The Hutton Inquiry

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Hearing Transcripts

October 13, 2003: Morning

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

October 13, 2003: Afternoon

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

September 25, 2003: Morning

Jeremy Gompertz QC

Counsel for the Kelly family

Jonathan Sumption QC

Counsel for the Government

September 25, 2003: Afternoon

Jonathan Sumption QC

Counsel for the Government

Andrew Caldecott QC

Counsel for the BBC

Heather Rogers QC

Counsel for Andrew Gilligan

James Dingemans QC

Counsel for the Inquiry

Closing statement by Lord Hutton

September 24, 2003: Morning

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

Gavyn Davies

BBC

September 24, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

Nick Rufford

Sunday Times, journalist

Wing Commander John Clark

Ministry of Defence

James Harrison

Ministry of Defence

Professor Keith Hawton

Psychiatrist

September 23, 2003: Morning

Godric Smith

Prime Minister's Press Office

Tom Kelly

Prime Minister's Press Office

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

September 23, 2003: Afternoon

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

Assistant Chief Constable Michael Page

Thames Valley Police

September 22, 2003: Morning

Lee Hughes

Hutton Inquiry Secretariat

Geoffrey Hoon MP

Secretary of State for Defence

September 22, 2003: Afternoon

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

September 18, 2003: Morning

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Pamela Teare

Director of News, MoD

September 18, 2003: Afternoon

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

Pamela Teare

Director of News, MoD

Edward Wilding

Computer Investigator

Professor A J Sammes

Professor of Computer Science and Director of the Centre for Forensic Computing at Cranfield University

September 17, 2003: Morning

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

September 17, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Richard Sambrook

Head of News, BBC

September 16, 2003: Morning

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

DC Graham Coe

Police Officer

Dr Nicholas Hunt

Forensic Pathologist

September 16, 2003: Afternoon

Dr Shuttleworth

Defence, Science & Technology Laboratory

Kate Wilson

Chief Press Officer, MoD

September 15, 2003: Morning

Counsel's opening statement

Tony Cragg

Air Marshal J French

September 15, 2003: Afternoon

Sir Richard Dearlove

Dr Richard Scott

Greg Dyke

September 4, 2003: Morning

Olivia Bosch

Colleague

Leigh Potter

Neighbour

Tom Mangold

Journalist

Richard Taylor

Special Advisor to Secretary of State for Defence

September 3, 2003: Morning

Richard Allan

Toxicologist

Assistant Chief Constable Page

Steven Macdonald

MOD

Dr Jones

September 3, 2003: Afternoon

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Dr Jones

Mr A

MOD

Mr Green

Forensic Biologist

September 2, 2003: Morning

Ruth Absalom

Neighbour

Dr Malcolm Warner

GP

Louise Holmes

Search team

Paul Chapman

Search team

PC Andrew Franklin

PC Martyn Sawyer

Sergeant Geoffrey Webb

September 2, 2003: Afternoon

PC Jonathan Martyn

Vanessa Hunt

Ambulance

David Bartlett

Ambulance

Barney Leith

Baha'i faith

Professor Hawton

Psychiatrist

September 1, 2003: Morning

Mrs Kelly

Family

Sarah Pape

Family

Rachel Kelly

Family

September 1, 2003: Afternoon

Professor Roger Avery

Friend

David Wilkins

Family

August 28, 2003: Morning

Tony Blair MP

Prime Minister

Gavyn Davies

BBC

August 28, 2003: Afternoon

Gavyn Davies

BBC

August 27, 2003: Morning

Geoff Hoon MP

Secretary of State for Defence

August 27, 2003: Afternoon

Wing Commander John Clark

Ministry of Defence

James Harrison

Ministry of Defence

Ann Taylor MP

Chair of Intelligence and Security Committee

August 26, 2003: Morning

Andrew MacKinlay MP

Foreign Affairs Select Committee

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

August 26, 2003: Afternoon

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

Sir David Omand

Cabinet Office

August 21, 2003: Morning

Donald Anderson MP

Foreign Affairs Select Committee

Nick Rufford

Sunday Times, journalist

James Blitz

Financial Times, journalist

August 21, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Norton-Taylor

Guardian, journalist

Peter Beaumont

The Observer, journalist

Tom Baldwin

The Times, journalist

Michael Evans

The Times, journalist

David Broucher

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Lee Hughes

Hutton Inquiry Secretariat

August 20, 2003: Morning

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

August 20, 2003: Afternoon

Godric Smith

Prime Minister's Press Office

Tom Kelly

Prime Minister's Press Office

August 19, 2003: Morning

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

August 19, 2003: Afternoon

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

August 18, 2003: Morning

Pam Teare

Ministry of Defence Press Office

Jonathan Powell

Prime Minister's Office

August 18, 2003: Afternoon

Jonathan Powell

Prime Minister's Office

Sir David Manning

Prime Minister's Office

August 14, 2003: Morning

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

August 14, 2003: Afternoon

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

John Williams

Director of Communications, FCO

August 13, 2003: Morning

Susan Watts

BBC Reporter

Gavin Hewitt

BBC Reporter

August 13, 2003: Afternoon

Gavin Hewitt

BBC Reporter

Richard Sambrook

Head of News, BBC

August 12, 2003: Morning

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

August 12, 2003: Afternoon

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

Susan Watts

BBC Reporter

August 11, 2003: Morning

Terence Taylor

President and Executive Director for the International Institute of Strategic Studies (US)

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

August 11, 2003: Afternoon

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Julian Miller

Chief of the Assessment Staff Cabinet Office.


hutton.softblade.com

(10.30 am)

LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Yes, Mr Dingemans.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, can I just announce a few changes in the timetable? Mr Wilding and Mr Sammes, computer experts who were going to give evidence this morning before Mr Gilligan gave his evidence, are in the course still of meetings and they will not be available to give evidence until tomorrow afternoon. What will happen therefore will be that Mr Gilligan will give his evidence as planned, and after the computer experts have given their evidence tomorrow afternoon he will give some further short evidence. One reason there is space available tomorrow afternoon is that Sir Kevin Tebbit has just undergone an urgent eye operation and is not available, for medical reasons, tomorrow afternoon. The final change in the timetable is this, my Lord: on Thursday 25th September the lunch adjournment will take place between 12 o'clock and 1.15.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Dingemans.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, that is therefore Ms Rogers.

LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you very much. Ms Rogers; and Mr Gilligan, would you be good enough to take a seat please.

MR ANDREW GILLIGAN (called)
Examined by MS ROGERS

MS ROGERS: Mr Gilligan, it has been some time since you were in the witness box, going back to Day 3 on the 12th August. As you have heard, the computer experts are going to give evidence tomorrow and we are going to deal with any points that arise on that about your computer notes after that. There are a few points I would like to go back over before you are asked questions by Mr Sumption on behalf of the Government. The first matter is your meetings with Dr Kelly. You have already given evidence of your first meeting in early 2001 of which you have manuscript notes, your second meeting on 11th April 2002, of which you have a diary entry and some manuscript notes; and then there is a matter which arose from what Dr David Kelly had said, relating to a meeting which he believed had taken place in September 2002 and it emerged he thought he had met you at an IISS event. Have you carried out any further checks since you last gave evidence on that matter?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. I have confirmed with the IISS that I was not in fact at that event. They produced an attendance list showing that Dr Kelly was there but I was not, and if I had not been on the list I would not have been allowed to attend. I have also confirmed that I was on holiday during the time of that event.

MS ROGERS: I think the dates of that event are thought to be 12th to 14th September.

MR GILLIGAN: That is right; and I was, in fact, on holiday over that weekend. I think we have some documentation, boat hire documentation to support that.

MS ROGERS: You are right about that. That, we believe, is on the system at ANG/2/20. I can see your home address is on that document, perhaps that should have been taken off.

LORD HUTTON: I hope no-one will make a note of that. I am sure they will not.

MS ROGERS: I am sure it will be blanked out. One sees the start date, 13th September, and finish date of the 16th. This is a confirmation letter that you were perhaps a year ago on holiday.

MR GILLIGAN: That is right.

MS ROGERS: We also have a letter from the IISS, not on the system yet, that has been produced to the Inquiry confirming that Mr Gilligan was not at the conference. There was another meeting which Dr Kelly thought had taken place in February 2003, although we have not been able to find any date that Dr Kelly -- Dr Kelly did not give a specific date. Again, have you been able to check anything further as to the likelihood of a February meeting?

MR GILLIGAN: I have done some further checks. As I said before, there is no record of this in any of my diaries or notebooks. I can say that I was away for work for a good deal of that month. I was in New York for UN debates on Iraq and I was also in Germany at a security conference. I really was not in London much of that month of February at all.

MS ROGERS: So do you believe you met David Kelly at that time?

MR GILLIGAN: No.

MS ROGERS: We all agree there was a meeting on 22nd May and your organiser notes have been produced to the Inquiry. I am not going to go back to those now. You mentioned in your first evidence that you also produced a longer manuscript note. Can you say when you produced that?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that was produced the following day. It was a note from the organiser notes and from memory of what happened at the meeting.

MS ROGERS: Can you throw any further light on what has happened to that note?

MR GILLIGAN: I cannot find it. I think I have mislaid it. I have looked quite hard for it.

MS ROGERS: In addition to your organiser notes, there is a note that you produced for Miranda Holt, which is at BBC/7/61. Do you remember whether or not you had the manuscript note at the time you prepared this note for Ms Holt?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I did, yes.

MS ROGERS: Can you remind the Inquiry why you made this note?

MR GILLIGAN: This was a note requested by the programme when I offered them the story. They wanted a summary of David Kelly's main quotes. As I have said in my previous evidence, it does not purport to be a verbatim transcript of what was said but it is a record of the main highlights of what we discussed.

MS ROGERS: Is the handwriting at the top of this note yours?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I do not think it is.

MS ROGERS: Why did you not send your organiser note or manuscript note to Ms Holt?

MR GILLIGAN: They were not in a form I could send. The organiser note was on the organiser and it needs special software to print it out or to e-mail it. The handwritten note, I did not have access to a fax so I could not send the handwritten note.

MS ROGERS: Would you normally send original notes to the day editor or to the overall editor before doing a Today item?

MR GILLIGAN: No, only if asked.

MS ROGERS: Were you asked by anyone to send your original note prior to the broadcast?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I was not.

MS ROGERS: Now, in terms of what you then reported, you have already explained in your evidence why you regarded Dr Kelly as an authoritative source. You have also explained the steps you took after speaking to him. I am not going to go back over that. But I wonder if you could, since it has been a long time since you were here last, whether you could summarise in a few words what it was you wanted to report and why, in relation to your conversation with Dr Kelly?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. It was that one source had told us that the September dossier had been exaggerated, that it was transformed to make it sexier and that the classic example of that transformation was the claim that Saddam's military planning allows some WMD to be ready within 45 minutes. That information had not been in the original draft. It was based on a single source; and although it was real intelligence it was considered unreliable, it was considered wrong and it was considered misinterpreted. It had been included against the wishes of many in the intelligence community and most people in intelligence were not happy with the dossier because it did not reflect the considered view they were putting forward. That is what I understood David Kelly had told me.

MS ROGERS: We have lost the Miranda Holt note, but I think it is right that all of those points were reflected in the note to Ms Holt, BBC/7/61.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, indeed, and in the broadcast.

MS ROGERS: Had Dr Kelly said to you in terms that the Government knew that the intelligence was wrong or unreliable?

MR GILLIGAN: No. But he did say that the statement that WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes was unreliable, that it was wrong and that it was included "against our wishes"; and it was a logical conclusion to draw from this that those wishes had been made known, as we now indeed know to have been the case.

MS ROGERS: Looking back at the broadcast, we find the transcript at BBC/4/222. I am not going to go over this in great detail because I anticipate that is going to happen a little later. But you said in your first evidence that certainly viewed with hindsight it would have been better to script the 6.07 item.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that is right. I mean, the error I made here was in expressing the understanding I had that the views had been conveyed to the Government as something which Dr Kelly had told me directly. It was not intentional, it was the kind of slip of the tongue that does happen often during live broadcasts. It is an occupational hazard, which is why it would have been better to have scripted this one.

MS ROGERS: Can you scroll down to the bottom of that page? I anticipate what you are referring to is the sentence or phrase in the middle of that paragraph, which has been highlighted very much in this Inquiry, that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: You also refer, if we go over the page -- you use the word "ordered". Again, is that an exact word Dr Kelly had used?

MR GILLIGAN: No, it is not, but he clearly stated that the transformation of the dossier was the responsibility of Campbell, who had asked if anything else could be put in. So again, it was a reasonable conclusion to draw from what he had said.

MS ROGERS: In terms, also, of the reason for the non-inclusion of the 45 minutes, you say in this part of the broadcast, it is at the top of BBC/4/223, which I think is up, that the reason for the non-inclusion was that it had only come from one source.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. As I have said in my witness statement, that was wrong, although I do not attribute that particular view to David Kelly in fact. But that is clearly incorrect. The reason it came in late, which is now accepted, was that it simply was a matter of the timing when it arrived.

MS ROGERS: It arrived late, but it was single sourced?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Again, what this broadcast has been said to be is equivalent, essentially, to a charge of dishonesty.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Is that how you saw it at the time?

