The Hutton Inquiry

MR HOON: It is Geoffrey William Hoon.

MR HOON: I am, yes.

MR HOON: Yes, I have.

MR HOON: Yes, I did.

MR HOON: Yes, I did.

MR HOON: Yes, I did.

MR HOON: Well, I had been concerned for some days by then that an official having come forward who had something relevant to say about the subject of two Parliamentary inquiries, at that stage we had still not identified that fact. I first became aware of it on the previous Thursday, but in fact Dr Kelly had first communicated his contact with Andrew Gilligan as long ago as Monday 30th June. Therefore, I was increasingly concerned about the amount of time that was passing without us acknowledging the fact that an official had come forward. In addition, officials were due to give evidence the following day, the 9th, to the ISC; and therefore, again, there was some concern that if they had been asked questions about this matter they needed to be clear as to the position that the Government was taking. Above all else, because of both pressures, I was concerned that we should not be accused of covering up the fact that an official had come forward.

MR HOON: Yes, I do, because once an official had come forward, once he had made known the fact that he had had an unauthorised contact with Andrew Gilligan, then we had to deal with it. We did not have the option of doing nothing. We had to resolve this matter and use our best judgment to deal with the situation.

MR HOON: Yes, I was. I had had a conversation earlier that day with Sir Kevin Tebbit, the Permanent Secretary, in which he had set out to me the concerns that he had as far as the press office were concerned, in particular that individual press officers should not be seen to be lying to journalists, and that it was better that they should, if the right name was put to them, acknowledge the fact. He was also very concerned that there was a risk to other members of staff, other officials, and he did not want anything said by the press office to lead journalists in the direction of the wrong official.

MR HOON: Yes, I had.

MR HOON: Yes, I do.

MR HOON: It was shortly before my previous appearance. I was required to submit it 24 hours in advance.

MR HOON: Paragraph 25 begins: "On the morning of Wednesday 9th July, Jonathan Powell suggested that I should write again to Mr Davies but this time with Dr Kelly's name. I discussed this view with the MoD's Director of News, Pam Teare, and other officials. An alternative approach would have been to dispute Mr Davies' point about source protection and repeat the offer in my previous letter. I concluded, however, that we were more likely to obtain a sensible response if we gave the name to the BBC so that the Governors and senior management could establish whether they had been told the truth by Mr Gilligan. My office contacted Mr Davies' secretary in advance to ensure that the letter was sent directly to a fax in his own office and that the BBC understood that this letter would not be released to the press. Copies sent to the very limited number of Whitehall recipients were marked accordingly. "26. During the course of Wednesday 9th July the Permanent Secretary told me how the Ministry of Defence press office would deal with press enquiries trying to identify the official referred to in the Ministry of Defence statement. The decision to confirm the name of Dr Kelly if it was put to the MoD directly was to avoid any suggestion that we were in any way misleading journalists. We did not want anyone to claim that we had been less than straightforward in our dealing with them, not least in the light of the FAC's conclusion that Andrew Gilligan's alleged contact should be thoroughly investigated. "27. I did not brief Dr Kelly's name to any journalists, neither was I aware of any strategy to do so. The defensive question and answer material prepared to help the MoD press office respond to possible press enquiries was not put to me for approval and I did not see it at the time."

MR HOON: Yes, they are.

MR HOON: To the best of my recollection it took place immediately before the press meeting that has been referred to. Sir Kevin, quite frequently -- his office is close to mine -- will come in first thing in the morning, put his head around the door and if he wants to raise matters with me, he will do so. He is -- these are not in the nature of formal meetings but if there are matters he wants to clear with me, to check with me, then it is a very regular practice. It happens, I would say, more often than not on the days when we are both in the office together.

MR HOON: I have it, my Lord.

MR HOON: I am fairly confident that it took place immediately before the press meeting.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: In the meeting -- essentially he was setting out something that had been previously agreed, that is the night before, as I have understood the evidence, that in the Q and A was a reference to the fact that if a journalist approached the press office with the right name, then that name would be confirmed by press officers; and so essentially what Kevin was doing that morning was just checking with me essentially that I agreed to that approach.

MR HOON: Yes, I did. We equally had a brief discussion about the options that were available. Clearly, there were three. The press officer could either have told a flat lie to journalists, which would not have been appropriate; they could have confirmed it, as we agreed they should; or they could have obfuscated, they could have said: no comment. It was certainly my very strong view, and I think it has been confirmed by journalists who have given evidence to the Inquiry, that no comment was tantamount to admitting the name in question was the right name. Therefore it seemed to Sir Kevin, it was his view and it was certainly my view, that this was the best and most straightforward way of dealing with journalists who had identified correctly the name of the person who had come forward.

MR HOON: No, I did not.

MR HOON: I agreed with Sir Kevin. I confirmed the approach that had been previously outlined.

MR HOON: No, I was not.

MR HOON: There might have been further conversation with Kevin. I attended with him a service to commemorate the conclusion of the Korean War. To the best of my recollection we might have discussed it once more. But it was only in the nature of, in effect, confirming the decision we had previously agreed on.

MR HOON: No, I was not.

MR HOON: Well, I have referred already to the press briefing meeting. That is a regular meeting that occurs in my office first thing in the morning. I have checked my diary for that day; it was scheduled to last from 9 until 9.15. I had another meeting that day at 9.15. Towards the end of that meeting there was a further very brief discussion of the practice that Pam Teare, who was present at the meeting, was recommending for the press office, which was that -- consistent with what I had previously agreed with Sir Kevin -- if a journalist came forward with the right name then it would be confirmed by the press office. There was a discussion about the rationale for that; I suspect largely for the benefit of my special adviser, Richard Taylor, who had only learned about the fact that someone had come forward the previous evening when he had watched the news. So there was some discussion, really, about the underlying rationale, confirming what had previously been decided.

MR HOON: I was, Pam Teare, Richard Taylor, my principal private secretary.

MR HOON: No, I was not.

MR HOON: It could only have been a matter of minutes. Normally we would look at the extract of press cuttings that is delivered each day around the Ministry of Defence to see whether there were any issues that we had to deal with. We had a much longer discussion, as I previously indicated, about whether, in fact, to incorporate Dr Kelly's name in a further letter to Mr Davies. I would say that the discussion of the rationale underlying the approach of the press office probably took a couple of minutes at the end of the meeting. I can recall that everyone was anxious to finish the meeting because I had another meeting scheduled for 9.15. It is the kind of occasion on which private secretaries put their head around the door to indicate that you should be moving things along.

