The Hutton Inquiry

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Hearing Transcripts

October 13, 2003: Morning

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

October 13, 2003: Afternoon

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

September 25, 2003: Morning

Jeremy Gompertz QC

Counsel for the Kelly family

Jonathan Sumption QC

Counsel for the Government

September 25, 2003: Afternoon

Jonathan Sumption QC

Counsel for the Government

Andrew Caldecott QC

Counsel for the BBC

Heather Rogers QC

Counsel for Andrew Gilligan

James Dingemans QC

Counsel for the Inquiry

Closing statement by Lord Hutton

September 24, 2003: Morning

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

Gavyn Davies

BBC

September 24, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

Nick Rufford

Sunday Times, journalist

Wing Commander John Clark

Ministry of Defence

James Harrison

Ministry of Defence

Professor Keith Hawton

Psychiatrist

September 23, 2003: Morning

Godric Smith

Prime Minister's Press Office

Tom Kelly

Prime Minister's Press Office

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

September 23, 2003: Afternoon

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

Assistant Chief Constable Michael Page

Thames Valley Police

September 22, 2003: Morning

Lee Hughes

Hutton Inquiry Secretariat

Geoffrey Hoon MP

Secretary of State for Defence

September 22, 2003: Afternoon

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

September 18, 2003: Morning

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Pamela Teare

Director of News, MoD

September 18, 2003: Afternoon

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

Pamela Teare

Director of News, MoD

Edward Wilding

Computer Investigator

Professor A J Sammes

Professor of Computer Science and Director of the Centre for Forensic Computing at Cranfield University

September 17, 2003: Morning

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

September 17, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Richard Sambrook

Head of News, BBC

September 16, 2003: Morning

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

DC Graham Coe

Police Officer

Dr Nicholas Hunt

Forensic Pathologist

September 16, 2003: Afternoon

Dr Shuttleworth

Defence, Science & Technology Laboratory

Kate Wilson

Chief Press Officer, MoD

September 15, 2003: Morning

Counsel's opening statement

Tony Cragg

Air Marshal J French

September 15, 2003: Afternoon

Sir Richard Dearlove

Dr Richard Scott

Greg Dyke

September 4, 2003: Morning

Olivia Bosch

Colleague

Leigh Potter

Neighbour

Tom Mangold

Journalist

Richard Taylor

Special Advisor to Secretary of State for Defence

September 3, 2003: Morning

Richard Allan

Toxicologist

Assistant Chief Constable Page

Steven Macdonald

MOD

Dr Jones

September 3, 2003: Afternoon

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Dr Jones

Mr A

MOD

Mr Green

Forensic Biologist

September 2, 2003: Morning

Ruth Absalom

Neighbour

Dr Malcolm Warner

GP

Louise Holmes

Search team

Paul Chapman

Search team

PC Andrew Franklin

PC Martyn Sawyer

Sergeant Geoffrey Webb

September 2, 2003: Afternoon

PC Jonathan Martyn

Vanessa Hunt

Ambulance

David Bartlett

Ambulance

Barney Leith

Baha'i faith

Professor Hawton

Psychiatrist

September 1, 2003: Morning

Mrs Kelly

Family

Sarah Pape

Family

Rachel Kelly

Family

September 1, 2003: Afternoon

Professor Roger Avery

Friend

David Wilkins

Family

August 28, 2003: Morning

Tony Blair MP

Prime Minister

Gavyn Davies

BBC

August 28, 2003: Afternoon

Gavyn Davies

BBC

August 27, 2003: Morning

Geoff Hoon MP

Secretary of State for Defence

August 27, 2003: Afternoon

Wing Commander John Clark

Ministry of Defence

James Harrison

Ministry of Defence

Ann Taylor MP

Chair of Intelligence and Security Committee

August 26, 2003: Morning

Andrew MacKinlay MP

Foreign Affairs Select Committee

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

August 26, 2003: Afternoon

John Scarlett

Cabinet Office

Sir David Omand

Cabinet Office

August 21, 2003: Morning

Donald Anderson MP

Foreign Affairs Select Committee

Nick Rufford

Sunday Times, journalist

James Blitz

Financial Times, journalist

August 21, 2003: Afternoon

Richard Norton-Taylor

Guardian, journalist

Peter Beaumont

The Observer, journalist

Tom Baldwin

The Times, journalist

Michael Evans

The Times, journalist

David Broucher

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Lee Hughes

Hutton Inquiry Secretariat

August 20, 2003: Morning

Sir Kevin Tebbit

Ministry of Defence

August 20, 2003: Afternoon

Godric Smith

Prime Minister's Press Office

Tom Kelly

Prime Minister's Press Office

August 19, 2003: Morning

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

August 19, 2003: Afternoon

Alastair Campbell

Prime Minister's Office

August 18, 2003: Morning

Pam Teare

Ministry of Defence Press Office

Jonathan Powell

Prime Minister's Office

August 18, 2003: Afternoon

Jonathan Powell

Prime Minister's Office

Sir David Manning

Prime Minister's Office

August 14, 2003: Morning

Dr Bryan Wells

Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, MOD

August 14, 2003: Afternoon

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

John Williams

Director of Communications, FCO

August 13, 2003: Morning

Susan Watts

BBC Reporter

Gavin Hewitt

BBC Reporter

August 13, 2003: Afternoon

Gavin Hewitt

BBC Reporter

Richard Sambrook

Head of News, BBC

August 12, 2003: Morning

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

August 12, 2003: Afternoon

Andrew Gilligan

BBC Reporter

Susan Watts

BBC Reporter

August 11, 2003: Morning

Terence Taylor

President and Executive Director for the International Institute of Strategic Studies (US)

Richard Hatfield

Personnel Director MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

August 11, 2003: Afternoon

Martin Howard

Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence MOD

Patrick Lamb

Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department FCO

Julian Miller

Chief of the Assessment Staff Cabinet Office.


hutton.softblade.com

: And there is a difference, I take it, from your answer between "indicates" and "shows"?

DR JONES: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: This might be a convenient time to rise.

MR DINGEMANS: In fact Dr Jones will not be the next witness at 2 o'clock because we have the video link. I am sorry, you will have to wait to finish off your evidence after lunch.

(1.05 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(2.00 pm)

LORD HUTTON: We are having Mr A now, are we?

MR DINGEMANS: It is someone called Mr A. We are not going to see his face.

MR A (called)
Examined by MR DINGEMANS

MR DINGEMANS: Mr A we cannot see you. Can you see us?

MR : Yes, I can see you.

MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell us what your current occupation is?

MR : Currently I am a casually employed civil servant with the Counter Proliferation Arms Control Department.

MR DINGEMANS: Have you ever made Dr Kelly?

MR : I have met him on many occasions since I first met him in 1992.

MR DINGEMANS: Where did you meet him in 1992?

MR : I would have met him out in Bahrain as we helped the missions for UNSCOM, the United Nations Special Commission, prepare their missions into Iraq.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you get on well with him?

MR : Very well, initially as professionals working in the same field, and later on socially.

MR DINGEMANS: What were you doing from 1999 onwards?

MR : From 1999 onwards, along with Dr Kelly, we worked on a number of issues for the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence relating to the situation in Iraq.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you have anything to do with the drafting of the September dossier?

MR : I was invited to a meeting at the Ministry of Defence on 19th September.

MR DINGEMANS: Who invited you to that meeting?

MR : Dr Kelly invited me and suggested I had some valuable contributions to make to the process of that meeting.

MR DINGEMANS: And where was the meeting held?

MR : It was held in the Old War Office.

MR DINGEMANS: And who else was present at the meeting? I do not need names but were they Foreign and Commonwealth Office personnel?

MR : They were Ministry of Defence personnel.

MR DINGEMANS: And what part of the Ministry of Defence?

