The Hutton Inquiry

MR ALLAN: Thank you.

MR ALLAN: Alexander Richard Allan.

MR ALLAN: I am a Bachelor of Science, I am a Doctor of Philosophy, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Chemistry and a Chartered Chemist.

MR ALLAN: I am a forensic scientist, more specifically I am a forensic toxicologist specialising in the analysis of drugs and poisons in body fluids. I have been a forensic scientist for over 25 years.

MR ALLAN: I was, yes, for 20 years.

MR ALLAN: I am employed by Forensic Alliance, a company in Oxfordshire.

MR ALLAN: It is a private company that works for the police, prosecution and defence and so on.

MR ALLAN: I am designated the merit scientist in the toxicology and drugs department at Forensic Alliance.

MR ALLAN: I was. My Lord, may I refer to my notes?

MR ALLAN: I received several items. I can list them if you wish.

MR ALLAN: Yes. They were attributed to the body of Dr David Kelly. At that time I do not think the identity was absolutely certain but they were attributed, I believe, to Dr Kelly at a later time. But I received several items. The following: NCH39.

MR ALLAN: That was preserved urine.

MR ALLAN: That is urine with some preservative in it to try to retard any decomposition of the urine. So if you wish to do any analysis for alcohol, for example, then any microbiological action will not happen and the urine will last in a good condition for longer than if it were unpreserved.

MR ALLAN: The preservative-contained bottles come as part of the pathologist kits.

MR ALLAN: NCH40 plain urine. NCH41 bile. NCH42 preserved bile.

MR ALLAN: It is the same preservative, to retard decomposition of the fluid. NCH43 hard blood. NCH44 preserved blood. I have blood fluoride oxidate which is, again, preserved blood. NCH46 blood EDTA.

MR ALLAN: That is an anticoagulant in the blood to stop it clotting.

MR ALLAN: That is something that is added to the blood.

MR ALLAN: Yes, it is in a preservative containing -- it is in a little phial containing EDTA and the blood is added to that at the post-mortem.

MR ALLAN: Some more plain blood NCH47. NCH48 left lung.

MR ALLAN: It is the lung that has been removed from the body, the entire lung.

MR ALLAN: Yes.

MR ALLAN: NCH49 contents of stomach.

MR ALLAN: Yes, it is.

MR ALLAN: NCH50 liver sample.

MR ALLAN: NCH52 vitreous humor which was preserved, that is the fluid inside the eye. NCH53 vitreous humor plain.

MR ALLAN: Well, very briefly, I had been told that there was a body found in some woodland near -- I cannot remember the name of the village, Southmoor or something, Littlemoor. My colleagues were at the scene. There was, I believe, evidence of damage to Dr Kelly's wrist. There was evidence of some tablets present, some Coproxamol tablets were found in his pockets. There were, I believe, 30 tablets of which one remained. And I was also informed that a bottle of water was found nearby and some vomit was also present near the body.

MR ALLAN: I do not believe I was told at that time, no.

MR ALLAN: I do not believe so, no.

MR ALLAN: I carried out my examination on the Saturday morning when I received the items, which was the 19th, I believe.

MR ALLAN: Yes.

MR ALLAN: To analyse the body fluids for the presence of any substance that might have been ingested by Dr Kelly.

MR ALLAN: Such as alcohol, drugs of abuse, the components of these Coproxamol tablets, the components are paracetamol and a substance called dextropropoxyphene, and investigate the body contents for those substances.

MR ALLAN: The blood and urine samples were analysed for the presence of alcohol and a wide range of commonly available drugs that includes amphetamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepine drugs, that is the group that includes diazepam and temazepam, benzoylecgonine which is the metabolite or breakdown product of cocaine; cannabinoids, that is the constituents of cannabis; chemically basic drugs such as anti-depressants, and that includes things like dextropropoxythene and antihistamines as well, amongst a wide range of other substances, methadone, methyl amphetamine, 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine which is known by its initials MDMA and also known as ecstasy and related compounds. Opiate drugs such as morphine and heroin, and this is the standard sort of analysis that we do in all suspicious deaths in criminal cases.