MR HOON: Yes, I did.

MR HOON: Hmm, hmm.

MR HOON: Yes, it was.

MR HOON: Because otherwise having considered the two other options that seemed to be available, neither of the other two options I regarded as being satisfactory. One was to lie; the other would undoubtedly have involved considerable difficulties for press officers trying to maintain a no comment policy, a no comment policy which I know from experience of dealing with journalists they would simply have regarded as some sort of confirmation. I think, my Lord, it was Mr Blitz who said just that in his evidence to the Inquiry.

MR HOON: Yes, I do.

MR HOON: Yes. As I think I gave evidence on the last occasion, my Lord, it was a consistent view of all of those who had to deal with this problem that sooner rather than later Dr Kelly's name would emerge. Right from the beginning when Dr Kelly in his letter indicated why he had come forward, he said that it was because a colleague had identified his words in the version that Andrew Gilligan gave to the Foreign Affairs Committee, that those words were so distinctive, so associated with Dr Kelly, that she mentioned it to him. And given that if one person could identify Dr Kelly's views in the mouth of Andrew Gilligan, then it would hardly be surprising if others did the same. And the way in which these things worked, I think everyone assumed that sooner rather than later Dr Kelly's name would emerge.

MR HOON: Certainly on the Friday, in the course of the first interview with Richard Hatfield I had understood -- I had been told that Richard Hatfield had made it very clear that it was very likely that his name would emerge and that Dr Kelly -- I think the word used -- had accepted that.

MR HOON: On the Friday, I know from the evidence that they would have prepared routinely a question and answer brief to deal with the possibility that the name might emerge over the weekend. I certainly recall having discussions over the weekend about what we would do if a Sunday newspaper, for example, discovered that Dr Kelly had come forward.

MR HOON: Well, that happened on the Tuesday, on 8th July, that as the press statement was being drafted and prepared the press office contacted Dr Kelly, I think it was Kate Wilson, to warn him of the likelihood that he would be approached by members of the press and that he should take appropriate action. I think she suggested to him that it might be sensible for a short period for him to find somewhere else to live in order to avoid unwelcome attention from the press.

MR HOON: Yes, I did. I regularly asked my private secretary to ensure that someone was in contact with Dr Kelly. He reported to me that Bryan Wells, who was formally Dr Kelly's line manager -- but I was very -- I was given a very clear impression that the two men got on well together and Bryan Wells was taking a personal interest in Dr Kelly's welfare; even to the extent, I am not quite sure when I was told this but I was well aware that Mr Wells had cancelled a trip to the United States in order to remain in the United Kingdom precisely to fulfil that function. I felt that there was, in my case, a balance to be struck in taking an interest in Dr Kelly's welfare but at the same time not interfering in what was a personnel process. I did not want anyone to suggest there was political interference in the decisions and the approaches being taken by those responsible for individual personnel matters.

MR HOON: Essentially as I would have expected. Mr Anderson was concerned about the fact that the Committee had previously heard evidence from both Mr Campbell and Mr Gilligan and they were concerned about what light potentially Dr Kelly might throw on that. So the letter from Donald Anderson was couched in those terms. It was in the context of their previous findings and deliberations.

MR HOON: In a sense it begins from the original letter from Mr Anderson, which indicated that he wanted to ask Dr Kelly questions arising out of the report that the FAC had concluded. I think a second factor was that obviously the issue for Dr Kelly and the Committee was what had taken place between Dr Kelly and Andrew Gilligan. He was the only person in a position to give evidence of that kind; and it seemed right, consistent with what Donald Anderson had asked me, that that limitation should be there. I also had in mind, because it was contained in the original evidence -- sorry, in the original submission from Sir Kevin Tebbit, I had in mind that it was likely, at that stage, that Dr Kelly would be giving evidence to two different Committees on the same day; and therefore limiting the amount of time picked up, in a sense, the point that Kevin Tebbit had made that I should have regard to the man, that is, that he should not be subject to two back-to-back inquiries that were of the usual length. The usual length, in my experience of an appearance before a Parliamentary Committee, is in the order of 2 and a half hours. It would not seem to me to be right to subject someone to two back-to-back two and a half hour sessions.

MR HOON: Well, what he said in his reply was: "I share your clear understanding of the scope and duration of the questioning." Indeed, having looked at this letter since, he could have said: I reluctantly accept, or: I am bound by your request. What he actually said was that he shared my view. I took that to mean that he agreed entirely with the approach that I had taken.

MR HOON: Having followed your cross-examination carefully, over several days, I can see that there may be judgments about the precise timing of particular decisions, the precise point at which those decisions had an effect, which are within what I would describe as the reasonable range of judgments that people can take when confronted with these situations. But if you mean were any of those outside those reasonable range of judgments, so far out as to be wrong, then I would say not.

MR HOON: No, I do not believe so.

MR HOON: In fact I did not say errors of judgment, no. In fact, I was at pains to avoid saying that. I said in any given situation when people exercise their judgment there are reasonable judgments they can take. They may not necessarily always take the same judgment. That does not mean because they differ that they are errors.

MR HOON: What I am saying is that there are -- there is the possibility that different people, with the benefit of hindsight, might have judged that the decisions could have been taken slightly differently. What I would be at pains to emphasise is I do not believe this would have had any material effect.

MR HOON: I believe, and I still believe, that it would have been wrong to volunteer his name without having that confidence.

MR HOON: Well, that does not surprise me. I have not counted them but it was something that was firmly in my mind.

MR HOON: I said that on the last occasion.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes, please, if I may. Yes, I have it. Thank you.

MR HOON: That is what I said, certainly.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: In a private letter to the Chairman of the Governors, yes.

MR HOON: I am fairly familiar with it.

MR HOON: Yes. Yes.

MR HOON: I think writing a letter in confidence to the Chairman of the BBC, having taken some trouble to ensure that it was only seen by Mr Davies, is protecting his anonymity, yes.

MR HOON: There had been some considerable discussions, over a number of days, about the best way to identify whether or not, first of all, Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's primary source, and whether the BBC would acknowledge that fact.

MR HOON: Well, I think we had had a number of discussions. I had certainly had them over the weekend with Alastair Campbell. I had discussed it, again, with him on the Monday evening. Although I was not present at the meeting on Tuesday that took place in the Cabinet Office, I assume that it was discussed there as well because on the Wednesday morning, as I have just given evidence, I had a message from Jonathan Powell, which I took to be on behalf of the Prime Minister, saying that it was now appropriate, as far as they were concerned, that I could privately mention to Gavyn Davies that the person who had come forward was, in fact, Dr Kelly.