MR : The Defence Intelligence Service.

MR DINGEMANS: What was discussed at this meeting?

MR : A draft of the dossier had been produced and the purpose of the meeting was to check it, once again, for errors of fact, errors of language and the totality of the document as a whole.

LORD HUTTON: Mr A, we have heard evidence from Dr Brian Jones this morning. Was he at the meeting?

MR : He was.

LORD HUTTON: Did he chair the meeting?

MR : He did chair the meeting.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you. Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: How many other people, apart from you, Dr Kelly and Dr Jones, were at the meeting?

MR : Another 7 or 8 apart from myself, Dr Kelly and Dr Jones.

MR DINGEMANS: Had you seen any earlier drafts of the dossier?

MR : I had not.

MR DINGEMANS: Do you recall the nature of the discussions?

MR : It was a page by page fact checking exercise. We were going through it fairly swiftly in order to catch any last minute items that had been incorrectly stated or needed amplification.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you make any particular comments on the dossier?

MR : Yes, I did. There were errors of detail and there were errors of emphasis, in my view.

MR DINGEMANS: Can you help us what areas you thought there were errors of detail on?

MR : The detail appears to be covered in one of the documents already submitted to you. And that is, I believe, CAB/3/79.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Can we look at CAB/3/79? This is a letter dated 19th September from the DIS to the JIO assessment staff. If we scroll down the page. Can you see that now yourself?

MR : I have a copy myself in front of me.

MR DINGEMANS: We are looking now, and it begins: "Page 4, paragraph 5, 4th bullet; "Suggest change ..." And the rationale is language. Is that what you are talking about in terms of detail?

MR : Yes, I have been through the document, myself, in the past couple of days. I have not seen the document before, but I can see, within that document, perhaps 12 changes which I believe were suggested by Dr Kelly and about four changes I believe were suggested by myself. These, of course, represent changes which were accepted and forwarded to the assessment staff for change or inclusion.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Changes that were accepted in the discussion group that you were having?

MR : That is correct.

MR DINGEMANS: And can you help us with the changes that Dr Kelly suggested?

MR : I would say pretty much the majority -- I can go through them point by point but I have possibly 12 to 14 points which I believe come from Dr Kelly.

MR DINGEMANS: Can you very quickly take us through those?

MR : Certainly. At the bottom of the first page: "Amend to: '... with her team at al-Muthanna...'" The next four points completely, down to "aflatoxin. "4.6 tons of growth media". Moving down the page, the "al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute". The "facility ... used to store biological agent". The point beneath that dealing with UNSCOM establishing that in 1987.

MR DINGEMANS: That is at the bottom of the second page, is it?

MR : That is at the bottom of the second page.

MR DINGEMANS: Going to the third page now.

MR : The first point: "... is known to have tested." About halfway down the page "add additional sentence ... 'specified timeframe'", and the next two points beneath that.

MR DINGEMANS: They were all Dr Kelly's suggestions, were they?

MR : Looking back at my recollection of the meeting, I believe those were all suggested by him.

MR DINGEMANS: And there was a letter being drafted or these points were being noted and then put into the letter; is that right?

MR : I believe so. As I say, I have not seen this document before three days ago. Therefore it looks like the formal response from the DIS to the assessment staff.

MR DINGEMANS: And you said that there were points on detail that you commented on. Were there any points on emphasis?

MR : Indeed, I made a comment on the al-Qa'qa' phosgene plant and the tone adopted in relation to that.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I just pull up another document for us back here because we do not have anything to look at, at the moment. It is DOS/1/75 at paragraph 10.

MR : I do not have a copy of that in front of me.

MR DINGEMANS: Well, this is the dossier itself, as published, and we can see if we scroll down to paragraph 10 -- can I help you by reading out what it says: "Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. These were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent." Is that the passage you are referring to?

MR : That is indeed. I have a copy of that in CAB/3/43 also paragraph 10, word for word identical.

MR DINGEMANS: What were your concerns about that?

MR : My concerns were that it really was a non-issue, and it was wrong for the Government to make such a fuss about the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. I had visited there as part of a UN inspection team and many other inspection teams had visited the plant. It is true that phosgene was used as a toxication during the First World War, but some 6 million tons or so, I believe, are manufactured worldwide every year, and this was a small expensive way of producing phosgene dedicated to a particular process, a legitimate process within the al-Qa'qa' plant. Therefore to state it was of particular concern against a background in which the Iraqi armed forces had never weaponised phosgene nor shown any intention of doing so was, for me, the wrong emphasis. My quarrel was with the phrase "of particular concern".

MR DINGEMANS: What we are looking at at DOS/1/75 is the final version. That rather suggests that your concerns were not accepted.

MR : That is correct.

MR DINGEMANS: What was Dr Kelly's attitude to the dossier, apart from those specific comments that you have already identified?

MR : Both of us believed that if you took the dossier as a whole it was a reasonable and accurate reflection of the intelligence that we had available to us at that time.

MR DINGEMANS: And after the meeting, did you have any further involvement in the drafting of the dossier?

MR : I did not.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you have any other communications with Dr Kelly about the dossier?

MR : I did. I e-mailed him about --

LORD HUTTON: Just before we move there, Mr A, did Dr Kelly, at that meeting, make any reference to the statement in the dossier that chemical and biological weapons could be ready for use within 45 minutes?

MR : I think all of us touched on the subject in one way or another. It was a statement which seemed to rather beg more questions than it answered; and for those of us without access to the source intelligence, it really made us ask further questions. Since we did not have access to that intelligence, no assurances about its origins or its implications could be given.

LORD HUTTON: Was Dr Kelly critical of that statement or did he raise questions about it? Can you be a little more specific on that point?

MR : Certainly. I think all those of us without access to that intelligence immediately asked the question: well, what does the 45 minutes refer to? Are you referring to a technical process? Are you referring to a commander control process? And if your assessment causes you to immediately ask questions, then we felt that it was not perhaps a statement that ought to be included. But the discussion about it was general, and did not relate to Dr Kelly or any other person at the meeting feeling particularly that it should not have been included.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: You were about to tell us of the further contact you had had with Dr Kelly about the dossier.

MR : Indeed. About six days later, on the 25th, I e-mailed him. He had asked for a little bit of background on the phosgene plant and I had dug some old stuff out of my files.

MR DINGEMANS: Did that follow a newspaper report?

MR : It did. As I sadly predicted, the Iraqis had immediately invited journalists to go to the al-Qa'qa' plant and see for themselves no proscribed activities were taking place.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I just interrupt you and ask for MED/5/1 to 2? We are going to look at The Guardian, page 2 for 25th September 2002. Is that the newspaper report that you are going to refer to?

MR : It is indeed.

MR DINGEMANS: What this says in paragraph 2 is: "Mr Said, director general of the al-Qa'qa' military industrial complex, near Baghdad, said that at least one of the chemical warfare allegations in relation to his plant was easily refutable: 'it is a pretty stupid mistake for the British to make.' "He expected to be bombed anyway..." Then he went on to talk on about various other matters and make specific comments on it. Is that the article you were referring to?

MR : It is indeed. I wrote to David on that day that I was with the manager of al-Qa'qa', that it was a pretty stupid mistake for the British to make.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I pull up CAB/29/15? Can you see what we are looking at or not?

MR : CAB/29/15. I do not believe I can.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. This is an e-mail from someone who is blanked out to David Kelly and it is dated 25th September 2002 timed at 14:58:10 "research department of ..." Is that the e-mail you sent to Dr Kelly?

MR : That is the e-mail I sent to Dr Kelly.

MR DINGEMANS: Why did you send him this e-mail?

MR : As I say, he had asked me for a little bit of background material on al-Qa'qa'. I was able to dig it out and in passing I made the comment that The Guardian newspaper interview of the manager of al-Qa'qa' had resulted in what I had suggested would happen at the meeting of 19th September.

