The Hutton Inquiry

LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Yes, Mr Dingemans.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, this is the commencement of stage 2 of your Inquiry. We have been delayed for a few minutes by some technical hitches but they have now been overcome. In addition to those appearing before you in stage 1, my learned friend Mr Jonathan Sumption QC, Phillip Sales, Mr David Lloyd Jones QC and Mr James Maxwell Scott appear for the Government and individual witnesses. Otherwise the representation is as it was before. Stage 1 of the Inquiry commenced on 11th August 2003, some five days after the funeral of Dr Kelly. Over some 15 days of evidence, concluding on 4th September 2003, your Lordship heard from in excess of 65 witnesses. Your Lordship has also seen thousands of pages of documents, most of which have been referred to, however briefly, in stage 1 of the proceedings. The transcripts of the oral evidence given and the documentary evidence adduced in stage 1 of the proceedings have been made available on the Inquiry website. So far as it is possible to predict and manage these matters, it is intended that stage 2 of the Inquiry will hear evidence and submissions over four days this week and four days next week. It is therefore intended that the hearing will be concluded by 25th September 2003. In this statement I intend to outline why it is necessary to have stage 2, the outline issues already raised by the evidence and the witnesses to be heard in stage 2. To the extent that everyone is inwardly groaning at the thought of listening to me talk at length, I can say that no more than one hour has been allocated for this opening statement and I am conscious that I have used 3 minutes of it already and we have lost 8 minutes for the technical hitches. The reasons for stage 2. There are two principal reasons for stage 2 and both are equally important. First, although your Lordship heard from many witnesses in stage 1 there are areas of the evidence which need to be tidied up. This may be because the witness was not available in stage 1 of the proceedings, it may be because it has not yet proved possible to determine why a certain event has occurred or it may be because there are some inconsistencies in the evidence already heard which need to be addressed. The second reason is that your Lordship, having heard the evidence at stage 1 of the proceedings, has been able to identify in private letters to the persons concerned some possible criticisms which might be made of them. You have asked those persons to state, in private letters, whether they accept or reject the possible criticisms. This process has also enabled the institutions responsible for the individuals involved to identify what possible criticisms might be made of them. Stage 2 of the proceedings provides an opportunity for those individuals, if they wish, to give further oral evidence and to make oral and written submissions. Further, the represented parties, the Government, the BBC, the family and counsel for individual witnesses may want to cross-examine witnesses for other parties. This may be in order to elicit evidence which might enable them to answer possible criticisms of the party whom they represent or to suggest further possible criticisms of those other witnesses, so that your Lordship might be persuaded to criticise those witnesses. But your Lordship has already made it clear that cross-examination will be confined to issues which you think are relevant to the matters which fall to be considered under your terms of reference. It should be apparent, therefore, that persons giving evidence in stage 2 may be giving evidence for a number of different reasons. They may have been unavailable at stage 1 of the proceedings. It may have been identified from evidence at stage 1 of the proceedings that they could give relevant evidence. They may be giving further evidence to clarify any consistencies. They may be giving evidence to show a possible criticism is not well founded. They may be giving evidence because another party wants to cross-examine them in order to elicit relevant evidence or to advance a possible criticism. They may be giving evidence as a result of a combination of a number of these reasons. These facts underline the point made by your Lordship on 4th September at the conclusion of stage 1 of the proceedings, namely that speculation about whether certain persons may or may not be the subject of criticism from their appearance or nonappearance at stage 2 of the Inquiry may be ill-founded. It is intended, therefore, that stage 2 of the Inquiry will enable your Lordship to have a full an understanding as possible of the relevant evidence and to enable each party to have a full and fair opportunity to adduce relevant evidence and to make submissions. The issues. It appears from the evidence that has been heard in stage 1 that your Lordship may wish to consider, in particular, some or all of the following issues: 1. How was the dossier of 24th September 2002 prepared and who was responsible for drafting it? 2. What part did Dr Kelly play in the preparation of the dossier? 3. What knowledge did Dr Kelly have of the contents of the dossier and of earlier drafts of the dossier? 4. Were the Prime Minister and Mr Alastair Campbell and other officials in No. 10 Downing Street responsible for intelligence being set out in the dossier which was incorrect or misleading or to which improper emphasis was given? 5. What was said by Dr Kelly to Mr Gilligan on 22nd May 2003? 6. Whether or not Mr Gilligan accurately reported what was said by Dr Kelly to him in his broadcasts on 29th May and in his Mail on Sunday article on 1st June 2003. 7. Whether or not the matters reported by Mr Gilligan on 29th May and in his Mail on Sunday article on 1st June were in fact true. It is for this reason that your Lordship has heard evidence and will hear further evidence about the September 2002 dossier. 8. The response and complaints made by the Government to the BBC relating to the broadcast on 29th May 2003. 9. The BBC reaction to those complaints. 