MR GILLIGAN: No, not at all. I mean, this was an allegation of spin, of exaggeration. Politics is an arena in which such allegations are the stock in trade. And this came as part of a continuing debate over the authenticity of some of the information in the dossier. And even on the morning of the broadcast, for instance, there were two or three articles in the newspapers, before I had said a single word, explicitly accusing the Government and the Prime Minister of lying over the dossier. So there was a continuing and lively political debate. This did not start it and did not set it off. This was regarded by all of us as a contribution to that debate.

MS ROGERS: If you had seen it as an allegation of out and out dishonesty, would you have done anything different in preparing the story?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. There is a process, a BBC process. Everything has to be scripted. The scripts have to be approved by the lawyers and everyone, including the presenters, has to stick to the scripts and that is for every appearance on the programme.

LORD HUTTON: That is if there is a specific and express allegation of dishonesty?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Can you give an example from your own experience of having to go through that procedure?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. About a year ago I did a story in which a British company offered to sell me anti-personnel land mines, which are banned of course. That was a criminal act, an illegal act. The relevant meeting was tape recorded. We had the sales manager on tape offering to sell us the land mines. Everything done on that story was scripted, including the presenter cues, including all the two-ways, and everything was passed through the lawyers and the lawyers had to approve every word and we had to stick to every word in all our output. The reason this was not done in this case was it was simply perceived as a different beast. This is a political charge essentially.

MS ROGERS: Was it suggested to you by anybody else, as part of the editorial team, that you should be using, we will call it the lawyered process?

MR GILLIGAN: No, it was not. And it was, you know, the story was thoroughly discussed by the whole editorial team.

MS ROGERS: If we scroll on down from the 6.07 unscripted item, we get to the 7.32. It starts on page 225. We see there John Humphrys giving the time and then introducing the item. If we look at the end of Mr Humphrys' words: "Are you suggesting, let's be very clear about this, that it was not the work of the intelligence agencies?" You go on to say: "No, the information which I'm told was dubious did come from the agencies..." Can you explain why you use those words? That is, as I understand it, before you get to the scripted part?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that is right. I was conscious that the 6.07 broadcast might have left some with the impression that this material had been in some way fabricated or that it was not real intelligence. That was not the impression I intended to give, and I think a reading of it does not support that impression; but I was concerned in case it had given that impression and I wanted to correct it at the earliest opportunity, which I did. And it was a correction I returned to at many points in the future.

MS ROGERS: Perhaps I will leave that. I will come back to that. You report on this story not just on the 29th but in later broadcasts, and I am sure that the Inquiry has them and you may be asked about some of them. But, in fact, is it right that the next day, the 29th itself, you were not reporting on this story at all?

MR GILLIGAN: On the 30th, no, I was reporting on a different story then, the potential dispatch of British peace keeping troops to the Congo.

MS ROGERS: Did you speak to anybody at the MoD about that story?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I did. I spoke to the chief press officer, Kate Wilson.

MS ROGERS: Do you remember what date you would have spoken to her?

MR GILLIGAN: That would have been on the 29th.

MS ROGERS: The only other matters I wanted to deal with, very briefly, in fact is the question of the 28th June, so we are moving on to a month after this broadcast, when there is a Today broadcast on a Saturday morning where Ben Bradshaw has an interview with John Humphrys.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Do you remember whether you heard that broadcast at the time?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I did.

MS ROGERS: What did you do after you had heard it?

MR GILLIGAN: When I heard John Humphrys say that the story had been checked with the MoD, I rang the Ministry of Defence duty press officer to remind her of how I had approached the MoD with regard to the story.

MS ROGERS: Do you remember who you spoke to?

MR GILLIGAN: It was the duty press officer, who is Leanne.

MS ROGERS: And why did you do that?

MR GILLIGAN: I anticipated that the Ministry of Defence might say that I had not run the story past them and I wanted to remind them about the call I had made to Kate Wilson on the evening of the 28th in which I had run the story past them.

MS ROGERS: I know that you are aware that Kate Wilson gave evidence about that call yesterday; but what was your purpose in ringing Kate Wilson on 28th May prior to the broadcast?

MR GILLIGAN: My purpose -- the programme team had decided that the way to include the Ministry of Defence -- the Government response to my original broadcast was to invite Adam Ingram, the Defence Minister, who was due on anyway to talk about cluster bombs, to answer questions on it; and two members of the programme team made calls to the Ministry of Defence to tell them about this and I made a third call to Kate Wilson at 7.30 in the evening of the 28th to -- again, to tell them.

LORD HUTTON: To tell them what, Mr Gilligan?

MR GILLIGAN: To give them the story that I was going to run and to allow them to brief Mr Ingram so he was able to respond to it.

LORD HUTTON: Did you give any details of the story you were going to run?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I gave the gist of the allegations, which is that the dossier had been exaggerated and that there was concern in the Intelligence Services about the inclusion of the 45 minutes claim or the ready in 45 minutes claim, and that people in intelligence did not think it reflected the considered views they were putting forward.

MS ROGERS: It is right that you have no notes of that conversation?

MR GILLIGAN: No. Indeed, I do not think Ms Wilson has either.

MS ROGERS: All we know is it lasted 7 minutes 24 seconds.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, 7 and a half minutes. I understand Ms Wilson has said I spoke about cluster bombs. I may have spoken briefly about cluster bombs but the cluster bombs story was not my story. I did not know what it was.

MS ROGERS: Had you spoken to Ms Wilson about cluster bombs on previous occasions?

MR GILLIGAN: I may have done, certainly. But on this occasion the cluster bombs story was another reporter's story. I did not know what the story was.

MS ROGERS: It is Ian Watson who is the cluster bombs story.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MS ROGERS: Had you done any work on Ian Watson's story?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I do not think I would have spent 7 and a half minutes talking about another reporter's story.

MS ROGERS: One final matter before I leave you to Mr Sumption. We have heard, since you gave your evidence last time, about an e-mail that you sent on 14th July to some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee Select Committee. I hesitate to have it called up, but it is BBC/12/22. Is there anything you want to say about that e-mail to this Inquiry?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. It was quite wrong to send it and I can only apologise. I did not even know for sure that David Kelly was Susan Watts' source. I was under an enormous amount of pressure at the time and I simply was not thinking straight, so I really do want to apologise for that.

MS ROGERS: Thank you, Mr Gilligan.

Cross-examination by MR SUMPTION

MR SUMPTION: Mr Gilligan, I would like to ask you first about your 6.07 broadcast, where you said that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong even before they put it in. You made a point a few minutes ago about the difference between dishonesty and spin. If a Government puts into a dossier which it lays before Parliament a statement which it probably knows to be wrong, is that an allegation that they are dishonest, in your book?

MR GILLIGAN: I think the allegation here that I was trying to convey was that the claim in the form in which it was made was considered to be wrong, considered to be unreliable and considered to be misinterpreted by many in the intelligence community; and that form being that Saddam's military planning allows some WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.

MR SUMPTION: But when you said that the Government probably knew that it was wrong, you were actually saying, whether you intended to or not, that they were dishonest, were you not?

MR GILLIGAN: The allegation I intended to make was of spin, but as I say, I do regard those words as imperfect and I should not have said them.

MR SUMPTION: And the reason why you should not have said them is that they did, in fact, accuse the Government of dishonesty, whether or not that was your intention.

MR GILLIGAN: I think that is probably right, yes. But I really did try and repeatedly make it clear on subsequent occasions that I was not accusing the Government of lying or fabrication. I said that the intelligence was real. I said at 7.32 -- I said on subsequent broadcasts on 31st May that I was not accusing the Government of lying or fabrication or of making this up. I said it also repeatedly to the Foreign Affairs Committee, to the Spectator and in The Mail on Sunday.

MR SUMPTION: I think you accepted on the last occasion that you gave evidence here, and more or less accepted this morning, that that particular allegation, that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong, was something that you could not support?

MR GILLIGAN: It was not sufficiently supported. It did not have no support. David Kelly did not say it in terms but he did say that the statement that WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes was unreliable. He said it was wrong. He said it was included "against our wishes". And the conclusion I drew from that was that the wishes had been expressed and the wishes had been made known, which is something we do now know to be the case.

MR SUMPTION: You accept, I think, that it was expressed by you as something that your source had said, whereas in fact it was an inference of your own?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that is right, that was my mistake.

MR SUMPTION: The same is true, is it not, of the word "ordered"; that was not something that Dr Kelly had said, it was Gilligan speaking not Kelly, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. It was my interpretation of what he had said.

MR SUMPTION: You have suggested in your evidence, on a number of occasions, a few minutes ago, for example, that you did not intend to make it at 6.07 and you expressed yourself in different terms at 7.32. I want to turn to what you did say at 7.32. You probably have in front of you, in fact I can see you do, a blue folder with a hard copy of your evidence last time.

MR GILLIGAN: Right.

MR SUMPTION: I am just pointing that out now. I will want to refer to it from time to time. It has also been scanned so it can be put on the overhead screen. What you actually broadcast at 7.32 was a slightly different allegation of bad faith, was it not? Namely, that the Intelligence Services did not want the 45 minutes point in the dossier because they thought that their informant had got it wrong. You said that the Government overruled them and put it in anyway. That was the substance of your statement, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: Did I use those words?

MR SUMPTION: No, it is the substance of it. Would you like to see the actual words that you did use?

MR GILLIGAN: I have them in front of me here in fact.

MR SUMPTION: For the benefit of everyone else, it is at BBC/1/5.

LORD HUTTON: What were the particular words you are referring to, Mr Sumption?

MR SUMPTION: If you have the transcript of the broadcast, at 7.32 we first of all have an introduction by John Humphrys. Then you say at the bottom of the page: "No, the information which I'm told was dubious did come from the agencies, but they were unhappy about it, because they didn't think it should have been in there. They thought it was, it was not corroborated sufficiently, and they actually thought it was wrong, they thought the informant concerned [I take that to be the Intelligence Services' informant] had got it wrong, they thought he'd misunderstood what was happening." Over the page, you go through some of the background, the circumstances in which the dossier was published: "This is quite a serious document. It dominated the news that day and you open up the dossier and the first thing you see is a preface by Tony Blair that includes the following words, 'Saddam's military planning allows for some weapons of mass destruction to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to deploy them'. Now that claim has come back to haunt Mr Blair because if the weapons had been readily to hand, they probably would have been found by now. But you know, it could have been an honest mistake, but what I have been told is that the Government knew that claim was questionable, even before the war, even before they wrote it in their dossier." Do you not regard that as being an allegation of bad faith?

MR GILLIGAN: The first part of the quote that you gave me, the information that they were unhappy about it, they did not think it should have been in there, they thought it was not corroborated sufficiently and they thought it was wrong, they thought the informant had misunderstood what was happening, that is a perfectly -- that is an accurate reflection of what Dr Kelly had told me. "What I have been told is that the Government knew that claim was questionable" is again my interpretation of what he had told me. But "questionable" is a word I would be happier about defending than "wrong" because quite clearly questions had been raised about this claim and they had been conveyed to Government.

MR SUMPTION: What you are saying, in that last sentence, is it could have been an honest mistake but what you have been told is that it was not, because the Government realised the claim was questionable when they put it in. That is my paraphrase, but it is quite plainly what is being conveyed in that sentence, is it not?

MR GILLIGAN: When I say it could have been an honest mistake, indeed earlier on in 6.07 when I said if the Government knew it was wrong, I am quite clearly expressing there that I do not adopt the statement as necessarily true. I am not making a hard and fast allegation of dishonesty and wrongdoing here; I am saying that this is something which has been -- something which has been said, something which has been questioned. I am not saying that we adopt it as true.

MR SUMPTION: But you just told us, Mr Gilligan, that it was not something that Dr Kelly said, it was an inference of yours.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it was the -- the path which led me to this is clear. Although David Kelly did not say it in terms, he said that the statement that WMD was ready for use in 45 minutes was unreliable. He said it was wrong. He said it had been misinterpreted. And that the Intelligence Services, that it had been included against the wishes of the Intelligence Services; and quite clearly those wishes would have been expressed. Now, the wishes included the questioning of this claim.

MR SUMPTION: You had read the dossier, of course, had you not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: And you realised, did you not, that the dossier had said, in terms, that it reflected the views of the Intelligence Services. You did realise that, did you not?

MR GILLIGAN: The dossier was described as a production of the Joint Intelligence Committee, yes.

MR SUMPTION: And the executive summary said that it reflected their views.

MR GILLIGAN: If you say so. I am not sure about that exact phrase.

MR SUMPTION: What you were saying, in both your broadcasts, was that when the Government put forward the dossier as being based on the views of the Intelligence Services, that was untrue because the 45 minutes point did not in fact reflect the view of the Intelligence Services as expressed to them. That is what you were saying on both occasions, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: The particular way in which the 45 minutes point was worded in the Prime Minister's foreword had concerned many within the Intelligence Services; that was the claim I reported, and it is a claim we now know to be correct.

MR SUMPTION: You did realise that the dossier had claimed to be based on the views of the Intelligence Services and in both your broadcasts you were saying that that was wrong because the Government had in fact been given views from the Intelligence Services that were inconsistent with it.

MR GILLIGAN: The concerns in the Intelligence Services about the 45 minutes claim as it was worded had been expressed to the Joint Intelligence Committee, to the assessment staff of the JIC, and that was the intention of what I was trying to convey.