MR HOON: I could see no reason why, in a confidential letter sent to the Chairman of the BBC, that this would result in Dr Kelly's name being widely known. Indeed, having looked at the evidence, I do not think it did.

MR HOON: Well, there were personnel procedures. As I indicated to the Inquiry before, it was my judgment that those were best left in the hands of those responsible, ultimately the Permanent Secretary. He delegated the responsibility of interviewing Dr Kelly to the personnel director, Richard Hatfield. I have read his evidence. It confirms it is consistent with what I was told at the time. He looked at this matter, first of all, on the basis of whether or not there was a disciplinary issue. Having decided that there was not, he then conducted a further interview with Dr Kelly. As I understand it, that is consistent with Ministry of Defence personnel procedures.

MR HOON: I did not name Dr Kelly other than in a private letter to --

MR HOON: Well, I think that is not the fairest way of putting this issue. The issue is whether the procedures were followed. The procedures, as I have indicated, were followed. Since I did not name Dr Kelly other than in relation to the letter that I wrote privately to Gavyn Davies, I am not sure where your question takes us.

MR HOON: Well, you have put that point to a number of witnesses; they have all denied it; and I deny it.

MR HOON: Not by me.

MR HOON: No.

MR HOON: I apologise for interrupting you. But the suggestion you are making is there is some evidence that I leaked it. Perhaps you would indicate where it is so that I can comment on it.

MR HOON: That is right, yes.

MR HOON: Well, first of all, the knowledge of his name was limited to a very small number of people within the Ministry of Defence. I gave evidence on the last occasion that I was not told of his name until the Friday evening in a conversation with the Permanent Secretary. I did not tell my own special adviser until Wednesday 9th July. He learned about it from a news bulletin the previous evening. My principal private secretary did not tell other members of the office of what had occurred. My office removed all identifying details from the copy of Dr Kelly's letter faxed to my constituency office on Friday 4th July because I did not have a secure line in my constituency office. Before we sent the private letter to Gavyn Davies we assured there was a fax line immediately available to him, again to ensure the letter did not fall into other hands. The press statement did not contain details about the name of Dr Kelly. Despite efforts by a number of journalists to require the press office to identify him by name, that was resisted. A whole series of steps were taken to protect Dr Kelly's anonymity.

MR HOON: Could you give me the date, it assists me in finding the --

MR HOON: Thank you. Yes. I have it there, yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: It is obviously a limited class. Whether it is "pretty limited" I think depends on how much information you have at the time about Dr Kelly. It seems to me clear that those journalists who had had contact with Dr Kelly would have thought that this was referring to him. Those journalists who had not had contact with Dr Kelly, I doubt this would have assisted them.

MR HOON: Yes, it was.

MR HOON: I have no doubt that journalists throughout this period were trying to identify who was the source of Andrew Gilligan when he had his conversations, yes.

MR HOON: I did not consider that it would alert journalists in the sense you are suggesting. It certainly inevitably meant that their interest in this matter would be heightened, yes.

MR HOON: I have just answered your question. I recognise that the issuing of a statement was likely to lead to journalists wanting even more than they had previously to identify Andrew Gilligan's source. But there is clear evidence that journalists were already looking for Andrew Gilligan's source. I accept that this was bound to increase their enthusiasm for making that identification.

MR HOON: I became aware afterwards, yes.

MR HOON: I think I have it, actually -- I have a record of the Lobby.

MR HOON: Well, in any event, I am absolutely clear that I had no contact with anyone who was responsible for giving that briefing before it took place.

MR HOON: No, it is not; and indeed I do not believe that there is the slightest shred of evidence for that assertion.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: He actually said for a "number", but yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: (Pause). I cannot actually see that, but I will take your word for it.

MR HOON: I do follow.

MR HOON: I cannot see it at the moment, but I will take that from you.

MR HOON: Perhaps you could refer me to specifically that part of it.

MR HOON: Could you give me the date of that?

MR HOON: The morning Lobby briefing?

MR HOON: Sorry, that is where my confusion arises.

MR HOON: Hmm. There are two Lobby briefings in the course of each day and I was looking at the first one.

MR HOON: Yes, I do. Thank you.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: Sorry, this is what was confusing me. This was a question put to him. This was: "Asked why..."

MR HOON: Asked if he was paid by the FCO, the PMOS declined to answer the question on the grounds that he did not want to do anything which might identify who the person was.

MR HOON: I do follow.

MR HOON: I am somewhat puzzled as to why I am being asked questions about what someone else said in relation to a briefing I had no part in and which I could not reasonably have anticipated was going to be given in this way.

MR HOON: That is exactly my position, my Lord.

MR HOON: Learned counsel is suggesting there was some sort of a conspiracy right across Government for all these people to be involved in giving out small parts of information which he has concluded provided a picture. But there is just no evidence of that, my Lord. Certainly as far as I am concerned there was no such conspiracy.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Not only was I not aware of it, I would be extremely surprised, not only in the light of the evidence which your Lordship has heard but also what I knew of what was going on elsewhere in Government, if that is a possible argument that any reasonable person could make.

MR HOON: That is a very difficult question to answer precisely. I am sure that as and when issues arise -- bear in mind that journalists who attend these Lobby briefings are trying to catch out the briefers on a range of issues and will ask all sorts of questions, some of which may be anticipated given the news of the day, some of which may not. So I think strictly the answer to your question is that by and large it would not always be possible for, on every occasion, the briefers to consult with the Department. They would simply have no notice of the questions that were coming up.

MR HOON: Yes, it was.

MR HOON: It was without my knowledge in any shape or form, yes.

MR HOON: That is absolutely right. I did not actually see it at all.

MR HOON: That is right.

MR HOON: One aspect of what was in the Q and A document, yes.

MR HOON: Yes, I do.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: So far as I am aware, yes.

MR HOON: I do not think I have actually, no.

MR HOON: I do not think I have said that they were in my office.

MR HOON: That is not the same thing.

MR HOON: Yes, I read her evidence very carefully.

MR HOON: I think, with the greatest respect, that is a very bad point. I cannot anticipate what Ms Teare had with her at the time. I gave you the evidence to the best of my knowledge and recollection. If I may say so, I thought that you seriously misled Pam Teare as to the facts before the Inquiry.