10. The decisions and the steps taken by the Ministry of Defence and the Government after Dr Kelly informed his line manager in the Ministry of Defence that he had spoken to Mr Gilligan on 22nd May. 11. The circumstances in which a press statement was released by the Ministry of Defence on 8th July 2003 and the question and answer material that came to be deployed in support of it. This also involves identifying what Dr Kelly was told about this process and determining whether or not he agreed to it. 12. Whether or not there was an attempt in Government dealings with the media to downplay Dr Kelly's importance as a civil servant and his role in the production of the dossier which did not reflect the reality and which was designed to assist in the dispute with the BBC. In this respect, your Lordship has already been assisted by journalists, including Mr Blitz and Mr Baldwin, who said they were briefed by Whitehall sources in the time leading up or after the publication of Dr Kelly's name but who, for proper reasons, refused to identify the persons involved in that briefing. 13. The circumstances leading up to Dr Kelly's giving of evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee and the hearings before those Committees. 14. How Dr Kelly died, and is it clear that Dr Kelly died by his own hand? 15. If Dr Kelly died by his own hand, the matters which, so far as it is possible to tell these things, were likely to have led him to take his own life. This is of course judged with the benefit of hindsight and expert psychiatric evidence which was not available to the parties at the time. Professor Hawton has already made it clear that those in contact with and who had dealings with Dr Kelly at the time could not reasonably have foreseen that Dr Kelly might take his own life. After the private letters were sent out on behalf of your Lordship, I have had extensive discussions with the other parties in an attempt to agree a timetable for stage 2 of the Inquiry. It was a particularly relaxing week. However, I can now give your Lordship the proposed timetable. As has already been published on the Inquiry website, witnesses today include Mr Cragg and Air Marshall Sir Joe French, both from the Defence Intelligence Service, an individual from the Security Services, Mr Scott Dr Kelly's line manager from Porton Down, and Mr Greg Dyke from the BBC. They will all be examined today by counsel to the Inquiry, meaning either myself or my learned friend Mr Knox. On Tuesday 16th September evidence will be given by Detective Constable Coe and Mr Hunt, the pathologist. They will be examined by counsel to the Inquiry. Mr Howard will give evidence. He will be examined by his own counsel, cross-examined by counsel for the Kelly family and the BBC and counsel for the Inquiry. Evidence will be give by Dr Shuttleworth of DSTL, who will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry. Miss Wilson, a press officer employed by the Ministry of Defence, will also give evidence. She will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry and cross-examined by counsel for the family and counsel for the BBC. On Wednesday 17th September evidence will be given by Mr Wilding and Mr Sambrooks, computer experts who will give evidence about Mr Gilligan's Sharp organiser. They will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry. Mr Gilligan will be examined by his own counsel, cross-examined by counsel for the family, counsel for the Government and counsel for the Inquiry. Mr Sambrook will be examined by his own counsel, cross-examined by counsel for the Government and counsel for the Inquiry. On 18th September, Thursday this week, Mr Hatfield, Ms Teare and Sir Kevin Tebbit will all give evidence. They will be examined by their own counsel and cross-examined by counsel for the family and by counsel for the Inquiry. That will conclude the evidence for the first week. On Monday 22nd September the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Hoon, will give evidence. He will be examined by his own counsel and cross-examined by counsel for the family, counsel for the BBC and by counsel for the Inquiry. Mr Hughes, the Secretary to the Inquiry, will produce further documents which have been made available to the Inquiry. Mr Campbell will be examined by his own counsel, cross-examined by counsel for the BBC, counsel for the family and counsel for the Inquiry. On 23rd September Mr Tom Kelly will be examined by his own counsel, cross-examined by counsel for the family and by counsel for the Inquiry. Mr Godric Smith will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry. Mr Scarlett will be examined by his own counsel, cross-examined by counsel for the BBC and by counsel for the Inquiry. Mr Page, Assistant Chief Constable, who has already given evidence, will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry; and Mr Gavyn Davies will be examined by his own counsel. On 24th September Mr Davies will be cross-examined by counsel for the Government and the Inquiry. Mr Lamb will be examined by his own counsel and cross-examined by counsel for the family. Dr Wells will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry and cross-examined by counsel for the family. Wing Commander Clarke and Mr Harrison will be examined by counsel for the Inquiry. Closing submissions will be made by counsel for the family on 23rd September. On 24th September closing submissions will be made by counsel for the Government, counsel for the BBC and counsel for individual witnesses. I will also make closing submissions. Your Lordship and others may be relieved to hear there is a limit of one hour for each counsel for the represented parties and a shorter period of time for counsel for individual witnesses. Those submissions will be televised, as is this submission, in accordance with your Lordship's earlier ruling on televising of proceedings. There is therefore a considerable amount of evidence to be called and submissions to be made and it is proposed to do this within 8 court days. There may be circumstances which disrupt the timetable set out above. As part of the timetable, time limits have been agreed with counsel for the cross-examination of witnesses; and your Lordship is aware of those time limits. Witnesses ought to be aware that time for cross-examination may be extended if your Lordship forms the view that they are, to use a cricketing analogy, playing for lunch and not providing speedy and accurate answers. A final point is this: the aim of the Inquiry is to urgently conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly. While stage 2 is necessary for the reasons which have been set out earlier, it is hoped that these proceedings will continue to attempt to be fair, courteous, but still designed to elicit the truth. It is partly by our dealings with each other, whatever the circumstances may be, that we define ourselves.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Dingemans. You are certainly within your time limit. Hopefully that will continue in the next 8 days.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I think we need a short break.