MR SUMPTION: Is it the BBC's policy that when a serious allegation is made against public figures as coming from an anonymous source, it should be an authoritative source?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: Would you agree that is a basic principle of reputable journalism?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: Would you agree that one reason for that is that when you broadcast an allegation as coming from an anonymous source you are not just saying: I have met a man who has said these things, you are putting his allegations into the public domain as worthy of belief. Would you accept that?

MR GILLIGAN: As worthy of reporting, certainly, yes.

MR SUMPTION: Not as worthy of belief?

MR GILLIGAN: As I say, we did not adopt these allegations as true, but nonetheless their broadcast on a medium like Radio 4 implies a certain level of credibility to the source, which David Kelly had.

MR SUMPTION: You would not regard it as reputable journalism, would you, to broadcast an anonymous allegation which you did not think was worthy of belief?

MR GILLIGAN: We believed that this allegation was in line with a great deal else that had been said on this subject, and that it was consistent with other evidence which had emerged although, as I said in my earlier evidence, there was no corroboration for the exact claims.

MR SUMPTION: You had a number of meetings with Dr Kelly before 22nd May; and you knew, did you not, that he worked in the Ministry of Defence?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. My understanding of Dr Kelly's role was that he was a bit more peripatetic than that, that he, to use his own words, drifted between various Government departments such as the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence. He also did work for the Intelligence Services.

MR SUMPTION: In the BBC database of contacts he is described as working for the Ministry of Defence, is he not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: You knew he was a scientist and a senior adviser to the Ministry of Defence on chemical and biological warfare?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I had seen him described in one of the standard reference works as the chief adviser to the Ministry of Defence on biological warfare.

MR SUMPTION: Yes. And that was in substance, I am not quoting the exact words, how he described himself, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: He described himself as somebody who told the intelligence agencies what intelligence on WMD meant; this is at one of our earlier meetings. I mean, he was too modest to describe his own status, but I had ample descriptions from other sources of his status as the pre-eminent expert on WMD, particularly Iraqi WMD, in Britain and indeed one of the pre-eminent ones in the world.

MR SUMPTION: In your broadcasts on 29th May in the Today Programme you described your source as one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier; do you remember that?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that was a description I had agreed with him.

MR SUMPTION: Could we have up the actual text, please, at BBC/1/5 and following? That description suggests, does it not, that he not only contributed advice relating to his own special field but actually had managerial responsibility for putting the document together, he was part of the editorial team as it were? Would you agree that is what one would deduce from your description of him?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, and that was one of the reasons why I believed that the doubts he said had been -- had been made known or the doubts he said had been expressed would have been made known to others in charge of drawing up the dossier. His description as one of those in charge was another one of the reasons why I believed it was justifiable to say that the Government had known.

MR SUMPTION: Are you saying Dr Kelly actually described himself as one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier?

MR GILLIGAN: At the end of our May 22nd meeting I asked him how he wanted to be described in the reporting and offered him two alternatives, a senior official involved with the dossier or one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier. He was happy with both alternatives, he said: fine. I believe he agreed to the second description because he was in fact in charge of one section of the dossier.

MR SUMPTION: That is substantially the same as the evidence that you gave in phase 1; and as I understand what you said, both in phase 1 and just now, this came up at the end of your meeting on 22nd May?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it did.

MR SUMPTION: He had not at any earlier stage of the meeting said that he was one of those in charge of the drawing up of the dossier?

MR GILLIGAN: No, although at our 11th April 2002 meeting he had been -- he had described to me his involvement then in the dossier and he had said --

MR SUMPTION: In the other dossier?

MR GILLIGAN: No, in the dossier that was eventually to come out in September.

MR SUMPTION: Right.

MR GILLIGAN: And again, he had told me then that he advised on the -- he advised the Intelligence Services on the claims relating to biological and chemical weapons.

MR SUMPTION: He was talking about an earlier version of the dossier or an earlier dossier, but in fact what your note says, I can have it up on the screen if you would like, is "Kelly role to advise on all CBW claims in dossier"; that is what you are referring to, is it?

MR GILLIGAN: That is right.

MR SUMPTION: That is very far from saying he was in charge of drawing it up.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, but that was a description I agreed with him at the subsequent meeting in May.

MR SUMPTION: I would like to get some impression of this discussion that occurred at the end of your meeting of 22nd May. At the end of the meeting you were getting his agreement to the use of particular phrases?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: And when you came to the description of himself, as I understand your evidence, you offered him two alternative descriptions of himself: "one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier" and "the senior official in charge of drawing up the dossier". That is right, is it not?

MR GILLIGAN: No, that is not correct and there is a transcription error, I think, in LiveNote on this which we have had corrected. The alternatives I offered him was "one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier" or "a senior official involved in drawing up the dossier".

MR SUMPTION: Let us just have a look at the transcript of the evidence that you gave last time. You will find it at page 136 of the hard copy and I think arrangements can be made to flash that up on the screen.

LORD HUTTON: Mr Sumption, would you be good enough to give me the paragraph numbers at some stage?

MR SUMPTION: In the internal numbering it is page 136. In the top numbering it is page 19 of 37 in my version, but --

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much.

MR SUMPTION: The answer I have in mind is at line 11: "At the end of the meeting I agreed, as part of the quote agreement process, how I would describe him in any report that I did and I offered him two alternatives, one of the senior officials involved in drawing up the dossier or the senior official in charge of drawing up the dossier and he said 'both fine'. He just said either was fine." Is that evidence you wish to correct?

MR GILLIGAN: I have already corrected it.

MR SUMPTION: Tell us what the correction we should make is.

MR GILLIGAN: It should read: "At the end of the meeting I agreed, as part of the quote agreement process, how I would describe him in any report that I did and I offered him two alternatives, one of the senior officials involved in drawing up the dossier or one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier." So the words "one of". That was corrected immediately afterwards because we could see that that transcript had got it wrong.

MR SUMPTION: What exactly are you doing in this discussion? Are you agreeing a description of Dr Kelly which will disguise his identity or are you agreeing a description which will accurately describe his role?

MR GILLIGAN: No, we are agreeing a description with which he was happy.

MR SUMPTION: I am a bit puzzled by the fact these descriptions came from you. As I understand your evidence, he had not described himself in this way earlier in the meeting and yet at the end of the meeting you make suggestions to him as to how he might properly be described when he had not in fact said anything of that sort to you before?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, since I was the one to be doing the describing, I think it reasonable that I ask him how he wanted to be described.

MR SUMPTION: Well, you did not ask him how he wanted to be described, you suggested to him a description.

MR GILLIGAN: But, I mean, he was at full liberty to reject that description. He was very well used to dealing with journalists. He knew well that if he had not wanted me to use that particular form of words, he would just have said "no" and I would not have used it. I mean, Dr Kelly was not a man into whose mouth you could put words.

MR SUMPTION: He left you with the alternatives. You could take your pick between them, could you?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, he said fine.

MR SUMPTION: What do you see as the difference between the two alternatives?

MR GILLIGAN: "Involved" is clearly a lesser description, if you like, than "in charge of".

MR SUMPTION: So there is a difference, you accept?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, there is.

MR SUMPTION: And you were allowed to choose which description you were going to use, were you, even though they were different?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, the one does not -- I mean, "in charge of" does not exclude "involved".

MR SUMPTION: No, but the other one is much weaker, is it not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, but they were not mutually exclusive.

MR SUMPTION: As I understand your evidence, Mr Gilligan, you are saying that at a time when Dr Kelly had said nothing about his role in this dossier, you proposed two different alternative methods of describing his role, which were different, and he calmly said to you: you can choose whichever you like best. That is basically your evidence, is it not?

MR GILLIGAN: He said "fine" to either description.

MR SUMPTION: Is that really a credible version of events? You are suggesting that he left to you the decision of how you were going to describe his role as between those two alternatives?

MR GILLIGAN: If he had wished to make a different description, he would have said so at that point; and I would have of course used it.

MR SUMPTION: Which one of those two did you think was accurate?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, that was one of the reasons I asked; and I think it was absolutely clear that he was heavily involved in drawing up the dossier. I also believed, and we now know, that he was in fact in charge of one section. So the description "one of those in charge" is not in fact inaccurate.

MR SUMPTION: Dr Kelly, as you said a moment ago, was a modest man; he never made such extravagant claims about his own role, did he?

MR GILLIGAN: I am not sure. I have not had access to the full record of --

MR SUMPTION: To you, I mean. He never made such extravagant claims to you about the particular role which he had played in the drawing up of the dossier.

MR GILLIGAN: He had said at the earlier meeting, the April meeting, that his role was to advise on all CBW and chemical and biological weapons claims in the dossier. That struck me as a relatively wide ranging role, although expressed in modest language.

MR SUMPTION: You are thinking back again to the April meeting about the four country dossier?

MR GILLIGAN: No, the -- it had already been announced by that stage that a dossier exclusively on Iraq was to be published at some point.

MR SUMPTION: It is not recorded in your personal organiser note or in the note that you gave to Miranda Holt on 28th May that Dr Kelly had this very prominent role, managerial role, in the preparation of the dossier, is it?

MR GILLIGAN: No, but I conveyed it orally to the editorial team when I discussed the story with them on the 28th.

MR SUMPTION: If you were making a note of the most important things that he had to say to you and he really had claimed to have been one of those in charge of the process, you would surely have recorded that, would you not?

MR GILLIGAN: As I said in my first evidence, I certainly should have recorded that; and I had put my organiser away by then, in fact.

MR SUMPTION: He never said any such thing to you, did he?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, he did.

MR SUMPTION: Did you appreciate that if you did describe him as one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier people would take your report more seriously?

MR GILLIGAN: No, that was not the intention. The intention was to describe his function in respect of the dossier accurately.

MR SUMPTION: Do you accept that Dr Kelly never described himself to you as a member of the Intelligence Services?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: You accept that?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: Could we have up, please, BBC/1/18? This is a transcript of your Radio 5 Live broadcast on 29th May, shortly after the Today broadcast. If you look about eight lines up from the bottom of the page you say: "... what my Intelligence Service source says is that essentially they were always suspicious about this claim..." Why did you describe him as your Intelligence Service source?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not know, it was a mistake. It was the kind of mistake that does arise in live broadcasting.

MR SUMPTION: Is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: It is ex tempore. That was the only time in all my broadcasts, and there were 19 of them on this subject, that I described him in this way. That is a mistake that I have already admitted to.

MR SUMPTION: Did you realise if you described him as an Intelligence Service source people would find your report both more exciting and more credible?

MR GILLIGAN: No, no, that was not -- as I say, there was no conscious purpose in doing it in this broadcast, it was simply a slip of the tongue.

MR SUMPTION: Were you aware that the World at One on 29th May described your source as "a member of the Security Services"?

MR GILLIGAN: No.

MR SUMPTION: You were not?

MR GILLIGAN: No.

MR SUMPTION: Were you aware that Richard Sambrook, the Director of News, in his interview on the Today Programme on 26th June, described your source as "a senior and credible source in the Intelligence Services"?

MR GILLIGAN: Not until he said it. I was listening to the interview.

MR SUMPTION: And when he had said it, did you suggest that there should be some correction?

MR GILLIGAN: When I spoke to Richard about the source later that day or the following day, I did say that that was wrong.

MR SUMPTION: And was it corrected?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not know. I do not think it was, no.

MR SUMPTION: Do you know why not?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, that is not a matter for me because I did not say it.

MR SUMPTION: Yes, but I am asking you whether you know why not. If you do not, say no.

MR GILLIGAN: I do not know, I am afraid.

MR SUMPTION: Were you aware the Governors of the BBC described him as "an intelligence source" in their press release following their meeting of 6th July?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, when I read the press release.

MR SUMPTION: Were you happy with that?

MR GILLIGAN: No, but again there was not very much I could do about it.

MR SUMPTION: You could suggest it was time for a corrective statement, could you not?

MR GILLIGAN: The BBC, and I suspect other media organisations, do not work in a way where their reporters can tell the Governors what to say.

MR SUMPTION: You were perfectly happy, were you not, that your reports should carry the spurious authority of a senior member of the Intelligence Services when you knew they were not entitled to that authority, is that not the position?

MR GILLIGAN: Apart from that one 5 Live report, none of my reports, none of my references to this story in any way referred to the source as being a member of the Intelligence Services.

MR SUMPTION: Do you remember telling the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, when you appeared before them for the first time, that your source was in the Intelligence Services?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I did not. I was asked whether he was in the -- whether he was a member of the Intelligence Services, and I said a couple of times that I could not distinguish between the Intelligence Services and the Civil Service. I was asked to make the distinction and I said I would not. It was in reply to a question by John Maples.

MR SUMPTION: Could you be please be shown FAC/2/166? This is part of your transcript of your evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee first time round. Question 559, the Chairman of the Committee asks you: "Can I sum up the position as this: you approached, on your initiative, a source in the Intelligence Services?" And your answer is "Yes". "Is that correct? "Absolutely, yes. Well, I would characterise this source in the same way as a characterised him on the programme." Are you not giving evidence to this Committee that your source was in fact in the Intelligence Services?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I am saying there explicitly that I would characterise this source in the same way as I characterised him on the programme, namely as an official, a senior official involved in drawing up the dossier or as one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier. That is explicitly what I said to the Committee.

MR SUMPTION: Why, when the Chairman asked you whether you had approached on your initiative a source in the Intelligence Services, did you say "yes" instead of correcting him?

