVIN: They are not actually in my bundle but I think I have a way of finding them.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I have them. The press statement?

SIR KEVIN: CAB/1/0070?

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, that looks like it. I think it is. I mean, it was amended slightly before it was issued but --

SIR KEVIN: I think the reference to the BBC in the second page was removed. I did not feel that we should be talking about the BBC in the statement. This statement was about a serious allegation against the Government, and I felt that that was not directly relevant. No. 10 had no problem about taking that out. There were one or two other quite small amendments. I think the reference to not seeing the 45 minute intelligence was moved down two paragraphs to fit in with a statement where it was made, two paragraphs down. There may have been one small insertion, I think Mr Hatfield made a couple of proposals to say that it was an unauthorised meeting.

SIR KEVIN: As we left the meeting in No. 10, I had a further discussion with Jonathan Powell briefly and he said: we do not want to issue anything that you are not content with. I said it is very important that Dr Kelly should be content with the statement and I needed to put it to him and I did not wish to commit myself until that opportunity occurred. It was sort of ad referendum.

SIR KEVIN: No, I do not think it was quite like that. But the Prime Minister had made clear, from the outset, that he did want the relationship with Dr Kelly, the personal aspects of it, to be handled by Sir David Omand and myself. Sir David was on, by that stage, an airplane to Canada. Therefore I took that responsibility. But as far as I was concerned, it was clear the Government, through the Prime Minister, had decided that a statement should be issued broadly along the lines of this, but that we first needed to make sure it was something that Dr Kelly would accept.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: He reported to me that Dr Kelly was content. That he had taken him through the text, paragraph by paragraph, and Dr Kelly had no difficulty with it.

SIR KEVIN: I do not think so. I think, firstly, we had enough to justify making a statement. In other words, I think it was sufficiently clear that the meeting with Dr Kelly was likely to be the explanation for his story, to justify making a statement of that. I do not think, at that stage, we had enough to be able to say we were absolutely certain it was Dr Kelly, when Dr Kelly himself gave that as one option but not the one he believed to be the case. The reason for making the statement was we did not feel we could hold on to this information any longer before we brought it into the public domain. As I say, the fear of being accused of a cover-up by the Foreign Affairs Committee, of putting our own Government witnesses in an untenable position really before the ISC. So the statement was made on that basis. There have been arguments, I know, that at least this gave Dr Kelly more time to prepare for the press interest that would be expressed in him. That happens to be true but it was not a driving consideration for us at the time, for me anyway, at the time. I am glad it did provide some time but that was not the overriding reason. The overriding reason was we felt that a statement did need to go out, preferably on Tuesday. Had Dr Kelly said, "I am not happy with it" or, "I want to discuss it further" or, "I am concerned about the implications of this statement", I think -- I have no doubt whatsoever we would have discussed it with him and explained to him the reasons why it was necessary for the Government to come forward with a statement of this kind. As it happened, that was not necessary. But I think we could only have delayed it a matter of hours. The sense in No. 10 was we really did need to come forward with a statement.

SIR KEVIN: When it was shown to me, very briefly, at the end of the discussions about the statement with my staff on the late afternoon of the 8th.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Only with the proposition that if the press came forward with Dr Kelly's name we would have no option but to confirm that information; I am afraid I did not trouble -- I should not use this phrase, but I did not go through the thing line by line to look at the detail of information. I regarded it partly as supporting information if Dr Kelly's name was brought forward by the press, and for the most part justificatory information for the statement. In other words, you know, it is rather old fashioned and quaint to think that the press will simply publish a statement. They are very sceptical. They ask lots of questions on individual parts of the statement. This is true of any policy issue or any major issue, as this was; and therefore Q and A material is routinely and regularly prepared to, in the modern parlance, stand up the statement, and this was no different from the others. I never see Q and A briefs as a routine matter. It is done by the staff as subordinate supporting material. Their professional judgment is trusted. The factual basis is usually critical. And this was no different from the rest. I mean, one does not wander around with Q and A material in one's own pocket or talk to the Secretary of State about the details of a Q and A brief. I can understand why it has been focused on, but it really was not right, that.

SIR KEVIN: Absolutely not. Absolutely categorically not.

SIR KEVIN: Well, what were the other options? The options were to deny, which would have been completely untrue and absurd, not just as a matter of credibility but, you know, what was the basic policy here? It was to actually bring this information forward. Denial would have been unacceptable both in principle and in terms of the process we were engaged in. No comment? My guess is "no comment" would have lasted a matter of hours while the press continued to beaver away assiduously to try to find out who it was. There was a real reason here which was not completely Dr Kelly specific. I do not think there was really anything we could have done to prevent Dr Kelly's name coming into the public domain. We felt this was going to happen, right from the outset, from the moment we received his letter, through the article by Tom Baldwin, through that weekend. But we could prevent other people being the subject of press speculation and spotlight, people who had nothing whatsoever to do with this, but were often in sensitive positions. I mean, we do have some staff that are very sensitively placed and their identity is a matter of concern for us. Indeed, this was not an abstract concern. One of these individuals did have, as I have testified before, the press round his house trying to get the attention of his children; somebody who did have a threat to his life; and we could protect those people and decided to do so. So the idea of confirming, if the name was put, was not entirely dependent on Dr Kelly, it was also dependent on other considerations. Protecting other members of staff and the press office themselves, and the Director of News felt that this was also a way of increasing the probability that the press would talk to us before they published a name, which was quite important in trying to manage the issue.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, totally different matters, my Lord.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, completely different issues.