LORD HUTTON: Very well.

LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Dingemans.

MR DINGEMANS: Before Mr Cragg is introduced, can I correct an error in dates that I made in my opening submission? Closing submissions will be made by counsel for the family on 24th September and it is on 25th September that final closing submissions will be made by the other parties.

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry, Mr Cragg. Could you give his Lordship your full name?

MR DINGEMANS: What is your former occupation?

MR DINGEMANS: What was your task as Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence?

MR DINGEMANS: So were you a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

MR DINGEMANS: And did you deal with weapons of mass destruction and the study of weapons of mass destruction?

MR DINGEMANS: Who did that in Defence Intelligence?

MR DINGEMANS: DIAS standing for?

MR DINGEMANS: What was your understanding of Dr Kelly's position within the Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff?

MR DINGEMANS: Did he, as far as you were aware, contribute to any discussions?

MR DINGEMANS: And which members were those?

LORD HUTTON: Mr Cragg, can I just ask you: Dr Bryan Jones who gave evidence, he was in the technical and scientific side.

LORD HUTTON: There was a director of that particular section, was there?

LORD HUTTON: Yes, I think that would be helpful. If you could just explain Dr Jones' position as it were in the hierarchy.

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard evidence that the Prime Minister announced a dossier would be published on 3rd September. You were a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee. What was the first meeting after that announcement on 3rd September?

MR DINGEMANS: Was the Prime Minister's announcement discussed?

MR DINGEMANS: There were other issues discussed?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to a document, which is CAB/17/3. This is a draft of the JIC assessment of 5th September, which was this: "Iraq has probably dispersed its special weapons, including its CBW weapons. Intelligence also indicates that from forward-deployed storage sites, chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 45 minutes." Is that what you were referring to? That, so far as we are aware, was dated 5th September but no doubt people may have known about it beforehand?

MR DINGEMANS: So what was your personal involvement with the dossier between 4th September and the next meeting on 11th September?

LORD HUTTON: When you say you were not present at 11th September, was the Chief of Defence Intelligence present at that meeting, as far as you know?

LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see.

MR DINGEMANS: Before we get to 10th or 11th September, did you have any personal involvement in the dossier or in the arrangements for the drafting of the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: Were members of your staff involved in drafting the dossier in this period, between 4th and 11th September?

MR DINGEMANS: Is the Cabinet Office assessment staff separate from the JIC?

MR DINGEMANS: So it reports up to the JIC?

MR DINGEMANS: And there were members of your staff on that Assessment Committee, drafting the dossier for the 10th/11th?

MR DINGEMANS: You did not attend the meeting on 9th September?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to DOS/2/2? If we look at the top right-hand corner you will see "10th/11th September 2002". This is the first draft of the dossier you saw, is that right?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to DOS/2/37, which is page 36 of the document. We can see in the top of the page it says this: "Within the last month intelligence has suggested that the Iraqi military would be able to use their chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so."

MR DINGEMANS: So that is what you have available, probably, for the JIC meeting on 11th September. But you have told us you were not there.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you see the minutes relating to that?

MR DINGEMANS: And were you also, no doubt, told of the discussions which had happened on 11th September?

MR DINGEMANS: From those sources, are you able to say whether the dossier was discussed?

MR DINGEMANS: You were not there?

MR DINGEMANS: Did you then deal with members of the Defence Intelligence Service after the meeting on 11th September in relation to the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to DOS/2/58, which I think should be that draft.

MR DINGEMANS: You can see "16th September".

MR DINGEMANS: If we go on to DOS/2/72 you can see what is said about the 45 minutes at the bottom of the page.

MR DINGEMANS: If we scroll down you can see this, the last bullet, last sentence: "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so." Which appears to be a weakening of the language from that which had appeared on 10th or 11th September.

MR DINGEMANS: And indeed differed from the language we saw in the JIC assessment.

MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware of any of the discussions leading up to that weakening of the language?

MR DINGEMANS: Were you made aware of any discussions within the Defence Intelligence Services about the language used in the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: Then after the 16th September draft the process appears to have been repeated, with various memoranda.

MR DINGEMANS: We have seen a document dated 17th September.

MR DINGEMANS: And 19th September.

MR DINGEMANS: Yes. What was the process by which those comments were collected? You outlined there were a number of branches of the Defence Intelligence Services.

MR DINGEMANS: Who was responsible for collating that? I do not need necessarily to know the names.

MR DINGEMANS: You were not feeding in then to the individual who was responsible for collating from the DIS?

MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware that Dr Jones' group was feeding into the comments going back to the JIC, as it were?

MR DINGEMANS: Right. But no-one made you aware of the specific comments?

MR DINGEMANS: Dr Jones has given evidence, and you are no doubt aware of that, where he said he became sufficiently agitated to write a memorandum on 19th September. We will come to that.

MR DINGEMANS: Before that, had you picked up anything to suggest he was unhappy or members of his staff were unhappy?

MR DINGEMANS: Right. And that was the extent of your knowledge of comments or unhappiness, as it were, in relation to those matters?

MR DINGEMANS: When is the next meeting after 11th September of the JIC?

MR DINGEMANS: On the 16th, of the JIC?

MR DINGEMANS: On 18th September?

MR DINGEMANS: Was there a discussion about the dossier at that time?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes, of course.

MR DINGEMANS: That is Mr Scarlett?

MR DINGEMANS: Was there any more extensive discussion of the dossier than that?

MR DINGEMANS: You have mentioned some DIS material that was dated 16th September. Are you sure about the date?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to a document which we have received, which is CAB/33/116.

MR DINGEMANS: This, if we scroll down, says "Executive Summary".

MR DINGEMANS: Various judgments.

MR DINGEMANS: You can see halfway down the page: "Executive summary, para 3, 2nd bullet: "The judgment 'has military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, some of which could be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them' is also rather strong since it is based on a single source. 'Could say intelligence suggests ...'"

MR DINGEMANS: That is referring to the executive summary which was produced on 16th September. I have shown you the dossier which was produced.

MR DINGEMANS: That had had the word "may".

MR DINGEMANS: Executive summary we can see at CAB/11/141. If we then go to page 142 we can see at the second bullet at the top of the page: "Has military plans for the use of chemical weapons, some of which could be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them." That is what was picked up at CAB/33/116.

MR DINGEMANS: What appears to have happened is that on 16th September two documents are produced, the executive summary which says "has" and "ready for use" and the dossier which has the use of the word "may". The Defence Intelligence Staff put in a response on 17th September saying: we are not very happy with the executive summary. They do not appear to make any specific point on the dossier point. As you rightly point out, they do not object to the fact it is included.

MR DINGEMANS: The only other document produced on 16th September is at CAB/11/38. This is a foreword which was not produced by the Intelligence Services so I will not necessarily take you through all of the aspects of it but just show you this is another document being produced on 16th September. So on 16th September we now have the foreword which is drafted on the Prime Minister's behalf and with his assistance by Mr Campbell.