MR GILLIGAN: But I did correct him.

MR SUMPTION: You did not correct him, you allowed him to think that you had said in your broadcasts, as indeed you had said in at least one of them, that your source was in the Intelligence Services.

MR GILLIGAN: No, I corrected him. I said: "Well, I would characterise this source in the same way as I characterised him on the programme", the Today Programme --

LORD HUTTON: What do the words "Absolutely, yes" mean, Mr Gilligan?

MR GILLIGAN: That is -- I mean, that answer quite clearly says that I would characterise the source in the same way as I characterised him on the programme. I realise that the impression may have been given by that "Yes" that he was a member of the Intelligence Services, so I moved to correct it.

MR SUMPTION: If you realised you had been giving him the impression he was in the Intelligence Services, surely the right way of correcting it is to say: I need to correct that statement, Mr Chairman, he was not in the Intelligence Services.

MR GILLIGAN: I was concerned when people said he was in the Intelligence Services not to be that specific in correction, because that, I thought, would jeopardise the source because it would narrow it down too much. I wanted to -- I did not want to exclude the possibility that he was in the Intelligence Services because had I done that then the focus would have narrowed inevitably on somebody in the -- not in the Intelligence Services, which might have been too narrow and might have led to the identification of this source. That is why I used the correction in that form "I would characterise this source in the same way as I characterised him on the programme". If I had ruled out his membership of the Intelligence Services that would have narrowed down the source too much.

MR SUMPTION: In other words, you were reluctant to say to them that he was not in the Intelligence Services in spite of previously having said that he was?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I was -- I wanted to be consistent in my description of the source as a senior official involved in drawing up the dossier or one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier; and that description was accurate but it was not narrow enough to lead to the potential identification of the source.

MR SUMPTION: Could you, please, be shown FAC/5/26. This is part of your evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, second time round, on 17th July. At this point of your evidence you are saying -- let us read what you did say: "Based on a comparison of my evidence to the Committee and Dr Kelly's evidence to the Committee, the Committee has already come to the judgment that Dr Kelly was not the source." That was a reference to the Committee's earlier report and to the evidence which had been given by Dr Kelly the day before. You then go on: "He met me in an hotel, okay that is the same; he said he did not have access to intelligence information about the 45 minutes; he said he did not bring up Alastair Campbell's role in the dossier; he said he was not a member of the intelligence community; he said he was not in charge of drawing up the dossier, he said we did not start off by talking about the railways. I really do have nothing to add to my evidence or the evidence of Dr Kelly." Now what you are doing here is you are pointing to a number of things that Dr Kelly had told the Foreign Affairs Committee when he was giving evidence which were not consistent with what you had said about your own source. That, in summary, is what you were doing here, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: I was attempting to protect Dr Kelly as my source without --

MR SUMPTION: We will come to your motive in a moment. Were you seeking to say to the Foreign Affairs Committee that there were differences between Dr Kelly's role as he had described it and your source's role as you had described it?

MR GILLIGAN: I was reporting what he had said to the Foreign Affairs Committee at his appearance; and he had said that there were a number of differences between my account of our meeting and his account of our meeting; and I was using those differences to try to steer the Foreign Affairs Committee away from the conclusion that he was my source, a conclusion which they had already rejected.

MR SUMPTION: Each of these points that you list here from Dr Kelly's evidence is a point on which you were saying Dr Kelly did not resemble your source; that is right, is it not?

MR GILLIGAN: No, it is me reporting what Dr Kelly had told the Foreign Affairs Committee. I am not making a judgment on whether it is right or not. I was --

MR SUMPTION: No, but you are -- sorry.

MR GILLIGAN: You know, I was clearly -- clearly if I had said, "Well, actually this is wrong", then that would have identified Dr Kelly as my source, which is not something that I would want to do.

MR SUMPTION: What you are doing is pointing to inconsistencies between the description of your source and Dr Kelly's description of himself; you agree, do you not?

MR GILLIGAN: I was pointing to what Dr Kelly had said to the Committee; and he had said that he did not have access to intelligence information about the 45 minutes, for instance. Now, obviously I knew that to be wrong; but had I said it to be wrong I would have betrayed Dr Kelly's identity as my source. I was content, therefore, simply to report it. The purpose of this hearing was to -- this second committee hearing, was to try to get me to reveal my source, which is simply not something I was prepared to do.

MR SUMPTION: One of the inconsistencies that you pointed out in your evidence to the Committee was that Dr Kelly had said that he was not a member of the intelligence community. You pointed that out because you had said that he was, and that was therefore an inconsistency between the two descriptions. Is that not right?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, and he was a member of the intelligence community, the broader intelligence community which shared -- he had access, as he said himself in his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, to all the intelligence relevant to his specialism, biological and chemical weapons. He told me, and others, that he interpreted intelligence on CBW for the Security Services and he worked closely with them. We now know obviously that he had the highest security clearance and he was considered the leading expert in this field, which is intelligence dominated.

MR SUMPTION: You knew Dr Kelly had given evidence he might not be your source because he was not a member of the Intelligence Services; and you were seeking to throw dust in the eyes of the Committee by challenging that account as a description of your source, were you not?

MR GILLIGAN: I make a clear distinction between a member of the Intelligence Services, which was not something I said about Dr Kelly except on that one mistaken occasion which we have discussed, and a member of the intelligence community, which I think is a very fair description of Dr Kelly.

MR SUMPTION: Mr Pope deduced from what you have just said, if you look at question 268: "What you are suggesting is that Dr Kelly was not the source." That is what you were suggesting, is it not?

MR GILLIGAN: It was not in fact what I was suggesting. I was not making any suggestion. I was simply reporting what he had said to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

MR SUMPTION: There is a world of difference, is there not, between protecting your sources by saying nothing about them and telling lies about them?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, but I do not think I did tell any lies about Dr Kelly.

MR SUMPTION: You sought to mislead.

MR GILLIGAN: No, I did not. I think -- this is simply just a factual account of what he said to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

MR SUMPTION: Would you, please, look at a press release which you authorised to be issued on your behalf on 20th July, which you find at BBC/6/261? Would you like to read the first substantial paragraph there, the one under the heading "Statement issued on behalf of Andrew Gilligan": "I want to make it clear that I did not misquote or misrepresent Dr David Kelly. Entirely separately from my meeting with him, Dr Kelly expressed very similar concerns about Downing Street interpretation of intelligence in the dossier and the unreliability of the 45 minutes point to Newsnight. These reports have never been questioned by Downing Street. Although Dr Kelly had close connections with the intelligence community none of these reports ever described him as a member of the Intelligence Services, but as a senior official closely involved in the preparation of the dossier." That statement that none of the reports had ever described him as a member of the Intelligence Services was wrong, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it was. One out of 19 had described him as such, but it was a live broadcast and once the words are out of your mouth, the -- you know, I did not go back and look at transcripts.

MR SUMPTION: The truth of the matter is this, Mr Gilligan, is it not: you had made this statement in your 5 Live broadcast and you had allowed your superiors in the BBC to repeat it on a number of occasions; you kept up the pretence that your source had been a member of the Intelligence Services because you were quite happy with it, until the BBC decided, after Dr Kelly's death, that they would have to disclose that he had been your source; at that point you changed tack and said you had never said otherwise, because you now realised you were going to be found out.

MR GILLIGAN: No, that is not the case. As I say, in all but one of the broadcasts, and I did many, many broadcasts on this subject, I was scrupulous to describe -- not to describe him as a member of the Intelligence Services. The descriptions by others of him as a member of the Intelligence Services came before they knew what his status was, so they were not a matter for me. They were not as a result of my telling them anything false about his assignation.

MR SUMPTION: Your evidence was, I think, that you had told Mr Sambrook on the afternoon of his broadcast on the Today Programme on the 26th that he had not in fact been a member of the Intelligence Services?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, or the day after. It was either that day or the day after.

MR SUMPTION: We will ask Mr Sambrook about that.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: Can I turn to a slightly different subject and ask you whether you would agree that the normal practice, at any rate in the case of the BBC, when you are about to broadcast damaging allegations against Government is to notify the department concerned in advance so that they can, if appropriate, respond?

MR GILLIGAN: The practice is discussed on each occasion with the programme team, it is a collective decision for the team; and on this occasion the outcome of the discussion was that we would put the allegations to the Defence Minister, Adam Ingram, who was due on the programme to talk about another subject, we would broaden the bid, in the jargon, and that he would be able to respond for the Government on that issue.

MR SUMPTION: I simply would like to ascertain first of all what is the normal practice. Is it the normal practice, when you are about to make serious allegations against the Government, to notify the Government concerned in advance?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, and that is in fact what we did do.

MR SUMPTION: It is not just a question of fairness to the department and allowing them to respond, is it? You might get a response from the Government which would cause a reputable journalist to think again before broadcasting the allegations, at any rate in the form originally envisaged; do you agree?

MR GILLIGAN: I think that the denial we received from the Ministry of Defence and from Downing Street would not on this occasion have caused us to change what we broadcast.

MR SUMPTION: You would not have modified your 6.07 broadcast in any way if you had known that the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee had supported the Government's denial and accepted that he was happy with the dossier as it was finally produced? That would have made no difference to you; is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: The Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee did not feature in the Government's first denials.

MR SUMPTION: It featured very soon afterwards, did it not?

MR GILLIGAN: It featured, I think, about four days afterwards, on 3rd June.

MR SUMPTION: No, it featured on the same day as the broadcast.

MR GILLIGAN: Well, not to my knowledge; but, I mean, it certainly did not feature in the Government denials which were issued initially.

MR SUMPTION: The department concerned in this story was not the Ministry of Defence, it was No. 10, was it not? They were the people who were alleged to have sexed up the dossier?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Mr Sumption are you suggesting to Mr Gilligan that it was made public that the Chairman of the JIC associated himself with the denial at an early stage?

MR SUMPTION: I will check my facts on that. I was suggesting that. Mr Gilligan has denied it and I need to look back at it.

MR GILLIGAN: My understanding on that point was that the Chairman of the JIC issued a statement, or a statement was reported in some of the newspapers on I believe the 3rd or 4th June.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: I was not referring to a statement by the Chairman of the JIC but a statement by No. 10 that the JIC had endorsed the denial. I will look into that. It is a matter of record.

MR GILLIGAN: Hmm.

MR SUMPTION: Mr Gilligan, you accept that the department concerned was No. 10. You accept, as I understand it, that you never gave advance notice to No. 10?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: Could you look, please, at BBC/5/153. This is a letter from Richard Sambrook to Ben Bradshaw shortly after the interview which was referred to in your evidence-in-chief a few minutes ago. One of the things that Mr Sambrook says when he recites the facts about this advance notice to the Ministry of Defence is: "At 6.30 pm Andrew Gilligan spoke to Kate O'Connor [that is the same as Kate Wilson], the MoD press officer, about the cluster bomb interview and added there would be another story running on WMD." Was that an accurate statement?

MR GILLIGAN: Certainly the cluster bomb issue came up, because that was the reason that Adam Ingram had been booked to talk on the programme the next day. So I began by saying: Adam Ingram, you know, is booked to talk on the cluster bomb subject but I want to put another subject to him as well, and I described the story, as the letter says.

MR SUMPTION: This statement was based on what you told Mr Sambrook, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: I am not sure it was, in fact, because the time is wrong here, 6.30. It should have been 7.30. I am not quite sure where this comes from.

MR SUMPTION: Mr Gilligan, there was no written record of this conversation, so the only place where Mr Sambrook could possibly have got it from was you.

MR GILLIGAN: I think I had spoken to the Controller of Editorial Policy, Stephen Whittle, about this. I think Mr Whittle had conveyed some of it to Mr Sambrook. Sometimes some of these things get a bit lost in the telling.

MR SUMPTION: What is being said here and what I suggest what you had told your superiors within the BBC is that you spoke to Ms Wilson about the cluster bomb interview and added that there would be another story on WMD.

MR GILLIGAN: Well, I certainly began by speaking about the cluster bomb interview because that was the starting point for Mr Ingram's appearance on the Today Programme the following morning. I really had very little to say about the subject of cluster bombs because I did not know what the story was, it was another reporter's story. As I said earlier, I simply would not discuss another reporter's story with the Ministry of Defence, even if I had been able to. It is a breach of protocol.

LORD HUTTON: Mr Gilligan, can I ask you: what was your purpose, then, for ringing Ms Wilson?

MR GILLIGAN: It was to give her an outline of the WMD story so that Adam Ingram could be briefed to answer questions on it.

LORD HUTTON: Why did you refer to the cluster bombs story? Was it just, as it were, as an introduction?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Because you knew Adam Ingram was coming on for that purpose.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. And I said: you know Adam Ingram is booked to talk about cluster bombs, we want to broaden the bid to talk about the dossier; and I gave her an outline of the story.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: You also said to your superiors within the BBC, did you not, that what you had said about WMD was that it was not a matter for the MoD but for another Government department. Do you remember that?

MR GILLIGAN: What I said to the MoD was that I was not seeking a point by point response from the press office, I did not want them to go away and come back with a point by point response to the allegations that were made. I wanted them to notify Mr Ingram so he would be prepared to answer on the subject the following morning; and that was how both I and the programme team, which included the day editor, Miranda Holt, and the overall editor of the programme, Kevin Marsh, had decided how this story would be handled. Similar calls were made by two others on the Today Programme team on that evening, by Martha Findlay and by Chris Howard.