SIR KEVIN: Well, we have other scientists, other technical specialists who are working in other fields who had had threats against their lives whose names we were keenly anxious not to have in the public domain, or indeed have the press round their houses knowing their identity. If you wish for details, my Lord, I would be very happy to give them to you privately.

SIR KEVIN: No, I was not.

SIR KEVIN: With the benefit of hindsight, I do believe they were justified. At the time, I thought it was rather odd, because I believe these were instructions that were given to the press officers about how they would handle the issue and that that was not something that would be volunteered to the press ahead of them coming forward with the name. As I say, it has been explained to me since, by the Director of News, that the motive there was to increase the probability that journalists would come forward and consult us before they published the name, rather than simply go ahead and publish willy-nilly and risk revealing a different person or indeed us having less notice they were going to publish Dr Kelly's name. That I see as a very responsible piece of behaviour by the Director of News, although I have to say when I first heard it I thought it was rather odd.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I did.

SIR KEVIN: Well, I think I probably mentioned it first on the early evening of the 8th. My recollection of that is not absolutely precise. Our offices are next to each other. There is a level of trust between myself and the Secretary of State which is quite strong and therefore we do talk to each other quite regularly. I could not recall whether I had directly said this to the Secretary of State or through my private secretary. I certainly had that conversation with him during the following day and recall, very specifically, confirming this approach in the late morning in the margins of the commemorative event for the Korean war victims. So, I mean, there is no doubt in my own mind that this was understood between us.

SIR KEVIN: Well, I did. I did have an eye for that throughout, including the initial judgment, actually, that we would accept Dr Kelly's account rather than seek to find some disciplinary case there. I checked, throughout the period, on this matter. On the Wednesday, when there was an increased likelihood that his name will come out -- I have to say, I had no view myself about when this was going to happen. It seems it was 24 hours, I have no idea. I asked whether the press office had been doing all their stuff and I was told they had already done it the previous night. I was particularly concerned that Dr Bryan Wells should be involved in handling the line management issues, because I knew him to be not only a sensitive individual but somebody who was liked by Dr Kelly, they knew each other well; and I regarded his relationship as important. I think, you know, it is a matter of record the things I wrote at the time show that I had no sense of disregard for Dr Kelly. I was concerned that he should not be exposed prematurely or put under pressure. I mentioned this in No. 10. I have mentioned it since. I mentioned it after that to a number of people. My instructions for the interviews with Dr Kelly on the 14th before his appearance before the FAC; as you know, I personally advised against him appearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee. So I think throughout the period -- I am not trying to belabour the point, I have been a personnel manager myself at earlier stages in my career. I have a reputation in the Department of being interested in the welfare of my staff.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Right.

SIR KEVIN: You mean in terms of paragraph 2?

SIR KEVIN: Well, as a matter of record, you know, usually the sort of people who appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee are very senior members of the Department, with policy responsibility for the area in question, Deputy Secretaries, Deputy Undersecretaries of State, Undersecretaries of State. That is the normal level of witnesses, if not Ministers themselves. Dr Kelly was a very, very renowned expert but he was not senior in the sense of carrying the policy responsibilities for the subjects at issue; and it was in that policy context, in terms of taking responsibility for huge chunks of work, that I referred to him as relatively junior. It was never intended, in any way, to criticise or be disrespectful to Dr Kelly and his expertise. It was about the sort of authority that people have to bring before that Committee in speaking on behalf of the Department as a whole; and it was in that sense that I described Dr Kelly. As I say, my concern was that he should bring forward his account of what happened with Andrew Gilligan but not act as the spokesman for policy, for which he was not responsible.

SIR KEVIN: Oh, very, very limited. It would not have gone to more than the people who have it here.

SIR KEVIN: I think it probably was not a realistic objective because, the name having been out there, to deny the Foreign Affairs Committee the opportunity to interview Dr Kelly would have been, I think, very difficult. I acknowledge that, I think, over the page. The problem is also that the Intelligence and Security Committee is not a committee of Parliament, it is a committee appointed by the Prime Minister and therefore would not have served the Parliamentary purpose which I think the Foreign Affairs Committee were concerned about. Nevertheless, this was partly a tactical minute designed to ensure that whatever hearing there was would be restrained and not go on for hours and not press Dr Kelly on issues which were not his responsibility. There was a combination, I am perfectly happy to stress, of factors. One was that we should not seek to use Dr Kelly to stress the policy, which was not for him; the other was to show regard for Dr Kelly himself. As I have said earlier, I may have overdone the "not senior" element, but if I did so it was with the best motives of trying to protect Dr Kelly from being forced into a position that he did not hold, rather than to be in any way disrespectful towards him. There was no way that he would have been aware of this minute.

SIR KEVIN: No, I did not. As I say, all that he was being asked to do was to state before the Committee what he had said to us in his letter. He was put under no pressure to go further than that or to say less than that. Indeed, I was concerned that if he wanted to say that he did not believe he was the source, then he must be free to say that and not be put under the burden of assuming -- having to accept our own judgment in the matter. With the benefit of hindsight, of course, I can now appreciate he had a lot more pressures on him than we recognised, but he gave no indication of those pressures whatsoever, and we accepted his account at face value. Of course, at that stage we had no idea of some of the further information that has come out from Andrew Gilligan, from Susan Watts, from Mr Beaumont, from Julie Flint, from Gavin Hewitt. We were unaware of those contacts and therefore had no reason to suppose he was under the pressure he may well in fact have been under.

