The Hutton Inquiry

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Hearing Transcripts

October 13, 2003: Morning

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

October 13, 2003: Afternoon

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

September 25, 2003: Morning

Jeremy Gompertz QC

Counsel for the Kelly family

Jonathan Sumption QC

Counsel for the Government

September 25, 2003: Afternoon

Jonathan Sumption QC

Counsel for the Government

Andrew Caldecott QC

Counsel for the BBC

Heather Rogers QC

Counsel for Andrew Gilligan

James Dingemans QC

Counsel for the Inquiry

Closing statement by Lord Hutton

September 24, 2003: Morning

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

Gavyn Davies

BBC

September 24, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

Nick Rufford

Sunday Times, journalist

Wing Commander John Clark

Ministry of Defence

James Harrison

Ministry of Defence

Professor Keith Hawton

Psychiatrist

September 23, 2003: Morning

Godric Smith

Prime Minister's Press Office

Tom Kelly

Prime Minister's Press Office

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

September 23, 2003: Afternoon

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

Assistant Chief Constable Michael Page

Thames Valley Police

September 22, 2003: Morning

Lee Hughes

Hutton Inquiry Secretariat

Geoffrey Hoon MP

Secretary of State for Defence

September 22, 2003: Afternoon

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

September 18, 2003: Morning

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Pamela Teare

Director of News, MoD

September 18, 2003: Afternoon

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

Pamela Teare

Director of News, MoD

Edward Wilding

Computer Investigator

Professor A J Sammes

Professor of Computer Science and Director of the Centre for Forensic Computing at Cranfield University

September 17, 2003: Morning

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

September 17, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Richard Sambrook

Head of News, BBC

September 16, 2003: Morning

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

DC Graham Coe

Police Officer

Dr Nicholas Hunt

Forensic Pathologist

September 16, 2003: Afternoon

Dr Shuttleworth

Defence, Science & Technology Laboratory

Kate Wilson

Chief Press Officer, MoD

September 15, 2003: Morning

Counsel's opening statement

Tony Cragg

Air Marshal J French

September 15, 2003: Afternoon

Sir Richard Dearlove

Dr Richard Scott

Greg Dyke

September 4, 2003: Morning

Olivia Bosch

Colleague

Leigh Potter

Neighbour

Tom Mangold

Journalist

Richard Taylor

Special Advisor to Secretary of State for Defence

September 3, 2003: Morning

Richard Allan

Toxicologist

Assistant Chief Constable Page

Steven Macdonald

MOD

Dr Jones

September 3, 2003: Afternoon

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Dr Jones

Mr A

MOD

Mr Green

Forensic Biologist

September 2, 2003: Morning

Ruth Absalom

Neighbour

Dr Malcolm Warner

GP

Louise Holmes

Search team

Paul Chapman

Search team

PC Andrew Franklin

PC Martyn Sawyer

Sergeant Geoffrey Webb

September 2, 2003: Afternoon

PC Jonathan Martyn

Vanessa Hunt

Ambulance

David Bartlett

Ambulance

Barney Leith

Baha'i faith

Professor Hawton

Psychiatrist

September 1, 2003: Morning

Mrs Kelly

Family

Sarah Pape

Family

Rachel Kelly

Family

September 1, 2003: Afternoon

Professor Roger Avery

Friend

David Wilkins

Family

August 28, 2003: Morning

Tony Blair MP

Prime Minister

Gavyn Davies

BBC

August 28, 2003: Afternoon

Gavyn Davies

BBC

August 27, 2003: Morning

Geoff Hoon MP

Secretary of State for Defence

August 27, 2003: Afternoon

Wing Commander John Clark

Ministry of Defence

James Harrison

Ministry of Defence

Ann Taylor MP

Chair of Intelligence and Security Committee

August 26, 2003: Morning

Andrew MacKinlay MP

Foreign Affairs Select Committee

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

August 26, 2003: Afternoon

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

Sir David Omand

Cabinet Office

August 21, 2003: Morning

Donald Anderson MP

Foreign Affairs Select Committee

Nick Rufford

Sunday Times, journalist

James Blitz

Financial Times, journalist

August 21, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Norton-Taylor

Guardian, journalist

Peter Beaumont

The Observer, journalist

Tom Baldwin

The Times, journalist

Michael Evans

The Times, journalist

David Broucher

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Lee Hughes

Hutton Inquiry Secretariat

August 20, 2003: Morning

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

August 20, 2003: Afternoon

Godric Smith

Prime Minister's Press Office

Tom Kelly

Prime Minister's Press Office

August 19, 2003: Morning

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

August 19, 2003: Afternoon

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

August 18, 2003: Morning

Pam Teare

Ministry of Defence Press Office

Jonathan Powell

Prime Minister's Office

August 18, 2003: Afternoon

Jonathan Powell

Prime Minister's Office

Sir David Manning

Prime Minister's Office

August 14, 2003: Morning

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

August 14, 2003: Afternoon

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

John Williams

Director of Communications, FCO

August 13, 2003: Morning

Susan Watts

BBC Reporter

Gavin Hewitt

BBC Reporter

August 13, 2003: Afternoon

Gavin Hewitt

BBC Reporter

Richard Sambrook

Head of News, BBC

August 12, 2003: Morning

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

August 12, 2003: Afternoon

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

Susan Watts

BBC Reporter

August 11, 2003: Morning

Terence Taylor

President and Executive Director for the International Institute of Strategic Studies (US)

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

August 11, 2003: Afternoon

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Julian Miller

Chief of the Assessment Staff Cabinet Office.


hutton.softblade.com

MS TEARE: No.

NONE: Is that right?

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm.

LORD HUTTON: Would this be a convenient time? MR LLOYD-JONES: My Lord, could I mention I am almost at the limit of my permitted time.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR LLOYD-JONES: There are a number of other matters I should, with your Lordship's permission, canvass with Ms Teare. I hope it will be of assistance to your Lordship if I did that.

LORD HUTTON: Certainly, by all means. We will proceed after lunch. You would not like to do it now? MR LLOYD-JONES: My Lord, no, if I could do it this afternoon I would be very grateful.

LORD HUTTON: Very well. Thank you very much.

(1.02 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(2.00 pm)
Examined by MR LLOYD-JONES

LORD HUTTON: Yes Mr Lloyd-Jones.

MR LLOYD-JONES: My Lord, thank you. Ms Teare, I think we had reached the afternoon of Tuesday 8th July and the question of your involvement with the Q and A material during the course of the afternoon. What was your contribution to the redrafting of the Q and A material, at that stage?

MS TEARE: Essentially I looked at the material we had and then discussed through with Martin Howard the other information that we might include, the gaps that I had; and I also took out some of the earlier parts of the second draft because they were no longer appropriate.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What was your contribution and what was Mr Howard's contribution to the draft?

MS TEARE: It was largely me suggesting the questions we were likely to be asked and then him providing the factual information.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Could we have on the screen, please, CAB/21/5? We looked at this this morning. This is the draft which you had sent over to the Permanent Secretary's office that morning and you were working on. We see in that draft it was proposed the individual would be told before his name was confirmed. Do you see that?

MS TEARE: (Nods).

MR LLOYD-JONES: That is not in the third and final draft. Can you tell us why not?

MS TEARE: No. I mean, the -- as I say, the different drafts of the Q and A leading up to the final version were very much work in progress documents. They were evolving on the basis of the information that I had at each point in time; and that was why there were some amendments made to them as time progressed. I had discovered that whilst in the Permanent Secretary's office that morning, that Dr Kelly had been forewarned that his name was likely to enter the public domain and accordingly I felt that it was reasonable, therefore, for us to confirm his name if the correct name was put to us, given all the other circumstances of the situation that we had to manage.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did there come a time when Sir Kevin came back from, I think it was Portsmouth?

MS TEARE: That is right, yes.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did he come back to his office?

MS TEARE: On his return from Portsmouth he popped back, briefly, into the office before going to a meeting at No. 10.

MR LLOYD-JONES: You have said that at some point you went back to your office. You are in the Metropole Building, I think?

MS TEARE: That is right.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did there come a time you were summoned back to Sir Kevin's office?

MS TEARE: Yes. At about the same time Sir Kevin went to No. 10, I came back to my own office. Then when he returned from No. 10 I was summoned back to his office, which must have been about 3.30.

MR LLOYD-JONES: When you saw Sir Kevin on your return and his return, what did he say to you?

MS TEARE: He said that the -- we were going to issue a statement that afternoon, and he had a draft with him on his return from No. 10.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did he show you the draft?

MS TEARE: I cannot remember whether it was copied or not. I know that there was a discussion between Martin Howard, Sir Kevin and myself which led to the draft being finalised. But I cannot recall the detail of any changes that we made.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Had it changed since you had last seen it? Had the version which Sir Kevin brought back changed since you had last seen it?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Do you recall in what respect?

MS TEARE: I seem to recall that it was a longer document. It was certainly a different sort of document to the draft that I had produced on the 7th.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Were any further changes then made to the statement in Sir Kevin's office?

MS TEARE: I think there were a couple of changes made, but I am afraid I cannot recall the detail of what they actually were. I cannot remember whether they were -- I do not think they were very major but I cannot recall the actual detail of them.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Do you know what happened to the statement then, once it had been finalised?

MS TEARE: As I understand it, the Permanent Secretary's private secretary e-mailed it to Richard Hatfield, so that he could clear it with Dr Kelly.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Was anything reported to you subsequently about that?

MS TEARE: I remained in the Permanent Secretary's office, and subsequently his private secretary came back and reported that Richard Hatfield had, indeed, read the statement to Dr Kelly and cleared it with him and that Dr Kelly had raised no issues on it.

MR LLOYD-JONES: At that stage, did you have authority to use the Q and A brief?

MS TEARE: No, I did not.

MR LLOYD-JONES: So what did you do about that?

MS TEARE: I said to the Permanent Secretary that, you know: Martin and I have agreed between us a Q and A, you know, I need your approval before it could be used.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did you show it to him?

MS TEARE: I did.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did he read it?

MS TEARE: Yes he did.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What did he say?

MS TEARE: He read it through and gave me approval for it to be deployed.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Was anything said about asking Dr Kelly to approve the Q and A brief?

MS TEARE: No, that was not discussed, nor would I have expected it to be so.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Why do you say that?

MS TEARE: Well, Q and A, as I say -- to prepare Q and A material in support of a statement is standard practice Whitehall-wide. It was essentially factual material, the contents of which I was sure it was accurate because I had agreed it with Martin Howard. As I say, Dr Kelly had also been made aware that his name was likely to enter the public domain.

MR LLOYD-JONES: So what did you do, at that point?

MS TEARE: At that point, I then returned to the press office. On the way I telephoned the Chief Press Officer to inform her that we were issuing a statement and that we had a final version and that she could put in hand preparations for it to be released.

MR LLOYD-JONES: To be released to whom?

MS TEARE: To be released to the media.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What about the Q and A brief, did you do anything in terms of instructing the press office as to how the Q and A brief should be applied?

MS TEARE: No. Whilst I was on the way back to the press office the Chief Press Officer briefed the press office on the content of the statement, although she did not reveal the name of the individual referred to; and when I returned with a copy of the final version of the Q and A, that was then distributed to the press office.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Could we have that on the screen please, MoD/1/62. It may assist you to have it there simply to refresh your memory, but in order to be able to operate a Q and A brief, at least in relation to the questions as to the identity of the person concerned, people in the press office needed to know the identity of that person, did they not?

MS TEARE: No, they did not.

MR LLOYD-JONES: How could it operate if they did not know the identity of the person concerned?

MS TEARE: Effectively the position that -- well, two points. First of all, on the evening of the 8th I am not aware -- I certainly did not receive any -- any names being put to the press office as to the possible identity of the individual concerned.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Pausing there, who, amongst you and your staff, knew the identity of the person concerned?

MS TEARE: The Chief Press Officer and I alone.

MR LLOYD-JONES: You were the only two?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR LLOYD-JONES: So what would happen if someone in the press office, the duty officer, overnight, received a call asking: is it Mr Jones?

MS TEARE: Well, then they would have had to have contacted us, because in the same way that they would not know whether -- well, they would not know whether any name put to them was the right one or the wrong one, so they would have to refer it to us; and I think during the course of the next day --

MR LLOYD-JONES: Before we get to the next day, during that evening did you receive any calls?

MS TEARE: I received a number of media enquiries, yes.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Were any of them enquiring about the identity?

MS TEARE: Some of them actually asked me what the name of the individual was.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did you tell them?

MS TEARE: No.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did you tell any of them that although you would not reveal the name, you would confirm it if they already knew it?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Why did you consider it appropriate to say that?

MS TEARE: I felt it was necessary to explain that because I wanted to ensure a system where the media would actually check with us before they printed a name or broadcast a name.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What interest were you seeking to protect by taking that course?

MS TEARE: Essentially, it would have two purposes. One was that it would prevent those who were not involved from wrongly being named in the media; and, secondly, it would give us an indication, and therefore we could pass the information on, if Dr Kelly's name was coming forward.

LORD HUTTON: Pass information on to whom?

MS TEARE: I am sorry, my Lord?

LORD HUTTON: Pass information on to whom that Dr Kelly name was coming up?

MS TEARE: No, I mean we would get -- if we had a system whereby journalists were coming to us to check the name first, we would get a heads up that Dr Kelly's name was likely to appear.

LORD HUTTON: I thought you said you could pass information on.

MS TEARE: In that we could alert Dr Kelly, I mean, and alert others in the department.

MR LLOYD-JONES: At this point -- we are still on the evening of 8th July -- were you aware, at that time, that earlier that day the Secretary of State had written a letter to the BBC?

MS TEARE: Yes, I was aware.

MR LLOYD-JONES: How were you aware of that?

MS TEARE: I had heard of it either from the Permanent Secretary's office or direct from the Secretary of State's office, one or the other.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did the MoD press office release that letter to the media?

MS TEARE: No, we did not.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did you receive any press queries about that letter?

MS TEARE: I seem to recall I had one call from the press about it, who asked whether --

MR LLOYD-JONES: Can I ask when that was?

MS TEARE: That would have been probably up to an hour after the release of the statement on the 8th. I do not recall the time.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What was the nature of the query?

MS TEARE: The best of my recollection is that it was enquiring as to whether we had written to the BBC.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What was your response to that query?

MS TEARE: I was not sure, at that point, whether or not we were actually discussing this letter, so I said that I would have to make enquiries; and I think, in practice, I did not actually return that call. It was not followed up.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Right. Could we have on the screen, please, MoD/32/46? You may be able to read that, Ms Teare. I am afraid we will need to see the full width of the page. Can you see a line, about halfway down the page?

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm.

MR LLOYD-JONES: I am going to ask you in a moment about the entry immediately above that line. First, is the press office at the MoD open 24 hours a day?

MS TEARE: Yes, it is.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Is a log kept 24 hours a day of enquiries received?

MS TEARE: No, the log does not operate over the 24 hour period. The log operates purely to recall -- sorry, to record calls and activity of a duty press officer.

MR LLOYD-JONES: So during what hours would the log be kept?