MR DINGEMANS: Well, you say in the second paragraph: "Casting your mind back to Thursday's rushed little meeting..." Is that the meeting that you are telling us about at the moment?

MR : It is, indeed.

MR DINGEMANS: "... you will recall me pointing out that the phosgene [plant] was too small to be interesting, and regarded by UNSCOM as legit dual use. I was assured that rebuilding had gone on. "I also pointed out that the bulk world usage of phosgene, and the small size of the unit. You will recall [blank] admitted they were grasping at straws." I do not know need to know who "blank" was. Was blank at the meeting?

MR : Blank was at the meeting. It was a conversation I had with blank after the meeting where I expressed my view that to include it in the document really was not going to serve any useful purpose.

MR DINGEMANS: Why did this person say they were grasping at straws?

MR : I cannot remember if he used those exact words. I may have paraphrased, in my e-mail to David, exactly what blank felt about it, but it was a conversational aside at the end of the meeting, that I was simply making the point that not taking my advice was not a good idea.

MR DINGEMANS: You then say: "My annotations are on [blank] draft -- you'll remember [blank] was keen to relieve me of possession of the dossier at the end of the meeting!" You have put exclamation marks. Was there any significance behind that?

MR : Not at all. I was shown a copy of the draft 20 or 30 minutes before the meeting. I read the relevant parts very quickly, made some notes on it and then handed the draft back.

MR DINGEMANS: You say in the penultimate paragraph: "So all in all -- having read page 2 of The Guardian -- I'm with the manager of al-Qa'qa: 'it is a pretty stupid mistake for the British to make'."

MR : Indeed, that was my opinion then and it remains my opinion.

MR DINGEMANS: Then you go on, last paragraph: "Another example supporting our view that you and I should have been more involved in this than the spin merchants of this administration. No doubt you will have to more to tell me as a result of your antics today. Let's hope it turns into tomorrow's chip wrappers ..." Had you and Dr Kelly discussed whether or not you felt you should have been more involved with drafting the dossier?

MR : We had. We, ourselves, had not been directly involved before; but as a result of the work that summer, where both of us had been involved in drafting the International Institute of Strategic Studies report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, we felt that the UK Government was missing a trick by not including us in the loop in the preparation of Her Majesty's Government's dossier.

MR DINGEMANS: You make the comment about the involvement of the spin merchants of this administration. Who were you referring to?

MR : Well, it is really a general comment from the working level within the DIS about perceived interference and really that --

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry to interrupt. What was the perception?

MR : The perception was that the dossier had been round the houses several times in order to try to find a form of words which would strengthen certain political objectives.

MR DINGEMANS: And was that a view widely shared within the DIS?

MR : I am not able to comment on that since I was not working at the DIS at the time.

MR DINGEMANS: You refer to his "antics today". What was that?

MR : I believe he was attending another meeting, but I cannot recall exactly which meeting he was attending.

MR DINGEMANS: And you express the hope that it turns into tomorrow's chip wrappers. Can you just explain formally what you mean by that?

MR : Well, news is often unimportant two or three days after it has been published and that was the sentiment I was seeking to express, that really we could move past this little difficulty of a dossier which had one or two errors in it. You must remember our view that the dossier as a whole was quite a decent dossier and represented a reasonable summation. It is just that it included some points which could have been left out.

MR DINGEMANS: After publication of the dossier, were you ever contacted by anyone in relation to the dossier?

MR : Some journalists had approached my home telephone number seeking for informed comments but I was unable to help them since I had not been involved in the production of the dossier apart from that particular meeting.

MR DINGEMANS: Were you authorised to speak to journalists?

MR : I was not authorised to speak to journalists and said very little other than: thank you very much and no I have nothing to say, before putting the phone down.

MR DINGEMANS: When did you last visit Dr Kelly?

MR : I last visited his home -- it would have been about a week before the 2nd July. He last visited my home on 10th July.

MR DINGEMANS: When you visited his home, if it is the week before, it is about 26th June, is that about right?

MR : It is about then, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he speak to you about any letters he was going to write to the Ministry of Defence about press contacts?

MR : He did not.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he speak to you about whether or not he had spoken to Mr Gilligan?

MR : He never mentioned Mr Gilligan at all.

MR DINGEMANS: Either on 26th or on 10th July?

MR : On neither occasion did he mention Mr Gilligan.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you see Dr Kelly after 26th June?

MR : Yes, I did. We underwent some training together at RAF Uxbridge and RAF Honnington in preparation for our imminent deployment to Iraq. And shortly after that training he visited my house on the 10th to drop off some malaria medication.

MR DINGEMANS: When you saw him at RAF Uxbridge and RAF Honnington, how did he seem?

MR : He seemed his normal self, chatty, friendly, gregarious and it was only when he was called away on the Monday we were at Honnington, which I believe is the 7th --

MR DINGEMANS: 7th July?

MR : 7th July, that he -- we began to think that perhaps there were other matters afoot which would involve him.

MR DINGEMANS: Who is "we"?

MR : Those people being trained to deploy to Iraq.

MR DINGEMANS: How did Dr Kelly seem when he was called away?

MR : He simply turned his phone off and turned -- rather ended the call and said: I have to go to London immediately; and made preparations to leave the training.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you overhear the conversation?

MR : No, I did not.

MR DINGEMANS: When you saw him on 10th July, where were you?

MR : I was at home, preparing to fly the next day.

MR DINGEMANS: We do not want to know exactly where your home is. Can you give us a general description of the area, perhaps by county?

MR : Certainly, Wiltshire.

MR DINGEMANS: And you saw him on 10th July?

MR : Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard that he spent the night of the 9th July at a hotel in Weston-Super-Mare then, I think, travelled down on 10th July to Cornwall. Did he tell you that he was travelling anywhere?

MR : It was slightly odd. He rang me on the morning of the 10th to tell me he had the medication for me.

MR DINGEMANS: What medication was this?

MR : It was paladin, it is an anti-malarial medication.

MR DINGEMANS: Who had given him that?

MR : The doctor at RAF Honnington had given him the medication for the three of us who were about to deploy to Iraq on Friday. She had made a slight error in the prescription and was giving us some more.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. And he rang you to say that he had the medication -- sorry, I interrupted.

MR : Yes. He rang to say he had the medication and was quite happy to drop it off. This was quite odd. I was quite happy to travel the short distance to his home to pick it up. But he almost insisted he dropped it off. Within about half an hour to an hour he arrived at my house.

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry to press you, whereabouts in Wiltshire? Can you give a town that you are near?

MR : I am near Swindon.

LORD HUTTON: Was Mrs Kelly with Dr Kelly at this time, Mr A?

MR : It is possible that she could have been in the car. I myself did not understand how the whole Weston-Super-Mare/Cornwall trip works in the chronology. David had parked some distance from my house and walked 100 yards up the road to my house.

MR DINGEMANS: Do you have a drive?

MR : I am afraid not.

MR DINGEMANS: Was 100 yards the closest he could park?

MR : Yes, that is the problem.

MR DINGEMANS: And how did he seem to you when you saw him on 10th July?

MR : He was distracted. Our conversation would normally include a significant part relating to work, but he seemed to want nothing more than to have a cup of coffee and walk through my garden talking about the garden, so that is what we did.

MR DINGEMANS: Was that usual behaviour for him?

MR : It was not. I would characterise his behaviour as being somewhat distracted at this point; and he clearly did not want to talk much about work.

MR DINGEMANS: Was that usual?

MR : It was not. Our friendship was based partly on work but -- mostly on work, and really a large part of our meetings would consist of talking of matters of professional mutual concern.

MR DINGEMANS: Had you by this stage become aware of the Ministry of Defence press release on the evening of 8th July which referred to an unnamed official coming forward?