MR HOON: You put to Pam Teare -- this is the point -- I think it is important. You put to Pam Teare that there was evidence in the Inquiry that there was a discussion about the Q and A. In fact, I have not been able to find any such evidence. I think you are probably referring to what Mr Richard Taylor said.

MR HOON: Well, Richard Taylor said categorically that there was no such discussion.

MR HOON: I can give you the quotation.

MR HOON: Well, it is at page 81 of Mr Taylor's evidence, my Lord. He said: "I would not call it a discussion of the Q and A material."

MR HOON: My Lord, I only have my notes. I do not have the full --

MR HOON: Can you remind me which line you are at?

MR HOON: What you have put to Ms Teare that I was complaining about, you put to her that we have some evidence to suggest that the Secretary of State saw the Q and A document. That was simply not right. There is no such evidence.

MR HOON: No, no, I am quoting you directly, Mr Gompertz.

MR HOON: But I think, Mr Gompertz, if I may explain: you are not properly understanding the way in which a Q and A document works. A Q and A document is prepared for the use of press officers. It is not something that comes to my office. It is based on decisions that are taken by the Department as a whole as a guidance for press officers when they are answering questions put to them by journalists. If I may give you an example: at around this time we were taking a decision on which particular training aircraft should be purchased for the Royal Air Force. Eventually a decision was taken on which aircraft we would choose. That would have been, I am sure -- I have never seen it, but I am sure that would have been incorporated into a question and answer document, but I would not have needed to see the answer to the question which I am sure was likely to be the first question: which training aircraft has the Ministry of Defence decided to purchase? It would have then given the answer. But I would not have needed to see that because in fact it was simply reflecting decisions previously taken by the Ministry of Defence, in exactly the same way that I take it that this question and answer document was reflecting the views taken in the Department.

MR HOON: Yes, I have.

MR HOON: Well, the Q and A had been prepared the night before.

MR HOON: Therefore I played no part in its preparation.

MR HOON: I was asked by the Permanent Secretary whether I confirmed the document that had been prepared the night before, as far as one small aspect of it was concerned, which was the decision to confirm Dr Kelly's name if a journalist got it right, and I agreed to that. But that was the only issue that was raised with me by either the Permanent Secretary or indeed in the subsequent press briefing meeting.

MR HOON: Not until I saw the Q and A document much later, no.

MR HOON: Well, with the benefit of hindsight I can see that the answers to some of those questions might have assisted journalists in that process, yes.

MR HOON: Well, I have made clear on more than one occasion that this is a routine process entered into for the benefit of press officers answering questions put to them by journalists. It has never been my practice to go through the Q and As which I am sure are routinely prepared in relation to a whole range of subjects in the Ministry of Defence.

MR HOON: Yes, I did.

MR HOON: I am confident that I called him.

MR HOON: I had seen a story in that morning's Times, written by Tom Baldwin, which seemed to indicate some greater knowledge of the identity of Andrew Gilligan's primary source than, for example, I had been able to glean from any evidence that Andrew Gilligan had given before the Foreign Affairs Committee. So it seemed to me that Tom Baldwin had some information that was not readily available otherwise.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: Well, I cannot strictly answer that question but, as I indicated on the last occasion, we had a conversation about the process that I think I have already described to the Inquiry today; a process whereby initially there was a consideration of whether or not there were any disciplinary questions that Dr Kelly might face, followed by a recognition that having come forward voluntarily, apparently cooperating, that the matter could be dealt with in a different light. And I believe what I told the Inquiry on the last occasion, and I stand by, is that that description might have led Mr Campbell to see this in terms of, journalistic shorthand, a plea bargain.

MR HOON: Well, I have seen those words.

MR HOON: No, I do not. I indicated to the Inquiry on the last occasion that I recognised them as journalistic shorthand for rather a long explanation that I had given to Alastair about what had, by then, taken place.

MR HOON: He did.

MR HOON: I am well aware of it.

MR HOON: As I indicated on the last occasion, Dr Kelly was coming forward, he volunteered, he appeared to be cooperating. That -- perhaps you would be best putting these matters to Mr Campbell, but that is an aspect, at any rate, of what happens where there is a plea bargain, someone cooperates with the authorities.

MR HOON: No, there is not; and I was at great pains to emphasise that there was no bargain; and indeed when you put that I think to Mr Hatfield, he said there was no bargain. Nothing followed from this conversation at all. There is no evidence at all anywhere that anyone entered into any kind of a bargain with Dr Kelly.

MR HOON: Well, to the best of my recollection, on the Saturday morning I was describing to him -- I was relaying to him second-hand conversations because I was describing to him what I had been told by the Permanent Secretary.

MR HOON: Sorry, I do not follow that.

MR HOON: I was not.

MR HOON: Well, I think I have explained my understanding of this exchange. I took Alastair Campbell through what had occurred up until then. I explained that Dr Kelly -- I am not even sure, to be quite -- I am pretty confident I did not actually say it was Dr Kelly, I said "the official" or something of the kind. I have indicated previously, as far as I am concerned that that was his summary of the past. I do not understand that this was anything that was to be acted on for the future. Indeed, there is no evidence that anyone so acted.

MR HOON: When I received a request from the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I eventually concluded, with the benefit of the advice that I had received, that, yes, he should give evidence once his name was in the public domain, yes.

MR HOON: I think it would assist everyone. I think it would have assisted --

MR HOON: I am including the Government in "everyone".

MR HOON: The Government would have benefited; the BBC would have benefited; and I think, most importantly, the public would have benefited. And the point that I made right at the outset of my original evidence was that the difficulty with Andrew Gilligan's story was that we were not in a position to assess the nature, quality, status of his source. So that ultimately it was of benefit to everyone that he should give evidence once he had been identified.

MR HOON: Perhaps I need to look at his diary in order to be sure about what you are saying. I have summarised, I think on more than one occasion, and I do not wish to try your patience by repeating it, but these were Alastair Campbell's words, they were not my words; and the best I can do is to say that they were a summary of the description of the process that by then I was aware had taken place.

MR HOON: Eventually, yes.

MR HOON: With my agreement.