MS TEARE: It varies. If it is a very busy day the duty press officer might not actually start to be operating alone till maybe 7.30, maybe a bit later. I would have thought on average until about 7.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Until what time?

MS TEARE: Until the press officers get in in the morning, so I would have thought from about 7 to 8.

MR LLOYD-JONES: If we look at that entry, on the face of it it appears to be an entry in relation to something that happened at 09.45 on the morning of 8th July.

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm. That cannot be the case because the log does not run in the daytime, as I say. It would certainly go no later than 8.30.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Yes. Have you caused any enquiries to be made in the press office about this?

MS TEARE: Yes, I did. I asked for the duty press officer involved, Howard Rhodes, actually to be contacted. He was on holiday, but we have spoken to him. And he confirmed that call was received on the evening of 8th July; and whilst it says 09.45 it should in fact say 21.45. I think he merely slipped from using the 24 hour clock to the 12.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Have you made enquiries as to whether Mr Rhodes was, in fact, the duty press officer that night of the 8th to the 9th?

MS TEARE: I know that he was in the duty press office, because I was in the press office that evening.

MR LLOYD-JONES: If we look at the entry, the press officer was Howard Rhodes. Caller Finlo Nelson -- can you read it on your copy? Thank you. Finlo Nelson Rohrer. Origination, BBC online: "Can we have a copy of Geoff Hoon's letter to Gavyn Davies?" We see recorded there the response -- would that be the response made by Mr Rhodes?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR LLOYD-JONES: It reads: "This is private correspondence and will remain so as far as we are concerned." Did you survey the press coverage on this matter following the 8th July?

MS TEARE: Yes, I did, obviously not on just this particular aspect but coverage across the board.

MR LLOYD-JONES: So far as this particular aspect is concerned, did you examine press reports?

MS TEARE: Yes, I read all the press reports.

MR LLOYD-JONES: In those reports did you find any direct quotes from the letter which the Secretary of State had written to the BBC?

MS TEARE: I did not find any at all, no.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did you draw any conclusion from that?

MS TEARE: I felt that, at the most, journalists obviously knew that we had written to Gavyn Davies, but again not least one of the reasons they knew that was because the BBC themselves actually issued to the media their response to that letter. So I concluded, from that, that they knew that we had written but that they had not seen the contents of our letter.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Was the MoD press office aware of whether any reply had been received to that letter?

MS TEARE: We were aware that a reply had been sent or -- because we were getting calls from the media to respond to it. But in actual fact -- although the media had been given copies of it, we had not, neither had the Secretary of State's office.

MR LLOYD-JONES: On the evening of Tuesday 8th July, did the press office do anything to assist Dr Kelly once the statement had been published?

MS TEARE: Yes. I had discussions with the Chief Press Officer, Kate Wilson, and we agreed that there was a need to telephone him and to alert him to the high levels of media interest in the statement, and to make sure that he knew how to make a -- how to have access to 24 hour media handling advice and also to say that he might want to consider staying with friends.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Moving on, then, to 9th July, was there a Secretary of State's briefing meeting that morning?

MS TEARE: Yes, there was.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did you attend it?

MS TEARE: Yes, I did.

MR LLOYD-JONES: How clear is your recollection as to what was discussed at the meeting?

MS TEARE: I mean, I recall there was a meeting. I can recall what the key topics of conversation were, but I do not recall exactly who said what.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Do you recall who was there?

MS TEARE: The Secretary of State, his principal private secretary, Richard Taylor, special adviser, myself. I think that was all.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What is your recollection as to what was discussed?

MS TEARE: Well, it was a fairly brief meeting, because I know we had another one that was about to start very shortly afterwards. But my recollection is that the bulk of the meeting was to do with discussions of how we might follow up with the correspondence with the BBC.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Was anything said about the Q and A material?

MS TEARE: I think it is likely that I might have run through the -- an outline of the Q and A material and the approach that we were adopting.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Would you have had any particular reason to do that?

MS TEARE: No, other than at that meeting it has several purposes: one, I go through the press coverage of the morning and I would normally outline how we were handling sort of main issues of the day. And it would be in that line that I would have done so.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Later that morning, do you recall, when back in your own office, receiving a telephone call from Mr Tom Kelly?

MS TEARE: I recall I had a call from Tom that morning, yes.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Was anyone else in the room with you at that time?

MS TEARE: The Chief Press Officer.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Was she able to hear the conversation you had with Mr Kelly?

MS TEARE: I put the call on speaker.

MR LLOYD-JONES: How clear is your recollection of the conversation which followed?

MS TEARE: Again, it is not that clear. As I understand it, his enquiry related to something that had -- or an exchange rather that had occurred at the 8.30 No. 10 meeting, which I had not attended but the Chief Press Officer had attended, so she dealt with it.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Were you aware of what information may have been supplied to Mr Kelly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office --

MS TEARE: No, I was not.

MR LLOYD-JONES: -- following that conversation?

MS TEARE: No. I understood that they were sending information direct to Tom and I did not see it in advance.

MR LLOYD-JONES: During the morning of 9th July, did you take any press calls?

MS TEARE: No.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Who would have taken the calls?

MS TEARE: The calls were all being dealt with by the Chief Press Officer and the rest of the press office.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did you receive any reports of what was happening?

MS TEARE: I did receive accounts of the calls that had been received during the day.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What sort of questions were being put by callers in relation to the matter of Dr Kelly?

MS TEARE: Well, there were a wide variety of calls being received. Some were actively encouraging the press office to give them clues. They asked questions like: does his name rhyme with someone's in the press office? What is his first name? What are his initials? Can you give me all of the names of the people who work in the same field? One journalist claimed that he could see him in his mind and he said that he could picture him as having been someone who gave a background briefing at the MoD some time ago and therefore could he have a list of all the names of people who had given background briefings in the MoD for the last two years.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Was that list provided?

MS TEARE: No, it was not. The press office did not engage in any of these exchanges.

MR LLOYD-JONES: How did the press officers respond to the questions of that sort you have just described?

MS TEARE: As I say, they did not become engaged in any of those sort of fishing ventures.

MR LLOYD-JONES: It has been suggested that The Times put 21 names to the press office, is that right?

MS TEARE: I have seen that reported certainly. My understanding is that The Times did put a number of names to the press office during the course of the day. It certainly was not a question of 21 being put in one batch. I think small numbers were put to the press office during the day, and their recollection is that the total is somewhat less than 21.

MR LLOYD-JONES: There came a point in the late afternoon when the Financial Times phoned and put the correct name. Did you take that call?

MS TEARE: Yes, I did.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What did you say?

MS TEARE: I confirmed Dr Kelly's name when it was put to me.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Once Dr Kelly's name had been confirmed to the Financial Times by you, was there any change in the approach adopted by the press office to handling these calls?

MS TEARE: No, there was not, because the press office still did not know the name.

MR LLOYD-JONES: At that point --

LORD HUTTON: The press office still did not know?

MS TEARE: Know the name, except for the Chief Press Officer.

MR LLOYD-JONES: At that point who in the press office staff knew the name of Dr Kelly?

MS TEARE: Just myself and Kate Wilson.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did that remain the case?

MS TEARE: No, that position changed shortly after I had confirmed the name. This was purely to take account of the fact that there was a duty press officer who would be taking over shortly and obviously he needed to know the correct name; but he was only made aware of this once the name had been confirmed.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Do you recall Kate Wilson being in your room later that evening when she received a call from The Times?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Did you overhear that conversation?

MS TEARE: I did not overhear, I could only hear her end of it, obviously. She was again being pressed for the name by The Times and she said to me: now that the name has been confirmed, you know, can I tell The Times what the name is? She was -- you know, she was seeking my advice, which is perfectly reasonable.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What did you say?

MS TEARE: I said very firmly that we could not reveal the name and so that is what she said.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Ms Teare, was it ever your intention the Q and A brief or the way in it which it was used should be some device for secretly leaking Dr Kelly's identity and making it public?

MS TEARE: No, it was not.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Were you aware what the press office was doing on that evening of the 9th to assist Dr Kelly?

MS TEARE: On the evening of the 9th, again once the name had been confirmed, we were anxious that we should identify and have ready to go, or in fact send, a press officer to Dr Kelly's house.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What would have been the point of sending a press officer?

MS TEARE: The point had been that had Dr Kelly chosen to stay there, the likelihood, in fact the certainty, was that large numbers of media would turn up outside his house, and the role of the press officer is to act as a buffer between the media and Dr Kelly and to give him advice on handling and to deal with the media on the scene.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Do you know why that was not done sooner?

MS TEARE: It was not done sooner because (a) the name had not been confirmed; but also we were working on the assumption that once the name had been confirmed it would take journalists a number of hours to work out where he lives because, in the normal way, they would go through the electoral role and then operate a policy of elimination. We had assumed after the name had been confirmed there would be a couple of hours -- a few hours, actually where we could arrange to send someone.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Was a press officer in fact sent to Dr Kelly's home?

MS TEARE: No, a press officer was not sent but one was identified and one was on standby ready to go.

MR LLOYD-JONES: When you confirmed the name of the individual to the Financial Times, whom did you tell that you had done that?

MS TEARE: I told the Chief Press Officer that I had done it. I think that is all I told. She then -- I cannot remember what I -- I was busy with something else, but she then telephoned the Secretary of State's office and the Permanent Secretary's office, plus the press officers of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the No. 10 press office, to let them know that the name had been confirmed. In talking to the Permanent Secretary's office she requested that arrangements be put in hand for Dr Kelly to be told.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Finally, and very briefly, Ms Teare, the FAC hearing took place on 15th July and Dr Kelly appeared to give evidence. Did the press office provide any assistance to Dr Kelly in respect of that appearance?

MS TEARE: Yes, a press officer was sent to accompany Dr Kelly.

MR LLOYD-JONES: What was the press officer's role on that occasion?

MS TEARE: Essentially to ensure that the media did not hassle or pester Dr Kelly in any way.

MR LLOYD-JONES: Thank you, Ms Teare. I am very grateful, my Lord, for the additional time.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Mr Gompertz.

Cross-examined by MR GOMPERTZ

MR GOMPERTZ: Ms Teare, let us start with the 9th July. The first identification was made at 5.30 approximately in the evening.

MS TEARE: It was 5.30 or very shortly thereafter.

MR GOMPERTZ: Yes. Why was it that Dr Kelly was not notified of this fact at all until he telephoned at about 8 o'clock?

MS TEARE: Well, as I say, the Chief Press Officer rang the Permanent Secretary's office and they were going to make the appropriate arrangements for him to be told. We felt that -- it was certainly my view that there were two things: 1. It would be better for him to talk to someone who knew him about this; and also that while the press office role was there to provide practical media handling advice, you know, we did not have any responsibilities for a welfare role; and again, we thought it was better that his line manager should contact him so that he could also discuss, you know, availability of hotel accommodation if that was what Dr Kelly was seeking. Now, I understand that Dr Wells did speak to him but you would need to check the times with him.

MR GOMPERTZ: Had you alerted Dr Wells to the fact that he might be needed in order to inform Dr Kelly of his identification?

MS TEARE: Not specifically, but --

MR GOMPERTZ: Why not?

MS TEARE: Because I did not think that it --

MR GOMPERTZ: Why had he not been notified he might be needed as a matter of urgency to telephone Dr Kelly?

MS TEARE: I think that the way the situation was unfolding at the time, Dr Kelly was in very regular contact with all of those involved -- sorry, Dr Wells was in very regular contact with all of those involved, and that the Permanent Secretary's office had numbers to contact him in and out of working hours.

MR GOMPERTZ: I do not follow that. I am sure it is my fault. Had anybody contacted Dr Wells to say: you may be needed at short notice to contact Dr Kelly to tell him he has been identified by the press?

MS TEARE: That had not been done so by the press office, that is all I can say.

MR GOMPERTZ: Why could not Mrs Wilson telephone Dr Kelly direct? She had done so the night before after all.

MS TEARE: She could have done that but, as I have explained, we felt that it was better that Dr Kelly should receive this news from his line manager. As I say, we did not have in our gift any arrangements vis a vis hotel accommodation should Dr Kelly have decided that he wanted to take that up.

MR GOMPERTZ: You do not think, with the benefit of hindsight, it would have been very much better if Dr Kelly had had something like two hours' notice rather than 10 minutes' notice to leave the house?

MS TEARE: I think that what was important in handling this situation and in the media advice he was given was the crucial time was when the statement was first issued on the 8th; and on that day Dr Kelly was contacted. He was told of the very high levels of media interest and he was advised, at that point, to consider staying with friends; and I think that actually was the most important time.

MR GOMPERTZ: Can I go to the Q and A material, please? In the first draft produced by yourself and Mrs Wilson on the evening of Friday 4th July, the first two questions were to the effect: who is the official? Answer: we are not prepared to name him. Question: why not? Answer: we have released all the relevant details. There is nothing to gain by releasing the name of the individual who has come forward voluntarily. You thought that was the proper approach, did you?

MS TEARE: As I say, the draft we produced on 4th July, and indeed the one on 7th July, they were not freestanding documents that had been agreed and approved, they were drafts. They were -- it was a document that was evolving to reflect the information and thought that I had given to the subject. So accordingly the draft that I had produced on the night of the 4th was -- I have to say, a great deal of thought had not been given to it because I had not had much of the information for very long, I was getting the information second-hand and, what is more, certainly the situation is that if Dr Kelly's name had become public over the weekend, because that draft says we would not reveal the name, what that draft also shows is that we had not had sufficient time to think through how we would react if his name actually appeared in the press; and if it had have done, I would have had to consult with the senior officials involved and it is conceivable that we may have had to have confirmed the name over that weekend. So I do not feel that you can say from the draft of the 4th that automatically we would not have confirmed the name that weekend. It was all very much --

MR GOMPERTZ: I think the answer to my question was a simple "yes" rather than an answer taking something like several minutes. The question I asked you was: on the Friday evening when you put those first two questions and answers in the draft Q and As, did you think that that was a proper approach? The answer surely is "yes", is it not?

MS TEARE: Obviously that situation was to deal with a position where Dr Kelly's name had not appeared in a paper. It would not have --

MR GOMPERTZ: Well, it had not appeared in a paper on the Monday, either, had it?

MS TEARE: No, it had not.

MR GOMPERTZ: And yet in the second draft, which was produced on the Monday, the position had changed very radically, had it not?

MS TEARE: I would suggest that there was not a change because to say that there was a change suggests that there was already one agreed position from which we changed towards another; and as I have said, the document of 4th July was not in any way a formal document. It had had no approval. It was a working document.

LORD HUTTON: Ms Teare, accepting that but just going back to Mr Gompertz's question, and I appreciate you say the situation was changing and evolving, but the question to you was: when you drafted that first question and answer, and it contained the view that the name would not be given, did you think that was the proper approach to take, at that time, in those circumstances?