MR ALLAN: Yes.

MR ALLAN: I examined it for the presence of paracetamols as well as measuring the contents and visually inspecting the contents.

MR ALLAN: Yes. I also analysed the blood for the presence of paracetamol and volatile substances such as organic solvents.

MR ALLAN: I did, yes. On this initial stage I had two assistants.

MR ALLAN: That is right, yes.

MR ALLAN: Yes, I found paracetamol at a concentration of 97 microgrammes per millilitre of blood; and dextropropoxyphene at a concentration of 1.0 microgrammes per millilitre of blood.

MR ALLAN: Yes, I did. I also found some substances related to dextropropoxyphene, breakdown products, metabolites, and so on, and some caffeine.

MR ALLAN: I analysed the blood item, 44, for alcohol and I found no alcohol in that. And I found no alcohol in the urine item NCH39.

MR ALLAN: I found traces of acetone in the blood and also possibly in the urine and none of the other volatile substances were detected.

MR ALLAN: Yes.

MR ALLAN: I found caffeine in that, significant amounts of dextropropoxyphene again and its breakdown products, the metabolites and so on. I did not specifically analyse that for paracetamol but doubtless there was some in there.

MR ALLAN: Yes, the stomach contents consisted of a brown watery slurry containing approximately 67 milligrammes of paracetamol. I noticed when I was examining it that there was no unusual smell and there was no obvious tablet or food material. I did however notice two pieces of what I believe could have been tablet film coating, the protective plastic coating, yes. That is all I did at that stage, yes.

MR ALLAN: Well, the two components, paracetamol and dextropropoxyphene, are the active components of a substance called Coproxamol which is a prescription only medicine containing 325 milligrammes of paracetamol and 32.5 milligrammes of dextropropoxyphene.

MR ALLAN: Mild to moderate pain, typically a bad back or period pain, something like that. And the concentrations of both drugs represent quite a large overdose of Coproxamol.

MR ALLAN: Dextropropoxyphene is an opioid analgesic drug which causes effects typical of opiate drugs in overdose, effects such as drowsiness, sedation and ultimately coma, respiratory depression and heart failure and dextropropoxyphene is known particularly in certain circumstances to cause disruption of the rhythm of the heart and it can cause death by that process in some cases of overdose.

MR ALLAN: Paracetamol does not cause drowsiness or sedation in overdose, but if enough is taken it can cause damage to the liver.

MR ALLAN: If too much is taken. I beg your pardon.

MR ALLAN: They are much higher than therapeutic use. Typically therapeutic use would represent one tenth of these concentrations. They clearly represent an overdose. But they are somewhat lower than what I would normally expect to encounter in cases of death due to an overdose of Coproxamol.

MR ALLAN: There are two surveys reported I am aware of. One reports a concentration of 2.8 microgrammes per millilitre of blood of dextropropoxyphene in a series of fatal overdose cases. Another one reports an average concentration of 4.7 microgrammes per millilitre of blood. You can say that they are several fold larger than the level I found of 1.

MR ALLAN: Again, it is higher than would be expected for therapeutic use, approximately 5 or 10 times higher. But it is much lower or lower than would be expected for paracetamol fatalities normally unless there was other factors of drugs involved.

MR ALLAN: I think if you can get the blood reasonably shortly after the incident and the person does not die slowly in hospital due to liver failure, perhaps typically 3 to 400 microgrammes per millilitre of blood.

MR ALLAN: Yes.

MR ALLAN: Two, three, four times as much paracetamol and two, three, four times as much dextropropoxyphene in the average overdose case, which results in fatalities.

MR ALLAN: It is not possible to do that, because of the complex nature of the behaviour of the drugs in the body. I understand that Dr Kelly may have vomited so he would have lost some stomach contents then. There was still some left in the stomach and presumably still some left in the gastrointestinal tracts. What I can say is that it is consistent with say 29/30 tablets but it could be consistent with other scenarios as well.