MR HOON: I think that is a very simplistic description of a rather detailed process that took place. The advice that came from Kevin Tebbit relating to both requests, made by both Chairmen of both Committees, was, first of all, that it might be possible, in Kevin's view, that Dr Kelly should give evidence to the ISC in public. That was his thought. But by the time that I had received the advice, and by the time that I came to consider the advice, that option had already been withdrawn because it was judged inappropriate for the Government to suggest that the ISC should meet in public. In any event I doubted that the Chairman of the ISC would agree to that, since one of the main purposes of the ISC is to be able to hear matters in confidence. So once that had been withdrawn, that meant, in effect, that the only opportunity for Dr Kelly to give evidence was either in a closed session with the ISC, which I simply did not judge would be acceptable to my Parliamentary colleagues, or that he should give evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in public. And given that the Foreign Affairs Committee had made that request, and given that I recognised that this would be a very significant Parliamentary and public row if I refused it, it seemed to me right that I should accept the request made to me by the Chairman of the FAC.

MR HOON: I would not put it that way. Civil servants give advice to Ministers, it is not always accepted.

MR HOON: It is part of the process of taking decisions. "Overrule" is -- perhaps it might be good for a headline but it does not describe the process that takes place in Government. No-one was suggesting Kevin Tebbit's advice was definitive. I considered it and I decided to take a different course.

MR HOON: I am certainly saying that was at the forefront of my mind, yes. Here is a man who has been asked to appear before two Parliamentary Committees to give evidence. It seemed to me right that that should be constrained to the issues that the inquiries were concerned with.

MR HOON: (Pause). I can, from experience -- I recognise that giving evidence in public is always more demanding than giving evidence in private.

MR HOON: Well, that is a feature of modern Parliamentary proceedings.

MR HOON: Again, I can see that televising a Parliamentary proceeding adds to the pressure.

MR HOON: Well, I was never, ever contemplating that; and I think -- I have seen your questioning before to previous witnesses on this subject; and again you are looking at a draft, a draft that came up from the Department, not anything that I ever prepared or acted upon. In fact, it would be fairer if you recognised that I changed that draft significantly.

MR HOON: Yes, I have.

MR HOON: They would have been produced in the Department for my consideration.

MR HOON: I obviously saw the drafts after they came to me, before I sent them to the persons they were addressed to; and in that process I made significant changes to the drafts in order to better reflect what I thought should occur.

MR HOON: Well, drafts are routinely prepared elsewhere --

MR HOON: Sorry let me finish. Drafts are routinely prepared elsewhere in the Department. They would come up to my office. I would look at the drafts. If I accepted the draft, I would sign it and send it off. If I wanted to make changes, I would make changes; and that would be the letter that I agreed to that was then sent. This was precisely the process that occurred in relation to these drafts. The drafts were prepared elsewhere in the Ministry of Defence by officials. They were for me to consider. I considered them. I judged that it was necessary to make changes and I made changes; and those are the letters that I sent.

MR HOON: The idea of the ISC hearing taking place in public was not mine, no. I think it is clear from the evidence that it was Sir Kevin Tebbit's, but it was not an idea that was -- by the time that I came to send the letter to Ann Taylor, who is the Chairman of the ISC, it was not an option that was still in play; because by then my office had received advice this was not an appropriate course of action. In any event, even if I had not received that advice I, from experience of the ISC, doubted whether they would meet in public.

MR HOON: Yes, I have.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Well, if I may say so in the first place, if I could refer you back to MoD/1/73 and the request that came in from Donald Anderson. He said he was making the request for Dr Kelly to appear on questions: directly relevant to the Committee's report published earlier this week, arising from the MoD statement of 9th July. Therefore the qualification here entirely reflects the request that I had received from Donald Anderson.

MR HOON: Well, I think I then went on -- if you compare it to the original draft, this was something that I added. I indicated: "... Dr Kelly will have appeared earlier the same day before the ISC [which was our understanding at the time]. I hope that you will bear this in mind and not detain him for longer than about the same period of time indicated by the ISC. As he is not used to this degree of public exposure, Dr Kelly has asked if he could be accompanied by a colleague." Again, something I added in out of concern for Dr Kelly's welfare.

MR HOON: It was to ensure that the questions put to Dr Kelly were consistent with the requests that had been made by the Chairman of the Committee, which is to pursue matters relevant to their previously published report.

MR HOON: I knew from the outset, for example, that Dr Kelly had some distinctive views about whether Saddam Hussein's regime was still manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. He judged there was only a 35 per cent likelihood that was the case. That was a distinctive view that had been recognised by a colleague, which prompted him to come forward in the first place. Yes, I was aware that his views were not entirely consistent with those that, for example, had appeared in the dossier that had been published in September.

MR HOON: On the contrary, the issue about the extent to which Dr Kelly was free to speak his mind had been considered. I have to say I did not know this at the time, but it had been considered in the preparation that he was given for his appearance before the Committee. And he was -- having read it, he was told that he would be free to speak his mind.

MR HOON: He said: "I share your clear understanding of the scope and duration of the questioning..." Yes. I have to say that chairmen of Select Committees do not always agree to requests made by Secretaries of State in these circumstances, nor would I necessarily expect them to. But I think it was -- as I indicated to the Inquiry earlier, the fact he used the words "I share" I think indicated his entire acceptance that I was asking for a proper definition of the areas on which Dr Kelly should give evidence.

MR HOON: I am aware of those rules, yes; and I was aware at the time.

MR HOON: I did not go through them in detail but I understand the essential principle underlying them, yes.

MR HOON: Yes, of course, and that does happen in certain circumstances.

MR HOON: Because those circumstances normally relate to security considerations. They normally turn upon evidence, particularly as far as the Defence Select Committee is concerned, where essentially we are briefing Members of Parliament on matters that are sensitive on security grounds.

MR HOON: I can certainly see that that is a possibility; but I did not judge that these were matters of discipline, at this stage.

MR HOON: Well, I think that is pitching it rather high. Essentially, the point was that if new information arose it could be gone back to, but, I mean, that would be a -- that would be the case in any disciplinary proceedings. Essentially the disciplinary proceedings had been brought to a close; and that was done actually quite early on in these events, in the middle of the hearing on 4th July.

MR HOON: I certainly think that every reasonable step was taken to ensure that Dr Kelly was properly supported, yes.

MR HOON: The Ministry of Defence did not release his name.

MR HOON: Well, that is not quite the same as releasing it, is it?

MR HOON: Again, there was no strategy; but I was well aware that Dr Kelly anticipated that his name would become public. It was something that he had understood. It had been explained to him on the Friday; it was something that, as I understand it, was explained to him again on the Monday. Indeed, on the Monday a draft press statement was shown to him. On the Tuesday, a press statement was read over to him, and I think Richard Hatfield's evidence is "paragraph by paragraph". And he consented to that detail paragraph by paragraph. So there cannot be any doubt that on the Tuesday evening Dr Kelly was well aware that there was every likelihood of his name becoming public, which, in fact, is what happened through the assiduous efforts of journalists.