MR SUMPTION: Let me remind you of my question: I did not ask you what you had told the MoD, I asked you what you had told your superiors within the BBC, which was rather different.

MR GILLIGAN: Well, my answer is the same because that -- you know, that is -- as I have just said, that is what we had agreed, what my superiors, in other words Miranda Holt and Kevin Marsh, had agreed with me.

MR SUMPTION: Did you say to Mr Sambrook that you had said something to the MoD to indicate that the WMD story was not an MoD story? Do you follow me?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, as I said, I told the press officer, I told Kate Wilson that it was not -- I did not seek a point by point response from the MoD press office but I did hope that Adam Ingram would be able to answer questions on it.

MR SUMPTION: Just focus on my question, please, Mr Gilligan. Did you say to Mr Sambrook: I told the MoD that I was working on a WMD story, but it was not a matter for the MoD? Did you say that to him or words to that effect?

MR GILLIGAN: I cannot remember what I said to him, but what I -- if I indeed said that, and I am not sure I did, but what I meant from that was that I had told them that it was not a matter on which I was expecting a point by point response from the MoD but one which I expected them to brief Adam Ingram on for his appearance on the programme the next morning.

MR SUMPTION: Could we have, please, BBC/6/105? Just to explain what this is, this is part of the minute of the Governors' meeting of the BBC on 6th July. It is a meeting most of which was attended by Mr Sambrook, among other senior executives of the BBC; and there is a heading, halfway down the page: "Contacts with the Government." Stephen Whittle was also present: "Stephen Whittle said achieving clarity on the contacts between the Today team and Government departments on this occasion was difficult because a full note had not been kept ... In addition to the information already provided by Richard Sambrook about requests for an interview with Adam Ingram, he reported that Andrew Gilligan spoke to an MoD press officer (mobile to mobile) at around 6.30 pm to inform them that the interview would be extended to include WMD. The MoD's account of this contact was different, claiming that Andrew Gilligan mentioned only the cluster bomb story and only upon being asked said there was another issue but this was not a matter for the MoD. Andrew Gilligan agrees he said something to indicate that the WMD issue was not principally an MoD story, but claims that he only spoke about WMD during the conversation and not cluster bombs." You did agree when you were asked by -- I suggest it was probably Mr Sambrook but it might have been Mr Whittle, you did agree, did you not, that you had said something to the MoD to indicate to them that the WMD story was not a matter for them?

MR GILLIGAN: What that sentence conveys -- what I intended to convey when I spoke to Stephen Whittle about this was that I had said that I did not seek a point by point response from the MoD press office; it was not therefore a matter for the MoD press office. But I did outline the story in order to give Adam Ingram a chance to be briefed and to be able to respond to it on the programme. That was the approach that all three of us, that I, the editor and the day editor on the programme team, had discussed and had decided on when deciding how to get the Government response on this story.

MR SUMPTION: So Mr Whittle has got this wrong when he was talking to the Governors, has he?

MR GILLIGAN: I mean, I think when he says "this was not a matter for the MoD", I think he is probably referring to my saying that it was not something on which I sought a point by point response from the MoD press office.

MR SUMPTION: It was not a matter for the MoD, was it, which is why you would not in fact have discussed it in any detail with Ms Wilson, who was an MoD press officer?

MR GILLIGAN: As defence correspondent, my principal contact is with the MoD. Had anyone on the programme decided to contact Downing Street, it would have been done, you know, I would have been told to do it or somebody else would have been told to do it. It was not something that any of us on the programme decided to do in order to get the Government response on the story.

LORD HUTTON: Mr Gilligan, if you ring up the MoD about the Minister coming on to the Today Programme and you say that you wish the Minister to speak about a particular subject, would you also, at that time, ask the MoD press officer for a response? I mean, it would seem to me, just on the first impression, that on that occasion you would not be looking for a response from the MoD press officer?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, I think that is right. I mean, in hindsight I think we should have asked the MoD for a response and -- but as I say, the approach discussed and decided on by the programme team, which is me, the editor and the day editor, was not that, it was a different one.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR GILLIGAN: And I was following that approach, as were the other people who made calls to the MoD. I mean, the grammar of the Today Programme, as indeed of Newsnight and other such programmes, is that a story is broadcast and then, immediately afterwards, or shortly afterwards, the relevant Minister appears to give the Government response.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: On the last occasion that you gave evidence to this Inquiry, Mr Gilligan, when you were asked what you had said to Ms Wilson, you replied -- the question was: "Question: In the early morning broadcast you have referred to the Government knowing that the 45 minute claim was wrong before it was put in. Did you put that allegation to the Ministry of Defence press officer?" Your answer was: "I do not believe I did put those specific words, no. As I say, I cannot remember exactly what I said. I gave them an outline of the story, a summary of the story but I cannot remember exactly what I said to them." When you gave evidence in answer to questions from Ms Rogers this morning you produced a complete string of precise statements about what you had said. What has happened since the last occasion to wake up your memory on this point?

MR GILLIGAN: I think that was in respect of what I broadcast rather than what I said to Kate Wilson. As I have said before, I gave Kate Wilson a general outline of the story, including the claims that the dossier had been exaggerated and this was done at Downing Street's behest and that the Intelligence Services were unhappy about the inclusion of the 45 minutes claim in the form it took. Those to me were the main elements of the story. I confirm as I said before that I did not -- I do not believe I did put the specific phrase "the Government probably knew it was wrong" to Kate Wilson.

MR SUMPTION: I suggest that you did not in fact say anything about the story at all other than that there would be a story about the WMD issue, which was not a matter for them.

MR GILLIGAN: No, that is not --

MR SUMPTION: What do you say?

MR GILLIGAN: That is not the case. I spoke to Kate Wilson for 7 and a half minutes. I really would not have spent all that time speaking about another reporter's story of which I knew nothing.

MR SUMPTION: When on 28th June you rang up the MoD press officer to remind them, as you put it, that you had said something about this to Kate Wilson, you were doing that because you realised that there was unlikely to be any record of this conversation at the MoD because you had said no such thing and you were trying to generate a record within their system a month after the event, were you not?

MR GILLIGAN: No, that was not my intention. I wanted to remind them of the call I had made; and, you know, there are -- there is in fact a record of that call. There is a mobile phone bill showing that it took place for 7 and a half minutes to Kate Wilson's number.

MR SUMPTION: There is one other matter I want to ask you about --

LORD HUTTON: I think we should give the stenographers a break.

MR SUMPTION: I do apologise, my Lord.

LORD HUTTON: I will rise for five minutes.

(11.52 am)
(Short Break)
(11.57 am)

MR SUMPTION: Yes, my Lord. The facts about disclosure of the endorsements by the Chairman of the JIC are that the authority was actually obtained on 29th itself but the first occasion when it was announced that the JIC Chairman endorsed the denial was on the following day, in a press statements made in Poland which were reported in certain of the media straightaway.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: When I say the following day, it was on 1st June. The reference for that, though I am not asking for it to be put up on the screen, is CAB/1/158.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Sumption.

MR SUMPTION: The other matter I want to ask you about, Mr Gilligan, concerns a document which is at BBC/3/25. This is a press release issued by the BBC on 9th July. Just to explain the background, I am not asking you to comment on it but just to give you some context, this is a press release from the BBC about the Ministry of Defence's announcement that an unnamed official had come forward as a possible source for your story. It deals with the question whether the unnamed official described in the MoD's press statement of the previous evening was the same as your source. And it its relevance is that it is the main reason why the Prime Minister's spokesman had to deal later on the day, the 9th July, with questions from the Lobby about what sort of person this official was. The press release notes the Ministry of Defence statement in the first paragraph and it says, in the second paragraph: "The description of the individual contained in the statement does not match Mr Gilligan's source in some important ways. Mr Gilligan's source does not work in the Ministry of Defence and he has known the source for a number of years not months." It was not true, was it, that your source did not work in the Ministry of Defence?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it was true. I mean, we have heard in evidence that he did not have a desk at the MoD, that his main place of work was his home, and he had already described to me how he drifted between various Government departments. His salary, I believe, was paid by the Foreign Office.

MR SUMPTION: Mr Gilligan, were you consulted about this press statement?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR SUMPTION: Who by?

MR GILLIGAN: By the people who drew it up, which was --

MR SUMPTION: Who were they?

MR GILLIGAN: I think it was Sally Osman, who is the head of communications, by Greg Dyke, who was involved in drawing it up, and I think possibly Mark Damazer. I cannot recall. It was a conference call.

MR SUMPTION: Of those three people, you were the only one who actually knew who your source was, I think?

MR GILLIGAN: I was not quite sure what Richard Sambrook had told Greg, but I believe -- you know, Richard was -- I do not believe Richard was part of that conference call. I am not absolutely sure of that.

MR SUMPTION: The other two who knew who he was were Kevin Marsh and Richard Sambrook?

MR GILLIGAN: Kevin Marsh knew the source's affiliations and his background, and Richard knew his name.

MR SUMPTION: Were you entirely happy with the BBC putting out a press release saying that your source, who we now know to be Dr Kelly, does not work in the Ministry of Defence? Did that strike you as an honest statement to make?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, as I have said, he did not work in the Ministry of Defence.

MR SUMPTION: Oh come off it, Mr Gilligan, you knew perfectly well and you told us at the beginning of your evidence that he was a senior chemical and biological warfare adviser to the Ministry of Defence. What are you doing here allowing the press release to go out saying he does not work for the Ministry of Defence in it?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I did not say he did not work for the Ministry of Defence, I said he did not work in the Ministry of Defence.

MR SUMPTION: Do you agree that this press statement was quite plainly designed to give the impression that it could not be Dr Kelly, because Dr Kelly worked in the Ministry of Defence whereas your source did not? That is what you were trying to convey.

MR GILLIGAN: Dr Kelly did not work in the Ministry of Defence, he worked from home, he worked from UN headquarters, he worked in Iraq, he worked in the Foreign Office, he worked in a number of places. The Government spokesman himself, I believe, corrected his characterisations of Dr Kelly as a result of this statement. The affiliation of Dr Kelly is a matter of public record.

MR SUMPTION: The relevance of making this point was to suggest that the person who had come forward as described in the Ministry of Defence press statement was not necessarily the same as your source. That was the purpose of making this statement, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. Not necessarily.

MR SUMPTION: Right.

MR GILLIGAN: I mean, there is a passage further down here where it says: "We note that the MoD statement says that, 'we do not know whether this official is Mr Gilligan's source'. Neither do we." We simply do not have enough information to judge at this point.

MR SUMPTION: But you knew who he was, of course, and you were consulted about this press statement.

MR GILLIGAN: Well, I was not clear that the person -- I mean, as I say in my witness statement, I suspected that it was Dr Kelly who they had spoken to but I was not certain that it was; and I was under absolutely no obligation to help the Ministry of Defence identify my source. In fact, I was under an obligation to protect him.

MR SUMPTION: You were not under an obligation to protect him by approving a press statement on behalf of the BBC which contained a plainly misleading statement, namely that your source did not work in the Ministry of Defence.

MR GILLIGAN: I mean, I am afraid that statement is correct. He did not work in the Ministry of Defence. As you have heard from many witnesses, he visited it from time to time but he did not have a desk there and, you know, he was attached from the DSTL at Porton Down. They were his formal employers. You know, Dr Kelly had made it plain that he worked from many places, principally his home.

MR SUMPTION: The point of this press release was not to explain where Dr Kelly or where the source was physically working from, it was to explain who his employer was, who he worked for in a broad sense. It was to contradict the Ministry of Defence's statement that somebody who might be your source had come forward who was an official at the Ministry of Defence.

MR GILLIGAN: No, I mean, we did not use the words who he worked for. As I say, if the press statement had been seeking to explain whose his employer was then why did it say "in" rather than "for"?

MR SUMPTION: You thought that was a distinction that would be immediately grasped by anybody reading this press release, did you?

MR GILLIGAN: Our concern in issuing this press statement was to protect the identity of Dr Kelly as our source. That is an fundamental obligation. We did not know under what circumstances Dr Kelly had come forward. We did not know whether he was under any kind of threat of disciplinary action. We did not know whether he had been discovered or whether he had -- truly had volunteered his contact with me. We did not know a great deal about this. We had an absolute obligation to protect him, and we did so in the form of this press release.

MR SUMPTION: You did not need to say anything about him at all which was not strictly true. You had the choice, did you not, of simply keeping quiet?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I think we did; and perhaps we should have, but had we kept quiet I think the feeling might have been that we were, you know, acquiescing in the statement that the MoD had put out. We had a difficult call to make and not very much time to make it in. The statement was put out at 6 o'clock in the evening and almost at once -- obviously really not very far off newspaper deadlines, and almost at once we were bombarded with calls asking us about it.

MR SUMPTION: You see, it was because that statement was issued that the Prime Minister's official spokesman in the afternoon Lobby briefing was obliged to field questions about the contradiction between the BBC's statement and the MoD's statement in the way that he did.

MR GILLIGAN: No, I do not believe that to be the case. Even as the Ministry of Defence statement was being issued, at least one newspaper, The Times, was being given very full details which would enable them to identify Dr Kelly. The Times on the morning -- the statement was issued at 6 o'clock on the evening of the 8th. The Times on the morning of the 9th, in other words the reporting for which would have been done on the 8th, contained a description of the unnamed official as a Government adviser who is understood to work for the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat at the MoD and a former UN weapons inspector.