MS TEARE: Yes, I did, my Lord.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS TEARE: But what I was trying to explain was that that -- the suggested responses in that document would only cover a situation where if, over the weekend, someone had asked us for the name.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS TEARE: But that document would not have dealt with a situation whereby if the name itself had appeared in the media; and in that latter set of circumstances we would have had to have taken advice, and we may well have ended up confirming the name over that weekend.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Thank you.

MR GOMPERTZ: The name had not appeared in the media by the Monday evening, had it?

MS TEARE: No, it had not.

MR GOMPERTZ: So that had not changed, had it?

MS TEARE: No.

MR GOMPERTZ: So why did the change take place in the second draft, which by all means look at if you wish, but I am sure you are very familiar with it. Why was there the change to "if the correct name is put to us from a number of callers we will need to tell the individual we are going to confirm his name before doing so"?

MS TEARE: Well, as I say, this was a document that was evolving to reflect the further time I had had to consider the issues with which we had had to contend and to reflect further information I had obtained. During that time, I had had time to actually consider, unlike on the Friday night -- I had actually considered the fact that names were likely to be put to the press office and we needed to find a way to actually deal with that situation. That line of thought had been absent from the draft of 4th July.

MR GOMPERTZ: The decision to name or not name would not be one to be taken by the press office, would it?

MS TEARE: That is correct.

MR GOMPERTZ: So who took the decision to make the change in the second draft to the format I have just put to you?

MS TEARE: Sorry, do you mean from the 4th July --

MR GOMPERTZ: From it being: we will not name the individual involved, nothing to be gained by doing so, to: if the correct name is put, we will have to go back to the individual and confirm his name before doing so. Who authorised or was responsible for that change?

MS TEARE: As I say, it was not a change, and in terms of authorisation I did not consider any of these drafts to be suitable for use in any way until they had been --

MR GOMPERTZ: You think there is no difference between the first draft and the second draft. Is that what you are really saying?

MS TEARE: No, I am saying that there is a difference which reflected the further thought that I had been able to give to the subject. But that is different from saying a decision had been taken, because none of these two documents represented information that had been approved or agreed; and, therefore, neither of the -- none of the information in those two documents could have been used by the press office.

MR GOMPERTZ: So are you saying that you were responsible for this change?

MS TEARE: I am saying that my role in the production of these drafts is to provide my advice on the information and thought that I have given. It is part of my role to provide advice on media handling. And my current state of view on the situation and how it might best be handled was set out in that draft. That was my current thinking and no more than that on the evening of the 7th.

MR GOMPERTZ: Let us go on to the draft as used. Would you like to look at that? It is MoD/1/62. Do you accept that there is a change between, at any rate, the first draft that you prepared and this draft with regard to the naming: "If the correct name is given [underlined] we can confirm it ...", and so on. Do you accept there is a change there?

MS TEARE: I will accept it reflects a different approach.

MR GOMPERTZ: Who authorised that approach?

MS TEARE: As I say, these documents were evolving and reflecting my advice, at the time, on the basis of the information I had at the time.

MR GOMPERTZ: Would you like to answer the question?

MS TEARE: I am trying to help you with the question. And accordingly no decision was taken -- you say: who took the decision? I did not consider that any of this material was available for use by the press office until it had been agreed by a senior official and approved. Other than that, it was just a document that reflected my advice and my views and was subject to approval.

MR GOMPERTZ: Yes. Who approved it?

MS TEARE: It was agreed with Martin Howard and it was approved by the Permanent Secretary.

MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you. Did the Secretary of State see this draft?

MS TEARE: Not to the best of my knowledge.

MR GOMPERTZ: No?

MS TEARE: No.

MR GOMPERTZ: What about the routine press meeting on 9th July which you attended and which other people attended as well?

MS TEARE: That was the day after the draft had been approved.

MR GOMPERTZ: Yes. Did the Secretary of State see that document at that meeting?

MS TEARE: I do not recall.

MR GOMPERTZ: You see, we have heard some evidence to suggest that he did, and that there was some brief discussion about this document at that meeting.

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm.

MR GOMPERTZ: You know that, I expect. Do you agree or disagree with that evidence or do you not remember?

MS TEARE: I do not recall there being a long discussion about the Q and A.

MR GOMPERTZ: Nobody said that there was a long discussion.

MS TEARE: No.

MR GOMPERTZ: A brief discussion is what I put to you.

MS TEARE: I cannot recall the detail, though I think it is highly likely that I would have outlined some of the material in the Q and A, but I cannot give you a verbatim account.

MR GOMPERTZ: To the Secretary of State?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: And no doubt in order to outline the material you would have had the document with you.

MS TEARE: Yes, I suspect I would have done.

MR GOMPERTZ: And no doubt you would have shown it to him?

MS TEARE: He may have already had it. He may have already --

MR GOMPERTZ: Do you know or not know?

MS TEARE: I do not know. I did not show him a document at that meeting, because, as I say, the bulk of that meeting was about how to follow up the correspondence with the BBC.

MR GOMPERTZ: Yes. Let us look at the history of the statements, very briefly. Can we look, first, at MoD/17/2, which, for whatever reason, we, on behalf of the family, saw for the first time this morning.

MS TEARE: I had --

MR GOMPERTZ: I am not suggesting it is your fault. What I would like to know is: is that your draft or not?

MS TEARE: I would need to see the full document.

MR GOMPERTZ: Certainly. Can we scroll down?

MS TEARE: (Pause). Yes, that is my draft.

MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you. Submitted to whom and when, please?

MS TEARE: Sent to the Permanent Secretary's office on the evening of 7th July.

MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you. What was actually used as a press statement we can see on MoD/1/67. Is that right?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: That was what you released on 8th July at 5.45 pm.

MS TEARE: Yes, about that time.

MR GOMPERTZ: Yes. Upon whose instructions did you release that statement?

MS TEARE: On the Permanent Secretary's.

MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you. Is that the document that he brought back with him from the meeting at No. 10?

MS TEARE: In the main it is the document. I think that a couple of small changes were discussed, principally between he and Martin Howard and myself; but I could not detail for you exactly what changes were made for the final version as compared to the version that he brought back from No. 10 with him.

MR GOMPERTZ: Very well. There are changes, however, are there not, from the draft which you had submitted --

MS TEARE: Yes, there are.

MR GOMPERTZ: -- to the Permanent Secretary?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: So they were inserted, as you understand it, at No. 10?

MS TEARE: Yes --

MR GOMPERTZ: Is that right?

MS TEARE: As I said in my earlier evidence, I recalled a conversation with Godric Smith where he had suggested something along the lines of the penultimate paragraph. I certainly recall that discussion; but I do not recall discussing, in detail, a statement of this length.

MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you. One other matter. If the MoD did not wish to release Dr Kelly's name, could it not, in response to an enquiry, say this: we will neither confirm nor deny any name?

MS TEARE: That is one approach, but I had considered --

MR GOMPERTZ: What is wrong with it? You were about to tell us, I apologise, I interrupted you.

MS TEARE: It is one that I had considered; but again, it did not deal with the difficulty of other people who were involved in the similar field from being named in the media; and that was something we felt that was not acceptable.

MR GOMPERTZ: So on the one hand it was not acceptable that they might be wrongly identified.

MS TEARE: It was not just a question of wrongly identified, because certainly my view was that anyone that was named would actually be subject to very high levels of media interest.

MR GOMPERTZ: Yes. Did you consider, though, that if that did happen it would not be through the agency of the MoD, would it, because you had not either confirmed nor denied their name?

MS TEARE: But the effect would have been the same; and what I was seeking to avoid was that individuals who had nothing to do with this situation were subject to high levels of media intrusion.

MR GOMPERTZ: Do you know whether any assessment was undertaken as to the pros and cons of releasing information of the kind that appears in the statement and in the Q and As which would lead to Dr Kelly's identification, against adopting a stone wall attitude, if I can put it in that way, of declining to cooperate with the press at all? Was anything like that undertaken?

MS TEARE: I am not aware of anything, no, nor would I expect to be.

MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you very much.

Cross-examined by MR KNOX

LORD HUTTON: Mr Knox, yes.

MR KNOX: You said in your evidence that production of Q and A material is quite normal in a case when a press announcement is being put out, is that correct?

MS TEARE: Yes. I think I said "standard practice".

MR KNOX: Is it standard practice that the following should happen: first, that a press announcement is agreed with a civil servant concerned in a story which contains some information about that civil servant but at the same time Q and A briefings are prepared which give more details about the identity of that civil servant over and above those agreed in the press statement?

MS TEARE: I cannot agree with you that it is standard; and the reason that I cannot accept, you know -- accept that, is that the situation with which we had to contend was totally without precedent, so there was not, you know, such as a thing as standard practice. There was no yardstick with which to judge it. That is one of the reasons why it was such a difficult situation.

MR KNOX: It certainly would not be a standard practice to agree a press statement expressly with a civil servant which contains some details about him and not tell him about further details you are going to be releasing as part of a Q and A briefing if necessary, is it?

MS TEARE: As I say, there is not a standard practice in this situation. There are no rules that govern the release of civil servants' names. We were dealing with an unprecedented situation.

MR KNOX: It is not really usual at all, is it, to even make press statements about civil servants or indeed to prepare Q and A briefings in relation to them?

MS TEARE: As I said, this situation we were dealing with was unprecedented.

MR KNOX: I think the answer to my question is "yes", is that right?

MS TEARE: I think you have now confused me that I am not sure what I am saying "yes" to.

MR KNOX: It is not usual, is it, to give a Q and A briefing and also prepare a press statement when you are talking about the identity of civil servants, is it?

MS TEARE: I have not been involved in a situation similar to this, even similar to this one, so I cannot say what is usual.

MR KNOX: I just want to consider the question of the fairness with which Dr Kelly was dealt with. Your duty, presumably, in the press office, is to give advice and support to Dr Kelly relating to the practicalities of dealing with the media; is that right?

MS TEARE: (Nods).

MR KNOX: You presumably wanted to deal fairly with Dr Kelly; is that right?

MS TEARE: That is right.

MR KNOX: That was, presumably, very important?

MS TEARE: That was important.

MR KNOX: By the time that Mr Hatfield spoke to Dr Kelly at about 4.30 or so on Tuesday afternoon, 8th July --

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm.

MR KNOX: -- he had a press statement which he was going to try to agree with Dr Kelly; that is right, is it not?

MS TEARE: (Nods).

MR KNOX: By that time you had already worked out the basic Q and A strategy which you were going to use in connection with that press statement when the press made calls as a result of the press statement; that is right, is it not?

MS TEARE: Over the lunchtime I had agreed Q and A material with Martin Howard; but, as I have said, it could not be used or deployed by the press office until approval by the Permanent Secretary. Now, that -- he read the material and approved it -- I am not quite sure, some time, I would say, between 4 and 4.30, maybe a bit later.

MR KNOX: So it is probably right -- and I think we heard from Mr Hatfield this morning anyway, it is probably right that by the time the press statement had been drafted to agree with Dr Kelly, the Q and A briefing material had also been prepared. That is right, is it not?

MS TEARE: I do not -- all I am saying is I am not quite sure as to whether it had been approved by then. My understanding was that when the press statement had been finalised the Permanent Secretary's private secretary then e-mailed it to Richard Hatfield for him then to clear with Dr Kelly; and then Martin Howard and the Permanent Secretary and I went through the Q and A material.

MR KNOX: Shall we assume for present purposes it had been approved by the time that Mr Hatfield agreed the press statement with Dr Kelly? Assume that for present purposes. Could we just call up MoD/1/62? It is right, is it not, that the press statement, we need not go to that for the moment, does undoubtedly contain some details about Dr Kelly, without naming him? That is right, is it not?

MS TEARE: That is right.

MR KNOX: If you drop down this page you will see that further details are going to be given to the press: "How long has he been in the MoD?" "He has been in his current position for 3 to 4 years. Before that he was a member of UNSCOM. "Did the official play any part in drawing up the dossier? "He was involved in providing historical details ... "Is he a senior figure? ... "Is he still working for MoD? "Yes. "Is he in Iraq? "No, though he visited recently for a week. "Is he a member of the ISG? "No." Those are further details about Dr Kelly that were not agreed with him in the press statement.

MS TEARE: Perhaps I should just say again that Q and A material is not released in its entirety. I would say that the way you were reading that -- those Q and A -- those Q and As out there suggested that we were giving this information out wholesale. That was not the position, nor should it be.

MR KNOX: You would not give it out wholesale but you would give it out if you were asked the relevant questions?

MS TEARE: We would give it out if we were asked the relevant question. I rather felt you were suggesting we would give that material out in one batch, which is not the position.

MR KNOX: So in other words, perhaps you could explain, at what point would you give out the individual bits of material?

MS TEARE: If we were asked those specific questions.

MR KNOX: So if someone said, "Is he in Iraq?", at that point you would say "No, though he visited Iraq recently".

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: These are effectively additions to the details provided in the press statement?

MS TEARE: Again, that is part of the standard practice in Q and As.

MR KNOX: I think we have already agreed this is a totally unusual situation.

MS TEARE: But the principle of Q and A material is not different.

MR KNOX: Surely, in fairness to Dr Kelly, to help him deal with the media, should you not have ensured that Mr Hatfield told Dr Kelly (a) that his employers were going to tell journalists all these extra details; and (b) you, that is the MoD, his employers, were going to tell journalists in terms that you would confirm his name. Should that not have been done as well as agreeing the press statement with Dr Kelly?

MS TEARE: I am not quite sure when you say in your question "to help him deal with the media". I think our point was we wanted to make sure the situation was that we dealt with the media, rather than him.

MR KNOX: Let us just deal with the matter, as a matter of fairness. Dr Kelly is called in the afternoon in order to agree a press statement with him; that is right, is it not?

MS TEARE: (Nods).

MR KNOX: He would naturally suppose from that that certain information is going to be released about him in that press statement.

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm.

MR KNOX: He is not told by the MoD that further information will be released about him by the MoD press office, is he?

MS TEARE: No, he is not, but as I say --

LORD HUTTON: Yes, carry on Ms Teare. You were going to add something.

MS TEARE: As I say, it is standard Civil Service practice when any statement is released that a Q and A is also produced to support it which contains some factual information related to the statement. That is not an unusual practice.

MR KNOX: I understand "unusual" or "not unusual". What I am trying to understand is this: why did you not tell Dr Kelly this is what you were proposing to do?

MS TEARE: I saw there to be no reason to tell him, because the material that we had was in the Q and A, it was largely factual, and that Dr Kelly had already been forewarned that his name was likely to enter the public domain. And what is more, we -- when -- you know, in the run up to that happening we would -- I knew that we would be in touch with Dr Kelly to provide him with advice on media handling. So I saw no role for me to insist that the Q and A should be run by him.

MR KNOX: Was there any reason for not telling Dr Kelly what you were intending to do in answer to questions from journalists?

MS TEARE: No, there was not any reason why he could not have been told. As I say, there was no discussion of it because it was not felt to be an issue.

MR KNOX: Would it not have been better and fairer to Dr Kelly to give him the full picture? Namely: (1) we will put out this press statement; (2) if we get asked certain questions we are going to have to answer them this way and thereby reveal further details about you. Would that not have been the fairer way of dealing with it?