MR DINGEMANS: Then we have the executive summary. We have heard evidence that Mr Scarlett was responsible for that; and we have the dossier itself.

MR DINGEMANS: Your response on 17th September, from the DIS, is to point out that the executive summary is too strong.

MR DINGEMANS: In fact, there was also another response on 17th September, which pointed out that perhaps the dossier was too weak. Can I take you to CAB/11/66? This is a memo dated 17th September from Mr Campbell. If we go to 67 and to point 10, we can see: "On page 17, 2 lines from the bottom, 'may' is weaker than in the summary."

MR DINGEMANS: On the same day you have the Defence Intelligence Staff putting in its response saying: we are not so happy with the executive summary, we do not mind the dossier. And you have Mr Campbell putting in: we are quite happy with the summary, not so happy with the dossier.

MR DINGEMANS: If you then go on to page 70 you can see the response, which is dated 18th September 2002. This is from Mr Scarlett. If you go over to 71 at 10 you we can see: "The language you queried on the old page 17 has been tightened", which picks up the point in the dossier.

MR DINGEMANS: It seems, therefore, that Mr Scarlett was taking on-board the comment from Mr Campbell but not necessarily taking on-board the comment from the Defence Intelligence Staff.

MR DINGEMANS: Do you know whether or not that caused any unhappiness amongst the Defence Intelligence Staff?

MR DINGEMANS: On 18th September, after 16th September, the next dossier which is produced appears to be dated 19th September in the morning.

MR DINGEMANS: No-one has had a chance to note that at the 18th September JIC meeting.

MR DINGEMANS: With that to refresh your memory, was there any discussion on 18th September about the inconsistency or apparent inconsistency between the executive summary and the wording of the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Yes, of course.

MR DINGEMANS: So when was the date of this meeting, then?

MR DINGEMANS: When this inconsistency was being reviewed, as it were.

MR DINGEMANS: On the 17th?

LORD HUTTON: Then, in the light of what you were told at that meeting, you decided to call a meeting yourself, is that correct, Mr Cragg?

LORD HUTTON: Sorry, you arranged that meeting, did you?

LORD HUTTON: Who were those two directors?

LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: What did those who had attended the Cabinet Office assessment tell you about the discussion of the inconsistency that we can see between the documents on 16th September?

MR DINGEMANS: I do not want to ask you about the wording of the recent intelligence.

MR DINGEMANS: Or indeed where it had come from.

MR DINGEMANS: But is this right: the recent intelligence did not deal with the 45 minute issue?

MR DINGEMANS: It did?

LORD HUTTON: Mr Cragg, did part of this discussion relate to the point that I think Dr Jones had been concerned that the intelligence about the 45 minutes claim was single sourced, but then, as I follow the evidence, the SIS, at the meeting that you conducted or at the meeting in which you took part, said that they were satisfied about the reliability of that source? Was that what occurred? Have I understood it correctly?

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Yes.

LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: What was your understanding about ownership of the dossier --

LORD HUTTON: Just before you ask that, may I ask you: at the conclusion of the meeting which you attended, and you had knowledge that Dr Jones and his staff were concerned about the wording relating to the 45 minutes claim, what was your conclusion about the validity of their concerns?

LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Yes. Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: And your view was then made known to the two directors who had attended?

MR DINGEMANS: The Director for Science and Technology was the line manager for Dr Jones, is that right?

MR DINGEMANS: I was turning to the issue of ownership of the dossier. Was the word "ownership" ever used at the time, as far as you were aware?

MR DINGEMANS: Can you help with a document, which is CAB/27/2, which is dated 18th September. We can see if we go down to CAB/27/3 at the bottom -- perhaps even 27/4, sorry. Yes. 18th September 2002. Going back then to CAB/27/2, having dated that document, and scrolling down to ownership of the dossier. A document or a memorandum dated 18th September appears to state: "Ownership of the dossier. "Ownership lay with No. 10." If we scroll up to the top of the record of the meeting, this appears to be a meeting which was held, one infers, on 18th September because it says: "The following main points were agreed at a meeting held in John Scarlett's office..." Were you present at that meeting at all?

MR DINGEMANS: So the extent that the meeting is concerned you obviously cannot assist us?

MR DINGEMANS: Do you know whether anything was said about ownership before or after 19 September?

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard of the drafts that were produced 10th/11th September, 16th September, then 19th. The 19th September appears to have been distributed early in the morning. Do you know if there was any sort of deadline for responses?

MR DINGEMANS: Right. We have also seen, so I will not take you back to it, a series of comments that were passed by DIS.

MR DINGEMANS: At this stage, were you aware of anything following your meeting with the head of GI and head of science and technology about unhappiness with the 45 minutes claim?

MR DINGEMANS: How did it become clear later in the day?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to that, which is MoD/22/1. Dr Jones has given evidence about this. The distribution says: "MA/DCDI." I imagine that means it came to you?

MR DINGEMANS: Dr Jones has given evidence about this. He says at (1) that: "A number of people have been involved in the generation of the Iraq dossier which has involved a number of iterations. "It is my understanding that some of the intelligence has not been made available to my branch."

MR DINGEMANS: He must have picked that up following the meeting you had had with his director.

MR DINGEMANS: So the recent intelligence was not on the 45 minutes issue?

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Was that the recent intelligence that had been referred to at the Cabinet Office assessment meeting, that was the genesis of your subsequent meeting?

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry to interrupt.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. But that recent intelligence was not 45 minutes intelligence?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes. We have heard other evidence it came in at the end of August.

MR DINGEMANS: Then we have seen the two assessments.

MR DINGEMANS: The 5th and 9th September.

MR DINGEMANS: Dr Jones' director?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We have seen this document, 19th September, when Dr Jones has commented on it.