SIR KEVIN: Invariably these briefings do happen. I asked Martin Howard to do this, partly to remind Dr Kelly of how the Committee operates -- a reminder because he had been there before, the previous year, with the Foreign Secretary -- to ensure that he understood the difference between policies for which he was not responsible and the description of the exchanges he had with Andrew Gilligan for which he was, and generally to be helpful in that regard.

SIR KEVIN: None. None whatsoever. It does seem to me that both I and all of the officials dealing with this issue were doing their best to advance a policy in a public interest while at the same time showing due regard for Dr Kelly. The number of efforts that Bryan Wells made, the amount of effort that indeed our press and news people made to ensure that he was aware that his name was likely to come out very quickly and that he should take measures accordingly. I cannot say why he seemed not to heed the advice he received and the warnings he had, but I am quite sure that they were given.

SIR KEVIN: None whatsoever. None whatsoever.

SIR KEVIN: Oh, if it had been under threat no, I do not think he could have returned to Iraq. But it was not under threat. As I say, Mr Hatfield drew a line under disciplinary procedures after the first interview. I think that was very important. I mean, had this not been done, I mean I think it would have been very difficult to expect him to then appear before the Committees. That was not the reason for doing it. But the fact is that he was not in a double jeopardy of that kind. There was absolutely no question, as far as I was concerned, of his security clearance being withdrawn or his pension. I was aware that plans were going on for him to go to Iraq. I was content with those, and indeed confirmed it myself on the 17th in a conversation with Martin Howard in that: it is now time for Dr Kelly to go and do what he does best, which is inspect for weapons in Iraq.

SIR KEVIN: I am entirely in your hands, my Lord.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: I have it.

SIR KEVIN: I have it.

SIR KEVIN: I have it.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: It was one of three or so issues that were at the forefront of my mind, yes.

SIR KEVIN: Indeed.

SIR KEVIN: Carry on. Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: I would challenge the underlying assumption of deployment, which implies that there was some stratagem there. The Q and A material, as I have said before, was material which simply supported the statement, no more and no less; and that in giving his very explicit consent to the statement I believe that that subsumed satisfactorily the material in the Q and A brief.

SIR KEVIN: My understanding, which is very clear, is that there was an understanding between him and Mr Hatfield, as a result of two quite long interviews and the clearing of the statement, that Dr Kelly expected his name to come out and that this was understood, and that this was not something that was cleared with him because we were not, ourselves, in complete control as to when and in precisely what circumstances his name did come out. But I believe this to be part of the a qui that existed between Dr Kelly and the Department.

SIR KEVIN: There is a difference but I do not believe that was the critical issue. The Department was taking positive steps to bring forward information which they believed was necessary and vital in the public interest. The Prime Minister himself has said how serious it would have been for him if that slur had remained unchallenged and unchecked and uncorrected. In the process of doing so, it became necessary to provide information about the source which gave credibility to the point that while this was a man who would have certainly been found very interesting by Andrew Gilligan, and who Gilligan may well have regarded as being an important source for information, his identity, his nature, his role was not such as to be able to say with any authority the sorts of things that were alleged by Andrew Gilligan in terms of the sexing up of the dossier by the Government, and by Campbell in particular, against the wishes of the intelligence community. It was in order to give credibility to that statement that the details were made available, not in order to release, as it were, Dr Kelly's name.

SIR KEVIN: Which question?

SIR KEVIN: We confirmed the name when it was put to us; and, as I have said before, my understanding was he had reached a point in his discussions with us where he expected his name to come out, and he said it to other people. It was not just a question of relying on what we said. He told Olivia Bosch that he accepted his name would come out. He was reconciled to it or was resigned to it. We know that we told Mrs Kelly that that was so, on the basis of the statement. I do not think he was even aware of the Q and A material.

SIR KEVIN: Thank you.

SIR KEVIN: I have it.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: No, he was never asked that question because that was not the question that we were seeking to establish. As I have said to you before, the problem here is you are assuming, if I may put it like that, there was some process to reveal Dr Kelly's name. There was not a process to reveal Dr Kelly's name. There was a process to release the information which the Government believed it could not sit on any longer because of fear of cover-up, because of witnesses being in very difficult -- I mean false positions in front of the ISC, which meant that a statement needed to be made. We hoped that the information could be evaluated further in confidence, in the ISC. We hoped that the BBC would help to resolve remaining doubts by being prepared to say, if only this: no, it is not this individual, it is somebody else; but they were not prepared to cooperate. We believed on that Tuesday that we had enough justification and need to bring forward the information, without naming Dr Kelly, while not being sufficiently certain to be justified in actually naming Dr Kelly as some people felt would have been ideal. But the force of the requirement to come forward with the statement was what was determining this issue. There was no devious strategy involved, as you put it. We had no need to follow that sort of course.

SIR KEVIN: I am aware.

SIR KEVIN: Well, he was asked about this; and he said he was content to appear before both, even at the time that I was seeking to argue that he should not have to appear before both. Dr Kelly had, as I say, made a clear determination of willingness; and I am not surprised, frankly. I mean, I regarded Dr Kelly, when he wrote his letter of 30th June of basically saying, as a good public servant would: look, I should not have done this but I realise that I have contributed to a problem. I am ready to try and put this right. That was why he wrote the letter; and I believe that, throughout this process, that was what Dr Kelly believed he was doing, which is why he always cooperated, did not disagree with any of the proposals put to him, and said so to the Committees themselves and to other people unconnected with Government.