MR SUMPTION: That description was right, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: It certainly was. That description had been given before our statement had even been issued. So the Government was already providing clues long before our statement was issued.

MR SUMPTION: You have no basis for saying the Government provided those. And your organisation, later in the afternoon, contradicted it by saying: no, he was not at the Ministry of Defence.

MR GILLIGAN: As I say, the argument that was made that that statement obliged the Government to provide clues to Dr Kelly's identity is incorrect, because they already were providing clues of his identity to The Times before the statement was even issued.

MR SUMPTION: You have no knowledge of that.

MR GILLIGAN: Well, I mean, it is simply how newspapers work. A newspaper deadline is roughly 6/7 o'clock in the evening; and The Times had this information for its relevant day's edition so it must have been provided on the afternoon or the early evening of the 8th. So there was no -- you know, so that provision of clues started before the Government spokesman on the 9th had started on the afternoon or evening of the 8th.

MR SUMPTION: Thank you, Mr Gilligan.

LORD HUTTON: Now Mr Gompertz.

Cross-examination by MR GOMPERTZ

MR GOMPERTZ: Mr Gilligan, I hope I can be very brief for three reasons. First of all, you have made, today, a number of concessions; secondly, almost all ground has just been covered by my learned friend Mr Sumption; and, thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Kelly family do not want you or anybody else to be subjected at their hands to an ordeal comparable to that endured by Dr Kelly; do you follow?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. Thank you.

MR GOMPERTZ: Just a couple of matters. First of all, I believe the first thing you did after meeting Dr Kelly on 22nd May was to make a manuscript note of the conversation --

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: -- while it was still fresh in your mind.

MR GILLIGAN: (Nods).

MR GOMPERTZ: You have now lost that note?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I have.

MR GOMPERTZ: Before you lost it, did you use it as a basis for your broadcasts on 29th May?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, in that I used it as a basis for the note to Miranda Holt, which has already been given in evidence; and that was the basis for the broadcasts.

MR GOMPERTZ: So that note to Miranda Holt came first, followed by the broadcast on 29th May, and then The Mail on Sunday article on 1st June?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that is the order, yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: And where did you keep that note?

MR GILLIGAN: I had it in my bag; and I am really not sure where it has -- where it went in between then and my looking for it in advance of the Inquiry.

MR GOMPERTZ: By "in my bag" do you mean a briefcase in which you carry documents around or what?

MR GILLIGAN: It is a laptop bag, in fact, which I use to carry my audio equipment, my mini disk and my microphone and so on; and where the computer goes there are pockets in which I keep documents.

MR GOMPERTZ: So when did you last see this note?

MR GILLIGAN: I am not quite sure, to be honest, but some time in June would be my best guess.

MR GOMPERTZ: Did anybody else ever see it?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not believe so, no. They saw the Miranda Holt note on there -- of which the manuscript note was the base.

MR GOMPERTZ: So you never showed it to anybody?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not believe I did. Again, it is difficult to recall at this length of time.

MR GOMPERTZ: Could you look, please, at the document you were shown just a few minutes ago, BBC/3/25, the press statement on 9th July? If we can go down the page there is a paragraph which begins in the middle there: "For the single conversation which led to the Today story Mr Gilligan took comprehensive notes during the meeting with his source which do not correspond with the account given in the MoD statement." Just pausing there, which notes are being referred to?

MR GILLIGAN: These were the notes taken during the meeting, in other words the organiser notes.

MR GOMPERTZ: The organiser notes?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. They have been provided to the Inquiry.

MR GOMPERTZ: The next sentence reads: "These notes have already been deposited with the BBC legal department."

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: Was there ever a third set of notes compiled by yourself?

MR GILLIGAN: Other than the Miranda Holt, the manuscript and the organiser?

MR GOMPERTZ: If you take the Miranda Holt note into account then it would be a fourth set. Was there ever such a document?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not believe so, no. I mean, I may have -- I may have, at some point, made a representation or something of what was in the broadcast or something like that. But there were no other things which were actual notes, no.

MR GOMPERTZ: When you discovered that you had lost the manuscript note made just after your meeting, did you ever attempt to reconstruct it?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I mean -- reconstruct the manuscript note?

MR GOMPERTZ: Yes.

MR GILLIGAN: No. In manuscript form, no.

MR GOMPERTZ: So the position is this: that the manuscript note has not been seen by anybody else, and we have only your word for what it contained?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you. Of course, you tell us that the note for Miranda Holt was based upon it.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: Could you look, please, at BBC/7/61? This note, which seems to have been sent to Miranda Holt on 28th May -- is that correct?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that is right.

MR GOMPERTZ: That is how it is endorsed at the top.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: It is headed "What my man said".

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: There are then set out a number of questions and answers, I think four questions initially and four answers, going to about two-thirds of the way down the page; is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: Is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. Yes, it is. Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: And they are in inverted commas, are they not?

MR GILLIGAN: There is an inverted comma -- yes, they are, yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: Quotation marks?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, they are.

MR GOMPERTZ: Does that not imply that the questions were as asked by you and that the answers were as given by Dr Kelly?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, as I said in my earlier evidence, this does not purport to be a verbatim transcript but it is a summary of what Dr Kelly said. All the quotes there were said by him.

MR GOMPERTZ: It is because of your previous evidence that I ask you this. There is a difference, is there not, between a summary and a verbatim transcript?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: If you set out questions and answers as you have on this page, in inverted commas, that purports to be a verbatim transcript, does it not?

MR GILLIGAN: No. I mean, as I said in my evidence, I explicitly said this does not purport to be a verbatim transcript. There are areas which were not covered -- you know, I mean, there would be gaps. The phrases -- all the words used by Dr Kelly -- were spoken by Dr Kelly in this.

MR GOMPERTZ: Were they?

MR GILLIGAN: But it is not verbatim.

MR GOMPERTZ: Let us just look at two examples. In the first answer you record that he said, second sentence: "It was transformed in the week before it was published, to make it sexier."

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: I think you have conceded, have you not, that those last four words "to make it sexier", were introduced into the conversation by you and not by him?

MR GILLIGAN: That is correct, but they were adopted by him and they were spoken, he repeated the words, by him.

MR GOMPERTZ: That is not what this document shows, is it?

MR GILLIGAN: No, but as I say, it does not purport to be a verbatim transcript of the conversation. It does not include that question.

MR GOMPERTZ: The other passage to which I will direct your attention, if I may, comes in the next answer -- we will not go all the way through it, but do you see that the penultimate sentence is: "What we thought it actually meant was that they could launch a conventional missile in 45 minutes." That statement does not appear, does it, in your text file?

MR GILLIGAN: No, it does not. I mean, that was part of the manuscript note which I remembered him saying after the meeting.

MR GOMPERTZ: So that sentence was taken from the manuscript note, which obviously we cannot check.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. That is right.

MR GOMPERTZ: You say, do you, that anybody looking at this document would know that this was not purporting to be a verbatim account of what was said, but simply a summary of the main quotes?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. I cannot remember exactly what I said to Miranda when I sent her the note, but I think I said something along those lines: I will send a summary of the main quotes.

LORD HUTTON: When you say this is what Dr Kelly said, do you mean by that it was the gist of what Dr Kelly said?

MR GILLIGAN: No, these were these words. The great majority of these are from the organiser note, and a few, like the last sentence you picked up, were from memory, reconstructing the conversation immediately after it took place for the purposes of the manuscript note.

LORD HUTTON: But when you say they were his words, you have said it is not a verbatim transcript. If they were his words, do you mean that the answers are a verbatim account of what he said?

MR GILLIGAN: The answers are -- I say it is not verbatim because for a start, as Mr Gompertz has pointed out, one of the questions is missing, my question "To make it sexier" and he says "Yes, to make it sexier". Equally, one of the phrases here is in a different order from when he said it. He said -- let us see -- that the -- that the organiser notes have it in a slightly different order. That is why I say it is not verbatim, it is a summary of the main quotes. But it -- I mean, these -- all the words attributed to Dr Kelly in this note were spoken by Dr Kelly.

LORD HUTTON: Although perhaps in a slightly different order?

MR GILLIGAN: In one case in a different order, I think, but not in a way that changed the meaning.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: There is another example, is there not, in this document where the word was spoken first by you and not by him, and I am referring there to the name "Campbell".

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that word was in fact spoken first by Dr Kelly.

MR GOMPERTZ: I suggest to you, on the documents that we have seen in this Inquiry, that it was the other way round, that it was in fact yourself who introduced that name.

MR GILLIGAN: No, that is not the case. It was him.

MR GOMPERTZ: Have you read or heard the evidence of Mrs Olivia Bosch?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I have.

MR GOMPERTZ: You will recollect that it was her evidence that Dr Kelly told her that you introduced names to him to attempt to elicit who was responsible for embellishing the dossier; that is a summary of what she said.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: Is there anything in that account which you recognise?

MR GILLIGAN: No. There was no name game as she described it. Only one name was mentioned. I did not introduce a number of names or indeed any name. Alastair Campbell's name was mentioned, it was brought up spontaneously by Dr Kelly, just as he brought it up spontaneously to Susan Watts on 7th May.

MR GOMPERTZ: In your text file, BBC/7/57, if you want to refresh your memory, you agreed a short time ago with Mr Sumption that there is no record of the conversation that you had with Dr Kelly about how he wished to be described.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: And you said that was because by that stage you had put your organiser away.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: I suppose the same applies, does it, to the conversation which you claim you had with him as to which parts of the interview with him you could use and which parts he did not want you to use?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, at the end of the conversation, as I have said in my earlier evidence, we did go over -- I read back to him some of the quotes, and we did go over some of the quotes, and he corrected one or two things, and he did ask me not to use one or two things. One or two things I took out and others I left in; but knowing not to use them.

MR GOMPERTZ: That does not appear, does it, in the text file?

MR GILLIGAN: No, it does not.

MR GOMPERTZ: Nor, indeed, in any other document that we have.

MR GILLIGAN: That is right, yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: You were going to Iraq earlier this year to cover the war.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: Had you been to Iraq before?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I had. Yes.

MR GOMPERTZ: Once or more than once?

MR GILLIGAN: Twice.

MR GOMPERTZ: Many times?

MR GILLIGAN: Twice.

MR GOMPERTZ: Dr Kelly had very considerable experience of the country, had he not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, he did.

MR GOMPERTZ: When was it that you went to Iraq? This year?

MR GILLIGAN: This year was -- roughly 9th March, I think.

MR GOMPERTZ: Did you not want to meet Dr Kelly before you went, to talk over matters which would be useful to you in your time in Iraq?

MR GILLIGAN: I did consider it, but I was too busy. There was a great deal happening in the run up to the war. There was an awful lot of news to report. The UN deliberations, the deployments of troops; I had to do some safety training and so on in preparation for going. So there was a great deal else on in that February/early March period. I just did not have time.

MR GOMPERTZ: I have no doubt. Did you not meet him in fact some time in February to discuss Iraq in general?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I do not believe I did. I have no records of it and I have no recollection of it.

MR GOMPERTZ: He had a considerable interest in Iraq and indeed in the Iraqi people, did he not?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, he did.

MR GOMPERTZ: Was the reason why the meeting was arranged on 22nd May that he wanted to hear about your experiences in Iraq; is that right? Is that fair?

MR GILLIGAN: I think that was one of the reasons certainly. But, as I said in my earlier evidence, I really do not think that what I could tell him would have been an enormous amount of use. I am not a trained scientist. The Iraqis had obviously not let us near anywhere that might have been deemed sensitive or a WMD site, and most of what I could tell him was essentially anecdotal. I thought and think that he was being polite, as much as anything else, in saying that he wanted to hear from me about my experiences because they were not worth much scientifically.

MR GOMPERTZ: You went to that meeting on 22nd May unequipped with a tape recorder or any recording device?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. I had my broadcast mini disk recorder, but I do not believe -- I mean, I did not -- I did not use it because it has a very big microphone, which is intimidating.

MR GOMPERTZ: So you did have means of recording the conversation that you had with him but you did not choose to employ it; is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: The broadcast mini disk recorder that I use comes with a very large microphone of the sort you see, you know, sports commentators waving. If you bring that out it tends to inhibit frank discussion.

MR GOMPERTZ: That is all that I want to ask you, Mr Gilligan, thank you.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you, Mr Gompertz.

Cross-examined by MR DINGEMANS

MR DINGEMANS: I will not repeat my earlier questioning nor indeed the earlier cross-examination. Can I just take you to some passages of the 29th May broadcast at the start and ask whether you contend these were accurate representations of what Dr Kelly had told you? BBC/1/4, if I may. The first part I want to draw your attention to is in the first paragraph: "... what we've been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that, actually the Government probably erm knew that that 45 minutes figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in." Do you now accept that was not based on what Dr Kelly had told you?

MR GILLIGAN: I accept that it was not the -- I accept that it was not the right form of words to use because it gave listeners the impression that he had said that in terms. He did not say it in terms.

MR DINGEMANS: And he did not suggest that to you?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, he said that the statement that WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes was unreliable, it was wrong, it was misinterpreted and he said that it had been included "against our wishes". I concluded from that that the wishes had been made known, but it was wrong to ascribe that statement that they had been made known to Dr Kelly.