MR : I had not. I picked up the paper shortly after he left and he was named in that paper; but at that point I did not know he had been named.

MR DINGEMANS: And he did not volunteer anything about that to you?

MR : He did not. I mentioned briefly whoever the mole was probably had some explaining to do. It never crossed my mind for a moment that they possibly could be referring to David. The reason for that is I knew he had been charged with the responsibility of giving background briefings by both the FCO and MoD for many years and I believe that his authorisation covered all his media contacts.

MR DINGEMANS: Had you ever discussed retirement plans or Dr Kelly's retirement plans?

MR : We often did. He was approaching the end of a long and meritorious career and he still had, he believed, a lot to offer. It was unclear to him exactly how he would deal with his retirement. But a significant change did occur over the period of the winter 2002 to the spring of 2003.

MR DINGEMANS: What was that change?

MR : I would say that before the autumn of 2002 he had every intention of working in an official/semi-official or academic capacity in the field which he had made his own for the past 30 years. But when we discussed the subject in May or June of 2003 he did say to me that the events of the winter and the spring had made him think very seriously as to whether his previous ideas of continuing on were realistic and maybe he ought to just draw a line under the whole experience when it was over.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he tell you what events he was referring to?

MR : David had been in great demand throughout the winter and the spring, by various people, and had done a lot of work and a lot of travelling; and I do not think necessarily that he had the support that he thought was necessary. I say in that that he found it really quite frustrating at times dealing with people who were not fully aware of the issues.

MR DINGEMANS: "Dealing with people", what sort of people?

MR : He was never indiscrete enough to mention which departments or individuals he was having difficulty with; but of course Government -- this is a consensual process and you can have opinions and people cannot take your advice. If people do not take your advice, this can be seen to be quite difficult.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he refer, in this context, to the dossier at all?

MR : He did not. That more or less did turn into yesterday's chip wrappers for a period over the winter, and it was subsumed by the February dossier to some extent which had its own particular problems.

MR DINGEMANS: Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

MR : Not at all, but I can tell you about a meeting held in Baghdad some 8 days after David's death. Some 30 former colleagues of David actually gathered, which in a sense was fairly impressive, to remember the man and his achievements. And we felt that his loss is actually a sorry loss for the Iraq Survey Group and we miss his expertise and his friendship greatly.

MR DINGEMANS: Is there anything else you would like to say?

MR : Not at all.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr A.

MR : Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I am afraid we will need a couple of minutes to disconnect.

LORD HUTTON: I will rise.

(2.28 pm)
(Short Break)
(2.30 pm)
DR BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES (continued)
Examined by MR DINGEMANS (continued)

LORD HUTTON: Sit down again, please, Dr Jones.

MR DINGEMANS: Dr Jones, I am sorry to have interrupted your evidence. You have told us about the three categories of concern you had in relation to the 45 minutes comment. You had also dealt with the other matter highlighted on that. When you were having your meeting on 19th September in DIS, was the person who we have heard of as Mr A present?

DR JONES: I believe so, yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): I do not know whether the voice was distorted or whether you might have been able to recognise him?

DR JONES: That was the only -- I think the only occasion I ever met Mr A; and so I am not familiar -- you know, I am not familiar with his voice. I am virtually certain it was.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): He sounded fairly forceful about certain matters. Was that a fair impression?

DR JONES: (Pause). My recollection of the meeting does not coincide exactly with what you have just heard. In the main parts I think it does. The reason for the meeting, from my perspective -- well, the meeting was not held for the reason that Mr A thinks it was, and it did not gather the information for the particular document you showed.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Right.

DR JONES: Some of it may have come from that meeting, but that was not the purpose of the meeting. The purpose of the meeting, and I think the description of it of "rushed" and "little" were probably correct. It was a rushed little meeting; but I actually called it at the suggestion of one of my staff, who was aware of the problem in my mind over the fact that Dr Kelly -- and that David had told me that he thought the dossier was good, on the one hand, and my staff and indeed my impressions of it were that it was not completely good.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): So it was to iron out those differences of perception?

DR JONES: It was to iron out those differences. As far as the presence of Mr A, you know that was an additional bonus, if you like, that he had come in and he was the CW expert in --

LORD HUTTON: He was the what expert, sorry?

DR JONES: The CW, sorry, the chemical warfare expert. David being the biological warfare expert. We could just sit down and briefly chew over the things really in order to try to, you know, settle this problem I had in my mind. I have a great deal of respect for David Kelly's input to this, and I was really worried about there being some contradiction.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. It seems from what Mr A had said that the invitation was extended by Dr Kelly. Did you invite Mr A or did Dr Kelly?

DR JONES: I did not. The way in which it happened was that on that morning a member of my staff, knowing that I had these worries, said to me that David was coming in and Mr A was coming in with him, would I like a small get together just to try to resolve some of the issues that existed? I said: that is a very good idea. And we had a meeting, I think in the late morning; and we did have a round table discussion of aspects of the dossier. But I do not think it was a very long meeting and it certainly did not itemise matters that I was going to put or a member of my staff was going to put in a response to the assessment staff.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Mr A referred to the letter at CAB/3/79. He identified a number of comments that Dr Kelly had made and he identified Dr Kelly as being the source of those comments. Did that accord with your recollection?

DR JONES: That could well have been the case, but you will recall that Dr Kelly was looking at the dossier the day before --

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Yes.

DR JONES: -- and he will have been passing comments, I imagine, to members of my staff who would then have incorporated them in the comments they would send on. So it does not surprise me that these additional comments, where my staff thought that they contributed to the process, would have been taken and used in that way. Indeed, it is why they -- you know, why they were welcomed in to help in this exercise.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): The letter of 19th September we can see on the screen, was that sent after your meeting with Dr Kelly and Mr A and your other assessment staff?

DR JONES: I do not know. I mean, that did not originate in my branch. It almost certainly includes comments that my branch will have fed to this --

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Person coordinating?

DR JONES: Coordinating this.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): So this is the letter from your branch, reported up comments?

DR JONES: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): And the coordinator, having heard all the comments from DIS, then put this letter together?

DR JONES: I think that is what it represents, yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Do you remember what dossier you were looking at on 19th September? We have one at CAB/3/22 which, in the top right-hand corner, has some handwriting, 19th September on it.

DR JONES: My recollection is that David was coming in to look at the latest version of the dossier.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): That day?

DR JONES: So, I would -- my best guess would be that it was that version.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): We are told that the 19th September 2002 has been written on after the event to help us try to follow the progress of the dossier but is taken, as it were, from computer records. So you think it was a dossier that you got in that day?

DR JONES: I believe so. There was one, as I think I mentioned earlier, that they had been working on the day before; and as far as I can remember, and I cannot be absolutely certain about this, I believe that at that stage my CW expert said, when the new dossier arrived: they still have not taken these comments that I am rather bothered about. So I do not think the two versions, as far as we were concerned -- those pieces of the dossier that were primarily of interest to us, I do not think they had changed greatly between the two.

LORD HUTTON: Do you remember, Dr Jones, the draft of the dossier that you looked at of 19th September, was it in the same form as the dossier that was finally published on 24th September? Do you remember that?

DR JONES: (Pause). I think it was -- I think it was close to that, to the final version.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Might it have been exactly the same or -- I appreciate it is very difficult to remember precisely.

DR JONES: Yes, yes.

LORD HUTTON: -- is it the position it might have been the identical document or it was certainly close to it?

DR JONES: I believed, I think, at the time that this was the version as it would appear and that the only comments that were required on it were very minimal and there were going to be no further major changes.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

DR JONES: I was surprised when I refreshed my memory last week at the Ministry of Defence to see that there had been, in fact, another version on the 20th. I cannot recall that that was the case, but that is what the record showed and I can believe that.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. You saw another version, handwriting in the top right-hand corner with the 20th on it?