SIR KEVIN: I have it.

SIR KEVIN: I do not know her personally but I believe her to be the private secretary to the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office.

SIR KEVIN: He is the Deputy Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office who deals with defence matters.

SIR KEVIN: Indeed.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Well, I think what I probably said was: you know, Kelly is prepared to do this. I am not very happy about him having to do it but that is the position, and I wanted --

SIR KEVIN: To appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee as well as the ISC. You know, the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, formally speaking, the Foreign Affairs Committee is his Committee, he is the official liaison with it, as it were. I am more concerned with the Defence Committee. Therefore, I thought it was sensible to have a word with my colleague who was responsible for relations with the Foreign Affairs Committee, to get his view. I mean, actually I read this as part of my concern and consideration for Dr Kelly.

SIR KEVIN: Well, no, I always assumed that Dr Kelly would be appearing before the ISC. The question was whether he should also appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee, something which, you know, I accepted was inevitable but which I had sought to ease as far as I possibly could.

SIR KEVIN: I do not think that is a direct quote, I have to say. I think what I would have said is: I have to say that Kelly seems to be content that he should do it.

SIR KEVIN: That was one of the factors. I mean, if Dr Kelly had been deeply unhappy about this, I would have liked to have discussed it further and had it discussed further. But you know, in a sense he cut the ground out from my own feet in this matter by saying to the staff in the MoD he was happy to appear before both.

SIR KEVIN: I cannot recall at the moment who told me that, but it is a matter of record.

SIR KEVIN: Not off-hand I am afraid, but I am sure we will be able to.

SIR KEVIN: Indeed. I think on a -- quite early on, before I wrote this minute, on that same day I received a note which told me that -- I am sure it is in print, as it were, which told me that he was prepared to appear before both.

SIR KEVIN: I have it.

SIR KEVIN: Absolutely.

SIR KEVIN: Well, except that we concluded, or rather Mr Hatfield concluded and I accepted, on 4th July that we would not pursue a disciplinary case against Dr Kelly because he had come forward voluntarily. On his own account he had not said the things that were attributed to him; and Mr Hatfield did not believe that there was a serious disciplinary case to be raised. Now, had things been different, had he felt -- with the benefit of hindsight he might have done, and I know that Mr Hatfield has testified in these terms, then things would have been different; but as it was, given the man had come forward voluntarily, we believe that an employee of 20 years' standing, as has been clear to this hearing, a man of considerable eminence, in fact, his views were weighed against the views of Mr Gilligan, with whom he had recently had difficulties, and therefore as part of, in a sense, a good duty of care we sustained trust and confidence in our employee.

SIR KEVIN: Well, we knew that Dr Kelly could not have been one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier. That was a matter of fact. We knew he was not a member of the Intelligence Services; that was a matter of fact. You are inviting me to suspect that Dr Kelly was being untruthful. We simply accepted his account. There was no reason, no suspicion, even in the minds of the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, that Dr Kelly was being other than truthful with us. I mean, I really do not wish to get into the details of hindsight, which show he was not being fully truthful with us and was not being fully truthful about a lot of other contacts with other journalists. We did not know that at the time.

SIR KEVIN: No, because it was, as it were, Dr Kelly's word against Mr Gilligan's word; and we were disposed, for all the right reasons, to accept Dr Kelly's word.

SIR KEVIN: No, it was not.

SIR KEVIN: I cannot help you. All I can say is that that entry has no relevance whatsoever to the way in which I handled the case, or the way in which I have reason to believe Mr Hatfield handled the issue.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: I do.

SIR KEVIN: No, it certainly would not have been to a question and answer document. I was unaware of any Q and A material until I saw it on the 8th. This would have been, I think, a simple statement in case the news broke over the weekend and we needed to say something.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: That probably is it, yes.

SIR KEVIN: Indeed.

SIR KEVIN: It was before, of course, we had formed a judgment about the issue, a full judgment, and before, of course, we decided to issue the much fuller statement after the discussions on Tuesday. So the circumstances were very different.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: No, as I have already explained, the first time I saw any Q and A material was after I had returned from No. 10, when it was shown to me very briefly at the end of my meeting in finalising the statement.

SIR KEVIN: No, I found that the meeting had ended. As I have already explained, had I been present at the meeting I have no reason to suppose that I would have disagreed or differed or had a different judgment to offer the Prime Minister. So therefore I was content with the outcome.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I was in the room when the draft was worked up. We did not sit round a table and deliberate sentence by sentence because I think the material was taken from drafts which were already in existence.

SIR KEVIN: The issue had moved forward.

SIR KEVIN: There had been several developments since before the weekend.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, it did.

SIR KEVIN: It does have more material, yes, about the nature of the source.

SIR KEVIN: Well, on that I cannot help you because the only version of the Q and A material I saw was the version which I saw at the end of the day on Tuesday.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, and I assume that was the press office interpretation of the position we had on the Friday evening, after Mr Hatfield's first conversation, which suggested that we would not be going forward with this information, because we were not able, at that stage, to be certain that this was the source.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, because this was before the Government had decided on the statement which was then put to Dr Kelly, which he approved.

SIR KEVIN: The approval of that statement was part of the reflection of the -- the change in stance, as you put it, was a decision taken by a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister.

SIR KEVIN: I knew that then because I had seen that press statement.