MS TEARE: I do not actually accept it was unfair because Dr Kelly -- for a start, I felt that Dr Kelly's name was likely to emerge because he was quite well known in media circles anyway. But on the substance of the Q and A material, I do not see that there was anything there that we needed to consult him about in any way. As I say, if he had not have been -- if he had not been told and it had not been discussed with him and that he had no expectation of his name becoming public, if he in no way had been given to believe that might happen, then I think there would have been a question of fairness. But I do not see it at all in this case.

MR KNOX: What was the point of agreeing the press statement with him?

MS TEARE: The point of agreeing the press statement was that so he would know (a) exactly when it was happening and (b) what was said. That is quite standard to agree the actual contents of the statement.

MR KNOX: If that was the point of agreeing the press statement, surely there was every reason to tell him the whole story: not only are we going to put this statement out, but we are also going to give further details out which will almost certainly speed up the process by which your name comes into the public domain?

MS TEARE: No, I do not accept that because for a start we were not going to give out further details, it would only be if we were asked on certain points. What is more, I believe that the issue of the statement certainly accelerated the process of journalists wanting to identify the unnamed individual. I do not believe that the Q and A did. It was the statement that alerted journalists to this new situation; and I felt sure they would use all their energies to discover who it was. I also believe, from some of the evidence that the Inquiry has heard, that some journalists had a number of -- you know, seemed to think already that it was Dr Kelly, without having seen the statement.

MR KNOX: It was part of the Q and A strategy that you would actually tell journalists you would confirm his name if the right name was given, was it not?

MS TEARE: That was done, as I have already explained, to make sure that journalists would actually come and check names with us before going to print or before broadcasting them.

MR KNOX: That was one part of the strategy. The other part of the strategy was to give out further details if the right questions were asked. That is right, is it not?

MS TEARE: No, you are suggesting this is a strategy. What I am saying to you is the production of Q and A material is standard practice to back up a statement; that is one thing.

MR KNOX: Yes. With respect, Ms Teare, the answer to my question is surely: yes, we would give out further details about Dr Kelly's identity to journalists if they asked the right questions. For instance: is he in Iraq? You would answer: no, though he visited Iraq recently for a week. That is the position.

MS TEARE: The Q and A represents a balance. Its contents represent a balance between not identifying Dr Kelly personally but being able to answer factual questions that journalists could legitimately put to us.

MR KNOX: Ms Teare, the answer to my question is "yes", is it not? You would give out more information to journalists if they asked you the right questions. That was part of the Q and A material.

MS TEARE: Yes, we would answer --

LORD HUTTON: I think Ms Teare may be dwelling on your word "strategy", Mr Knox.

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: Leave aside "strategy". The effect of the Q and A was if journalists asked further questions you would give out further information about his identity.

MS TEARE: Yes, and that had been approved.

MR KNOX: That had been approved but it had not been passed by Dr Kelly, had it?

MS TEARE: No, but if I may, the information that was given in the Q and A is information that relates to the statement.

MR KNOX: I understand that. But why not tell Dr Kelly -- it comes back to the same point. As a matter of fairness to Dr Kelly, so he knows precisely where he stands with his employers, that you his employers are proposing to release further information in certain circumstances about him over and above the press statement you are asking him to agree, as a matter of fairness to Dr Kelly why not tell him that?

MS TEARE: I do not really see what it would have added to the situation. Dr Kelly, I think it is highly likely, as a civil servant, would be aware of the Q and A procedure. I do not know that for a fact but I think it is likely. There is nothing in the Q and A with which he could disagree.

MR KNOX: No. What I want to know is: why did you not tell him?

MS TEARE: I did not feel it was necessary, as I have already explained.

MR KNOX: Was there any consideration as to whether or not he should be told?

MS TEARE: No, there was no discussion of it.

MR KNOX: Can I just ask you to look up CAB/21/5? If you scroll down a little bit, you will see, under the heading: "Is it X (ie the correct name)?": "If the correct name is put to us from a number of callers, we will need to tell the individual we are going to confirm his name before doing so." Do you see that?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: We know in the eventual Q and A you prepare there is no equivalent provision for telling Dr Kelly that his name is now being put by journalists.

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm.

MR KNOX: Presumably, therefore, there was a conscious decision to change from the approach you see in the first of these Q and As I have showed you to the eventual approach adopted in the final Q and A, is that right?

MS TEARE: As I have tried to explain already, it is not -- when you say there was a decision to move from one to the other, that suggests that the existing one was a freestanding, approved document; it was not. The drafts of the Q and A represent the information and my thinking at that point in time --

LORD HUTTON: Ms Teare, I appreciate the point you have been making that the question and answer has to be approved by a policy maker --

MS TEARE: And indeed it -- sorry.

LORD HUTTON: -- but if you would look at the question this way: was it the position that your thinking on this matter was changing, in that in this draft you had said: if the correct name is given we will have to tell the individual we are going to confirm his name before doing so; and there is a change from that to the latter draft where that does not appear. What was your thinking as to that change, contrary to anything -- just what was in your mind?

MS TEARE: Yes, to get from the second to the third?

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS TEARE: That reflected the development of my thinking, also that I had acquired more knowledge about the situation, because I had been told, during the course of the 8th, that Dr Kelly had been forewarned that his name was likely to become public.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS TEARE: So, therefore, I felt that there was no need to retain the qualification that I had set out in the second draft.

MR KNOX: Ms Teare, it is right, is it not, that Dr Kelly had not been told that the MoD would make his name public, had he?

MS TEARE: The MoD did not make his name public, it confirmed it when a journalist had identified it.

MR KNOX: Well, I appreciate your difference, the distinction you make, but he had not been told the latter point either, had he? He had not been told: if the correct name is put to us, we will I am afraid have to give it out.

MS TEARE: No, he had not.

MR KNOX: In those circumstances, why did you not retain some provision for giving Dr Kelly express notice as to the time at which his name would come out?

MS TEARE: As I have already explained, that was because I had -- I then learnt that Dr Kelly had been told that his name was likely to enter the public domain; and I think we have heard that this morning from Mr Hatfield. And, as I have said, we already would put in place arrangements to make sure that Dr Kelly had what media handling advice and support he needed.

MR KNOX: We know that after Mr Hatfield spoke of that to Dr Kelly to agree the press statement with him, Kate Wilson also, on Tuesday evening, spoke to him --

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: -- on the telephone.

MS TEARE: (Nods).

MR KNOX: It is right, is it not, that even she did not tell Dr Kelly what you in the press office were doing, namely telling journalists that you would give his name if the correct name was put? She did not tell him that, did she?

MS TEARE: As I understand it, it was a very -- she had two conversations, I think, both of them very brief; the first one exceptionally brief and the second one fairly brief too because, you know, he was not at home.

MR KNOX: I cannot understand, why did not even Kate Wilson tell Dr Kelly: look, journalists are ringing in at the moment and we have told them we are going to give your name if they get it; why did not even she tell him?

MS TEARE: I think the explanation or rather the description of the situation you are describing is not quite right. It was not that we were sitting in the press office just repeating the fact, you know -- repeating to everyone that we are going to confirm the name if asked. I mean, that is not what was happening. I think that might have been said to maybe one or two people who specifically pressed for the name, so, you know, as opposed to the picture you are painting, which is one of everyone in the press office saying that to every caller. I mean, that is just not what was the situation.

LORD HUTTON: Could you just explain that a little more? Certainly some callers from the press were told: if you give us the correct name we will confirm it; is that right?

MS TEARE: I think I told -- I think I said that to one person and that was, as I say, because they were specifically pressing on: who is the individual concerned?

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS TEARE: But there were -- there were a number of others -- we had a lot of media calls. They were not all asking what the name was. Some of them were interview requests for the Secretary of State. Some of them were different things.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS TEARE: So it is not the position that everyone who rang up that evening was told this.

LORD HUTTON: But if we just concentrate on those who did ring up to try to find out the name of the civil servant.

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm. I would have said that was a small proportion of the calls received overall.

LORD HUTTON: As regards those people who rang on that particular point, were they all told that: if you give me the correct name I will confirm it or were only some of them told it, or was it just the occasional one who was particularly pressing?

MS TEARE: I could not say overall. All I could say was the ones -- the calls I took.

LORD HUTTON: As regards the calls you took, if the call was about the name of the civil servant, you said: if you give me the correct name I will give it to you.

MS TEARE: No I did not put it in those terms. If I was being pressed to reveal the name, I was saying that I was not prepared to do that. If I was being pressed -- when I was pressed further, I said: look, we are not going to give out the name but if you put the correct name to us then we would be prepared to confirm it.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS TEARE: As I say, that was because we wanted to protect the identity -- you know, the identity of those who were not involved and therefore have a position whereby journalists would be willing to check names with us before either printing or broadcasting them.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR KNOX: In any event, Kate Wilson did not pass this on to Dr Kelly.

MS TEARE: No, she did not. As I say, I do not really accept why you think it should have been passed on.

MR KNOX: It is right, is it not, that on 7th July you had several chats with Mr Campbell; is that right?

MS TEARE: On 7th July?

MR KNOX: Yes. Monday, 7th July. Would it be right that you had several chats with Mr Campbell about this matter?

MS TEARE: I do not recall talking to Alastair on 7th July.

MR KNOX: The reason I mention it is we have seen certain diary entries which seem to refer in terms to several chats with you, amongst other people. Do you not recall any discussions with Mr Campbell on 7th July?

MS TEARE: I can recall a very brief discussion with Alastair after the 8.30 meeting at No. 10 that morning.

MR KNOX: And that would have been about the Dr Kelly matter; is that right?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: Was not Mr Campbell very keen indeed to get Dr Kelly's name out into the public domain?

MS TEARE: That was not the nature of the brief discussion we had.

MR KNOX: But it was about the question of Dr Kelly, was it not?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: Can you remember what the discussion was, then?

MS TEARE: It was more about the issue in general terms and the fact that it was quite -- it was difficult to judge whether or not the individual who had come forward in MoD voluntarily was Andrew Gilligan's source. That was what the -- you know, that was the main pitch of it.

MR KNOX: Ms Teare, with hindsight, thinking back on what happened, the inevitable effect of the Q and A approach was this surely: first, it was likely to increase the interest of journalists because you have this almost game of 20 questions; is that not right?

MS TEARE: I do not accept that. I mean, I do not understand what you mean by why the Q and A would encourage that. As I said, the Q and A is produced in support of any statement; and in terms of the guessing game, the guessing game was of the journalists' own making, it was not ours.

MR KNOX: Do you think it did have the effect of increasing the journalists' interests, the way that information was gradually being given to them?

MS TEARE: No, I do not. I think what stimulated the journalists' interest was the release of the statement; and it was on that same day that Dr Kelly was contacted by the press office, warned of the high level of media interest and, as I say, offered media handling advice there and then.

MR KNOX: Did not the approach also mean this: that Dr Kelly's name would come out at a wholly unpredictable time?

MS TEARE: Short of actually including Dr Kelly's name in the original statement, I do not see how we could have controlled when his name would have emerged.

MR KNOX: It would follow, would it not, also, that Dr Kelly himself would not have any proper notice of the fact or time at which his name was going to be revealed? That must be right.

MS TEARE: Dr Kelly was told on the evening of the 8th July that a statement had been issued, there were very high levels of media interest and that he might want to think about staying with friends. That to my mind was the key point, because once we had issued the statement then journalists from that point were going to try hard to identify the individual. He was made aware of that high level of interest.

MR KNOX: Yes. Would it not have been better to adopt a rather more upfront approach with Dr Kelly, in hindsight, and simply agree a particular time at which his name could be given to the press, so he would know exactly what was going on?

MS TEARE: I think we certainly are talking hindsight there. The position that we were in was one where, as we have heard, although the idea of including Dr Kelly's name with the original statement that Kevin Tebbit had asked should be pursued, it was not in fact pursued. The position that we would have put Dr Kelly in is that we would have been finishing, finalising the statement and then sort of springing on him the notion of including his name in it. So I think that would not have been fair either.

MR KNOX: You did not want to spring anything on Dr Kelly, is that right?

MS TEARE: I did not want to say to Dr Kelly, with a few moments -- no more than a few moments to consider it: we are going to put your name in the statement.

LORD HUTTON: Just on that point, Ms Teare, and I appreciate you say we are discussing the matter with hindsight, looking at what happened and bearing in mind the point you made that Mrs Wilson in fact rang him on the evening of the 8th July and said to consider alternative accommodation. But looking back, with hindsight, might it not have been better to have said to Dr Kelly that the MoD were proposing to name him in the statement but it would not be released for 24 hours and it would be released at a particular time? Suppose you would have said to him on the Monday afternoon: it will be released at 6 pm on the Tuesday afternoon. Then he would have known precisely when his name was going to come into the public arena, and if he had wanted to leave home he would have had the time to do it.

MS TEARE: Again, with hindsight, that could have been a possibility; but I do not think -- again, to get to that position you would have to unpick so many of the things that happened.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS TEARE: As I say, because the issue of including Dr Kelly's name in the original statement was never addressed with him.

LORD HUTTON: I quite appreciate that and you are making the point a lot of things would have to be unpicked. But even on that basis, it would have been open, let us say over the weekend, or on Monday 7th July, to have had a meeting with Dr Kelly and to have said to him: this is a matter of great public importance, the Ministry of Defence feels, because of the interests of the FAC and the general public interest, that we will have to put out a statement that you have come forward, and we consider that it would be better for you, as well as for the MoD, that we name you in the statement, and we are proposing to issue a statement in 24 hours' time. The point I am putting to you is, with hindsight, that that would have made it clear to him precisely when his name would become public and there would not have been the matter of him having to leave his home with Mrs Kelly in a rush, within about 10 minutes.

MS TEARE: As I say, that would have been a possibility; but one of the reasons I feel that we did not get to that point was because there remained uncertainty as to whether Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's source or not.

LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. That has been mentioned by other witnesses. I appreciate that.

MS TEARE: I think it was that uncertainty that sort of meant that a decision was not taken until sort of, you know, the Tuesday afternoon, really, to make a statement.

LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Yes.

MR KNOX: There are just two more points, Ms Teare. The first is this: you say the name would come out anyway. Surely it is not that simple for the press to print Dr Kelly's name, as there is no doubt they eventually did print it, as the mole or anything like that, because they would be worried about defamation questions, would they not?

MS TEARE: I do not understand what you mean by "the mole".

MR KNOX: Well, if Dr Kelly was named as the person who had spoken to Mr Gilligan there would inevitably be questions as to whether that was a defamatory statement.

MS TEARE: Well, I am not an expert in media law, I could not answer that question.

MR KNOX: You see, we have heard a lot about it being inevitable that Dr Kelly's name would have come out. But that is not necessarily the case at all, because unless the MoD confirmed that Dr Kelly is indeed the man there is some risk for the press in printing his name.

MS TEARE: I think it highly unlikely that the press would not have printed either his name or, if they had wrongly identified others, those names.