MR DINGEMANS: He says he had only been moved to write it, a document similar to this, I think he said once or perhaps twice before in his 13 years as an intelligence assessor.

MR DINGEMANS: Is this strong language for intelligence personnel?

MR DINGEMANS: And having received a document that surprised you, what did you do as a result of that?

MR DINGEMANS: Were you given another version after 19th September?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: So, for the reasons you have given, you do not do anything about it on the 19th?

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes, please do.

LORD HUTTON: Did you consider, Mr Cragg, whether you should report Dr Jones' concerns to the Chief of Defence Intelligence or to the JIC? In a sense, I think you have perhaps given an explanation already, but I would just like you to respond to that particular question, if you would, please.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: On 20th September there was another document which was produced. Can I take you to CAB/33/114? We can see the date of that top left-hand corner.

MR DINGEMANS: It says this: "Iraq Dossier", at A a memo dated 19th September 2002. And then the draft issued on 20th September.

MR DINGEMANS: We can see from what A is from paragraph 1: "At reference A Bryan Jones recorded concerns of his branch ..." We know that is the document we have just looked at.

MR DINGEMANS: "I have now seen the draft issued today and although one of the points referred to in reference A [has] been addressed, others remain. The 20th September draft still includes a number of statements which are not supported by the evidence available to me. I have set out below my concerns about CW aspects of the paper since this is my area of responsibility." Then he goes through the Prime Minister's foreword and he makes two comments on that, scrolling down the page, concluding with: "And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them."

MR DINGEMANS: He says this: "A similar statement appears in the dossier. This is reported as fact whereas the intelligence comes from a single source. In my view the intelligence warrants no stronger a statement than 'intelligence suggests that military planning allows...'" Then over the page, to 115, he talks about the executive summary.

MR DINGEMANS: And a number of points continuing to the bottom of the page.

MR DINGEMANS: For perfectly understandable reasons we have the bottom blanked out. I am sure you know who was the person who sent this memo.

MR DINGEMANS: But this appears to be a separate memo from the memo sent by Dr Jones.

MR DINGEMANS: One memo might perhaps be understandable. Is two beginning to indicate a pattern?

MR DINGEMANS: I do not want to know the name of the individual but is this an individual we have heard evidence from as Mr A?

LORD HUTTON: Without naming him, was he a member of Dr Jones' section?

LORD HUTTON: And Dr Jones was his superior?

LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I also ask this: I asked about Dr Jones' reaction or description of his memo. He said: very unusual, I think 2 or 3 times in the 13 year period. This memo seems to be in broadly similar language to that of Dr Jones; is that fair?

MR DINGEMANS: When did you first see this memo of 20th September?

MR DINGEMANS: Right. If you had seen it at the time, would that have altered the view that you had taken for the reasons that you have already given?

MR DINGEMANS: You go on leave, I think, on the evening of 19th September.

MR DINGEMANS: Do you return before the dossier is published?

MR DINGEMANS: Which must be 25th September.

MR DINGEMANS: And so you have no further involvement in the steps leading up to publication?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I then just ask you to look at something that was said by the Foreign Affairs Committee about the 45 minutes claim? It is at FAC/3/28. If we scroll down, they refer to what Dr Inch had said, someone writing in The Times, Bronwen Maddox, and what the Foreign Secretary had said. They say at the bottom: "This answer begs the question why the 45 minutes claim was highlighted by the Prime Minister when he presented the dossier to the House, and why it was given such prominence in the dossier itself, being mentioned no fewer than four times, including in the Prime Minister's foreword and in the executive summary? We have not seen a satisfactory answer to that question. We have been told that the entire document, including the executive summary, was prepared by the Chairman of the JIC, except for the foreword, which he approved. We node with disappointment that we were unable to find out why Mr Scarlett chose to give the 45 minutes claim such prominence, as we have been prevented from questioning him." Did you think that the 45 minutes claim was given undue prominence in the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: I am afraid we have not yet been able to scan in the Intelligence and Security Committee report. Have you had a chance to read that?

MR DINGEMANS: If I can read it out. Sorry you do not have it in front you have. At paragraph 108 they talk about the drafting process and they note that the JIC Chairman stated unequivocally he did not feel under any pressure and said the document was not sexed up by Alastair Campbell. At paragraph 109 they say Mr Campbell did not chair meetings on intelligence matters. At paragraph 110, to put it in context, the use of the phrase "continued to produce chemical and biological weapons" in the foreword and the absence of detail on amounts of agents produced could give the impression he was actively producing both chemical and biological weapons. They comment on that.

MR DINGEMANS: They say in paragraph 111 "not considered a current or imminent threat." At 112 they say this, I am sorry to give you the context but it is not in front of you: "The dossier was for public consumption and not for experienced readers of intelligence material. The 45 minutes claim, included four times, was always likely to attract attention because it was arresting detail that the public had not seen before. As the 45 minutes claim was new to its readers, the context of the intelligence and any assessment needed to be explained. The fact that it was assessed to refer to battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on the battlefield, not to any other form of chemical or biological attack, should have been highlighted in the dossier. The omission of the context and assessment allowed speculation as to its exact meaning. This was unhelpful to an understanding of this issue." Would you agree with that paragraph that I have read in full?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I help you, rather than test your memory, and take you to CAB/17/3. This is the redacted assessments. (Pause). Having had a chance to read that memorandum --

MR DINGEMANS: -- would you agree with the paragraph that was written by the Intelligence and Security Committee?