SIR KEVIN: The change, I have to tell you, is irrelevant because a policy decision on the handling of this matter had not been taken until the Prime Minister's meeting on the Tuesday. And it was only after that that any of the press people had an authoritative basis on which to proceed.

SIR KEVIN: I was not trying to make that point. I was trying to contrast to you the difference between a formal decision on bringing forward the information into the public arena and the stage before any such decision had been taken.

SIR KEVIN: The decision was taken at a meeting in No. 10 with which the Ministry of Defence concurred.

SIR KEVIN: Yes. But, I mean, it was in line with the sort of advice I was giving from the previous evening.

SIR KEVIN: No, it was not ever.

SIR KEVIN: I understand that Alastair Campbell has a very racy diary style, but this was never put to us as an option. Omand and Tebbit were unaware of any such suggestion; and I think had we been consulted we would still have been against it. But the Prime Minister was against it before we ever got informed, so there we are.

SIR KEVIN: No. I really am completely unaware of that. It would have been the easiest thing to do had anybody decided to do it, but they did not decide it to do it because it would have been wrong.

SIR KEVIN: Really I do not think it is helpful for me to discuss Alastair Campbell's diaries because I recognise nothing here that I was aware of. I think, if I may say so, you are coming still at that we had a stratagem to reveal the name, we did not. We had a stratagem to put the information in the public arena without revealing the name, in the hope that it could have been discussed in the ISC, and in the hope we could have had dialogue with the BBC before we reached the stage where we came forward with the name.

SIR KEVIN: What I do recognise, because it was very clear from the meeting I did attend on the Monday morning that the Prime Minister was quite clear that he wanted this handled on the basis of advice from Sir David Omand and myself; and that seems to me to have been a consistent theme throughout. And I was unaware of any other activities that were underway.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: That is probably correct. I mean, I was given, as it were, an oral read out of this meeting both from Mr Hatfield and Martin Howard, but I did not see this particular document until then.

SIR KEVIN: Not in those terms, no, because, firstly, as I think Mr Hatfield has testified, this was an understatement of the strength with which he believes he had an understanding with Dr Kelly, that his name was bound to come out; and, secondly, you are still putting it to me in the context of some stratagem to reveal the name, when it was not a stratagem to reveal the name. It was a decision that we needed to come forward with information which cast doubt on the veracity of Mr Gilligan's account, and would need to do with authority, which therefore needed to say quite a lot about the nature of the individual as well as what he actually said. That is very different from the sort of context in which you are putting it to me.

SIR KEVIN: What was being done?

SIR KEVIN: Well, the statement was put to Dr Kelly, paragraph by paragraph, by Mr Hatfield and he told me that he was content with it and also that he, Mr Hatfield, had said, "Now you really do need some advice on media handling because, you know, there is going to be a lot of pressure here"; which is tantamount, as far as I am concerned, to saying, "When this statement issues, it is likely the press will be on to you". This, as I understand it, was Dr Kelly's own assumption, which he said to other people as well, in addition to Mr Hatfield believing that to be the case, and indeed our press believing that to be the case because they telephoned very shortly after to reinforce the message about advice on handling the press.

SIR KEVIN: Well, I have to say in all honesty, in precise terms I do not. We could never really have been sure unless the BBC had told us that it was indeed the case. What I think we were trying to do was narrow and reduce the uncertainty and the doubt where we could reasonably do so.

SIR KEVIN: Sure is absolute certainty. Nobody could have been absolutely certain until that stage. That sort of information was never going to be available. It was more a question of probability and being sufficiently satisfied to bring forward the information we had.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: I would not put it quite like that but I am still with you here.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Indeed.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: I think, yes, we did have a brief discussion about it.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I did.

SIR KEVIN: Not explicitly because they were not relevant in this case, in the sense that, firstly, Dr Kelly was not facing a disciplinary action. As I said in my first examination, this was to clarify the public record, not to participate in any disciplinary activity. And, secondly, you know, it is for the Ministers to decide who appears before Committees, not for officials to make that final decision.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, it does, but the circumstances envisaged there did not apply in this case. These are circumstances of national security and threats to the State rather than what was being dealt with here.

SIR KEVIN: Well, it could be wider. But it does not extend as widely as would have been the case here.

SIR KEVIN: Well, I had accepted that once he had been named it was going to be very difficult indeed to keep this entirely to a private hearing; and therefore I felt that some degree of public accountability would be necessary. But I had no specific views on precisely how this would be done; and in any case, it was turned down, for reasons which are perfectly understandable.

SIR KEVIN: It would.

SIR KEVIN: I was still seeking to keep the focus in the ISC, which I think is a better forum for evaluating the information that was brought forward, rather than the Foreign Affairs Committee.

SIR KEVIN: He was cooperating voluntarily in correcting a problem that he had had a hand in creating in the first instance, as he acknowledged. When you say: were we certain he was the source? We were certain throughout that he had been partly responsible for causing the difficulties that had arisen, and therefore he also had a responsibility, which, as I say, I think he accepted voluntarily and well, for doing what he could to clear it up. Which is why I think he was ready to cooperate at all stages in this process.

SIR KEVIN: I do not think he was asked about that because it did not get to that stage. He had already said he was ready to give evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee which would, by definition, be in public.

SIR KEVIN: It will not surprise you to learn that I would strongly disagree with that.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, indeed. These things are bound to be stressful.

SIR KEVIN: Correct.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, he did.