MR KNOX: I think you have also mentioned, in connection with this inevitability of the name coming out, that there was enormous press interest in the matter, is that right? Certainly Mr Baldwin in his evidence said that by 9th July the story had become a bit "anorakish", to use his word, and that interest was waning, and you said in your initial evidence last time round that after 9th July there was rather little interest in the story.

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: That rather suggests that perhaps the story was not quite as of much interest to the press as you are now saying.

MS TEARE: I mean, I found Mr Baldwin's remarks interesting, given that he had written articles on both the 5th and 8th July on this subject, so that is two articles in the space of a very short period. So I did not think that actually represented waning interest.

MR KNOX: Finally, I want to ask you one question about Mr Blitz. After you -- I think it may not have been you, but one of your assistants had confirmed the name of Dr Kelly to Mr Blitz?

MS TEARE: No, the name was not confirmed to Mr Blitz.

MR KNOX: Mr Adams?

MS TEARE: The name was first put to me by Mr Adams of the FT, and I confirmed it.

MR KNOX: But Mr Blitz, we understand, then asked you to ask for an interview with Dr Kelly; is that right?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: You refused?

MS TEARE: Yes.

MR KNOX: We know some time later Blitz got a call from Whitehall officials giving him further details about Dr Kelly.

MS TEARE: Hmm, hmm.

MR KNOX: Are you able to explain how that came out?

MS TEARE: No, I have absolutely no knowledge of it, I do not know who it was.

MR KNOX: Thank you very much.

LORD HUTTON: Any re-examination? MR LLOYD-JONES: I have no re-examination, my Lord. It may assist if I mention that document MoD/17/2, which is a draft of the press statement produced on 7th July, to which Ms Teare referred in her evidence, was supplied to the Inquiry by the Ministry of Defence on 19th August. The covering letter from the Treasury Solicitor is MoD/17/1.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed. Thank you very much indeed, Ms Teare. We will rise now, Mr Dingemans, for 5 minutes.

(3.23 pm)
(Short Break)
(3.28 pm)
MR EDWARD WILDING (called)
Examined by MR DINGEMANS

MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?

MR WILDING: I am William Edward Wilding.

MR DINGEMANS: Qualifications?

MR WILDING: Educational or?

MR DINGEMANS: Professional.

MR WILDING: I have been a computer investigator for the last 10 years and I have been in the computer industry, IT industry, for 14 years.

MR DINGEMANS: Any publications?

MR WILDING: I published a book called Computer Evidence, a computer investigations handbook published by Sweet & Maxwell in 1997.

MR DINGEMANS: Has anyone instructed you in relation to this matter?

MR WILDING: Yes, I have been instructed by Farah & Co.

MR DINGEMANS: They are solicitors for Mr Gilligan?

MR WILDING: Correct.

MR DINGEMANS: What did they ask you to do?

MR WILDING: They instructed me to examine the contents of a Sharp personal organiser that was the property of Mr Gilligan and to find out the circumstances by which two memoranda came to be entered on to that machine.

MR DINGEMANS: Are there many types of computer like that?

MR WILDING: To my knowledge, at the moment there are over 400 different types of organiser in the world, from more than 70 manufacturers.

MR DINGEMANS: Are you an expert in all 400?

MR WILDING: By no means.

MR DINGEMANS: How have you analysed this organiser?

MR WILDING: I decided to take a common sense approach and try and produce real computer evidence on the advice -- in a manner that would follow the ACPO guidelines, which is the Association of Chief Police Officers.

MR DINGEMANS: So what did you do?

MR WILDING: The rules are that you should not destroy the data on the organiser or change it in any way. So what we do is we export the data from the organiser to a computer and we look at the exported data to see whether we can work out the circumstances.

MR DINGEMANS: Before you had seen the organiser, had it been preserved, as it were, evidentially?

MR WILDING: No, it was clear to me that we were looking into memoranda that were dated ostensibly the 22nd May 2003 and the machine has been in a lot of use since then and has been subjected to -- has been in operational use since then for a long period.

MR DINGEMANS: So how did you extract the data from the machine?

MR WILDING: We used a piece of software for extracting -- produced for Sharp organisers specifically; and this software extracted the data in a large block from the machine to the computer, in a way that was non-invasive and would not damage the data on the original machine.

MR DINGEMANS: Before you extracted the data, did you do any other checks on the machine?

MR WILDING: We switched the machine on because we wanted to establish what the time and date on the clock was at the time of our analysis.

MR DINGEMANS: Was it accurate?

MR WILDING: On the machine, on the organiser that we examined, it was 1 hour and 16 minutes slow, I believe.

MR DINGEMANS: Is that usual?

MR WILDING: In my experience it is very, very common for computer clocks to be either fast or slow or generally inaccurate.

MR DINGEMANS: Where did you upload the data to?

MR WILDING: We uploaded it to a computer, a standard PC which was supplied by Farah & Co.

MR DINGEMANS: How long did that take?

MR WILDING: May I refer to my notes?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes. I do not need an exact time.

MR WILDING: It was approximately 20 minutes, I think.

MR DINGEMANS: Was all the data extracted from the organiser?

MR WILDING: The data that would be input by a user was. I have been consulting Professor Sammes on this point though and I have read his report and he tells me, informs me, that some data was not extracted but that data has not affected this investigation.

MR DINGEMANS: Who is Professor Sammes?

MR WILDING: Professor Sammes is arguably, probably, one of the most pre-eminent experts on organisers in the world.

MR DINGEMANS: And he has been instructed by the Inquiry.

MR WILDING: He has indeed, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: But he is based at Shrivenham, is that right?

MR WILDING: That is correct, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Or has offices there which is near to a Ministry of Defence building, is that right?

MR WILDING: That is correct, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Is it for that reason that Farah & Co instructed you rather than Professor Sammes?

MR WILDING: I think that is an issue for Farah, but my understanding is they have been very concerned about the confidentiality of information on the organiser.

MR DINGEMANS: So were you the person that looked at the uploaded data?

MR WILDING: I was not.

MR DINGEMANS: Who did that?

MR WILDING: That was Mr Julian Pike on the evening of the 27th. Mr Pike is a solicitor with Farah & Co.

MR DINGEMANS: And did you tell him what to do?

MR WILDING: We instructed him in the use of our proposed analytical method and Mr Pike then proceeded to extract memoranda from the upload that we had taken and printed those out.

MR DINGEMANS: How did he extract those memoranda?

MR WILDING: I advised him to use key words that appeared in the questions memoranda and to search for these in the uploaded file, and when he found those key words I advised him to extract the memoranda in an intelligible format that could be read fairly easily.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he extract any memoranda, having gone through this process?

MR WILDING: He did, yes, quite a large number.

MR DINGEMANS: How many?

MR WILDING: If I may refer to my report?

MR DINGEMANS: May we have ANG/5/4?

MR WILDING: Yes, on the evening of 27th August there were 29 extracted memoranda.

MR DINGEMANS: Is this the first one, JP1? Go to the next page, JP2?

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: I rather infer that that is Julian Pike 1, 2, 3?

MR WILDING: Yes, indeed.

MR DINGEMANS: If we carry on scrolling through the pages you can see that. So 29 memoranda. Did he show those to you?

MR WILDING: I watched them being printed. He would then consult Mr Gilligan. They would decide then whether there was a redaction exercise needed to remove sensitive information. Then they did show them to me. If I recall, on those 29 memoranda they decided not one redaction needed to be made.

MR DINGEMANS: How do you get 29 memoranda when we have only had two printouts, as it were?

MR WILDING: Yes, it is to do with live and residual data or deleted data. Two of these memoranda are live on the system and you can access those through the interface of the device and see them readily --

MR DINGEMANS: So you would not have needed any special software to read those?

MR WILDING: No, you could have read those on the organiser.

MR DINGEMANS: And the others?

MR WILDING: These are in areas of memory which are not usually obtainable to the user of the organiser. These are in deleted clusters or deleted areas of memory.

MR DINGEMANS: But left on the hard drive, as it were, of the organiser?

MR WILDING: Left on the flash memory of the organiser, which is similar in concept to a hard drive.

MR DINGEMANS: As sort of electronic fingerprints?

MR WILDING: As electronic fingerprints, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Are they dated?

MR WILDING: They are.

MR DINGEMANS: And how are they dated?

MR WILDING: They are dated in a very interesting way by the computer's -- by the organiser's clock.

MR DINGEMANS: If we are looking at JP1 or whatever JP we have on the screen, JP3. Can I take you to the top left-hand corner?

MR WILDING: Yes, you can see there "memo" at the top. Then you can see "2003". Then you can see --

MR DINGEMANS: That is the year, is it?

MR WILDING: 06 is June and 26 is the day. So it is 26th June 2003.

MR DINGEMANS: Why is it dated 26th June?

MR WILDING: Because that is a memo, I believe, that was produced subsequent to the 22nd May, which is a date that we were interested in examining and investigating.

MR DINGEMANS: Were there any memoranda dated before 22nd May?

MR WILDING: We found, on that --

MR DINGEMANS: With this text on it?

MR WILDING: On that evening, we found -- well, Mr Pike produced one memorandum produced on 21st May. Subsequent to that and subsequent from our examinations more recently we found another memo dated 21st May.

MR DINGEMANS: So what is an explanation for that, that the meeting we heard took place on the 22nd?

MR WILDING: Correct. I -- initially, and ostensibly that could look quite suspicious but when I examined the computer, personal organiser, currently used by Mr Gilligan and when I looked at other memos produced by him, I saw a consistent slippage of a day in terms of a day backwards, his memos being out of kilter by a day.

MR DINGEMANS: When you examined the organiser it was out by 1 hour 16 minutes; that is right, is it not?

MR WILDING: That is correct.

MR DINGEMANS: But this meeting we know took place at either 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

MR WILDING: Correct.

MR DINGEMANS: So if it was still out by an hour and 15 minutes it would have got the right day, is that right?

MR WILDING: No, I believe the clock has been adjusted at least once, from a statement of Mr Gilligan's. It may have been adjusted many more times than that since the meeting of the 22nd.

MR DINGEMANS: How do you adjust your clock? Is it like any other computer, you can alter the date and time?

MR WILDING: You can alter the date and time at will. There is evidence in a statement of Mr Gilligan that the clock was adjusted subsequently to that meeting; and there is clear evidence, to my mind, from looking at Mr Gilligan's current personal organiser, that the clock was out of kilter, may have been out of kilter on the day of 22nd May.

MR DINGEMANS: Being out of kilter would be affected by changing batteries and the like?

MR WILDING: It might be changed by battery changes. When you change the batteries on this device you do not have to but you are given the opportunity to reset the clock. As I say, Mr Gilligan says he did set the clock. I also discovered some experimentation on the Sharp where they were -- somebody was looking at creating memos and seeing if dates and times could be changed.

MR DINGEMANS: Someone had been experimenting on the memo?

MR WILDING: Not on the memo. They had been creating a memo, and I have put that in my report, a reference in my report.

MR DINGEMANS: Yes. If you have a Sharp organiser, you have a lot of material there, it is a bit of a risk, you might lose it?

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Do you save it anywhere?

MR WILDING: Yes, the normal procedure for anybody with one of these devices is to back the system up, usually to a computer, so you have all your data safe and secure should your machine become damaged or become unusable.

MR DINGEMANS: When you examined the memoranda you had expected did you identify any anomalies?

MR WILDING: I identified five seeming anomalies, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: They may all be capable of explanation?

MR WILDING: Five anomalies.

MR DINGEMANS: Can you explain what they were and what explanation there might be?

MR WILDING: Five anomalies identified, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: The first one was what?

MR WILDING: If I may refer to my report?

LORD HUTTON: What paragraph are we at, Mr Dingemans?

MR DINGEMANS: 27, my Lord.

MR WILDING: This is my report, 27(a). The first seeming anomaly, I use that word advisedly, in the sequence those memos were produced from the organiser we do not see an obvious chronology. The memos on the 21st and 22nd May are inserted between memos dated 26th June 2003 and then 30th June 2003.

MR DINGEMANS: Is there an explanation for that?

MR WILDING: Yes. After some very careful experimentation on a Sharp we had bought specifically for the purpose of examination, we managed to reproduce this effect. I also got confirmation from Sharp in Japan that this was a perfectly natural effect and that memoranda and other data may be allocated randomly in the computer's memory.

LORD HUTTON: Does that mean if you enter a memorandum on, let us say, 1st September of 2003 if months later you search back through that organiser in the way that you have done you may find that actual memorandum but with a quite different date on it?

MR WILDING: No, not with a different date stamp, my Lord. What you would find is that you might find memos created after that memo not in a logical sequence as stored in memory. So you might find a memo from 1st June 2003 stored after a memo dated October 2003.

LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see.

MR WILDING: So there is no logical sequencing in the memory.

MR DINGEMANS: Second two anomalies?

MR WILDING: Yes, there was a version of a memorandum called kelly.txt.

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR WILDING: This is dated 21st May 2003. There is also a version of a memorandum called kelly[underscore]cont.txt which is also dated 21st --

MR DINGEMANS: If we look at BBC/1/54. What Mr Gilligan told us when he produced this memoranda is he had run out of space on the first one, this is the first one, and then if we go to the next page you have Kelly continued.

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: He says they were both made at the same meeting.

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: But the one you saw, going back to the date in the text, had 21st in the time clock?

MR WILDING: Correct.

MR DINGEMANS: Does it give a time or just the date?

MR WILDING: Unfortunately we do not get the time, just the date.

MR DINGEMANS: What is the explanation for that anomaly?

MR WILDING: Well, from my experimentation and from looking at Mr Gilligan's current organiser, which will reflect the same date as the back up from his old organiser, and from looking at other files on his machine I have seen a consistent slippage of about a day, which tends to explain this phenomenon.

MR DINGEMANS: The fourth anomaly, what is that?

MR WILDING: This is where we have many versions of kelly.txt and kelly[underscore]cont.txt on Mr Gilligan's organiser. This may be explained by the fact that I believe, as I say, this machine has been in continual operation or use since 22nd May 2003 and these may have been created either by Mr Gilligan perhaps accidentally saving these memos as he looked at them --

LORD HUTTON: Accidentally doing what?

MR WILDING: Accidentally saving them when he came out of these memos, as he looked at them.

MR DINGEMANS: If you look at it, do nothing to it but save it again, you get another fingerprint?

MR WILDING: Yes, that may be one explanation; and I believe also that he may have been cutting and -- there is some possibility that he may have cut and pasted memos for his own records subsequent to the Inquiry and other things.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Fifth anomaly?

MR WILDING: Yes. This has worried me quite a lot. The version of kelly.txt dated 21st May 2003 is different to the version produced by Mr Gilligan to the Inquiry.

MR DINGEMANS: If we compare JP1 and JP15, and I think people have available that in hard copy, is JP1 the one dated 21st May? -- sorry, JP11. JP11 and JP15.

MR WILDING: JP11 is from the 21st, that is right; and the one that was submitted to the Inquiry, if I could see it again on screen --

MR DINGEMANS: BBC/1/54, from recollection.

MR WILDING: Could we have that on screen? Yes. Well, we can clearly see that there are differences here. The difference that struck me as interesting particularly is there is no mention of "Campbell" in this memo.