MR ALLAN: I do, yes. They have the following warnings: it may cause drowsiness. If affected do not drive or operate machinery. Avoid alcoholic drink and do not take more than two at any one time. Do not take more than eight in 24 hours and do not take with any other paracetamol products. Those last two warnings are because of the danger of paracetamol overdose causing liver damage.

MR ALLAN: I found in the stomach contents 67 milligrammes of paracetamol.

MR ALLAN: Yes.

MR ALLAN: Yes.

MR ALLAN: Well clearly that is much less than the equivalent of one tablet which contains 325 milligrammes of paracetamol. So it is approximately equivalent to a fifth.

MR ALLAN: They would have been absorbed into the body, and some ejected into the vomit.

MR ALLAN: Again, it is difficult to say, but what I would say is that I believe it is probably -- it is likely that they may have been ingested about an hour or so or longer before death, because of the lack of residue in the stomach, notwithstanding the ejection of some by vomit. But the lack of residue in the stomach indicates probably about an hour or so before he died that they were ingested.

MR ALLAN: The fact that there was a reasonable amount present in the urine obviously meant that his body was functioning for some time before he died and that allowed time for the paracetamol to pass -- for the dextropropoxyphene and the paracetamol to pass into the urine.

MR ALLAN: That seems to be what the findings of the stomach contents are telling me, yes.

MR ALLAN: That is very likely. If he had not ejected some of the vomit and the residue in the stomach had been absorbed into the bloodstream, then he could had achieved higher levels of paracetamol and dextropropoxyphene, yes.

MR ALLAN: Yes.

MR ALLAN: No, typically you would find caffeine in most people. It is due to the consumption of tea, coffee or soft drinks.

MR ALLAN: Yes, I found a trace of acetone in the blood sample. Again, it is produced naturally in the body in small quantities if you have not eaten for some time and it is of no significance.

MR ALLAN: No, it is difficult to say. When your body runs out of glycogen, which is the energy source, the main energy source which produces glucose, and there are limits to the supplies in the liver, your body switches to a different mechanism for production of energy which is the burning of fats and the burning of fats produces traces of acetone in the body and these traces of acetone can last for some considerable time. It just may mean he skipped a meal or has not had a full meal.

MR ALLAN: Not that level, no, it is just a tiny trace.

MR ALLAN: They indicate that Dr Kelly had taken a considerable Coproxamol overdose.

MR ALLAN: Death appeared to have intervened before all the paracetamol had been absorbed from the stomach.

MR ALLAN: There is a possibility that they could be fatal or potentially fatal, but it is more likely in the absence of other substances which combine with the actions of dextropropoxyphene, such as alcohol, that the levels may not have produced fatal respiratory depression, although I cannot rule out the possibility of adverse cardiac effects from the dextropropoxyphene overdose.

MR ALLAN: They were at a later date. Some of those samples were analysed, yes.

MR ALLAN: I can, yes. (Pause). There were various dates. I can refer -- go through my notes.

MR ALLAN: In the period up to the end of July there were additional analyses carried out.

MR ALLAN: Those analyses confirmed my original findings, the Coproxamol overdose, and they entirely support my original conclusions.

MR ALLAN: It was confirmatory. What I also did was I looked at the water which was found at the scene, or the contents of the water bottle that was found at the scene.

MR ALLAN: I found traces of dextropropoxyphene in that. Presumably that would come from someone contacting the bottle with saliva in the bottle. We did not find anything else of note in there. It may be that paracetamol was in there as well but the tests are not sensitive enough to detect the traces of paracetamol that may have been present.

MR ALLAN: I did not, as far as I am aware. I am just checking. I did not analyse any other exhibits, no.

MR ALLAN: From the toxicological point of view, no.

MR ALLAN: It is possible, but I think it would be --

MR ALLAN: Yes, he has to ingest those tablets.

PAGE: Michael Page.