SIR KEVIN: Well, in addition to the information he had himself, he was able and did, I gather, consult Dr Bryan Wells, who was in regular contact and sought to stay in regular contact with Dr Kelly throughout; and this was also the general impression that we had through all of the contacts that took place, to my knowledge, with Dr Kelly.

SIR KEVIN: No, I was not; and I do not know on what basis Mr Smith has it because I notice the word "apparently". That was not what I was hearing from my own staff.

SIR KEVIN: I honestly did not. I honestly did not.

SIR KEVIN: Perhaps you would remind me of what it said.

SIR KEVIN: I am aware of the article from recollection.

SIR KEVIN: I was aware of that article at the time. I must say, the thing I found most interesting was that it broke six weeks earlier, which was rather a long time ago. I sought to rack my brains as to what happened six weeks earlier.

SIR KEVIN: I know it is not convenient, but I think that was when the meeting with Mr Gilligan took place.

SIR KEVIN: I have to say that I was quite annoyed when I read that article. I was irritated that after being told to be careful about relations with the press, Dr Kelly had immediately had a conversation with a journalist, which did seem to me to be improper. I noticed the distinction between what was being said for the record and what was being said privately, which I equally was concerned about; and so I did not necessarily read that article to be totally straightforward. Dr Kelly said that the MoD were being quite good about it all; and then he said that was for the record. And then there was stuff about how else he was feeling. I honestly did not know how to evaluate that, other than to be rather concerned that sort of contact had taken place. But I did check with Mr Wells, and others, as to whether Dr Kelly was holding up well; and the information I had was that, indeed, he was.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, indeed, it does.

SIR KEVIN: I mean, we had no reason to suppose that the Welfare Department should have been involved in --

SIR KEVIN: The answer to your question is no, for good informed reasons as opposed to negligent aspects.

SIR KEVIN: There was absolutely no reason for us to suppose that Dr Kelly needed any welfare assistance. He had several conversations with members of my staff, his line manager and the media people, as well as others in his own Department, and there was no evidence that he felt under these pressures. Indeed, to the extent that there was any information, it was that he was rather, as it were, dismissive of the suggestions and help he was given, giving the impression that he was handling it and he knew how to deal with it. I know Mrs Kelly said he could sometimes be a difficult person to help. There was certainly no impression coming from him to my staff that he was in difficulty. And on the basis of the information we were operating to, there was no real reason why he should have been.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: I really meant only that he was not a member of the Senior Civil Service; and that, as it were, is a matter of record. I was not seeking to disparage Dr Kelly in any way.

SIR KEVIN: No, I have my own dossier of members of the Senior Civil Service. There are about 250 of them. I knew from the outset Dr Kelly was not there because I looked straightaway, as soon as I received the letter.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: I think that is fair.

SIR KEVIN: No, I stand by them.

SIR KEVIN: One can be a great expert in a particularly narrow field and very, very eminent indeed and still not be a senior official in the context of policy responsibility. That was the distinction I was making, albeit in terms which were rather, if I one may say so, crude. Again, this was an internal document for internal use. It was not a document to be handed to an inquiry and it was not something to be shown to Dr Kelly.

SIR KEVIN: With respect, I do not think that is so. I think that Dr Kelly was handled extremely carefully and considerately throughout.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: No. No, not at all. Not at all. It was a matter of concern because, as I have testified, I was absolutely clear that Dr Kelly should say what he said to Gilligan and give his own account even where that was inconvenient for the Government, because I believed this was a matter of integrity and trust. On the question of the 45 minute intelligence, what Dr Kelly believed was not helpful, because he did not share the judgments of the majority of the intelligence community on that. I felt that, nevertheless, it was right that he should say what he had said to Gilligan, no more and no less. But it was important, obviously, if somebody is appearing before a committee, to be clear what his views are actually on the issues that he is likely to be asked about. He was told not to discuss policy issues reserved for Ministers and therefore it is relevant to actually understand what he was likely to say. But that is very different from saying that he was, as it were, being managed out of saying what he believed to be the case in relation to his conversation with Gilligan.

SIR KEVIN: He was not the authority, you see, on these issues or the individual responsible for the policy.

SIR KEVIN: No, I do not believe that I used those words.

SIR KEVIN: Actually I think they are fascinating documents and no doubt will be so in the future. If you want me to expand on that, I think I would have said that he does seem to be somebody who enjoys talking to journalists.

SIR KEVIN: I would have said no more than that.

SIR KEVIN: I certainly did not use the word "show off".

SIR KEVIN: Well, I think that is part of the story; but I think it also is true that he enjoyed very wide relations with journalists and was regarded very highly by them. And that contrasts a little with the idea of the modesty.

SIR KEVIN: I am just reading it now. It was not something I was aware of before. (Pause). Thank you. I have read it.

SIR KEVIN: Nothing at all.

SIR KEVIN: "Mave's farewell" is not something I understand.

SIR KEVIN: Well, I think this may refer to -- I gave a speech at the Italian Ambassador's house on the 16th July. It was a speech on European defence and security policy, followed by a lengthy question and answer session, all of it authorised, I might say. After that there was a supper given by the Ambassador, with a wide spectrum of people present: officials, embassy people, think tankers and I think a few journalists. It may come from that event. But I do not understand anything about Mave's farewell.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I do. Allow me. Perhaps I could explain. I think this is a rather strange version of events. There was a buffet supper afterwards, and at one point I do recall going to the table to recharge or collect my plate and I did bump into somebody I think I now know as James Robbins, but I thought he was someone else, to tell you the truth, before we discussed. When I realised it was the BBC I was slightly embarrassed and did say -- we did have a very brief exchange about this issue. It was not quite in these terms but I can tell you that this is not my considered or was not my considered view of Dr Kelly.