MR DINGEMANS: In JP11?

MR WILDING: In JP11, which also produces a hexadecimal -- sorry, I am leaping ahead of myself. Yes, JP11.

MR DINGEMANS: When is the first time you see the word "Campbell" mentioned?

MR WILDING: I do not see the word "Campbell" mentioned in this memo.

MR DINGEMANS: No. If I take you to JP15.

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Is that the first memo that mentions the word "Campbell"?

MR WILDING: I believe JP12 does, which is -- sorry, memo, yes. You are quite right. The first memo was JP14 that mentions Campbell.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. I think we are looking at JP11 and JP15. They are in those respects effectively the same, are they?

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: What were your conclusions from this?

MR WILDING: There are two -- well, there are a number of possibilities, to my mind. One is that the clock was back and during the meeting, if these notes were contemporaneous, the clock went forward through midnight and changed date, which I believe to be a possibility. Another possibility is that JP -- sorry, JP --

LORD HUTTON: Sorry, I am afraid I am not best in these technicalities, you will have to help me. If the clock went forward during the meeting, how does that explain the omission of the word "Campbell"?

MR WILDING: Well, that concerns me. The reason -- if the clock went forward it would explain that there are two related memos; but I do not really understand why the word "Campbell" is not there.

MR DINGEMANS: That is something Mr Gilligan may be able to assist with.

MR WILDING: I think he should, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: I will ask him those questions. So there are no technical explanations for that. But if we look at JP11 and JP15. On JP11, top left-hand corner, we have the 21st May 2003, 05 for May and 21, is that right?

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: And yet the first memo with Mr Campbell's name in it at JP15, if I am looking at that, that has 20030522, is that right?

MR WILDING: Correct.

MR DINGEMANS: Which means that we can tell this -- tell me if I am getting this wrong, the memo, JP11, predates the memo JP15?

MR WILDING: Correct.

MR DINGEMANS: And, secondly, if they were both made at the meeting then the clock must have been some -- assuming the meeting was 4 o'clock for these purposes, lasts an hour, then the clock must have been some 16 hours out?

MR WILDING: At least 16 and at maximum 40 hours is my calculation.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. You said computer clocks are frequently inaccurate.

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Between 16 and 40 hours sounds quite a lot of inaccuracy.

MR WILDING: Not in my experience.

MR DINGEMANS: Well, that is what I am asking about --

MR WILDING: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: -- so that you can deal with that.

MR WILDING: Very often people do not work by their clock on these sort of devices.

MR DINGEMANS: You have referred to some experimentation on the date and time. Do you know or have you been told who carried that out?

MR WILDING: My understanding is that it was some technical people from the BBC.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. There is only one set of experimentation, is that right?

MR WILDING: It appears so, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: After you produced your report, when did you produce your report?

MR WILDING: My report was dated, I believe, 12th September.

MR DINGEMANS: When were you instructed by Farahs on behalf of Mr Gilligan?

MR WILDING: I was instructed on 27th August, in terms of: yes, we want to do this particular exercise.

MR DINGEMANS: After you produced your report did Professor Sammes see it?

MR WILDING: Yes, he did and I was very keen that he should.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he make any comments on it?

MR WILDING: Yes, he did.

MR DINGEMANS: We are going to hear from Professor Sammes. Can you explain to a lay person like myself what the gist of the comments were?

MR WILDING: He made it clear to me that I had not followed best practice, which I did not find surprising given his eminence in this area and given the rather esoteric nature of the exercise we had to do.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he give you any pointers as to how you might remedy that?

MR WILDING: Yes he did.

MR DINGEMANS: When did that take place?

MR WILDING: We had a very constructive meeting yesterday of about two and a half hours.

MR DINGEMANS: Which is why you did not come and give evidence yesterday.

MR WILDING: Yes. We needed to resolve these issues.

MR DINGEMANS: And as a result of that what did you do?

MR WILDING: We came to an agreement whereby the admissibility of my evidence was called into question by Professor Sammes and yesterday we worked out a method whereby the admissibility of that evidence --

MR DINGEMANS: On these two memorandum?

MR WILDING: On these memorandum, could be retained, which was fixed yesterday I believe, but Professor Sammes will probably have more detail about that. So at least we can trust the memoranda are true representations of what --

MR DINGEMANS: What did Professor Sammes need you to do?

MR WILDING: He needed us to produce the memoranda that we found in what is called a hexadecimal format, which is --

MR DINGEMANS: Do not bother. In a format. And he asked you to send that to him?

MR WILDING: Yes, indeed: yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you send to him the documents that we see in hard form here?

MR WILDING: We do. There is a continuity issue because Professor Sammes, last night, received all of the -- I am going to use the word again -- hexadecimal format. Last night he received all of that by e-mail. Just on a continuity issue, I can cover for that and say that all the material that is represented here in hexadecimal format is the same material that went to him last night, although it is referred to as different exhibit numbers here.

MR DINGEMANS: Why was he concerned before?

MR WILDING: He was very concerned because he had advised me that on this type of organiser there is a form of data compression that might materially affect the reliability of the evidence, in terms of: I had said that the word "Campbell", for instance, was not in one of these memos and Professor Sammes pointed out that because we had not decompressed the upload file, which is -- that we might have missed evidence or that evidence in these memos might not be in a contiguous form. So he wanted to assure himself that these memoranda were true representations of what was stored on the organiser.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you find out whether or not Mr Gilligan had saved this material to any other document at the time or any other computer at the time?

MR WILDING: Yes, on 27th August when I was instructed I asked Mr Gilligan about the back up system that he used. And he regularly used to back up the organiser, the data from the organiser to a laptop computer. And it was my concern on the 27th that it would be useful to look at that data as well.

MR DINGEMANS: Have you been given access to that by Mr Gilligan?

MR WILDING: On the evening of the 27th, on grounds of the confidentiality of the data, it was decided that I would be only given access to the organiser itself.

MR DINGEMANS: So you were not even able to do what you did with the organiser on that computer material?

MR WILDING: No.

MR DINGEMANS: A final document, if I may, JP37. I am not sure I can call it up. What does this relate to, in relation to experimentation?

MR WILDING: Yes. We cannot call this up but --

MR DINGEMANS: I am sorry, I told a lie. ANG/5/40. That should call it up. Is that JP37, if we scroll down to the bottom of the page?

MR WILDING: Yes, it is.

MR DINGEMANS: Going up again, what is this about?

MR WILDING: I believe that -- well, it is clearly somebody trying to test whether memos -- why clock dates would slip on memos, or the circumstances under which memos might show a wrong date and time. Well, date in this particular instance.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Thank you. Subject to that, is there anything else that you wanted to say in relation to your report?

MR WILDING: I believe that in the light of Professor Sammes' report that there may be further work that might be advisable and I think perhaps that the Inquiry should take that into consideration.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Okay. Thank you very much indeed.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Professor Sammes, please.

PROFESSOR A J SAMMES (called)
Examined by MR DINGEMANS

MR DINGEMANS: Professor, I am sorry, I am going to have to take you reasonably shortly.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Indeed.

MR DINGEMANS: But it is important you tell me anything that I am missing out. First of all, what is your full name?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Anthony John Sammes.

MR DINGEMANS: And your qualifications?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: I have a Bachelor of Science, a Master of Philosophy and a Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science.

MR DINGEMANS: Have you written any books in relation to computers?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Yes, I co-authored a book called "Forensic Computing: A Practitioners Guide".

MR DINGEMANS: Where are you based at the moment?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: I am currently based -- I am actually a Professor of Computing Science and Director of the Centre for Forensic Computing of Cranfield University, but I am based at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham, and Cranfield University provides higher education facilities to that college.

MR DINGEMANS: And the Royal Military College of Science is a Ministry of Defence establishment?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: It is indeed.

MR DINGEMANS: You have been instructed on behalf of the Inquiry; is that right?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: That is correct, sir.

MR DINGEMANS: To consider the report that was produced by Mr Wilding.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Yes, indeed.

MR DINGEMANS: He has told us that he produced his report, I think on 12th September he told us. Did you look at that report?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Yes, I did. Just checking, if I may, my notes. I received a series of faxes from Mr Martin Smith on Thursday 11th September, which --

MR DINGEMANS: Martin Smith is the solicitor to the Inquiry?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: The solicitor to the Inquiry, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Of Clifford Chance, yes.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: I received a copy of Mr Wilding's report and the four appendices associated with it, and a witness statement by Mr Julian Pike.

MR DINGEMANS: Right.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: And the 42 document exhibits.

MR DINGEMANS: You looked through the report that Mr Wilding had produced?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Yes, I did.

MR DINGEMANS: And you made, I think -- and history has overtaken it a bit so if I may go shortly, tell me if I miss anything out -- a number of detailed suggestions about what might be done.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Yes, I did. I had particular concern -- if I may just briefly explain -- that if the file had not been decompressed, which it had not --

MR DINGEMANS: What does "decompressed" mean?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: In order to save space in terms of saving the back up from the organiser, the organiser is quite large, in fact, it has quite a large memory and in order to save space a large number of same characters are replaced by that character and the number of characters that are there. So, for example, if we had 256 of the same number in the memory, we could in fact write that number with 256 after it, so we have effectively saved 256 spaces when we --

MR DINGEMANS: Or 255 spaces.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Or 255. Thank you. Indeed. 255 spaces.

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry.

LORD HUTTON: You can be described as very eminent too, Mr Dingemans!

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry, I interrupted.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: That is what we mean by compression. That is known as run length encoding. It effectively compresses the file and allows the back up to be carried out in a much shorter period of time and using much less space.

MR DINGEMANS: Why does it become important to decompress the file?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Because the files themselves are actually set up by a series of what are known as clusters. They are a little bit like pages in a book. Normally, when you are reading a book you go from page 1 to page 2 to page 3 to page 4, but the clusters, which if you like are like pages in a book, have a pointer at the top which says: now we have got to page 4, it is not page 5 next, it is page 27. So you then have to leap to page 27 and read the text there. And at the top of page 27 there may be a pointer which says: go back to page 6. Those are what are known as clusters. It is those pointers which are pointing to where you need to go next which you need to be able to see in order to be able to associate text correctly. What we say when we say "contiguous", we mean they are just like the pages in the book, one after the other. If they are non-contiguous, we are jumping out to different page and coming back again.

MR DINGEMANS: Putting it shortly, you were slightly concerned that the memoranda that had been printed off were not contiguous documents, is that right?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: We did not know, was the problem. In particular, the issue concerning the presence of the word "Campbell" or not was of particular concern.

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard about a meeting that you had yesterday and you suggested a practical way round, in the time available, this problem, is that right?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Yes. That was to reproduce the same information, not just in printed format but in a so-called hexadecimal format. All that does is gives us access to look at these pointers so that we could then examine not just the text but all the linkages as well, and confirm whether or not the text was correctly contiguous or whether there were jumps out to other places in the memory.

MR DINGEMANS: So the text was then e-mailed to you in a hexadecimal format, is that right?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: That is correct, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you look at it?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: I did indeed, last night. I went through it all. I expanded the files by decompressing them, and I examined each one in turn and I formed the view that all the text that I was looking at was indeed contiguous.

MR DINGEMANS: So we have now heard from Mr Wilding that the text that we have seen, the JP11 and JP15, was, for example, the text that he had sent you.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Not quite. I believe that there is a subsequent set of exhibits.

MR DINGEMANS: Right.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Which I am not sure that we have heard about yet.

MR DINGEMANS: Right.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Which were the ones related to the hexadecimal listings.

MR DINGEMANS: But those subsequent pieces of text appeared to have mirrored these earlier printouts?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: That is my understanding, though I have no way of confirming that.

MR DINGEMANS: That is what Mr Wilding has confirmed to us.

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Indeed.

MR DINGEMANS: As a result of that, assuming Mr Wilding is right about having sent you the correct texts, and then having printed it out again, are you happy that the documents are at least contiguous?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: I am happy that the hexadecimal listings I looked at last night which were sent to me were -- all the text in those is contiguous.

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Wilding mentioned some other matters you might want to raise. What are those?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: They particularly concern the expansion of the complete file, the decompression of the complete file, because the file does contain within it what in a normal computer system would be known as the directory, and it has got what is called a central directory which points to or would point to all the files.

MR DINGEMANS: How would that help?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: One of the things that it contains are records of numbers of deletions; so, for example, each entry may have up to six different pointers which every time that an item is deleted the pointer remains but the -- and a next item is used or a next pointer is used. So you could be able to order the memos or rather the possibility exists that you could order the memos if you could examine that information.

MR DINGEMANS: So with further work one might be able to put JP11, 12, 13 and 14 in an order?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: Precisely so.

MR DINGEMANS: May or may not, depending on --

PROFESSOR SAMMES: It depends on what one found, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Subject to that, is there anything else, in the very short examination that I have done with you, that I have missed out that is relevant?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: The only point I would like to make is to reiterate what Mr Wilding said, that the best evidence almost certainly would be that which is still within the laptop, because the back ups within the laptop are -- would, in fact, contain information much closer to the time of these events, that these events took place; and a forensic examination of the laptop would almost certainly reveal this kind of information, which could be very valuable to the Inquiry.

MR DINGEMANS: But we do not have the laptop?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: We do not have the laptop, no.

MR DINGEMANS: Is there anything else you wanted to add?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: The only thing is I would like to make an acknowledgement to Mr David Reidy, who assisted me when I e-mailed him with the information in this area.

MR DINGEMANS: And who is he?

PROFESSOR SAMMES: He is someone who has written software for this system in the past. He resides in the United States. I e-mailed him for support and he very kindly gave it to me.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Professor Sammes.

MR DINGEMANS: I think Ms Rogers is now going to deal with Mr Gilligan.

MR ANDREW GILLIGAN (called)
Examined by MS ROGERS

MS ROGERS: Mr Gilligan, this is the matter that we left from yesterday so that you could follow the experts having given their evidence to the Inquiry.

MR GILLIGAN: Hmm.

MS ROGERS: Can I first ask you this: we know that you handed your organiser to the BBC at some point; can you give the date on which that happened?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it was 18th July.

MS ROGERS: Did you carry out any experimentation on your organiser prior to that date?

MR GILLIGAN: No, in what respect?

MS ROGERS: Any experimentation. We have seen a test memo which was -- I do not have the reference. It is ANG/5/40.

MR GILLIGAN: No, that was not mine. That was done on the 23rd by somebody else in the BBC's technical department.

MS ROGERS: What, with Mr Dingemans' agreement, has happened is that copies of two memoranda have been handed out, I hope generally, so that people can follow where we are. The Inquiry has previously seen your notes on the organiser. They are at BBC/4/198. I fear there may be another reference too, but ...

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Who produced those notes for this Inquiry?

MR GILLIGAN: That was produced by the BBC. They took the -- they downloaded the organiser on to a PC. They found this file, which is dated 22nd May 2003, and --

MS ROGERS: I think if we scroll down we see another.