DR JONES: No, I do not think I saw that.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): No, no, not at the time, but last week?

DR JONES: No, I saw reference to it in a chronological list of --

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Of dossiers?

DR JONES: Of dossiers, yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Do you remember -- it is slightly unfair -- how many dossiers there were listed there?

DR JONES: No.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): What was the latest dossier that you recall there?

DR JONES: Well, I believe it was the one on the 20th was the last draft. But I cannot be certain about that.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): After the meeting on 19th September, your CW expert, and I imagine that is a different --

LORD HUTTON: Sorry, may I just ask: you said that the purpose of that meeting was to really resolve an issue which was that some members of your staff had reservations about the dossier, whereas Dr Kelly had told you that he thought it was a good dossier. That was the purpose of the meeting, as I understand it.

DR JONES: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: How was that matter resolved at that meeting or was it resolved?

DR JONES: Well, it was resolved to my satisfaction and to the extent that David made it clear that his comments on the dossier did not relate to the latest intelligence, which he had not seen; that it was mainly about those parts of the dossier dealing with the historical aspects and the information he had acquired in his duties as an inspector. Those were the parts that he was focusing on.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

DR JONES: And his position was that they were very sound and the general thrust of the document he found -- he thought was good.

LORD HUTTON: Please correct me if I am in any way wrong in my understanding. Was it the position that Dr Kelly then did not express a view about the 45 minute claim, in that it was based on recent intelligence which he had not seen?

DR JONES: I cannot recall that he expressed a view on it.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

DR JONES: It may well be that, as you heard from the last witness, there may have been some general discussion about it. In fact, I think that was probably likely. But -- and I think probably the context of the meeting was that my staff expressed reservations about it, but since he will not have seen it, I do not think there could have been a detailed discussion of it because it would not have been appropriate at that time.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: After the meeting, a letter is written, we have seen that letter, which incorporates various comments and --

DR JONES: Sorry, which --

MR DINGEMANS (continued): We have seen the letter, 19th September letter.

DR JONES: The one that was --

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Yes. Do you want to see it again?

DR JONES: I do not think so. I mean, you should be clear that that letter or that minute was not as a result of the meeting.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): No, sorry. Well, comments are passed up to the coordinator, who then writes the letter.

DR JONES: Yes, as far as I am aware. It might have been done before we had the meeting, I do not know.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Were any comments passed up, as a result of the meeting, to the coordinator by your group?

DR JONES: Not as a -- no. No, they were not.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Right. But by then, comments had been passed up by your CW expert that had not been accepted in the subsequent drafts?

DR JONES: They had been passed up several times during the course of the preparation of the dossier.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Was your CW expert happy or unhappy about this?

DR JONES: He remained unhappy that significant -- that comments he had made that he felt were significant had not been incorporated.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): So what do you do in those circumstances?

DR JONES: Well, these circumstances are quite unusual.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Can you tell us why?

DR JONES: Well, I mean the whole dossier was unusual. It was not something we did. If I think about that in the same context as the normal product of the assessment process and the JIC assessment process, it would, in fact, be very unusual to arrive at a point where a paper was about to be published, not in the wider sense but published as a secure paper --

MR DINGEMANS (continued): The JIC assessment finalised?

DR JONES: Yes, where significant differences remain. Part of that process in the normal production of a JIC assessment would involve a meeting within the DIS of analysts with our two representatives on the Joint Intelligence Committee, at which arguments would be put to them, if there were outstanding issues, for them to take into the full Committee to discuss. And that happened fairly often, that there would be one or two things and the Chief of Defence Intelligence and his deputy would look at those and decide whether they would represent them or otherwise.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): At the Joint Intelligence Committee meeting?

DR JONES: Yes, yes. And usually issues were either resolved before that or resolved as part of that process.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Because the Chief of Defence Intelligence would say, "Look, you are being silly about this; for reasons A, B, C I am not going to represent this argument in the Joint Intelligence Committee" or "You have persuaded me, I will see what I can do".

DR JONES: That is exactly it.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Did that happen in this case?

DR JONES: No. There was, I believe, a slight difference in process here, in that these latest dossiers were -- the latest drafts of the dossier, I think, were being modified between major JIC meetings, as I understand.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Right.

DR JONES: So -- sorry.

LORD HUTTON: Carry on please, Dr Jones.

DR JONES: So I think some of these issues were -- probably must have been, as far as I can see, dealt with out of committee, as it were, by members of the JIC.

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett told us that he set up a drafting committee, sub-committee, I hope I represent it fairly, from the Joint Intelligence Committee and his joint intelligence assessment staff which was responsible for drafting the dossier.

DR JONES: That is right, yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): And that is what you refer to as being a slightly unusual process, is it?

DR JONES: No, no. The involvement of the assessment staff in the drafting of the papers was normal process.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): What was abnormal?

DR JONES: (Pause). I am -- I think "abnormal" is the wrong word. What was unusual or what did not follow the normal practice was that this was not a paper that was going through the process by which it was examined and argued over at a full meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the stage that we are talking about.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Right.

DR JONES: Unless there was an extraordinary one, of which I am totally unaware, I would think that the last meeting before publication, which was a Tuesday, would have been the previous Wednesday.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Right.

DR JONES: And here we are into the Thursday and the Friday of that cycle.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): So the -- and I think Mr Scarlett has already told us this -- Joint Intelligence Committee committee meetings are the Wednesday. If you work back on the dossier: the dossier is published on 24th September; we know there are some versions, 20th you refer to or late on the 19th, maybe the same one, which are produced after the Joint Intelligence Committee had met.

DR JONES: Yes, I think that just working backwards there would have been a meeting on the 18th, I believe.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Right. Do you understand there to have been a full meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee which considered the final draft of the dossier?

DR JONES: I am not aware that there was one, but I am not sure that there was not one.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Right. Would you normally know of meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

DR JONES: I think I would have known if there was one on this matter, but again I cannot be absolutely sure.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Their usual meetings are the Wednesday. You would have known there was an extraordinary, in the sense of not the usual time, meeting?

DR JONES: I would be surprised if I did not know. But, I mean, one cannot be absolutely certain. There was a lot going on. But I am not aware that there was; but if someone told me that there was one, I would not argue with it.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Is that why you considered the process -- I used the word "abnormal", you did not like that, you said "unusual". Is that why you considered there was an unusual process?

DR JONES: Well, yes, in the sense that the task that was being undertaken was different from the normal process. I mean, we had maybe produced one paper that was a bit like the dossier before, and this was really, you know, unusual in its -- the whole thing was a little unusual. So it was not necessarily surprising that it did not follow exactly the same process. It was not surprising to me then.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Was the perception, right or wrong, that the Joint Intelligence Committee had not considered in committee the final draft before it was published something that was commented on by others?

DR JONES: No, I think it has only sort of dawned on me that was the case retrospectively. I mean, I do not remember thinking that -- I do not remember thinking that, at the time. The impression I had was that on about 19th September, as it may have been the 20th September, as it were, the shutters were coming down on this particular paper, that the discussion and the argument had been concluded. And it was the impression that I had, at that time, that our reservations about the dossier were not going to be reflected in the final version.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): As a result of this, did you take any action?

DR JONES: Yes, I wrote a minute to my director making it clear that there were problems with this, and I copied that to --

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Can I call up a minute and you can tell me if it is the right one?

DR JONES: -- my deputy director.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): It is MoD/22/1. If we scroll down.