SIR KEVIN: Well, I think it might -- I think it might. Let me go further, I think I did say, frankly the reason this has arisen is because anybody who has a conversation like this with Andrew Gilligan must be a bit eccentric and a bit -- you know. That was the context, but it was not my considered opinion of Dr Kelly. It was my view about the wisdom of having a conversation with this kind of Mr Gilligan.

SIR KEVIN: Well, that would not have been me. As I say, I do think I bumped into somebody, which I subsequently realised was James Robbins, but I certainly did not seek him out.

SIR KEVIN: Maybe it is not me then. I do not think this is a terribly relevant piece of information. I tell you what is: I was deeply disturbed when after Dr Kelly's death I saw a newspaper article carrying on these slurs, and I think it was deeply disrespectful. My light comments were made, as I say, in the context of anybody who talks to Andrew Gilligan like this must be off their head. That was the context. It was not about my view about Dr Kelly. At that stage I believed Dr Kelly was clear of all this, on his way to Iraq to carry on his career with absolutely no slurs on his character; and I was very sorry to see that the newspapers should have published something like that just before this Inquiry began, and that depressed me greatly. And that was what worried me, I may say.

SIR KEVIN: Not in as many words, but --

SIR KEVIN: The brief conversation I had -- this was very brief. This is when we were standing at a table collecting food, waiting. I mean this was an extremely brief and fleeting exchange. But I think I was asked by Mr Robbins why did this happen, why had it -- I was basically saying: I am sorry we have had to have this row with the BBC but it is a question of correcting the record and an inaccuracy, it is not a vendetta. That was the context of the conversation.

SIR KEVIN: I was not enjoying the conversation when I realised I was talking to the BBC diplomatic correspondent rather than somebody I thought was different.

SIR KEVIN: I -- carry on.

SIR KEVIN: It was not intended as a smear. It was in the context of: why would anyone do this? I said, you know, frankly anyone who talks to Andrew Gilligan in these circumstances must be a bit odd. But I -- it was about the behaviour of the meeting with Gilligan; it was not my considered view of Dr Kelly. Had it been my considered view of Dr Kelly, I would not have agreed that he should go forward and pursue his career and carry on inspecting. It was not consistent with the way in which I treated Dr Kelly or any basic view about him.

SIR KEVIN: That is untrue.

SIR KEVIN: Completely false.

SIR KEVIN: I have sought to explain the event as I recall it, which is a very small fragment of a very busy day. I have got no comment to make on this article, which I regard as extremely unpleasant.

SIR KEVIN: I regard it with contempt.

SIR KEVIN: No, I have not. Actually, I was unaware of the article appearing because I was not in the UK at the time; and by the time I was aware of it, it had happened.

SIR KEVIN: I have not taken any action since. I usually regard these things as just best left alone.

SIR KEVIN: I said at the outset, and my Department as a whole, that we would be giving evidence to this Committee and this hearing and this Inquiry and would not be commenting on the sort of things we have seen in the newspapers. I have to say, I have seen an awful lot more in the newspapers about me and about other members of my staff and we have refrained from comment, and we have given all of our evidence and all of our information to Lord Hutton and his Inquiry and that remains our position.

SIR KEVIN: I really do not see how this is relevant. As I say, one has to make one's own judgments about these things, and my own view is these things are just best left alone where they deserve to be.

SIR KEVIN: None whatsoever, no.

SIR KEVIN: Certainly not. The remarks, as I say, need to be taken in the context in which they occurred, and they are very different from the context you are placing them in.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, it would be my view in the light of what has come out through this hearing; but we would not have been aware of that unless this hearing had taken place.

SIR KEVIN: It is my view because of more facts that have emerged surrounding what Dr Kelly knew when he spoke to Mr Gilligan, about the testimony of Susan Watts, about the testimony of Mr Beaumont, about the evidence from Julie Flint and about the testimony of Mr Hewitt.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: No. Sorry, the disciplinary rules to protect -- I did not quite answer your question.

SIR KEVIN: Well, you could.

SIR KEVIN: I certainly would have thought that was true. But there was absolutely no -- one of the reasons why I asked Mr Hatfield to do this was that he was not engaged in any way with the rest of the issue and would therefore look at it on its merits.

SIR KEVIN: None whatsoever in terms of my instructions to Mr Hatfield, which were very clear, that he should establish first whether there was a disciplinary case to answer.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, with Bryan Wells; yes.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, that was my view; but on the basis that he had been -- his views had been considerably embellished, as he said.

SIR KEVIN: Because of the single anonymous source point --

SIR KEVIN: -- that Gilligan had made.

SIR KEVIN: I understand what you mean. I mean, the concern about the, as it were, Gilligan allegations were not precisely those concerns.

SIR KEVIN: I understand that, yes.

SIR KEVIN: If you put it like that, yes, I think they probably were.

SIR KEVIN: Not necessarily.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I think that is right.

SIR KEVIN: Sorry, what was obvious at the time?

SIR KEVIN: Not in my own mind, I have to say I did not focus on that point.

SIR KEVIN: No.

SIR KEVIN: I had not seen it all, actually, at that stage, no.

SIR KEVIN: Subsequent to this point.