MR GILLIGAN: They produced printouts of it and submitted to the Inquiry. There is also a second file kellycont with the same date of it. A printout of that was produced and also submitted to the Inquiry. This is the notes that the Inquiry has been dealing with.

MS ROGERS: When you looked at the organiser, were you aware of any other files on your organiser at that time?

MR GILLIGAN: No. These two files, kelly.txt and kelly[underscore]cont.txt, are the ones that come up and indeed come up to this day when you look in the index of the organiser.

MS ROGERS: I hope you have, or if not you can be given JP11 and JP15.

MR GILLIGAN: Can I have it, please? (Handed).

MS ROGERS: If your Lordship has a file, it is in tab 1. They have been placed, I hope, so that both can be looked at at the same time?

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Very well.

MS ROGERS: Can you first of all identify the document on the right-hand page?

LORD HUTTON: Sorry, I have the two pages -- I can look at them together. JP11 and JP15.

MS ROGERS: There is a file in which they are set out, so they are --

LORD HUTTON: Oh yes, I think that is it. Yes. Oh yes, I have. Yes. Yes. That is very helpful. Thank you.

MS ROGERS: Essentially what has been agreed with Mr Dingemans is I am going to identify the differences and take you through them for the opportunity to comment on them.

MR GILLIGAN: Sure.

MS ROGERS: First of all, can you tell me -- we know that there is the extant file which we have just looked at -- the one that is produced to the Inquiry.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: That we also know is identical to JP15.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Can you tell us when JP15 was created, first of all?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. JP15 was created at the meeting with David Kelly. There were two saves of this file in the organiser. The one on the left that you see which has the date of the 21st on it, and the one on the right which has the date of the 22nd, indicating that the organiser's clock crossed midnight during the meeting. The one on the right, the 22nd, is the final saved version of the notes taken at that meeting.

MS ROGERS: When did you create that document?

MR GILLIGAN: At the end of the meeting with David Kelly, when I was agreeing the quotes I would use with him. It was the result of the checks I did with Dr Kelly at the end of the meeting. It overwrote the version of 21st May.

MS ROGERS: Looking at the version on the left for a moment, we see that about halfway down the page there is a reference to "45 min was single source". Can you tell us when and from whom you obtained that information?

MR GILLIGAN: From Dr Kelly.

MS ROGERS: And when?

MR GILLIGAN: At the meeting on 22nd May.

MS ROGERS: Is it possible you obtained that information on the 21st May?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I did not.

MS ROGERS: Can we take the document on the right and together put some numbers by text. If we put the number 1 by the first paragraph which starts "transformed [week before] pub..." Then put the number 2 by "most people in [intelligence]..." 3 by "Campbell". 4 by the side of the "real [information]", those two lines. 5 by "[uranium] from Africa". 6 by "10-15 [years ago]." 7 by "it was small..." 8 by "no usable [weapons]." 9 by "in one of the [jan]", put a bracket down running down from that, right down through nine lines of text ending in "[Middle East]".

LORD HUTTON: It is my fault. I have not discovered "Middle East".

MS ROGERS: It actually says "in ME". I am sorry, I am working from the expanded version as read by Mr Gilligan. It actually says on this file "in ME", that is in Middle East.

LORD HUTTON: I have a line "headed by major general"; where is it in relation to that?

MS ROGERS: It is four lines up. So the bracket runs from: "In one of the jan." The bracket closes after "in ME". Then we open a new bracket, 10, which runs from "there has been [proliferation]" down to the mysterious words "isqbay".

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: I hope if everyone has those references this will help when we look at the text. Over on the left-hand side of the page, four or five paragraphs down, we see the words "the dossier was transformed in the [week] before] [publication]". Could I ask you to put a 1 by the side of that? Looking a little further down to "45 min was single-source", could we put 1(a) beside that? Mr Gilligan, if one looks at the paragraph marked 1 on the left-hand page and 1 on the right-hand page, I am going to identify the differences. The words "the dossier was" do not appear. We start with "transformed". We have "week "wk" rather than "wekEK" and we have "pub" instead of "publish".

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Can you explain those changes?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. The second file, JP15 file, the one on the right, is the file I created at the end of the meeting when I was checking the quotes with Dr Kelly. The --

LORD HUTTON: Mr Gilligan, again I am sorry, you will have to help me with this. You say you created JP15 by writing this and noting this on your personal organiser, is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Had you already written something on your personal organiser in the course of that meeting?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I had already written JP11, that is the one on the left. That was the first save of my notes at that meeting. And the one on the right is the final save. And the changes in order of --

LORD HUTTON: I am sorry. In other words, in the course of the meeting you wrote down on your organiser what appears in JP11; is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Well, then, on JP15, which you wrote at the end of the meeting when you were checking quotes, is that a complete rewriting or is it a filling in of the earlier writing?

MR GILLIGAN: No, it is a revision to the original file which you see at JP11. To reflect the agreement of the quotes that I made with David Kelly, as I said in my earlier evidence, I agreed several of the key quotes that I would use with him. And this is me running past -- running the quotes past him and checking those quotes.

LORD HUTTON: May I ask you again, just for me to understand this: is it analogous to the position if I had interviewed Dr Kelly and had made longhand notes but had not got everything down, and I then -- suppose I had done that with a blue pen and then I went back over it to check matters and where I wanted to add words with his agreement I would write in words with a red pen. Is that very roughly what it was?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that is it; and, you know, in some cases he asked me to change one or two things. In some cases he expanded on what he had said in the earlier part of the meeting.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes.

MS ROGERS: Can I just ask you this: as you are taking notes during the conversation, are you getting down every word verbatim?

MR GILLIGAN: No.

MS ROGERS: So on the text on the right-hand page we see the words "[most things in] dossier were [double source] but that was single-source", and on the left-hand side of the page in the paragraph marked 1 those words are not there but there are three dots.

MR GILLIGAN: That is right.

MS ROGERS: Can you explain the change?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. Essentially this is me going over the quotes I wanted to use with David Kelly. I read them to him and he expanded on them for me in a couple of points. For instance, in that section about the 45 minutes, you will see that the original text says "the classic was the 45 [minutes]... one source said it took 4" should be 45 minutes "to set up a rocket launcher ... and that was misinterpreted". When I read back that quote he said "the classic was the 45 minutes" was fine; and then he said: Yes, most things in the dossier were double source but that was single source, and he asked me to change "rocket launcher" to "missile assembly", so -- which I did. And the rest of the quote is as he originally gave it.

MS ROGERS: Looking at the second paragraph on the right-hand page, can you look over to the left-hand side and about a third of the way down you see the words "most people in [intelligence] weren't happy". So will you put a 2 beside that? We know that there are no changes there. Paragraphs 3 and 4 and 5 do not appear on the left-hand page. Can you explain why it is that they do not appear on the left but they do appear on the right?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. This is the passage about Campbell, among other things. I cannot remember how far into the conversation that Campbell came up. This suggests it came up near the end, in the quote checking process, but I cannot be absolutely sure about that. What I do know is that when we were going over the checks then the words that appear there were spoken by David Kelly. We expanded on this section. He said -- this is when he made the point about it being real information but unreliable and "included against our wishes".

LORD HUTTON: I am sorry, does that mean that the name "Campbell", whether it was first uttered by you or by Dr Kelly, only arose when you were going through, at the end, with Dr Kelly, what he had already told you?

MR GILLIGAN: I cannot remember why I did not note it in the first version. It may be that he was going too fast, I did not get it down the first time. But what happened at the end was that the -- that when we were going over the quotes I was asking him whether there were -- whether I could use the Campbell quote, as I mentioned in my earlier evidence, and he said the words that appear in those notes.

LORD HUTTON: May it have been that the word "Campbell" was not uttered by you or by Dr Kelly until you were going over what he had previously told you at the end of your discussion?

MR GILLIGAN: That may be the case; but again, at this distance of four months I cannot remember. I was going on the JP15 note, which is the only sort of extant version in the organiser.

LORD HUTTON: But why does "Campbell" then appear towards the start of that note?

MR GILLIGAN: This is -- the notes are -- the notes are in the order of -- in which I discussed them with Dr Kelly, the quotes. Clearly the key quote of the exchange from my point of view was "transformed the week before it was published to make it sexier" and the second most important quote was "the classic was the 45 minutes". Those were the first two quotes I sought to check with David Kelly. So there the second, the JP15 version, shows the order in which I discussed them with Dr Kelly when I was checking them.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MS ROGERS: We have compared the taking of this kind of note with using a paper and pen. Do you ever use word processing software like Word?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I do, yes.

MS ROGERS: Is there any comparison between using Word to edit documents and using the organiser?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, you can move blocks of text around; you can cut and paste; you can -- it is not as sophisticated a word processor, as Word, but you can do that kind of thing certainly.

MS ROGERS: So it is possible if you want to move text to move it or to overwrite it?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it is, yes.

MS ROGERS: After paragraph 5, that is the uranium from Africa, that is another one which does not appear on the left-hand page. At 6 we have "10-15 years go there was a lot of info". If one looks to the left it is just above the halfway mark. So one can put a 6 by that text on the left-hand page. Again, there is no change in the substance. On the right-hand page, paragraph 7, again one can see it on the left-hand page about a third of the way up "it was small because you [could not] conceal a [large programme]." One sees I think a difference in spacing but not in text. If one puts a number 7 by the words "it was small" it has to cover three lines of text there as opposed to two lines of text. Again, is that a change that you can explain?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, the final saved version of the file reflects the order in which I discussed the quotes with Dr Kelly; and some of the -- he said some extra things at the end that I have put in there.

MS ROGERS: Sorry, it is not a change in the substance of the text, it is a change in the format, in the layout of it. There is a line break, I think one would call it, on the left.

MR GILLIGAN: Where are we looking at here?

MS ROGERS: If you see the words "it was small"?

MR GILLIGAN: Hmm, hmm.

MS ROGERS: If one can put a 7 beside that.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: To include "the sanctions were effective, they did limit programme".

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Looking on the right-hand page -- it may not be the most important point in the world -- one sees that it is reduced to two lines of text rather than two lines of text and a space.

MR GILLIGAN: That again probably reflects the moving around of some text to -- in accordance with the quote checking.

MS ROGERS: 8 is "no usable [weapons]" and that is not reflected on the left-hand page?

MR GILLIGAN: That is right, that is something he said -- that is something extra he said at the end.

MS ROGERS: Is your recollection clear about that or are you working backwards from the document?

MR GILLIGAN: My recollection on that is reasonably clear.

MS ROGERS: There is a large block of text which we have bracketed as 9 on the right-hand page. If we look at the left, this is the first eight lines of text. We could bracket that and put a 9 by the first eight lines. If we look at the left, the line "not much coming out of detainees despite financial inventives [that should be incentives I think] ... they are..." is incomplete. If we look at the right-hand page we see the additional words, which you have explained are "in [quite good conditions] in [the Middle East]".

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. When I was reading that back I noticed it was incomplete and went over the phrase again with Dr Kelly; and that was what he finished it off as.

MS ROGERS: Do you know why it was incomplete on the left-hand page?

MR GILLIGAN: I think it was just that he was speaking too fast for my typing.

MS ROGERS: On the right-hand page we have marked a block of text with a 10. If we look on the left-hand page, it is towards the bottom, "there has been proliferation", one can bracket that as a 10, right the way down to "it is a big handicap..." There is no change at all between those two.

MR GILLIGAN: No.

MS ROGERS: There is some text, if this has been marked on the left-hand page now, there is some text which does not have a marking by it, for example the single word "Saddam" which falls between blocks 7 and 10 on the left-hand page. Can you explain why that does not appear on the right?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, it simply was not written. I do not know what "Saddam" refers to there. But it was not written in the final version when we were checking the quotes.

MS ROGERS: Moving up a little bit more there are three lines of text: "Iraq Survey Group -- 1500 -- six months to 2 years. "War was a tragic failure of diplomacy, no direct [effort] to [engage] Iraq. "It was a football for everyone." Those words do not appear on the right. Can you explain that?

MR GILLIGAN: This was something he did not want me to include. He had not been against the war but I think he was more ambivalent about it by May, but he did not want me to include those words in any form. He was emphatic about that.

MS ROGERS: On the left-hand page, as well, we have, right at the foot of the page, "real debate as to whether the mobile labs are what they appear to be..." Could I just ask you to mark that with an 11? I was going to turn now to the other file, the Kelly continuation file, which is JP23 and JP25. The top two lines we can mark with the number 11 because that is the two lines which were on the foot of JP11. No change between the --

LORD HUTTON: I am sorry.

MS ROGERS: It should be in tab 2, my Lord, I am sorry. We have done the same, I hope.

LORD HUTTON: Yes, that is very helpful. Thank you.

MS ROGERS: The top two lines on JP25 can have the number 11 because they are the last two lines of text from JP11.

LORD HUTTON: Number 5?

MS ROGERS: I am sorry?

LORD HUTTON: You say put the number 5 against that?

MS ROGERS: 11, sorry. It is the last two lines.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Very well.

MS ROGERS: Again, what we have on these two memos is essentially the mirror of what we have been looking at. So we have a file dated the 21st according to your computer and a file dated the 22nd according to your computer. Again, can you confirm or explain when the document on the right, JP25, was made and when the document on the left, JP23, was made?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, both were made at the meeting. They are, again, first saves and final saves of the continuation memo of my conversation with David Kelly.

MS ROGERS: On the right-hand document, JP25, we can bracket all of the text, barring the first two lines, and mark it as 12. And we see that it is identical to the text on the left, including the typo of "enormosu" instead of "enormous", with two small differences. First of all, looking on the left we see three lines up from the bottom "his arsenal was small". If we look on the right we see "his [programme] was small". Comments on the change?

MR GILLIGAN: That was something again which David Kelly asked me to change after I had discussed it. I mean, he said that the -- that the word should be "programme" not "arsenal".

MS ROGERS: The second and final change is the additional words which we see on the penultimate line on the right "not really [mass destruction] in true meaning of] [w]ord". Again, we can look on the left we see they are not there. Can you explain why they are there on the right?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. Again this is something that David Kelly added when we were discussing the quotes at the end. It was just something that he said. Indeed, I know several of his colleagues have said the same sort of things in evidence to the Inquiry.

MS ROGERS: If it is to be suggested that you might have made the notes at JP15 and 25 at some time after you left the Charing Cross Hotel, how would you respond to that?

MR GILLIGAN: I would say no.

MS ROGERS: We know, because they have been produced by the experts, that there are a number of other versions of the document. There is a batch -- these have been copied only in hard copy form for your Lordship and for the lawyers. I am afraid we have not bothered with the ...

LORD HUTTON: Yes, very well. Yes.