MR HOON: I think the key time for all of these events is the point at which the press statement was issued. At that point great efforts were made to ensure that Dr Kelly was aware what was likely to follow, which was that his name would be revealed publicly. As a result of the efforts made by journalists, something that he accepted on the Friday, he accepted again on the Monday and something that he was specifically taken through on the Tuesday afternoon; something which he himself acknowledged would happen --

MR HOON: No.

MR HOON: Not in the context of someone who had been entirely accepting of the fact that his name would become public, who had had it explained to him repeatedly that it was highly likely that his name would become public, who was taken through the press statement paragraph by paragraph, who had advice from the press office of the consequences, as happened, once journalists became aware of his name; who himself acknowledged the fact that it was likely his name would become public quite soon.

MR HOON: I do not think I saw that at the time, but I have seen it since.

MR HOON: And that is consistent with the approach that the Ministry of Defence took. The Ministry of Defence did not reveal his name. They confirmed it once a journalist had correctly identified it.

MR HOON: Well, he was taken through the press statement carefully; warnings were given by a press officer as to the consequences; it was suggested that he should take appropriate action; and he made it quite clear that he was well aware that his name would come into the public domain, in his words "quite soon". Those were words that he used to Mrs Kelly, that she gave in her evidence as they sat and watched what I take to be the 7 o'clock Channel 4 bulletin. What she said was: I knew then he was aware that his name would be in the public domain quite soon. So he recognised that fact on the Tuesday evening.

MR HOON: Efforts were made to warn him both on the Tuesday evening when the press statement was made and indeed on the Wednesday evening after the name had been confirmed, yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Well, it indicates that the day before he had been warned of what was likely to follow, which is that once the press statement had been issued this would, I think I used the word earlier, heighten journalists' interest in it. It is also clear that he received a call at around that time, around the time he was visited by Nick Rufford, I assume indicating again that he should have regard to his own position as far as the journalists were concerned. So he was warned categorically, as I understand it, both on the day before when the press notice was issued and, indeed, again after it had been confirmed.

MR HOON: Hmm -- I do not think that is --

MR HOON: I do not think your presumption is quite right, if you will forgive me for saying so.

MR HOON: Because Mrs Kelly said in her evidence that: the MoD press office had just rung to say we ought to leave the house and quickly so we could not be followed by the press. That call occurred, in my view, at around the time or shortly after that Nick Rufford had visited, quite a long time before Dr Kelly himself called Kate Wilson.

MR HOON: It is the evidence of Mrs Kelly.

MR HOON: Well, I think Mrs Wilson was referring to a different call.

MR HOON: I believe that the right steps were taken, both by those concerned with Dr Kelly's welfare, directly Mr Wells, who as line manager had that responsibility, as well as by the press office informing him at appropriate stages of what was to take place.

MR HOON: And how would that have been achieved?

MR HOON: I am not at all sure that that makes sense, if you forgive me for saying so.

MR HOON: I understand the question, but I do not understand why the question is being put because it does not seem to be based on anything particularly sensible by way of explanation.

MR HOON: Well, because there are a number of things in that question that I disagree with. There was no objective of putting Dr Kelly's name into the public domain. That was not our objective. The question of the dossier and Dr Kelly's involvement in that was set out by him in his letter, which I read very carefully. A carefully drafted letter, long, detailed, in which he indicated his role in the preparation of the dossier, which I think, to the best of my recollection, was to do with the historical parts of the explanation of Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction. It was a very clear account of his involvement. As I say, I am puzzled as to why you think publishing successive drafts would have helped the Government's processes.

MR HOON: Thank you very much.

MR HOON: Thank you.

MR HOON: Yes -- when you say as part of my ministerial briefing, I would receive them routinely.

MR HOON: I confess I never checked the dates, but I assume so, yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes. Yes, I think this is public knowledge.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: That fits. I had been in the United States for all of the previous week representing the Government at the commemoration of the September 11th events at the Pentagon.

MR HOON: No, it did not.

MR HOON: No.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: I cannot remember, I am sorry.

MR HOON: I am sorry it does not, because I might watch Question Time in my office.

MR HOON: I am sorry, I do not wish to be unhelpful but I simply do not know.

MR HOON: As does my office in the Ministry of Defence.

MR HOON: I would, but again I do not want to give you any -- make any suggestion that because I would follow it closely I was necessarily watching it, because I simply do not recall what I was doing that particular day at that time.

MR HOON: I was, yes.

MR HOON: Thank you.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Well, I would just emphasise the qualification which the Prime Minister made at the outset where he said "which disagreed with its inclusion in the dossier".

MR HOON: I think that is a literal interpretation of those words, yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes, I was. Yes.

MR HOON: I certainly read the conclusions on 7th July, yes.

MR HOON: Yes, I have that.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: Yes, I do.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: It does not appear to have its accompanying --

MR HOON: It is there. It only seems to be part of the document, as I recall it, but I will --

MR HOON: I have that here. I am simply indicating to you that it is not the whole document.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes, I did.

MR HOON: When you say I would have known, I saw the name at the foot of the page. I did not know Dr Jones.

MR HOON: I think so, yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: I have to say that I probably was not in a position to make that judgment; but for the sake of accuracy, I took this, in fact, to be exactly what you have just described. This was an exchange in relation to some rather detailed points about the language that should be used in the dossier. I think we went through this on the last occasion that I gave evidence. I took this to be a series of very technical but equally precise suggestions as to the precise language that should be used in the dossier. I did not take it in any other way.

MR HOON: I agree; and indeed I would not have wanted to do anything to discourage that kind of debate amongst experts knowledgeable about their subject.

MR HOON: I cannot give evidence about the date on which it was finalised; but I accept that it was close to the date of publication.

MR HOON: That is certainly a possible interpretation.

MR HOON: No, I was not.

MR HOON: Well, I accept that it was close to the date of publication.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: That is right. In fact, I think it is -- when I read this originally I assumed that -- actually it is two points repeated in the context both of the Prime Minister's foreword, the executive summary, and indeed the substance of the dossier. So it is actually the same points highlighted in relation to different stages of the dossier.

MR HOON: Sorry, I do not understand your question.