DR JONES: Yes, that is the one.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): You send it to various people; and it said: "... has been involved in the generation of the Iraq dossier which, in the last two weeks has involved a number of iterations which have incorporated new intelligence. It is my understanding that some of the intelligence has not been made available to my branch. Because of this they have had to express their reservations on several aspects of the dossier. Most of these have been resolved. However, a number remain in the document at reference and it is important that I note for you at this stage the remaining areas where we are unable to confirm the statements made on the basis of the information available to my branch." Was that the background against which you wrote the note?

DR JONES: That was, yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Then you make a number of points: "Although we have no problem with a judgment based on intelligence that Saddam attaches great importance to possessing WMD we have not seen the intelligence that 'shows' this to be the case. Nor have we seen intelligence that 'shows' he does not regard them only as a weapon of last resort, although our judgment is that it would be sensible to assume he might use them in a number of other scenarios. The intelligence we have seen indicates rather than 'shows'..." That I think picks up a point you were making shortly before lunch, is that right?

DR JONES: Yes, that is right.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): At 3: "We have a number of questions in our minds relating to the intelligence on the military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, particularly about the times mentioned and the failure to differentiate between the two types of weapon." Is that a reference to the 45 minutes point?

DR JONES: It is, yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): "4. We have not seen intelligence which we believe 'shows' that Iraq has continued to produce CW agent in 1998-2002, although our judgment is that it has probably done so. Whilst we are even more convinced that Iraq has continued to produce biological weapons agent (on the basis of mobile production intelligence) we would not go so far as to say we 'know' this to be the case." That is on BW, is that?

DR JONES: Yes, that is right.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): That is a thing that Dr Kelly would have known about; is that right?

DR JONES: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Over the page: "Finally, I note we are pleased that the claim that Iraq used aflatoxin against the Shi'a uprising in 1991 has been excluded from the dossier but we are concerned that the claim in relation to mustard remains as we consider the evidence to be weak." To a lawyer who reads people moaning about words all the time, it might seem that this is a usual sort of minute to write. Would that be a fair impression?

DR JONES: No, if we revert to our comparison with the normal JIC product, I think I had only had cause to express this sort of reservation after the shutters had come down, if you like, on one occasion, maybe two. I can remember -- I can clearly remember one, but there may have been another. But, you know, in 15 years of dealing with this process it was very unusual to have to do that.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Did you get a response?

DR JONES: My director -- who I should explain was only recently in post, he had only been in post a few weeks, had come from outside the intelligence area -- was, you know, having a difficult time then, shall we say, coming to terms with all this. And he did write me a note saying: thank you for your minute; and I think that was the only response I had.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): You got the impression he did not really mean it when he said "thank you".

DR JONES: He may well not have meant it, but I do not know -- no, I cannot really comment on that. I mean, we had had a discussion about it, and he was aware of my reservations, you know, 24 hours earlier.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): At MoD/4/11 we can see a letter that is dated 8th July 2003, which refers to the fact that, halfway down: "Your records will show that as [then there is a title] and probably the most senior and experienced intelligence community official working on 'WMD', I was so concerned about the manner in which intelligence assessments for which I had some responsibility were being presented in the dossier of 24 September 2002, that I was moved to write formally to your predecessor, Tony Cragg, recording and explaining my reservations." Do you know anything about this letter?

DR JONES: Yes, I wrote it.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): That is from you, is it?

DR JONES: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): And I think we have seen the terms of that letter.

LORD HUTTON: Now, was Mr Tony Cragg someone separate and distinct from your director or is he the same?

DR JONES: Yes, he is my -- he was my director's boss.

LORD HUTTON: I see.

DR JONES: So he is --

LORD HUTTON: He was the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence.

DR JONES: Yes, that is right.

LORD HUTTON: He was your director's boss?

DR JONES: Yes, that is right.

LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to a document? It is SJW/1/59 and take you to the bottom of that. Taking it down the page, if that is all right, this is said to be a tape recording of Dr Kelly in conversation with Ms Watts. And if I pick it up just before the bottom of the page you can see: "DK: I wouldn't go as strongly as to say that particular bit, because I was not involved in the assessment of it, no. [He is talking about the 45 minutes] I can't say that it was against MY advice. I was uneasy with it. I mean my problem was I could give other explanations, which I've indicated to you, that it was the time to erect something like a scud missile or it was the time to fill a 40 barrel multi barrel rocket launcher. "45 minutes might well be important and I mean I have no idea who de-briefed this guy, quite often it's someone who has no idea of the topic and the information comes through and people then use it as they see fit." Do you recall Dr Kelly expressing those sort of comments?

DR JONES: No, I cannot recall that he did that.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): But you recall there was some discussion about the 45 minutes around the table?

DR JONES: I think there almost certainly was.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): It is just you --

DR JONES: And there may have been some general comments raised, as indeed the last witness mentioned, about an issue like that. I mean, they would obviously, with their background and experience, try to fit something into that, having read it in the draft dossier. I mean, they did parallel concerns that we were trying to deal with.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Ms Watts says: "So it wasn't as if there were lots of people saying don't put it in don't put it in, it's just it was in there and was seized upon, rather than No. 10 specifically going against." Dr Kelly is reported as saying this: "There were lots of people saying that -- I mean it was an interesting week before the dossier was put out because there were so many things in there that people were saying well we're not so sure about that, or in fact they were happy with it being in but not expressed the way that it was, because the wordsmithing is actually quite important and the intelligence community are a pretty cautious lot on the whole but once you get people putting it/presenting it for public consumption of course they use different words. I don't think they're being wilfully dishonest I think they just think that that's the way the public will appreciate it best. I'm sure you have the same problem as a journalist don't you? Sometimes you've got to put things into words that the public will understand." Is that a fair reflection of what was going on in the week before the dossier was published?

DR JONES: (Pause). Not completely. I think it depends on what one's perception of "lots of people" were. I mean people around -- a few people around me were; and letting me know about it.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): And a few people obviously then around Dr Kelly, because he was around the same sort of people.

DR JONES: He, I think, would have been aware to some extent of that. I do not think -- as I think I mentioned earlier, I do not think it was a matter of if we are still on the 45 minutes, I think we are --

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Well, generally.

DR JONES: It was a matter of saying, you know: do not put that in -- it was the way it was qualified which was the issue, I believe.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Over the page, at the top of page 60: "In your heart of hearts [this is Dr Kelly still] you must realise sometimes that's not actually the right thing to say but it's the only way you can put it over if you've got to get it over in two minutes or three minutes. Ms Watts: Did you actually write that section which refers to the 45 minutes or was it somebody else? "Dr Kelly: I didn't write THAT section, no. I mean I reviewed the whole thing. I was involved with the whole process. In the end it was just a flurry of activity and it was very difficult to get comments in because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the things." Was that a fair comment?

DR JONES: (Pause). I mean, I think David was involved in the whole process to the extent that he had visibility of the whole -- the complete drafts of the dossiers or at least by the time I returned from leave on the 18th I think he was seeing them. His -- I mean, he did not contribute to the process of the analysis of the latest intelligence, so he was not involved to that extent.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Now if --

DR JONES: His description of the flurry of activity was certainly right and I think I have explained that. I mean, I think -- I think the end of that, "Because people at the top didn't want to hear some of the things". I mean, whether that was the case or not, I do not know. It was certainly difficult to get the things done and it was more difficult than usual, and we were disappointed when we did not succeed. But the exact cause of that one can only guess at. One cannot -- I was not in a position to know, and I do not know whether he knew any more than I did.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): If members of your staff had given this sort of information to journalists about the discussions that had taken place in your branch relating to concerns about the dossier, what would your reaction have been to that?

DR JONES: (Pause). I would have thought that they were acting well beyond the bounds of what they should have been doing. I would have been very disappointed and very annoyed.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Can I take you to one final reference, CAB/29/15? This is the e-mail -- I think you were in while Mr A was on the screen. This was Mr A's e-mail. Just at the bottom of CAB/29/15 Mr A makes the comment: "Another example supporting our view that you and I should have been more involved in this than the spin merchants of this administration." Mr A has explained what he meant by that. Was there a perception, right or wrong, amongst DIS personnel that spin merchants were involved with the dossier?