SIR KEVIN: I probably had not read it in detail personally, no.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, that had been corroborated.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Not particularly strongly. I mean, this meeting with Andrew Gilligan took place nine months after the events in question; so it could have easily have been hearsay that, you know, there was a single source for the intelligence, without it being revealing knowledge of the intelligence report itself.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: No, I had not. And John Scarlett did not copy his minute. I had focused on the central issues on whether it was Alastair Campbell and the Government that had intervened against the wishes of the intelligence community and their views, and inserted information in the dossier, part of which they knew no longer to be accurate. I did not focus on this aspect.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, but on the other hand, we were not absolutely certain whether Mr Gilligan was being absolutely truthful or not. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but it was not absolutely clear at that stage.

SIR KEVIN: You mean as between Mr Hatfield and Dr Kelly?

SIR KEVIN: I believe so.

SIR KEVIN: I believe so. I mean the word is a rather strange one to use.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: As the ideal.

SIR KEVIN: No, I think it was still perfectly -- no, I do not actually.

SIR KEVIN: Firstly, you are elevating the Q and A material to a significance which it does not and did not have. One never sees Q and A material. I am myself responsible for advancing goodness knows how many policies. Q and A material is always provided on those policies, I~never see them. This is basic background material.

SIR KEVIN: I saw it only in the context, I think, probably because the team was sitting in my outer office doing the work and therefore showed it to me. I would not have expected to see it in normal circumstances. The critical issue I saw or discussed was the question: if the press come forward with Dr Kelly's name, we will have no alternative than to confirm it. That was the only issue that I was consulted on in -- actively.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: The individual answers that were given to specific questions if they were raised by the journalist; it was not something that was given out wholesale.

SIR KEVIN: They had to provide information that gave credibility to the elements of the statement. And it was in that context that it was provided, rather than serving a separate purpose.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: It was not used so that if Dr Kelly's name was given --

SIR KEVIN: It was a completely separate issue, if you will. I know it was included -- the Q and A served two purposes.

SIR KEVIN: But -- yes.

SIR KEVIN: It raised an important point.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Well, difficult in the sense that we needed to come forward with the information; but an important point, I think I would rather say than difficult in that sense.

SIR KEVIN: The reason why I challenge your use of the word "difficult" is because of the implication here that there was some understanding of anonymity, which there never was. We could never have given it anyway to Dr Kelly because of the expectation this would come out. But the idea that there was a confidentiality understanding is one which, you know, sadly it does seem, according to Mrs Kelly's testimony, that Dr Kelly may have been under the impression it was there. But I have to say that was never the impression that was given by me or any of my colleagues in dealings with Dr Kelly.

SIR KEVIN: It was still an important point.

SIR KEVIN: Yes indeed.

SIR KEVIN: Because I say, firstly, I think it was in the context that the understanding had already been reached with him, between Mr Hatfield and himself.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: What we were to do? Were we were to say: no? Were we to say: no comment? It would not have lasted very long.

SIR KEVIN: I think that was consistent with it. And there is a second point. The second point is that --

SIR KEVIN: No, he did not. No, he did not.

SIR KEVIN: Yes, I regarded that as part of the a qui.

SIR KEVIN: The second point is that decision did not depend entirely on Dr Kelly. There were other people, as I said before, in the Department to consider. Therefore the decision of trying to maintain some management of the issue in terms of being aware if they come forward with Dr Kelly's name, rather than just reading it in the press the next morning and, secondly, of managing the question to avoid other people being named who had nothing to do with this. That also played a part in the judgment.

SIR KEVIN: I did not say it was a specific understanding. I said I thought that was understood in the context of all of the discussions that had taken place.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Hmm, hmm.

SIR KEVIN: They do not confirm that impression but neither do they confirm an alternative impression that the Ministry of Defence would seek to withhold Dr Kelly's name if circumstances arose when it would have been unrealistic to do so. As I have testified, and clearly, we had an interest in clarifying the public record, which may have made it necessary to do that.

SIR KEVIN: Hmm, hmm.

SIR KEVIN: (Pause). Sorry, the change from?

SIR KEVIN: Well, it is not the press office that took the view it was a policy decision that we would do it that way.

SIR KEVIN: Because we had no alternative than to do so if the name was put to us.

SIR KEVIN: Not in explicit terms, but as I say I believe it was implicit.

SIR KEVIN: One way or another his name would come out. There are various ways in which it might happen. It was not explained to him that it could be that the journalist would come forward with the name, in which case we would have to confirm it. But the alternatives, to say we would not confirm it, seemed to me to be implausible.

SIR KEVIN: As I say, because it was felt that it was not necessary to do so. Dr Kelly himself felt that after he had agreed to the statement his name would come out. He told various people about that. We could not, ourselves, predict precisely the circumstances in which it would happen. As I say, hindsight is a wonderful thing but it is not like that when you are managing this and about a dozen other issues at the same time. Things move along. You know, it was not possible to predict precisely how this would arise. You have correctly emphasised my concern that we should do things in cooperation with Dr Kelly. But, as I say, there was also the right of Government here to decide how to proceed to correct the record; and while I wanted and we all wanted to do this cooperatively with Dr Kelly, because he would need to stand by whatever was said, this does not mean to say that we simply had to follow as opposed to lead in this respect.

SIR KEVIN: Yes.

SIR KEVIN: Well, he was cooperating throughout.

SIR KEVIN: He had an opportunity to say, if he wished, when the press statement was put to him, and this was very clear: I am very concerned about this statement because it looks to me as if my name will come out. He did not say that and he did not choose to say that. He had the opportunity to do so.