MS ROGERS: So far as other copies are concerned, I think we can have them on screen. There is a JP14. It is probably ANG/5/17. I think there is a plus 3, just so that people with the screens can follow it. With Mr Dingemans' consent I will just identify the single change in this document. After the word "misinterpreted" we see that there is a single full stop. In JP15 there is a double full stop. I think, given the time, I will not ask for a comment about that. There are two further documents which Mr Wilding has identified -- these are the tab 3 documents, JP12, JP13, which are clipboard documents, which means the text has been copied in some form. I am not going to ask you about those. I am going to ask you about some documents which were created on 26th June, which are JP1 to JP7. I say they are dated the 26th, what I should have said is that the computer clock shows 26th June. Can you say why there are copy documents in the memory of your computer dating from that time?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. At some point in June, as the clipboard you have just referred to shows, I created copies of the original files, leaving the originals unaltered, and the copies served as aide memoire for me which I could flesh out or add explanations to without compromising the originals. The originals remained unaltered and they remained in the organiser as they were.

MS ROGERS: Were any of these documents live on the organiser when you provided it to the BBC?

MR GILLIGAN: No.

MS ROGERS: Can I simply tell the Inquiry this: there has been a mistake in the fact that JP1 to JP6 had been printed off. There in fact are not six copies on the organiser memory. What has happened is that for some reason a document has been photocopied six times. So there should in fact be JP1 and JP7 only.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.

MS ROGERS: That is a mistake somewhere in our machinery, the photocopying. It is nothing to do with Mr Gilligan. There is a second set of memoranda which have been dragged from the memory which bear the computer date 30th June. Again, can you comment on those?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. These were the copies I just described. They are aide memoire for me so I could flesh out what was in them. If I needed to, you know, talk about it at a Select Committee or something like that. And again these are not the same as the originals, which were separate and which have remained unaltered.

MS ROGERS: I should have identified them for your Lordship. They are in tab 6 of the file, they bear the numbers JP9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20. Did you show these versions which bear the computer date 30th June to anyone else?

MR GILLIGAN: No, the only versions which have been produced are those which were created on 22nd May.

MS ROGERS: There is a document, JP21, which is in tab 7 of your Lordship's file. That bears the computer date 1st July 2003. That document is identical to JP15. Can you explain why there is a file copy dated 1st July?

MR GILLIGAN: I think some of these copies are simply views, they are times when I actually went and just looked at the file and a record has been left in the memory for some reason. Maybe I went in in the edit mode by mistake. But this is an identical copy and it is simply a view. So in other words, I simply had a look at it on 1st July.

MS ROGERS: Did you know the copy was there?

MR GILLIGAN: No, there are no copies of any description in the interface of the organiser other than the 22nd May ones.

MS ROGERS: Can we just identify for the record, we have been dealing with the memoranda all related to JP15, the first file. If we were to look at JP22, 27, 28 and 29, we see copies of the second Kelly file, the short Kelly file, bearing the dates 26th and 30th and 1st July. If there are any alterations in them, I am afraid they have escaped me. Again, can you explain why those exist in the memory of your organiser?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, again, these are copies; and they were taken on exactly the same principle as the copy of the main file, so I could have something to refer to without compromising the integrity of the original file.

MS ROGERS: Finally, on these documents, we have JP8. It should be in tab 9 of the hard copy file for those who have it. We know, because Mr Wilding has confirmed, a file with a SYS marking is a clipboard file. We see there is some text placed on the clipboard by being cut. Can you say when that was placed on the clipboard?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I cannot, but it is presumably something I used to create one of the copies of the second file.

MS ROGERS: Mr Gilligan, finally this: you were asked by the Inquiry to produce your organiser and agreed to do so. Professor Sammes and Mr Wilding have referred to source material. I wonder if you could say, briefly, what it is that you have on your organiser that led to confidential sources being discussed?

MR GILLIGAN: What I have is every contact I have, including their numbers, and in some cases notes of what stories they have helped me with. And in the memo field I have files detailing conversations, rather like the ones with David Kelly but with others. Several of those conversations would obviously be extremely sensitive and obviously would be of great interest to the Ministry of Defence. That is why I was and remain reluctant for the entire files to be examined by somebody, particularly if they work on a Ministry of Defence site.

MS ROGERS: I have nothing more for you. Mr Dingemans or Lord Hutton might.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

Cross-examined by MR DINGEMANS

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Gilligan, can I understand this: the gist of your evidence is this: that the reason for the two different memoranda is because one was produced as you were going through the quote agreement process; is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. The first one is the first save of the notes I took at the meeting; and the second one is the final save of the notes I took, which incorporates the quotes agreed with David Kelly.

MR DINGEMANS: And you say that the clock must have been between 16 and 40 hours out because it changed time in the middle of the meeting?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, Mr Wilding's evidence is that it is between 16 and 40 hours out. My own belief was it was probably about 16 or 17 hours out because it clearly passed midnight on the 21st during the meeting, which was at 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

MR DINGEMANS: When you went through the process of agreeing the quotes with Dr Kelly, did you have your organiser with you?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: If we look at JP11 and JP15, let us just take four paragraphs down on JP11, which comes to the top at JP15.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: "The dossier was transformed in the week before it was published". We can start to see at the top of the top of JP15 "transformed week before".

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: So you did not cut and paste the quote "the dossier was transformed" and just paste it up the page?

MR GILLIGAN: I did not cut and paste that particular sentence. I think I must have typed it again for some reason.

MR DINGEMANS: These Sharp organisers, it is not that easy to type on them. It is not like a keyboard, is it?

MR GILLIGAN: It is a keyboard it has, albeit a small keyboard.

MR DINGEMANS: It is not like a normal keyboard, it is a small keyboard?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: And it is therefore more difficult to type?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Cutting and pasting is the logical way of moving text around, is it not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it is; and, indeed, that is what I seem to have done on most of the occasions.

MR DINGEMANS: Do you know why you did not cut and paste this first one?

MR GILLIGAN: I think, perhaps, because it was the first and I was just getting it down as we spoke.

MR DINGEMANS: The whole of the quote agreement process, the whole of the quote agreement process, did you have your personal organiser out for it?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: And when you finished the quote agreement process, was there any other discussion between you and Dr Kelly?

MR GILLIGAN: The discussion was -- there was a later discussion just before he left about how he wanted to be described.

MR DINGEMANS: Was that before or after the computer had been put away?

MR GILLIGAN: That was after.

MR DINGEMANS: You see, on Day 3, 12th August 2003, this was before we had heard that the notes had been, as it were, changed and saved at the end of the meeting, you say this: "At the end of the meeting I agreed, as part of the quote agreement process, how I would describe him in any report that I did and offered him two alternatives..." And you then relay the two alternatives. So on Day 3 you are telling us that the quote agreement process, where you have your organiser out, included the description.

MR GILLIGAN: The quote agreement process was the agreement of the quotes; and that is what I had the organiser out for. Once I had agreed the quotes I put it away, and then just as we were leaving I asked him how he wanted to be described.

MR DINGEMANS: So in fact when you said on Day 3, and I will read exactly what you said: "At the end of the meeting I agreed, as part of the agreement process, how I would describe him in any report..." So that was just inaccurate, was it?

MR GILLIGAN: I think it was, yes. I mean, the quote agreement process to me is the agreement of the quotes, and that is what I meant when I used the words this afternoon.

MR DINGEMANS: Because yesterday when you were giving evidence, this is Day 19, page 32, after being asked about this by Mr Sumption, how you have recorded him: "It is not recorded in your personal organiser note or in the note that you gave to Miranda Holt on 28th May that Dr Kelly had this very prominent role... "Answer: No, but I conveyed it orally to the editorial team... "Question: If you were making a note of the most important things that he had to say to you and he really had claimed to have been one of those in charge of the process, you would surely have recorded that, would you not?. "Answer: As I said in my first evidence, I certainly should have recorded that; and I had put my organiser away by then, in fact."

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I believe I certainly should have recorded it, but I did not.

MR DINGEMANS: And this was therefore not part of the quote agreement process?

MR GILLIGAN: No, because it was not agreeing a quote, it was agreeing how he would be described in the report. As I say, I had in fact put my organiser away by that point, as I said in my evidence before.

MR DINGEMANS: After the meeting with Dr Kelly, did you access your notes again to revise them again?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I did not revise them. I did look at them, because I wanted to produce the manuscript note that we have discussed; and that was done from -- very largely based on these organiser notes and that was done the day after the meeting.

MR DINGEMANS: You did not revise those notes then?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I did not.

MR DINGEMANS: An obvious explanation for the notes having different dates would be this, would it not, Mr Gilligan: it is a day out. Day one is what you note with Dr Kelly and day two is your revision when you are producing your handwritten note. Is that what happened?

MR GILLIGAN: No, that is not the explanation. The organiser was not a day out, in my belief; it was 16 or 17 hours out.

MR DINGEMANS: I had asked you before when you gave evidence whether or not you used a pencil and notebook, because you have seen Dr Kelly's evidence in two passages where he referred to you using a pencil and notebook.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Dr Kelly was a scientist and we know he was interested in computers. I mean, he had seven or something, the police have told us, that were located at his property. If you had had a personal organiser, Sharp organiser, it is the sort of thing he is, as a scientist, interested in computers, likely to have recollected. Is that not right?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not know why he said I made notes with a pencil and notebook. All I can say is that my organiser, which is quite small, does look a little like a notebook when it is opened up. I do not think he was particularly concentrating on how I made notes. I mean, there are several inconsistencies in how Dr Kelly described the meeting and how I described the meeting. The time, for instance, is different. He said it was at 5. I said it was at 4. The duration of the meeting was described as different. So his recollection, quite understandably, of the meeting that he had had two months previously, you know, differs from mine.

MR DINGEMANS: That is entirely right; and different people will recollect different things. But sometimes scientists are more likely to be more accurate about things like computers or Sharp organisers?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not think that necessarily follows. I mean, as I say, this -- the organiser I use does look a little like a notebook. Maybe that is how the confusion arose.

MR DINGEMANS: Dr Kelly, you say, was the person who mentioned Mr Campbell's name for the first time.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, he was.

MR DINGEMANS: That must have come as a bolt out of the blue?

MR GILLIGAN: It was a -- it was certainly very interesting indeed, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: And yet on your first note you do not put it down.

MR GILLIGAN: That is correct.

MR DINGEMANS: When we look at your second note, it is hardly a long note, is it? It is "Campbell". How did you miss it?

MR GILLIGAN: As I say, I am not quite sure when the word "Campbell" was mentioned during the conversation. I know it was mentioned by David Kelly. But it may have come towards the end --

MR DINGEMANS: It might have come in the quote agreement process?

MR GILLIGAN: It might indeed. I mean, it is very difficult to recall at this length of time. Do not forget that the 21st May file, the first one here on the left, was only dragged out of the memory under the forensic analysis; and the version I was working from was the final save of the meeting, the 22nd May one.

MR DINGEMANS: Let me just take you to how you described the meeting once before, BBC/1/27. This is your Mail on Sunday article. I imagine this was accurate, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it was. Yes. Can I see it?

MR DINGEMANS: It is coming up.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: If we scroll down you talk about him, in the fourth paragraph, despairing about Downing Street and the dossier. Then, just where the words "Andrew" appear on the left-hand: "'Nothing changed', he said. 'Until the week before, it was just like I told you. It was transformed the week before publication, to make it sexier.' "'The classic', he said, 'was the statement that WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes..." Then he talks about that: "I asked him how this transformation happened. The answer was a single word 'Campbell'."

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: It rather suggests from that that you were saying Campbell was mentioned in the first run-through.

MR GILLIGAN: No, I do not think it necessarily does. I mean, I asked him how this transformation happened, it could indeed be something I asked rather later in the conversation.

MR DINGEMANS: Dr Kelly was clear that the words "Campbell" or the word "Campbell" as in Alastair Campbell had been mentioned at the meeting.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We have seen his evidence on that. But he has also been clear and consistent that it was you that had raised it. Does the fact that it is not in the first draft, where you are noting his answers but not your questions, suggest that it was you that raised the question of Mr Campbell?

MR GILLIGAN: No. I am not noting my questions in the second either, in the second version; and I will -- I will say again that it was he who brought up "Campbell" spontaneously, just as he brought him up spontaneously with Susan Watts in a conversation two weeks before.

MR DINGEMANS: Finally, a way of identifying as to timing what lag there really was on the personal organiser at the time, because once you have changed the batteries we now know the lag to be 1 hour 16 minutes but it could have been different, we have heard that from the experts, one way of chasing that down would be to look at the material you had already saved on your computer. Would you permit that to happen?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, absolutely. I am not sure it does resolve that issue, in fact. I mean, there is another way which Mr Wilding did in fact do, and it is described in his report, which is he looked at other files with dates noted in their titles and compared the date noted in the title of the file to the date on the organiser's date stamp. And again, he found rather consistently that the organiser's date stamp was a day or half a day earlier than the date noted in the title. So he was able to conclude that the organiser clock had indeed been substantially slow in the days leading up to the meeting of the 22nd May, and that is in his report. The download might help and I would certainly be happy to have that done.

MR DINGEMANS: Protected, again, to ensure that other sources were not --

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, absolutely.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, those are my questions.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. Mr Gilligan, your evidence is that the first mention of the name "Campbell" might have arisen when you are going through the interview at the end with Dr Kelly; is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: Again, I am not sure when it arose. It is difficult at a distance of four months to know precisely. It is entirely possible that it was in, for instance -- I mean, these may not be the only two saves of the file. It is entirely possible that there was a save of the file intermediate to this. It might be in that. Equally, he might have said it in the first bit and I just did not take it down. But it is entirely possible it was mentioned towards the end, but I cannot remember, I am afraid.

LORD HUTTON: Well, how could it have been mentioned towards the end? How would it have arisen?

MR GILLIGAN: We were discussing the -- we were discussing the quotes, "Transformed the week before publication to make it sexier"; and I would have asked a question, a supplementary question, something like that, which would have produced the answer.

LORD HUTTON: So, it was not just a matter of confirming quotes, you might have put some further questions to him about what he had earlier said?

MR GILLIGAN: I cannot remember exactly what I said at that meeting four months ago. As you can imagine, I have been racking my brains ever since the Inquiry was announced to try to put together a full picture.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR GILLIGAN: My memory is informed by the note I took on the organiser at the meeting, the note JP15, and, you know, that -- that informed -- that informed my memory.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you. Is there any other questions? Ms Rogers is there anything you wish to put? MS ROGERS: My Lord, no.

LORD HUTTON: Does that conclude the evidence? Ladies and gentlemen, I understand the suggestion has been made that to enable us to get through the timetable next week that we sit at 10.15 in the morning. I gather that whilst that may not be very convenient that there is no strong dissent. Am I correct in thinking that everyone is reasonably agreeable to that? Yes. Thank you very much. Then we will sit at 10.15 on Monday. There is another matter I would just like to mention which is this: I know that many of the members of the press have had to forego their summer holiday to report on this Inquiry and understand they wish to know if they can to make arrangements to have a holiday in October. I have been told that some of you ladies and gentlemen are concerned in case my report might be delivered in October when you are away on holiday. I shall of course try to deliver my report as quickly as I can, but there is no real prospect that it will be delivered in October and therefore holiday plans can safely be made for that month. I have stated that this afternoon simply to assist the members of the press. No inferences should be drawn from these remarks as to when I hope to deliver my report. I will probably make a further comment about this at the conclusion of the sittings.

(5.00 pm)
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