MR HOON: Well, I recall at the time having some discussion in the Ministry of Defence about the kinds of weapons that could be deployable within 45 minutes; and I think the assumption was made that they would be, for example, chemical shells, which were clearly capable of being deployed, as I think Mr Scarlett has indicated to the Inquiry, in a time even less than 45 minutes; I think he suggested 20 minutes.

MR HOON: I was certainly aware that that was one suggestion, yes.

MR HOON: I recall asking what kind of weapons would be deployable within 45 minutes; and the answer is the answer that I have just given to you.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: I think on an issue of this importance it would not simply have been the Ministry of Defence that was solely responsible. There would have been an effort across Government.

MR HOON: I can recall, yes.

MR HOON: I do not know.

MR HOON: I have spent many years trying to persuade newspapers and journalists to correct their stories. I have to say it is an extraordinarily time consuming and generally frustrating process.

MR HOON: What I am suggesting is that I was not aware of whether any consideration was given to such a correction. All that I do know from my experience is that, generally speaking, newspapers are resistant to corrections. That judgment may have been made by others as well.

MR HOON: Well, I was not horrified. I recognised that journalists occasionally write things that are more dramatic than the material upon which it is based.

MR HOON: I think that is a question you would have to put to the journalists and the editors responsible.

MR HOON: Well, as I say, my experience of trying to persuade newspapers to correct false impressions is one that is not full of success.

MR HOON: No, I do not.

MR HOON: Well, I apologise for repeating the same answer, but you are putting the question in another way. I have tried on many, many occasions to persuade journalists and newspapers to correct stories. They do not like to do so.

MR HOON: Well, I do not accept that.

MR HOON: I am certainly suggesting that it was an exaggeration, but it is not unusual for newspapers to exaggerate.

MR HOON: Well, I do not have it to hand; and I do not know whether it was made clear.

MR HOON: I certainly saw the summary at around the time it was published, I think a few weeks before the dossier.

MR HOON: Sorry, my apologies, you are talking about the most recent report?

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: They certainly indicate some concern about the language used in the draft dossier that was then being considered; and they make some specific suggestions for particular amendments, which is how I read it.

MR HOON: Well, I was not suggesting that they amounted to very little. I was suggesting that they were, I think, my Lord, I referred to them as technical amendments when I gave evidence previously. They were not challenging the inclusion in the dossier of the 45 minute point, which is the qualification that I referred you to earlier. What they were doing was, as you I think fairly said, they were changing the emphasis in the language of that particular piece of intelligence. That was properly then considered by those responsible for making these assessments and these particular suggestions were not incorporated, as I understand it; something that I asked about -- I asked about the status of these amendments, what had happened to them and why in fact they had not been included.

MR HOON: I think that is fair, yes.

MR HOON: What I did was in fact paraphrase the details contained here. I indicated to the ISC that people in the DIS had made proposals for amendments. I indicated to the ISC that the amendments suggested that the language should be tightened up in places. I outlined the fact that there was a dispute in these areas; and I specifically mentioned that the dispute was about whether the intelligence "showed" or "indicated" particular conclusions. I went on to explain to the ISC that this had been resolved within DIS; and by the then Chief of Defence Intelligence and by his deputy. I set out at each stage to the ISC precisely the process that had been gone through.

MR HOON: I think there were a number of reasons for that. First of all, this was something, as I understood it, that had been resolved almost immediately; that on the 19th and the 20th these issues had been discussed in DIS, that the particular amendment had been considered and, as far as I was concerned, had been dealt with within the system. Secondly, that I felt that if these particular documents were published at the time, that there was a clear risk that they would be taken out of context, that they would not be seen as being the result of a process that had been resolved in DIS but they would be seen as something more dramatic which, in fact, of course, when this matter was considered by the Inquiry, was precisely what happened. I had also been told to resist calls from the ISC to disclose the identities of the individuals concerned. And, indeed, the speaking note that was attached to the original advice did not specifically say that I should reveal that these amendments had been made in writing. So I felt that this was an entirely coherent account of what had taken place, which I set before the ISC.

MR HOON: I understood, by the time that I gave evidence to the ISC, which, I think, was 22nd July, so some, what -- some nine months later, I understood -- I was told that the matter had been resolved within DIS. I think that was the expression that I used earlier, that there was obviously a process within DIS for considering what I took to be straightforward suggestions for amendments of a linguistic kind that were addressed, either on the 19th in relation to Dr Jones or the 20th in relation to the other suggestions. I -- as far as I was aware, no complaint had been made by either of the individuals concerned, I think, until Dr Jones wrote again, I think to the Foreign Secretary on the 8th July. So from 19th September until 8th July, as far as I was aware, Dr Jones had made no further comment or complaint about the amendments that he put forward, which seemed to me to confirm that these had been issues resolved within DIS.

MR HOON: I think later I was, yes.

MR HOON: I would have to check.

MR HOON: I was certainly aware later that he had written. Whether I was aware on the 22nd, I would have to check.

MR HOON: I think -- well, I -- I can recall some details from the letter. He wrote, I think, because he was concerned about something that the Foreign Secretary had said in evidence to the FAC.

MR HOON: That is right, yes. But could I emphasise that when I looked at these two memos they did not seem to me, and I have looked at them again since, they did not seem to me to be letters of complaint. They seemed to be amendments, detailed amendments, suggested by two individuals, to the wording of DIS. They were detailed amendments. Both of them conceded they had not necessarily seen all of the intelligence. Both of them were of a very technical kind. And I was assured that in relation to both of them the matters had been resolved within DIS.

MR HOON: Well, I am just checking on his advice. (Pause). I am -- I cannot call that to mind at this stage. I do not see it in the advice; but if anything turns upon it I am perfectly willing to concede that I might well have done. But I looked at these amendments as being a contribution to a debate that was taking place in the Intelligence Service. I was told that that had been resolved within the Intelligence Service. On the face of it these did not look, to me, like letters of complaint. If I thought that they had have done, I might have viewed them in a different light.

MR HOON: Yes. To Gavyn Davies.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: (Pause). I mean, I do not precisely know, but --

MR HOON: I would imagine that given the sensitivities of these issues that perhaps Downing Street as well had a hand in making suggestions, but I could not say accurately who precisely drafted it.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Sorry, the name should be given to me or?

MR HOON: I was not aware of that, no.

MR HOON: No, I cannot. I think I gave evidence on the last occasion about the various discussions that were taking place. The meeting in Downing Street, I think, earlier in the morning had decided in fact to adopt a completely different approach by putting the matter to the ISC; and this approach was one that, in a sense, was used once it had been decided that the ISC could not be approached, I think the Chairman of the ISC had some reservations about publicising documents that had been passed to her.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: That was the account that Dr Kelly had given to us.