MR DINGEMANS: The bottom of the page: "... and the reason it hadn't been in the original draft was that it was, it was only erm, it came from one source and most of the other claims were from two, and the intelligence agencies say they don't really believe it was necessarily true..." That was not the reason it had not been in the original draft, do you now accept that?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I do.

MR DINGEMANS: And Dr Kelly gave you nothing to suggest that was the reason.

MR GILLIGAN: That is correct, and I did not ascribe it in fact to him either.

MR DINGEMANS: The next page. Just before "End of first recording": "Clearly, you know, if erm, if it, if it was, if it was wrong, things do, things are, got wrong in good faith but if they knew if was wrong before they actually made the claim, that's perhaps a bit more serious." Suggesting that Dr Kelly had suggested to you that the claim was false.

MR GILLIGAN: I think the operative word here is "if". This does suggest that I am not suggesting it is true. But, you know, as I have said to you before, the statement that -- the statement "probably knew it was wrong" was -- was not something that Dr Kelly had said in terms.

MR DINGEMANS: If you knew that this was not right you would have said so. It was not your suggestion that they knew that it was wrong, was it?

MR GILLIGAN: No, my error in this was in ascribing that -- you know, expressing my understanding as something which Dr Kelly had actually said in terms, which he had not.

MR DINGEMANS: And neither had he suggested it?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, he said things which had led me to conclude it, but he had not suggested it directly, no.

MR DINGEMANS: Scrolling down the page, Mr Humphrys picking up on what you are saying, fourth line down: "Now our defence correspondent, Andrew Gilligan, has found evidence that the Government's dossier on Iraq that was produced last September, was cobbled together at the last minute with some unconfirmed material that had not been approved by the Security Services." Dr Kelly did not say that to you, did he?

MR GILLIGAN: No. These were not my words, these were John Humphrys' words. I would not have said those words and did not write them for him.

MR DINGEMANS: That was Mr Humphrys' understanding of your earlier broadcast no doubt.

MR GILLIGAN: I do not believe it was --

MR DINGEMANS: He is hardly likely to have made it up.

MR GILLIGAN: The cues -- the things that the presenter says, the cues are actually written by the presenters before the programme even starts, so he would not have heard the earlier broadcast at the time that he devised this particular cue.

MR DINGEMANS: BBC/1/6 towards the bottom of the paragraph: "Now that claim has come back to haunt Mr Blair because if the weapons had been that readily to hand, they probably would have been found by now. but you know, it could have been an honest mistake, but what I have been told is that the Government knew that claim was questionable, even before the war, even before they wrote it in their dossier." Dr Kelly never told you that, did he?

MR GILLIGAN: No. Again, my error there was expressing that understanding, and I defend the use of "knew it was questionable" but expressing it as something which Dr Kelly had told me in terms, which he had not -- but it was not the main thrust. It was not the main import of the broadcast. The broadcast was summarised probably most -- in its essentials by the news bulletin piece which I wrote, and that did not mention any "Government knew" type things.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to BBC/1/15? It is a reference you have not been taken to so I will take you to it, if I may. Mr Humphrys, four paragraphs down, and he is talking to Mr Ingram, he says this: "What we have here is a source, within the Intelligence Service." In fact, that is the first reference to, as it were, the source being within the Intelligence Service. Who told him that?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not know. It was not me.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he infer that from your earlier broadcast?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not know. I do not know how John Humphrys arrived at that. You would have to ask him.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you put him right?

MR GILLIGAN: I did not have the opportunity to because I had finished broadcasting by then.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you read this transcript at any time before giving evidence?

MR GILLIGAN: I did not in fact hear the Adam Ingram interview because I was broadcasting on another station at the time, on Radio Scotland or something, so I did not even know that it had been said.

MR DINGEMANS: When did you become aware that it had been said?

MR GILLIGAN: Probably not until about 18th June when we got some transcripts for the Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, and possibly not even then because I think I just got the transcripts of what I myself had said rather than what Adam Ingram had said.

MR DINGEMANS: But you did not correct it then?

MR GILLIGAN: As I say, I am not sure I was actually in possession of the transcripts at that point. I did make it clear, as I have said in my evidence earlier today, to the Foreign Affairs Committee that I did not characterise my source as somebody in the Intelligence Services; but I have also said the reasons why I did not say he was not a member of the Intelligence Services, because that would narrow down the source identification too much.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to BBC/4/205? This is Miranda Holt's transcribed note. Can I take you to an entry four lines down: "'Sexed up' 45 minutes -- added at Campbell's behest." Then there is this: "MI6 -- defector. 'to set up missile'." This is a note she had made of a conversation with you, is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: I believe this is something she made after a phone conversation with me. You will see it says "AG meeting -- chief British weapons inspector"; that is an accurate description of Dr Kelly. That is where I describe my source in this particular instance.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you refer to MI6 at all in that conversation?

MR GILLIGAN: I am not sure I did, to be honest. I think -- I mean, she may have asked something like, "So where did the intelligence come from, did it come from a defector?", something like that. It is extremely difficult to recall these phone conversations at, you know, three and a half months' distance.

LORD HUTTON: When did this conversation take place?

MR GILLIGAN: This would have been on the 28th, the afternoon of the 28th.

MR DINGEMANS: So there are those errors you accept in your transmission on 29th May?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I do. Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: In fact, on 29th May there was an allegation made against the Government of conscious wrongdoing; do you accept that?

MR GILLIGAN: My feeling on this was that it was an allegation less serious than that; that it was part of a political debate. As I say, I mean, the Ministry of Defence press log is -- has got -- I have just got a -- I mean, the stories in the newspapers in the morning of 29th May, that was before a word had been spoken by me, included the Independent splash "Labour rebels threaten to report Tony Blair for misleading Parliament"; the Mirror "War of Lies"; the Guardian "Tony Blair faces growing crisis over failure to uncover WMD"; The Times "Inquiry into arms dossier claim". So this was seen --

MR DINGEMANS: So you thought you would join in?

MR GILLIGAN: This was seen as part of --

MR DINGEMANS: Is that right, Mr Gilligan?

MR GILLIGAN: This was seen as part of a continuing debate. It was not something we created. It was not something we started.

MR DINGEMANS: I did not say you created it, Mr Gilligan. I am asking you about 29th May. Did you think you would join in with that morning's headlines?

MR GILLIGAN: No, that was not the intention. The intention was to report what Dr Kelly had told me; and I regret that on those two occasions I did not report entirely carefully and accurately what he had said. My error was to ascribe that statement to him when it was actually a conclusion of mine.

MR DINGEMANS: BBC/4/202. This is a note before the programme goes out. It says this at the top: "Gilligan -- has a v good story he hasn't stood up yet. I'll explain in the meeting. ET." Somebody has helpfully told us who ET is. Did you stand up the story before it was broadcast?

MR GILLIGAN: As I said earlier when I gave evidence the first time, I think this refers to a different story because it is dated four days before I actually spoke to the programme about the dossier story.

MR DINGEMANS: But it was two days after you met Dr Kelly.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it was. But I do not believe this refers to the same story. I did other stories in the interim.

MR DINGEMANS: Have you in the time since you gave evidence been able to identify what other story that may have been?

MR GILLIGAN: No, but I can, if you wish.

MR DINGEMANS: The proper construction of the words used on 29th May was an allegation of conscious wrongdoing, you accept there was no support for that?

MR GILLIGAN: I do not accept that there was no support. As I say, Dr Kelly had said that the 45 minutes claim in the form in which it was used in the dossier in the foreword was wrong, was considered to be unreliable and had been included "against our wishes"; and it was my judgment from that that the wishes had been expressed, which we do indeed know to have been the case now; but, as I say, my error was in ascribing that directly to Dr Kelly, because he did not say it in terms.

MR DINGEMANS: Is that why you never corrected the original charge in the original broadcast?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, I repeatedly corrected any impression we may have given that the Government had lied or that it had fabricated anything or that the 45 minutes claim was not real intelligence. I started the second piece, the 7.32 piece, by saying: no, it was real intelligence. I then, on 31st May, said that we did not accuse the Government of lying or fabrication. I said the same thing in the Spectator, I said the same thing in The Mail on Sunday and I said the same thing in the Foreign Affairs Committee.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Gilligan, if we look at BBC/1/5, that is the broadcast at 7.32, if that could just be turned up, please. At the end of his introduction there Mr Humphrys says: "Are you suggesting, let's be very clear about this, that it was not the work of intelligence agencies?" You replied: "No, the information I'm told was dubious did come from the agencies, but they were unhappy about it..." et cetera. Do I understand from an earlier answer you gave that at the end of your first broadcast at 6.07 am you realised that you may have given the wrong impression in what you said and then you deliberately set out to correct it in that second broadcast at 7.32 am?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. I had not intended anyone to believe that the 45 minutes point was not real intelligence or that it was fabricated or that it had been written by political appointees at Downing Street or anything like that. I wanted to correct that impression and was given the opportunity to do so and did so.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Then I understand that you realised at the end of the first broadcast that you may have given the wrong impression; is that right?

MR GILLIGAN: I think that is right. I mean, I said -- I did not want anyone -- I mean, my intention -- it was not my intention to give any wrong impression. I was not sure I had, but if I had I wanted to correct it and I wanted to make sure that the point was clear, that this was real intelligence.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. I had understood your earlier evidence to be, I just want to be quite sure about this, that you had actually appreciated at the end of the first broadcast that you may have given the wrong impression, but is it perhaps more accurate to say that you were concerned to make it clear in this second broadcast that the intelligence was real intelligence?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that was my concern. I mean, at the end of the first broadcast I was concerned that there might have been a potential danger. I did not know whether I had or not, but I just wanted to make it absolutely clear that I did not accuse the Government of making up intelligence or of lying.

MR DINGEMANS: Having introduced that, over the page at page 6 you go on to say that the Government knew that the claim was questionable. It is not much of a retraction, is it, Mr Gilligan?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, knowing that a claim is questionable is not the same as knowing that it is wrong; and for that reason I was happier with the word "questionable". And as we now know -- I mean, David Kelly had told me that the claim had been harshly questioned, and that it was considered unreliable and it was believed to have been misinterpreted and it had been included "against our wishes"; and so it was a reasonable construction to put that it had been questioned. You know, if you are putting something in in the knowledge that it is questionable, it is not as serious as putting something in in the knowledge that it is wrong.

MR DINGEMANS: You did not give adequate notice of this proposed broadcast to your editor on the Today Programme, did you, Mr Gilligan, partly because you had no intention of making the charges that you did the night before?

MR GILLIGAN: It is correct to say that I did not give notice that I intended to say "probably knew it was wrong" because, as I said earlier, that was a slip of the tongue. It just came out. It is one of the perils of live broadcasting. But I mean, on the broadcast as a whole there is no question I did give adequate notice. The script was sent to the night editor several hours in advance of broadcast. A script was sent to the news bulletins editor. The content of the story was closely discussed with the editor and the day editor the day before; and nobody has complained that I did not give them adequate notice. You know, if I had not, then they would have had the sanction of not broadcasting it.

MR DINGEMANS: It was intended to run this story as a "chatter in the air" piece, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: That is somebody else's characterisation, but it is not unfair. It was not the lead item on the programme, that was the cluster bombs story. I mean, it seemed to us, and obviously in hindsight this is incorrect, but it seemed to us as actually not, you know, strikingly new. There had been an enormous amount of comment and allegation about the Government's alleged manipulation or untruthfulness in the arms dossier. I have given you three of the pieces on that morning alone; there had been many before. And it was seen as a contribution to that debate. You know, politics is an area in which allegations of exaggeration and misleading behaviour are the stock in trade, they are made daily. It did not seem to us to be as serious as a criminal allegation of sort of bribery or something like that. Perhaps we were wrong about that, but that is how it seemed. That was how we approached the piece. That is how we ran it. It was not intended as the definitive view of the dossier, it was intended as the opinion of one source.

MR DINGEMANS: BBC/5/124. This is a letter of 27th June. You realise you have made a mistake after the first broadcast, you tell us. 7.32 you say you put it right. This is the letter of 27th June. The BBC are specifically asked: "Does it still stand by the allegation made on that day that both we and the intelligence agencies knew the 45 minute claim to be wrong and inserted it despite knowing that?" The answer is given: "Andrew Gilligan accurately reported the source telling him that the Government 'probably knew that the 45 minute figure was wrong' and that the claim was 'questionable'." That is simply untrue.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, that is incorrect.

MR DINGEMANS: You were involved in drafting this letter, were you?

MR GILLIGAN: I was involved in the drafting process. I cannot remember exactly what comments I offered on this part of it. It was not written by me, it was not sent by me. I was involved. I have been trying to cast my mind back to remember exactly what I said about this and I cannot, but it is clearly wrong to say that.

MR DINGEMANS: This was a very serious charge, as it turned out, or a matter of great public interest, where you broadcast words simply unscripted. Do you accept that that was unfortunate?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, we should have scripted it.

MR DINGEMANS: You did not give notice of the matters in your broadcast to No. 10, did you?

MR GILLIGAN: No, although I did to the MoD and that --

MR DINGEMANS: You did not to No. 10. As to the MoD, all you said to the MoD was that there was going to be a discussion of weapons of mass destruction; you did not give any notice about the 45 minutes claim being the subject of the broadcast, did you?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I did. I specifically mentioned the 45 minute claim as one which had excited disquiet in the intelligence agencies.