DR JONES: Well, "spin merchants" is rather emotive. I think there was an impression, right or wrong, and I do not know, I did not allow that to concern me as this process -- I think there was an impression that there was an influence from outside the intelligence community.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): And were people in the intelligence community happy with that?

DR JONES: No, I do not think -- well, I cannot comment on the broader intelligence community. I think the people who had been involved on my staff and possibly others -- I mean, one cannot make a general statement about this. But certainly those people that were working directly with me were concerned and unhappy; in the way I think I described earlier in my evidence, in the way that people can be unhappy. But I think there was a realisation that this was a different process; and I think, at the end of the day, what they were very keen to do is have any assessment reflect as accurately as possible the product of their work.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

DR JONES: I do not think so, no.

MR DINGEMANS (continued): Is there anything else you would like to say?

DR JONES: No. No.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Dr Jones.

DR JONES: Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Green, please.

MR ROY JAMES GREEN (called)
Examined by MR DINGEMANS

LORD HUTTON: Just sit down, please, Mr Green.

MR GREEN: Thank you, my Lord.

MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?

MR GREEN: Yes, Roy James Green.

MR DINGEMANS: What is your occupation?

MR GREEN: I am a forensic biologist.

MR DINGEMANS: Who do you work for?

MR GREEN: I work for Forensic Alliance Limited.

MR DINGEMANS: And is that a private company or a publicly owned company?

MR GREEN: Forensic Alliance is a private forensic company, probably the largest independent supplier of forensic science in this country.

MR DINGEMANS: What does being a forensic biologist mean that you do?

MR GREEN: It is basically looking at evidence from crimes, interpreting the evidence that you find and giving an opinion on what you feel that evidence means.

MR DINGEMANS: Were you involved in the investigation into Dr Kelly's death?

MR GREEN: Yes, I was and I still am.

MR DINGEMANS: And when was your first involvement?

MR GREEN: May I refer to my notes, if that is all right?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes, of course.

MR GREEN: I received a phone call on 18th July.

MR DINGEMANS: At what time, morning, evening?

MR GREEN: It was around about dinner time.

MR DINGEMANS: Around about?

MR GREEN: Dinner time.

MR DINGEMANS: What did you do as a result of that?

MR GREEN: I attended Harrowdown Hill accompanied by one of my colleagues.

MR DINGEMANS: What was the name of your colleague?

MR GREEN: Dr Eileen Hickey.

MR DINGEMANS: What time did you get to Harrowdown Hill?

MR GREEN: We arrived at the scene at just gone 2 o'clock.

MR DINGEMANS: 2 o'clock in the afternoon?

MR GREEN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Who was there?

MR GREEN: There were lots of people there, but specifically there was Senior SOCO John Sharpley, Principal SOCO Mark Scholar.

MR DINGEMANS: What did you see when you arrived?

MR GREEN: Sorry, there were some other people. DCI Alan Young; the pathologist, Dr Hunt; a photographer Mr McGee(?); and another senior SOCO, Katie Langford(?).

MR DINGEMANS: What did you see when you arrive?

MR GREEN: Well, immediately we went to a tent to put on protective clothing and so forth.

MR DINGEMANS: Right.

MR GREEN: And I was then shown through a taped common access path.

MR DINGEMANS: Yes. Leading up to?

MR GREEN: Leading up into the wood; and there was a blue tent there, which contained the body of Dr Kelly.

MR DINGEMANS: When you arrived at the body, what did you do?

MR GREEN: Well, basically the start of it is just to have a look and see -- just to take it all in and make notes and measurements and try to get some sense of what could have happened.

MR DINGEMANS: How long were you doing that for?

MR GREEN: It was sort of a gradual process. As I say, I arrived at just gone 2 and left at about 7, so it was quite a while. But during that time I will have gone back to the original tent, the changing tent, to report what I was seeing to DCI Young.

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR GREEN: And to make arrangements for toxicology work that needed to be done.

MR DINGEMANS: How long were you on the scene for that day?

MR GREEN: In total, from just gone 2 until 7, so just short of five hours.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you spend your whole time looking at the body and then coming back and making reports?

MR GREEN: I also examined a gate further down the path.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. What did you do that for?

MR GREEN: I was told that there was a gate there and in case there might have been any blood staining on there; it was just a precaution really.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you find anything on the gate?

MR GREEN: No, nothing.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you find anything around the body area of interest?

MR GREEN: Yes. There was blood distribution.

MR DINGEMANS: Where had the blood come from?

MR GREEN: It appeared that the blood had originated from Dr Kelly's injured left wrist.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. I think we have heard from an extract that Mr Page has read out to us that the ulnar artery was severed. Did you understand that to be the case at the time?

MR GREEN: Obviously injuries are a pathologist's domain. However, the blood distribution was what I would expect to see if an artery had been severed. There was bloodstaining typical of that sort of injury.

MR DINGEMANS: What do you expect to see in such circumstances?

MR GREEN: Well, when veins are severed the blood comes out under a low pressure, but when arteries are severed it comes out on a much higher pressure and you get spurting of blood, you get a phenomenon known as arterial rain, where you have a great deal of smallish stains all of about the same size over the area.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you find that arterial rain?

MR GREEN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: On what?

MR GREEN: On the nettles -- there were nettles alongside the body of Dr Kelly.

MR DINGEMANS: And did you look for the distribution of blood?

MR GREEN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard from some ambulance personnel, and they said they were not specifically looking, for obvious reasons, at the distribution of blood but they noted, just on their brief glance, not very much blood. What were your detailed findings?

MR GREEN: Well, there was a fair bit of blood.

LORD HUTTON: There was -- I beg your pardon?

MR GREEN: A fair bit of blood, my Lord. The body was on leaf litter, the sort of detritus you might find on the floor of a wood, which is -- and that is very absorbent, so although it may not have appeared to them there was that much blood, it would obviously soak in.

MR DINGEMANS: A bit like blotting paper in some respects?

MR GREEN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: What else did you see around the body?

MR GREEN: There was a bloodstained watch and a knife to --

MR DINGEMANS: Was the knife bloodstained?

MR GREEN: Yes, it was, yes. There was a Barbour hat/cap near Dr Kelly's left shoulder and then out from that there was an Evian water bottle, the cap of which was just a bit further along. These were -- the bottle was about 25 centimetres from the shoulder.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you examine the vegetation around the body?

MR GREEN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Did you form any conclusions from that examination?

MR GREEN: Well, the blood staining that was highest from the ground was approximately 50 centimetres above the ground. This was above the position where Dr Kelly's left wrist was, but most of the stainings were 33 centimetres, which is approximately a foot above the ground. It was all fairly low level stuff.

MR DINGEMANS: What does that mean?

MR GREEN: It meant that because the injury -- most of the injuries would have taken place while Dr Kelly was sitting down or lying down.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. When you first saw the body, what position was it in?

MR GREEN: He was on his back with the left wrist curled back in this sort of manner (Indicates).

MR DINGEMANS: Did you make any other relevant discoveries while you were looking around the area?

MR GREEN: There was an obvious large contact bloodstain on the knee of the jeans.

MR DINGEMANS: What do you mean by a "contact bloodstain"?

MR GREEN: A contact stain is what you will observe if an item has come into contact with a bloodstained surface, as opposed to blood spots and splashes when blood splashes on to an item.

MR DINGEMANS: Which means at some stage his left wrist must have been in contact with his trousers?

MR GREEN: No, what I am saying, at some stage he has knelt -- I believe he has knelt in a pool of blood at some stage and this obviously is after he has been injured.