MR HOON: I do not believe this literally says that he was Mr Gilligan's source.

MR HOON: I am not sure that was necessarily the intention, but -- I am not actually sure either that that was the conclusion that was drawn.

MR HOON: I follow the point but I am not sure that is how I saw it at the time. The real point about Mr Gilligan's broadcast was that he was accusing the Government of exaggerating the material in the dossier, not that it particularly turned on whether that was a single source or not. I accept that is a subsidiary issue but I would not have regarded that as being the most important part of it. In fact, I seem to recall that when the Armed Forces Minister appeared on the radio at around the same time, he confirmed that it was based on a single source.

MR HOON: Well, given that I --

MR HOON: Mr Gilligan says that?

MR HOON: There are a lot of people who have connection to intelligence matters without being intelligence sources.

MR HOON: This is Dr Kelly rather than Andrew Gilligan?

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: Hmm.

MR HOON: Well, I do not accept that. We relied in good faith on what Dr Kelly had told us. He set it out in a letter. By then he had been interviewed twice, and it was on the basis of what he was telling us. The reason for going public, as you put it, at this stage, are for the reasons I have given on a number of occasions already. Many, many days had elapsed since Dr Kelly first approached Bryan Wells to say that he had had this unauthorised contact with Andrew Gilligan. I and the Government were concerned that we would be accused otherwise of covering up this fact if it then came out.

MR HOON: I regarded it as private. I too have conducted some research about how that came forward, because the BBC invited me to do so. A Guardian story, for example, the next day says, "According to BBC sources Geoff Hoon offered to tell Gavyn Davies the name of the MoD official". Pam Teare also referred to the fact that a BBC online journalist contacted the MoD press office on the evening of the 8th and asked for a copy of "Geoff Hoon's letter to Gavyn Davies". So I am afraid it is equally possible that it may have been BBC sources that made known --

MR HOON: -- I have not quite finished yet -- that made known the fact that a letter had been written.

MR HOON: I was very surprised by that point.

MR HOON: Well, because I did not believe that I had released it to the press; and I was very, very puzzled as to why he had included that in his letter.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Not particularly. If anything turns upon it, I associated calling Alastair with the story in The Times because that seemed to me to be something that I would raise with Alastair Campbell, given his responsibilities for media issues. So that is how I recollected the conversation.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: That was not my thinking, no.

MR HOON: On the Monday evening, I think in one of the conversations Alastair did suggest that we might brief a journalist, but I was -- I resisted that.

MR HOON: I think that was the suggestion, yes.

MR HOON: Sorry?

MR HOON: Sorry, I may be being slow today, I do not quite understand what you mean by that.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: Well, I resisted the idea that the briefing should take place, so I do not recall him adding to that.

MR HOON: I think given the discussion was whether or not we should do this and I said we should not, I really do not recall anything further.

MR HOON: Well, I was not present at the meeting.

MR HOON: I was aware that that was an approach that had been decided on at the meeting.

MR HOON: I think probably when Kevin Tebbit came back to the Department having finished that process; but I --

MR HOON: There was some obvious confusion that afternoon, because obviously what had been decided at the meeting that morning could not be carried through because --

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: I agreed to it.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: That is right.

MR HOON: The Q and A material?

MR HOON: I think we are probably going round the same course again. I did not see the Q and A material. I would not expect routinely to see it. The only aspect that was specifically raised with me was the question of whether or not MoD press officers should confirm the name of Dr Kelly if it was put to them.

MR HOON: I recall her evidence. I have read her evidence but it did not happen in that --

MR HOON: It did not happen in the meeting. I have given an account of the meeting. The only issue that I now know was in the Q and A that was raised was the question of confirmation. It was raised towards the end of what was a very short meeting; and indeed I think that is precisely how Richard Taylor in his evidence describes it. I have read Richard Taylor's evidence. I do not disagree with it.

MR HOON: I did not. But --

MR HOON: Well, because I believed that proper steps had been taken to apprise Dr Kelly of the consequences of, particularly, the press statement being issued on the Tuesday; and indeed felt that that was more than sufficient to make him aware of what was possibly going to follow.

MR HOON: There is clearly a difference; but the assumption throughout, which Dr Kelly had accepted, was that at some stage his name would come out; and of course it did come out, and it came out as a result of various investigations by journalists who then put the name to the MoD press office.

MR HOON: Again, I think that is to misunderstand the nature of the Q and A. It was not deployed in the sense that your question implies. It was simply background advice for press officers to deal with anticipated questions being put by journalists.

MR HOON: No, I do not. I regret that perhaps Dr Kelly's name was bandied about amongst journalists in the way that it was, but I do not believe, given the way in which journalists operate, that there was much alternative. I do not see how it could have been the case that journalists determined to identify Dr Kelly could have been prevented from doing so.

MR HOON: First of all, his consent had not been sought. And we do not know whether he would have consented to that process. Secondly, we were still, at that stage, as I have said repeatedly, unsure as to whether Dr Kelly was or was not Andrew Gilligan's single source.

MR HOON: Therefore, it did not seem to me necessarily appropriate, at that point, to volunteer his name.

MR HOON: Well, it would have met that particular complaint. Then perhaps if that course had been followed you would be putting to me a different complaint, which is that, for example, Dr Kelly was not given sufficient time to prepare himself; that he was not given sufficient opportunity to consider what course of action he should take. The approach that was taken, particularly on the evening of 8th July, to warn him that the press statement was being made, to give him the opportunity of going through all the details in the press statement and then to apprise him of the likely press interest following the issue of the press statement, at least gave him some time to think about what action he should take in order to protect himself against the enthusiasm of the press for seeking out his identity.

MR HOON: Yes.

MR HOON: I think that is a question that essentially is for the Foreign Affairs Committee. But if, on a proper application of the rules, officials give evidence on behalf of Ministers, which is what I understand to be the position generally speaking, then it is difficult to see why, having already taken evidence on the question of the dossier and its contents, reliability and so on, the Foreign Affairs Committee would need to go back on that in the light of one official having come forward; and I think that the concern there is that -- as I say, I think it is largely a matter for the Foreign Affairs Committee, is to establish whether, in fact, Dr Kelly would have given evidence on behalf of a minister before the Foreign Affairs Committee or whether, as I judged to be the case, he was giving evidence that only he could give evidence about.

MR HOON: Thank you.