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Mr Scarlett has already given some evidence.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to a document, SJW/1/39? These are comments said to have been recorded from Dr Kelly to Ms Watts. If we look at 39 and scroll halfway down the page, Dr Kelly said this: "You have to remember I'm not part of the intelligence community -- I'm a user of intelligence. Of course I'm very familiar with a lot of it, that's why I'm asked to comment on it. But I'm not deeply embedded into that xxx. So some of it I really can't comment because I don't know whether it's single sourced or not." He is asked: "But on the 45 minutes." He said this: "Oh that I knew because I knew the concern about the statement. It was a statement that was made and it just got out of all proportion. You know someone. They were desperate for information. They were pushing hard for information which could be released. That was one that popped up and it was seized on, and it was unfortunate that it was, which is why there is the argument between the intelligence services and cabinet office/number ten, because things were picked up on, and once they've picked up on it you can't pull it back, that's the problem." From your involvement in the process, would you say what Dr Kelly had said there was accurate?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to CAB/23/15, which is a memo of 11th September. I think you may have seen this or seen reference to it before. This was a memo which, if we scroll down, says: "We have now received comments back from No. 10 on the first draft of the dossier [which is the 10th/11th]. Unsurprisingly they have further questions and areas they would like expanded." Then they relate those. At the bottom, prepenultimate, they say this: "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around at least some of these buoys before, particularly item 4. But No. 10 through the Chairman want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. This is therefore a last(!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included."

MR DINGEMANS: Was that a document that you saw at the time?

MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware of a perception amongst members of your staff that they were being pressed, as it were, for any intelligence that would make the case to be presented in the dossier stronger?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I go back to SJW/1/39 and pick up below the answer that I have just referred to. Ms Watts asked this: "But it was against your advice that they should publish it? "I wouldn't go as strongly as to say that particular bit, because I was not involved in the assessment of it, no. I can't say that it was against MY advice. I was uneasy with it. I mean my problem was I could give other explanations, which I've indicated to you, that it was the time to erect something like a scud missile or it was the time to fill a 40 barrel, multibarrel rocket launcher. "45 minutes might well be important and -- I mean I have no idea who debriefed this guy. Quite often it's someone who has no idea of the topic and the information comes through and people then use it as they see fit." At 40 at the top of the page: "So it wasn't as if there were lots of people saying don't put it in don't put it in, it's just it was in there and seized upon -- rather than number ten specifically going against? "Dr Kelly: There were lots of people saying that -- I mean it was an interesting week before the dossier was put out because there were so many things in there that people were saying well we're not so sure about that, or in fact they were happy with it being in but not expressed the way that it was, because you know the wordsmithing is actually quite important, and the intelligence community are a pretty cautious lot on the whole but once you get people putting it/presenting it for public consumption then of course they use different words. I don't think they're being wilfully dishonest I think they just think that's the way the public will appreciate it best. I'm sure you have the same problem as a journalist, don't you? Sometimes you've got to put things into words that the public will understand." The comments Dr Kelly is reported as having said there, would you say that those were accurate?

MR DINGEMANS: Or perhaps even -- two individuals who do it in writing?

MR DINGEMANS: And a third individual I think we have heard of through the video link.

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry, who did not work for you but came in at least to one meeting?

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard reference to the wordsmithing that has been used.

MR DINGEMANS: Indeed we have seen a number of documents in which specific suggestions are made. I showed you the memorandum that was produced at CAB/11/66, which was comments made by Mr Campbell. Perhaps I can just show you that again.

MR DINGEMANS: You can see: "Please find below a number of drafting points." He goes over the page to detailed comments on the draft.

MR DINGEMANS: I think you have seen that document and Mr Scarlett's response?

MR DINGEMANS: Are those the sort of comments that one might see made by persons assessing intelligence?

MR DINGEMANS: But going back to this document --

MR DINGEMANS: -- we have seen your personnel writing: you should not use "shows", you should say "indicates".

MR DINGEMANS: Here we can see someone saying "may" is weaker than the summary, "could" is weak, et cetera.

MR DINGEMANS: With that context, would you say this is similar to the task that was being carried out by those assessing the intelligence?

MR DINGEMANS: What was your own view of whether or not Mr Campbell, for example, should have been making these types of comments?

MR DINGEMANS: Right. So any view would be only with the benefit of hindsight?

MR DINGEMANS: With that qualification?

MR DINGEMANS: What were your exact dealings with Dr Kelly? I think you have told us that you were aware that he came into Dr Jones' section. Did you have any other personal dealings with him?

MR DINGEMANS: Right. And you did not see any documents which he produced for your purposes at all?

MR DINGEMANS: Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Mr Cragg.

LORD HUTTON: This might be a convenient time for a short break.

MR DINGEMANS: Could you tell his Lordship your full name.

MR DINGEMANS: Your current occupation?

MR DINGEMANS: So that took in the period of time that the dossier was published?

MR DINGEMANS: Can you give an outline of your role as Chief of Defence Intelligence?

MR DINGEMANS: Did you sit on any Committees as a result of your role as Chief of Defence Intelligence?

MR DINGEMANS: When did you become aware that the Government was likely to publish the dossier it did publish in September 2002?

MR DINGEMANS: Were you involved in any of the decision-making to decide to publish the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: And what was decided in relation to that? When was the first meeting that discussed the publication of the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard that the Prime Minister announced on 3rd September that the dossier was to be published. Had the Joint Intelligence Committee discussed the dossier on dates before that?

MR DINGEMANS: Did you attend the meeting on 4th September?

MR DINGEMANS: Was there any discussion about the announcement that had been made the preceding day by the Prime Minister?