MR DINGEMANS: Any other findings?

MR GREEN: There were smears of blood on the Evian bottle and on the cap.

MR DINGEMANS: And what did that indicate to you?

MR GREEN: Well, that would indicate to me that Dr Kelly was already injured when he used the Evian bottle. As an explanation, my Lord --

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR GREEN: -- when people are injured and losing blood they will become thirsty.

MR DINGEMANS: They become?

MR GREEN: Thirsty, as they are losing all that fluid.

MR DINGEMANS: You thought he is likely to have had a drink then?

MR GREEN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: What else did you find?

MR GREEN: There was a bloodstain on the right sleeve of the Barbour jacket. At the time that was a bit -- slightly unusual, in that if someone is cutting their wrist you wonder how, if you are moving across like this, how you get blood sort of here (Indicates). But if the knife was held and it went like that, with the injury passing across the sleeve, that is a possible explanation. Another possible explanation is in leaning across to get the Evian bottle that the two areas may have crossed.

MR DINGEMANS: Had crossed?

MR GREEN: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We know, in fact, the wrist which was cut was the left wrist, is that right?

MR GREEN: That is correct.

MR DINGEMANS: And we know that Dr Kelly was right handed.

MR GREEN: I was not aware of that, but yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Were those all your relevant findings?

MR GREEN: The jeans, as I have talked about, with this large contact stain, did not appear to have any larger downward drops on them. There were a few stains and so forth but it did not have any staining that would suggest to me that his injuries, or his major injuries if you like, were caused while he was standing up, and there was not any -- there did not appear to be any blood underneath where he was found, and the body was later moved which all suggested those injuries were caused while he was sat or lying down.

MR DINGEMANS: And was that the extent of your investigations that day?

MR GREEN: Not entirely. I assisted in some of the removal of the clothing and the photography of the clothing, just providing a steadying hand for some items. I was present when the tablet packets were found and the mobile phone in his pocket.

MR DINGEMANS: You mentioned the tablet packets; those were the Coproxamol tablets?

MR GREEN: That is correct, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: How many packets were there?

MR GREEN: There were three blister packs.

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

MR GREEN: It was noted at the time that one tablet remained in it, so there were 29 missing, because each one had the capacity for 10 tablets.

MR DINGEMANS: They were packets of 10 each, were they?

MR GREEN: Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Were the packets actually found -- in what part of the clothing?

MR GREEN: They were in Dr Kelly's Barbour jacket, my Lord. I have a photograph --

LORD HUTTON: I think it suffices to have your evidence, thank you. And it was the pathologist who found them, was it? He took them out, did he; Dr Hunt?

MR GREEN: It was -- Dr Hunt was present, yes.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Were you present while any other relevant discoveries were made?

MR GREEN: I do not believe so. I was there from the time that Dr Kelly was in the blue tent till the time just before the body was about to be removed. As I left, the hearse was approaching. So it was my understanding that the body was then going to be taken for the post-mortem.

MR DINGEMANS: That concluded your investigations on the day, did it?

MR GREEN: On that day, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: And what further investigations did you make?

MR GREEN: Well, since then I have had upwards of -- I could count them but at a guess 50 items sent to the laboratory.

MR DINGEMANS: To analyse?

MR GREEN: To analyse, to carry out DNA profiling, to look at some of the staining in a little more detail.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. And you have carried all that out and reported back to Assistant Chief Constable Page or through his senior investigating officer?

MR GREEN: Well, my examinations are still ongoing.

MR DINGEMANS: Right.

MR GREEN: I have provided a spreadsheet with a kind of -- a snapshot of where we are today about what items have been examined, what has been found on them, which items were profiled, the results of those profile tests, although I have not put my evidence down in a statement form as yet.

MR DINGEMANS: Because you are just finishing off the testing of that material?

MR GREEN: Exactly.

MR DINGEMANS: I think when all that is concluded Assistant Chief Constable Page is going to come back and tell us the results. Subject to that, is there anything else that you know of relating to the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

MR GREEN: I do not think so, my Lord.

LORD HUTTON: Very well. Thank you very much indeed, Mr Green.

MR DINGEMANS: Thank you for coming at short notice.

MR GREEN: You are welcome.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Is that a conclusion of the evidence for today?

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, no. Mr Lamb is coming, just to be signed off formally.

LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes.

MR PATRICK LAMB (continued)
Examined by MR DINGEMANS

MR DINGEMANS: I am sorry to have brought you back. When you gave your evidence in two parts earlier on I did not ask you, as I had asked everyone else, was there anything else you knew, and at that time that was because you had just reported the contact that David Broucher had made with you; is that right?

MR LAMB: That is correct.

MR DINGEMANS: And in fact in the interim we have heard from David Broucher and he has given his evidence.

MR LAMB: Certainly.

MR DINGEMANS: And I think you have had a holiday?

MR LAMB: Absolutely, yes indeed, or part of a holiday.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I just ask you two quick questions in fact, now that I have got you back? First of all, on 5th June I think we had heard from the Foreign Affairs Committee that there was a meeting between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Do you recall that?

MR LAMB: Sorry, you heard on 5th June?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes, 5th June, which is shortly after Mr Gilligan's broadcast, and the Foreign Affairs Committee I think probably announced either that day or the day before they were going to set up an investigation. Do you recall visiting them on some --

MR LAMB: Excuse me, yes. There was a -- I think it was the correct date. I think it was the Wednesday morning, if the 5th June was a Wednesday.

MR DINGEMANS: I have not looked, sorry.

MR LAMB: Again, if I am correct, there was a half day course and a meeting which took place and an opportunity for Whitehall civil servants to acquaint themselves with Committees, and in particular the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I was one of the people quite by chance on that course on that very morning.

MR DINGEMANS: Right.

LORD HUTTON: I think the 5th June was a Thursday actually.

MR LAMB: I am very sorry.

MR DINGEMANS: We have also heard from you last time on 17th June you met Mr Howard at a reception and had mentioned the contact Dr Kelly had reported to you that he had had with Mr Gilligan.

MR LAMB: Correct.

MR DINGEMANS: And Mr Howard had then reported to Mr Tebbit and there was an interview going to be arranged for Dr Kelly to be seen on 24th June. Mr Howard told us that it was you that was to notify Dr Kelly of that interview. Do you recall that?

MR LAMB: No. I think that is incorrect because I, as I said, mentioned to Mr Howard on 17th June that Dr Kelly had told me in passing that he had spoken to both Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts. I reported that on that occasion in the context of a wider conversation concerning a separate and other issue, which was the press reporting concerning a British expert who was commenting on whether or not trailers which had recently been discovered in Iraq were either for the production of hydrogen, as was claimed, or whether they were for the production of biological weapons. There had been an article, I believe in The Observer, in which an unnamed, as at that point, BW expert had claimed they were not for the production of biological weapons. So there was concern as to who the source of that particular story was. There was a degree of suspicion that it was Dr Kelly, as the source of that particular story. That has, in fact, now or subsequently been confirmed by The Observer newspaper itself. It was in the context of that wider conversation that I mentioned to Mr Howard that I knew, from a conversation with Dr Kelly, that he had spoken to Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts. But after that I had no further involvement whatsoever and I certainly was not requested to contact Dr Kelly to inform him.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Did you in fact tell Dr Kelly of your conversation with Mr Howard?

MR LAMB: I did not, no.

MR DINGEMANS: I am sorry to have brought you back to answer this final question: is there anything else that you know then of the circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

MR DINGEMANS:

MR LAMB: No, sir.

MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. Mr Lamb, I think it was entirely proper of you to bring to the attention of the Inquiry Mr Broucher's recollection.

MR LAMB: Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, that is the end of the evidence for today.

LORD HUTTON: I will sit again at 10.30 tomorrow morning.

(3.30 pm)
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