MR DINGEMANS: You wrote an article in The Mail on Sunday, and we have seen it, it is BBC/1/27, which someone has said gave the story "booster rockets". It was headlined: "... why Blair misled us all over Saddam's WMD. His response? One word ... Campbell." Part of the reason for the headline was surely this: in your earlier broadcast you had suggested conscious wrongdoing and that was picked up by the headline writer, was it not?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I do not think that was the case. I mean that headline is not supported by the article. The --

MR DINGEMANS: Did you correct the headline or article afterwards?

MR GILLIGAN: I was -- no, I did not -- you know, I was not in a position to. No complaint had been received about the headline or the article; and it is unrealistic, really, to imagine that a newspaper would correct it if no complaint had even been received. The headline was not my work, it was somebody else's work. I would not have written that headline.

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Humphrys gets it wrong in saying "Intelligence Services", The Mail on Sunday get it wrong in "saying Blair misled us all" and yet you do not do anything about these errors other people are making on your story?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, as I say, if a complaint had been made about this story or indeed about the headline to The Mail on Sunday I would have recommended to the Mail on Sunday that they say that the headline is wrong, because they say that it is.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to BBC/5/110, 27th June, and suggest one reason why you did not get the letter of 27th June accurate? Because here is a memo you are sending to Kevin Marsh, Mark Damazer, Richard Sambrook and others. And you say this: "Everyone. "As well as responding to the Government's questions today it is perhaps worth considering being slightly more proactive and also putting some questions of our own to the Government, with the aim of turning the focus back on the central issue..." You, at this stage, had lost all objectivity, is that fair?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I am not sure it is, but perhaps you can expand on that.

MR DINGEMANS: Because if you read through this e-mail what you are proposing to do is a whole series of points to make against the Government, perhaps well founded, perhaps not well founded, rather than concentrating on the questions you have been asked about your broadcasts.

MR GILLIGAN: I do not think that is fair. I mean, we were dealing quite intensively with the questions we had been asked at the same time.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you tell any of those responsible for the letter that the notes you had made did not support the allegations of conscious wrongdoing that had been made early in the morning?

MR GILLIGAN: I was not asked about the notes at this stage by anybody at the BBC; and had I been asked to show them I would have shown them, but --

MR DINGEMANS: So the answer is yes?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, it is. Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Let me take you to the e-mails, finally. FAC/6/223. At the bottom of this e-mail you describe -- scrolling down the page -- Dr Kelly as the source: "He also told my colleague Susan Watts, science editor of Newsnight ..." If we go over the page, you set out what is said in Susan Watts' broadcast. Do you accept there you were purporting to tell someone who Susan Watts' source was?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, I did, and it was completely wrong of me.

MR DINGEMANS: I am grateful.

LORD HUTTON: Any re-examination, Ms Rogers? Re-examination by Ms Rogers

MR DINGEMANS: There are one or two points I would like to pick up and I would like to do it before lunch, if I may. First of all, just dealing with one of the points that was made towards the end of this, the suggestion that you did not give adequate notice to your editors at the Today Programme about the story you intended to publish. First of all, have you had any complaint from Kevin Marsh, who is the editor, or anybody else about a lack of notice?

MR GILLIGAN: No.

MR DINGEMANS: Could we have up BBC/8/1? This is an e-mail from Kevin Marsh to you sent on 30th May, that is the day after the broadcast. Can you just read the beginning part of that?

MR GILLIGAN: "Statement of the obvious, I guess, but it's really good to have you back here in the UK. Great week; great stories, well handled and well told."

MR DINGEMANS: I think you can stop there. That represents what Kevin Marsh said to you?

MR GILLIGAN: About the story 24 hours or so after it was broadcast.

MR DINGEMANS: Going back over what was broadcast on the 29th, there is only one point I want to pick up because this ground has been very heavily gone over. In the transcript at BBC/4/226 -- before I ask you to look at the transcript, can I just clarify one point: had you seen the headlines or any of the newspapers that were going to be published on the 29th at the time that you prepared the story?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I had not, because I prepared it on the evening of the 28th.

MR DINGEMANS: Could we scroll down the page a little, just to the end of your contribution. I think we see it now before the JH there, at the end of the item. We have the words: "Now the forty five minutes really is, is not just a detail, it did go to the heart of the Government's case that Saddam was an imminent threat, and it was repeated a further three times in the body of the dossier ..." That is a point you made earlier on.

LORD HUTTON: Sorry, Ms Rogers, what broadcast is this? MS ROGERS: It is the 7.32 item. There are two versions of this transcript. I am afraid I have been using this one; I know there has been reference to the other one. The reason for using this one is it sets out the actor voicing Dr Kelly's words. It is just before Mr Humphrys says: "Andrew Gilligan, many thanks." I wonder if you could look at, in the context of the suggestion you are making a serious charge, can you just read out the words from "and I understand".

MR GILLIGAN: "... and I understand that the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee is going to conduct an enquiry into the claims made by the British Government about Iraq, and it is obviously exactly this kind of issue that will be at the heart of their investigation."

MR DINGEMANS: What was your understanding about the potential investigations at that time?

MR GILLIGAN: There had been reports in the newspapers over the previous days that the ISC was going to conduct an inquiry; and I had spoken to one of the members of the ISC who had told me that, yes, they had in fact already called for the intelligence, which they -- which we now know they did on either the first or second week of May.

MR DINGEMANS: I think you have referred before as to whether your broadcast is a definitive judgment or a contribution to the debate.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We will not go over that. Looking at the question of adequacy of notice of Downing Street. We know that Downing Street listens to the Today Programme and they had rung in with a denial at some point in the morning before the 7.32 because Mr Humphrys refers to it. In terms of further correspondence with Downing Street, we know there is a letter of complaint at CAB/1/154, which is the Ann Shevas letter. Scrolling down this letter, I think it is right you did not see this at the time?

MR GILLIGAN: No, I did not.

MR DINGEMANS: But do you see anything in there that is an additional contribution by way of statement from Downing Street on this story, in terms of substantive comment on the story?

MR GILLIGAN: Let me look at the whole thing. (Pause). Can I see the next page? No, I do not.

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Sumption refers to what was said in terms of Government denials. We are given a reference; I would like, please, to have it turned up, it is CAB/1/158. This is a Government document. I cannot give you the date on which it is produced, but in terms of what was being reported could we just look briefly? We have the Prime Minister's statement in Poland, which is the first one, where there is a denial. There is no reference there to Mr Scarlett. If we scroll on down there is a reference to the Joint Intelligence Committee on the 1st. But if we scroll on down right to the bottom entry, the reference is made there -- I think you said you thought it was 3rd or 4th June. We see that the Prime Minister's quote in Hansard: "I have discussed it, as I said, with the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee..." That is the point at which we have a reference to a statement from the Joint Intelligence Committee itself?

MR GILLIGAN: The Chairman, yes. I think there is a point to be made about the denials here. Although the Government has now fastened on the phrase "probably knew it was wrong", it was not in fact a phrase they mentioned in any way in any of their complaints for a month. The initial complaints were as you see, and the initial denials were denials that intelligence had been invented and fabricated. That was again something we specifically said that we did not allege.

MR DINGEMANS: We can read for ourselves the denial there. It is the statement that says: "... the 45 minute claim provoked disquiet among the intelligence community..." is said to be "... completely and totally untrue." Moving on to what your function is when you are reporting a conversation. I hope I will be forgiven for stating the obvious. You are a journalist, and you are not a transcriber of court proceedings. The function of the LiveNote reporter is to get down every last word. Do you regard it part of your function as a journalist to report conversations in the same way that the LiveNote reporter transcribes evidence?

MR GILLIGAN: No. I mean, the intention here was to convey the essence of what Dr Kelly had told me; and the form in which it is conveyed is a three or four minute radio piece. It is impossible to say everything he said, but the concern is to report it accurately and fairly.

MR DINGEMANS: Do you regard it that if you report the substance of the questions, the substance of what is said, that that is as accurate as saying: this was the question, this was the answer?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. I mean, you know, with the exceptions which I have already acknowledged where the phrasing was less than perfect, I believe I reported accurately what Dr Kelly had told me.

MR DINGEMANS: There is another matter about the practicality of being a journalist and what the function is. If you are dealing with a source you cannot name, and we know that Dr Kelly spoke to you on an unattributable basis, which meant you could not say who he was or what his precise role was, if you had been free to name Dr Kelly and tell your listeners what his status was, would you have wanted to do so?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We know, from your previous evidence, that you had researched what his status was; and I think you have referred to Plague Wars, he is the senior adviser on biological defence, the West's leading biological warfare inspector, and so on. I think he had also told you, for the record the reference is Day 3/101, that he interpreted intelligence for the Intelligence Service?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, on his field of expertise.

MR DINGEMANS: So it is a problem when you cannot --

LORD HUTTON: I think this is a little leading, Ms Rogers. MS ROGERS: I am sorry. Mr Gilligan explained if you cannot identify the source, you do not want to do it by jigsaw identification --

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, and --

MR DINGEMANS: What was put to you while you were being questioned was a summary question from your FAC evidence where one of the MPs referred to what you said earlier. I would like, if I may, to have FAC/2/136. At question 417, which is at the foot of the page, we have Mr Maples asking you about various sources. Your answer is over the top of the next page.

MR GILLIGAN: Hmm.

MR DINGEMANS: At the end of that first answer you are recorded as saying: "I really cannot characterise the source any further than I already have done because it would compromise him."

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: You are pressed in question 418. Could we just look at your answer in full there?

MR GILLIGAN: Mr Maples asks -- I say I cannot characterise the source any further. Mr Maples says: "[What] No further than that he is a British official. I think it makes a huge difference to us to know how much credibility to attach to this. If it was somebody who actually works in SIS or on the JIC assessments staff ... can you not tell us which part of the Government that person works in?" Then I say: "I have described him as one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier and I can tell you that he is a source of longstanding, well-known to me, closely connected with the question of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, easily sufficiently senior and credible to be worth reporting."

MR DINGEMANS: Then again you are pressed in 419. Your answer?

MR GILLIGAN: I say again: "A source of long standing and I described him in the broadcast as one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier. That is how I would leave it."

MR DINGEMANS: So the reference back is the reference back to that evidence. That is to put it in context. The FAC come back, when you go back for your second set of evidence, and they are still pressing about your source. The line you still want to take is you do not want to identify your source. I just wanted to put in context the part of the evidence that was put to you by looking at FAC/5/4. Can you just explain -- there was a reference immediately above to this being an opening statement. Was this something that was unscripted and live or was it prepared?

MR GILLIGAN: No, it was prepared.

MR DINGEMANS: Can you explain what you are doing by making that statement or seeking to do?

MR GILLIGAN: I am saying that what I told the Committee the first time, the June 19th experience, represents the outer limit of what I can say about my principal source and I shall not be able to add anything to that evidence.

MR DINGEMANS: Just finally, on the question, then, of identifying Dr Kelly, there are many distinctions that can be drawn. I understood from your evidence when you were being questioned by Mr Sumption for you to be drawing a distinction between someone who could be a member of the intelligence community as distinct from somebody who is a member of the Intelligence Services.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: And I took it that your definition was the intelligence community was wider than the Intelligence Services.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I ask you this: can you be a source about intelligence without being a member of the Intelligence Services?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: And can you be a source about the Intelligence Services without being a member of the Intelligence Services?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes, if you have close contact with them.

MR DINGEMANS: Can we just look at the beginning of the Radio 5 Live broadcast? BBC/4/240.

LORD HUTTON: Ms Rogers, I am not rushing you at all. Would you like to adjourn now for lunch and resume in the afternoon or will you be finished quite soon? MS ROGERS: I will be finished very soon indeed. I will be, I hope, about 2 minutes.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. MS ROGERS: I just wanted to draw attention to the opening words of this broadcast. Is your source described at the start of that broadcast?

MR GILLIGAN: Yes. He is described as a senior official involved in preparing the Government's dossier.

MR DINGEMANS: Not obviously there as a member of the Intelligence Services. Can we go over to, I think it is the top of the next page? Do you describe Dr Kelly there as a member of the Intelligence Services?

MR GILLIGAN: Well, I describe him as my Intelligence Service source.

MR DINGEMANS: Do you describe him as a member of the Intelligence Services?

MR GILLIGAN: No, not in terms.

MR DINGEMANS: The final point I have is this: this is the question of how you described Dr Kelly in your evidence. I just want it to be made clear. It may be that the error is mine. I had heard it suggested that you had changed your evidence. Can we be clear about the position on the transcript at Day 3, page 137? What was flashed up on the screen was a version of the transcript as put out overnight.

MR GILLIGAN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We see that the transcript there referred to you saying that you had described Dr Kelly as "the senior official in charge of drawing up the dossier". Had you in fact ever said that?

MR GILLIGAN: No, that was a mistake in transcription.

MR DINGEMANS: And I think the Inquiry is aware that the LiveNote services very kindly checked, at our request, whether the word "the" or "a" had been used.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. MS ROGERS: It is accepted that it was a rare slip by LiveNote that the word Mr Gilligan had used was "a", not "the".

LORD HUTTON: I certainly accept that. MS ROGERS: It is not a suggestion that you had changed your evidence.

LORD HUTTON: No. MS ROGERS: Mr Gilligan, thank you.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Gilligan. Thank you, Ms Rogers. I will rise now and sit again at 2 o'clock.

(1.10 pm)
(The short adjournment)
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