MR DINGEMANS: Do you recollect any discussion about the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: What was your involvement between 4th and 11th September in the drafting of the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: On 10th September, a document which is at CAB/33/131, if I can show you this. The first draft of the dossier on 5th September did not include any part relating to the role of the JIC et cetera. But if you look at this document scrolling down in paragraph 1: "Some of you will have seen Alastair Campbell's note to me of 9th September setting out the broad, proposed structure for the 'dossier' on Iraqi WMD which is now under active presentation. Alastair did not refer to an additional section, which I have agreed with him, would be considered for inclusion in the 'dossier'. This would give an account of the JIC assessment of developments in Iraqi WMD programmes since UNSCOM inspectors were withdrawn in late 1998. On present plans, within the dossier, it would follow the section setting out the intelligence based account of what the Iraqis had been doing since late 1998..." Were you aware of any of those discussions leading up to that memorandum?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Now, we have heard from Mr Cragg, who was not present on 11th, but you were?

MR DINGEMANS: What was discussed in relation to the dossier on 11th September?

MR DINGEMANS: We have seen some e-mails that passed between Mrs Taylor and the Cabinet Office in that respect.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you discuss the detail of the dossier?

LORD HUTTON: With whom would you meet on those occasions, Air Marshall?

MR DINGEMANS: In terms of the 45 minutes claim, that related primarily to the area in which Dr Jones was the expert; is that fair?

MR DINGEMANS: Why is that?

MR DINGEMANS: After the meeting of 11th September, did you attend any other JIC meetings before the dossier was published?

MR DINGEMANS: And we have heard from Mr Cragg.

MR DINGEMANS: On 11th September you say you had a meeting beforehand to discuss any issues that had been raised. On 10th to 11th September there is the first draft of the dossier, which is produced after the 45 minutes claim has been finally assessed by the JIC. Was the 45 minutes claim raised at that stage?

MR DINGEMANS: Was it raised in the meeting with you beforehand?

MR DINGEMANS: If it had been mentioned to you, would you have raised it at the Joint Intelligence Committee?

MR DINGEMANS: When did you become aware of any unhappiness or concerns about the 45 minutes claims within members of the Defence Intelligence Staff?

MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware of any earlier comments on the 45 minutes claim? For example, CAB/33/134 which is dated 17th September. If we scroll down that. Sorry I think that must be a rogue reference. I will come back to that one. On 17th September, we have seen a document this morning whereby the Defence Intelligence Staff reported on the draft of 16th September. Were you aware of that?

MR DINGEMANS: You were away on 18th September?

MR DINGEMANS: The reference I gave you is 134. Can we try CAB/33/116? This is the letter of 17th September. Did you see that before you went away or was that sent to you?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes, this is not that document.

MR DINGEMANS: This is, I think, the collection of comments, but --

MR DINGEMANS: I appreciate that. But this letter is the coordinated letter sent into the Joint Intelligence office assessments staff.

MR DINGEMANS: We can see, halfway down the page, that there is being expressed at this stage, which is 17th September, on behalf of the DIS as a whole, the comment that the 45 minutes was rather strong because it is based on a single source. Were you aware, at any time before you saw Dr Jones' memo, of these concerns being expressed more generally?

MR DINGEMANS: Is this document here from the science and technology group alone?

MR DINGEMANS: Which rather suggests, having amalgamated the comments, the Defence Intelligence Staff took the view that the 45 minutes claim was, as expressed in the dossier -- they have given the dates, 15th September -- rather strong.

MR DINGEMANS: Right.

LORD HUTTON: Air Marshall, when you say it has to be clear at the Joint Intelligence Committee level, do you mean by that at the level of the JIC assessment staff --

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Before we get to the 19th September memo, there was a memo, I think you were in court earlier on this morning when Mr Cragg looked at it, which discussed ownership of the dossier. I appreciate it was a meeting you were not at. It was a memo dated 18th September. What were you aware of in relationship to ownership of the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: At all times?

MR DINGEMANS: You return from your travels, I think, on 20th September.

MR DINGEMANS: You did not come into your office?

MR DINGEMANS: Did you receive Dr Jones' memo at that stage?

MR DINGEMANS: Can we look at that? That is MoD/22/1. I think you were in court earlier on when Mr Cragg saw it.

MR DINGEMANS: I will not therefore necessarily take you through it, if I may. Mr Cragg was going off, I think, on leave for the next week and was away for the next week. So for the reasons he has given he did not do anything about it directly on the evening of the 19th September, and you were dealing with it, he knew, on the morning of the 20th September. What did you do with this document?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: The limited distribution intelligence did not refer to the 45 minutes claim?

MR DINGEMANS: So to the extent that Dr Jones was making comments about the 45 minutes issue, that was or was not answered by the recent intelligence?

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard of the reporting of that.

MR DINGEMANS: Having seen Dr Jones' memorandum, what did you do as a result of that?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Were you sent a copy of the dossier that was produced on 20th September?

MR DINGEMANS: Did the JIC meet in committee to approve that dossier on the 20th?

MR DINGEMANS: So a copy was distributed and it was up to you to make any objections known?

MR DINGEMANS: The other document that we have seen is at CAB/33/114, which is 20th September 2002. Mr Cragg said this came from someone else in Dr Jones' team. It refers to the 45 minutes claim. If we look at the bottom of the page you can see --

MR DINGEMANS: -- the 45 minutes claim. "This is reported as fact whereas the intelligence comes from a single course ... the intelligence warrants no stronger a statement than ... suggests." That has come pretty close to the DIS representation that was made on 17th September to the Joint Intelligence office of the assessment staff. What did you do with all those three combinations?

MR DINGEMANS: I think the ISC report makes that clear. But when you are looking at the language of it, dismissing it would mean not putting it in at all. No-one is suggesting that. What is being suggested --

MR DINGEMANS: You were content with that?

MR DINGEMANS: Did you communicate those views to Dr Jones at all?

MR DINGEMANS: And that was how it was dealt with?

MR DINGEMANS: Were you around when the dossier was published?

MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware of any involvement of Dr Kelly in the dossier?

MR DINGEMANS: And had not seen any of his work beforehand?

MR DINGEMANS: I have taken Mr Cragg, and you were here so I need not necessarily show you the references again, to passages in the Foreign Affairs Committee report commenting on the 45 minutes claim and also in the Intelligence and Security Committee report commenting on the 45 minutes claim. Is there anything that you wanted to say in relation to those passages?

MR DINGEMANS: You were content with the wording used for the 45 minutes claim?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I just take you to some passages of Mr Gilligan's transcript, to ask what you say in relation to these?

MR DINGEMANS: I have taken Mr Cragg to the Ms Watts' ones. I will take you to his broadcast, if I may. BBC/1/4. This is early in the morning. I am going to take you to two parts of the broadcast, because there is a difference in language used, and ask you to comment on both. What Mr Gilligan says is this: "... what we've been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that, actually the Government probably erm, knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in. What this person says, is that a week before the publication date of the dossier, it was rather erm a bland production." Was that a fair assessment of the dossier in the weeks before it was published?

MR DINGEMANS: No, but we are. He says that was Dr Kelly: "It didn't, the, the draft prepared for Mr Blair by the Intelligence Agencies actually didn't say very much more than was public knowledge already and erm, Downing Street, our source says, ordered a week before publication, ordered it to be sexed up, to be made more exciting and ordered more facts to be discovered." I have shown Mr Cragg the e-mail of 11th September, which is the only document which comes round, which we have seen, which asked for further intelligence where supported.

MR DINGEMANS: What was your view of that request?

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Humphrys asked: "When you say 'more facts to be discovered', does that suggest that they may not have been facts? "Well, erm, our source says that the dossier, as it was finally published, made the Intelligence Services unhappy, erm, because, to quote erm the source he said, there was basically, that there was, there was, there was unhappiness because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward, that's a quote from our source and essentially, erm, the 45 minute pointer er, was, was probably the most important thing that was added." Would you agree with that comment, that the 45 minutes point was probably the most important thing that was added?

MR DINGEMANS: The reason it had not been in the original draft was it only came from one source and most of the other claims were from two. The intelligence agencies say they do not really believe it was necessarily true because they thought the person making the claim had made a mistake, got it mixed up. We know that it did come from a single source.

MR DINGEMANS: And the reason that it was added late, did that have anything to do with it being single source or some other reason?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you over the page to BBC/1/5? Halfway through Mr Humphrys' introduction, having noted weapons of mass destruction had been a reason advanced, he says: "None of those weapons has been found. Now our defence correspondent, Andrew Gilligan, has found evidence that the Government's dossier on Iraq that was produced last September, was cobbled together at the last minute with some unconfirmed material that had not been approved by the Security Services." Is that allegation right or wrong?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes, the 24th.

MR DINGEMANS: I think we have seen in the passage I showed Mr Cragg that Dr Kelly reported that the last week before publication was an interesting week. Was that a fair comment in the sense there was a lot of work to be done?

MR DINGEMANS: Can I continue with the statement: "Now you told us about this earlier on the programme Andy, and we've had a statement from 10 Downing Street that say's it's not true, and let me just quote what they said to you. 'Not one word of the dossier was not entirely the work of the intelligence agencies.'" Then he comments on the English. "I think we know what they mean. Are you suggesting, let's be very about this, that it was not the work of the intelligence agencies? "Mr Gilligan: No, the information which I'm told was dubious did come from the agencies, but they were unhappy about it, because they didn't think it should have been in there." Was that right?

MR DINGEMANS: So what would have been right to say was that there were elements within the DIS who were unhappy about it, we know that now to be Dr Jones, but the DIS as a whole on its view was happy with the material?

MR DINGEMANS: Then over the page at 6, and if I can pick it up at the bottom of that first paragraph: "Now that claim has come back to haunt Mr Blair because if the weapons had been readily to hand, they probably would have been found by now. But you know, it could have been an honest mistake, but what I have been told is that the Government knew that claim was questionable, even before the war, even before they wrote it in their dossier." Do you know of anything to support that?

MR DINGEMANS: "I have spoken to a British official who was involved in the preparation of the dossier [we know from other evidence that to be Dr Kelly] and he told me that until the week before it was published, the draft dossier produced by the Intelligence Services added little to what was already publicly known." I have already asked you about that comment. What was already publicly known included the IISS report; is that right?

MR DINGEMANS: It was reported that Dr Kelly had said: "'It was transformed in the week before it was published, to make it sexier. The classic example was the statement that weapons of mass destruction were ready for use within 45 minutes. that information was not in the original draft. It was included in the dossier against our wishes, because it was not reliable.'" Was the material included in the dossier against the wishes of any intelligence agencies?

MR DINGEMANS: Then he goes on to deal with the transformation of the dossier, which he says took place at the behest of Downing Street. I have shown Mr Cragg, and I will not therefore show the document to you again but I think you have seen it, Mr Campbell's memo of 17th September 2002 which made some drafting suggestions. What was your view of Mr Campbell's involvement in that process?

MR DINGEMANS: Your own officials were Intelligence Service?

MR DINGEMANS: And Mr Campbell was?

MR DINGEMANS: Did you, therefore, have a view on whether Mr Campbell should be making those types of comments?

MR DINGEMANS: You may have understood it. You did not know it at the time and therefore obviously had no view at the time; but now, with the benefit of hindsight, is there anything you wanted to say about it?

MR DINGEMANS: After the dossier is published you have said you heard no further comments about it from the Defence Intelligence Staff. That, I assume, was until the broadcast from Mr Gilligan; is that right?

MR DINGEMANS: Is there anything else that you know of surrounding the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

MR DINGEMANS: And is there anything else you would like to say?

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Air Marshall. Do you want me to rise now, Mr Dingemans?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes. I am sorry, we have finished a wee bit early.

LORD HUTTON: We will sit again at 2 o'clock.