PAGE: I am Assistant Chief Constable, Community Services, Thames Valley Police.

PAGE: That is correct.

PAGE: I received a telephone call at 3.09 am on Friday morning.

PAGE: Yes.

PAGE: Only where there are vulnerable or exacerbating factors to the missing person.

PAGE: Well, all missing persons are subject to an assessment and the officers at the scene carried out an assessment.

PAGE: Sergeant Morris.

PAGE: Yes.

PAGE: That is right, which rated Dr Kelly as a medium risk missing person.

PAGE: Neither good nor bad in many respects. But it raises our awareness of issues around that person and prompts us to take certain actions.

PAGE: Normally the notification of the senior officer so that any specialist resources that are required can be obtained. In this particular case, that assessment was arrived at which prompted a call to the officer's area commander, as it would do.

PAGE: Chief Superintendent. She, on receipt of the information, coupled with her knowledge of Dr Kelly and the circumstances that surrounded him --

PAGE: She had watched the news and because he was a resident in her area, she was perhaps a little more aware of what was going on, and she decided that adding those circumstances to the standard assessment --

PAGE: The medium risk raised it somewhat higher and she rang me almost immediately.

PAGE: Absolutely.

PAGE: I listened very carefully to what had happened thus far and made my own assessment of the actions that had been taken.

PAGE: There had been a reasonably thorough search of Dr Kelly's house and the surrounding grounds.

PAGE: That had been carried out by Sergeant Morris and officers from the night shift at Abingdon. They were later supplemented by a police dog which had been used to assist in the search. I do apologise for my voice. So that search had been conducted at the scene. The police helicopter had also been called out and had been making intermittent searches around the area of the house using heat seeking equipment.

PAGE: Sergeant Morris.

PAGE: That is correct, that is where it is based.

PAGE: At that particular time half a dozen.

PAGE: It was a police helicopter, my Lord, yes.

PAGE: A number of items but the principal one in use on the night was heat seeking equipment.

PAGE: Yes.

PAGE: I asked for a further, more thorough search of the house and the outbuildings and the surrounding grounds to be made.

PAGE: Yes.

PAGE: Yes, I did. I asked for a number of key individuals to meet me at Abingdon police station at 5 am.

PAGE: Those key individuals were a superintendent to arrange resourcing for what I anticipated would be more widespread searching. The head of Special Branch of my organisation.

PAGE: Again because of -- having read the papers I was aware of the circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly.

PAGE: Absolutely; and I was aware that I may have to access Government departments and the easiest way for me to do that is through my own Special Branch.

PAGE: I called out Detective Inspector Smith, who was the area detective inspector, to begin inquiries for me. And myself and the area commander -- I beg your pardon, I also asked for a qualified police search adviser, Sergeant Paul Wood.

PAGE: Police search adviser.

PAGE: And I asked for a sergeant from Milton Keynes who had undertaken a lot of work nationally in respect of the assessment of missing persons and I asked them all to meet me at Abingdon police station at 5 am.

PAGE: I think we started the meeting about 5.15 am.

PAGE: I was obviously briefed on the information that had been obtained from Dr Kelly's family.

PAGE: In terms of when he had left the house, his demeanour, what he had been wearing when he had left, details of any conversations that had taken place, their feelings about his mood at the time of leaving, general background information as to what had happened over the last few weeks and what impact that may have had on him.

PAGE: Well, at that stage it was a missing person investigation. My concerns were that Dr Kelly had gone out for a walk, perhaps become ill, perhaps had an accident befall him, possibly had been abducted against his will, possibly was being detained. There were a whole range of options that I was trying to consider.

PAGE: Well the result of my meeting was that we began to establish a search pattern. As a holding measure, I asked for officers who were reinforcement officers who were arriving about this stage -- we had between 30 and 40 officers available to us, and I asked them to start searching outward from Dr Kelly's house. I asked for the helicopter to be brought into play again.

PAGE: But I also asked the police search adviser and the sergeant from Milton Keynes with the specialist knowledge of missing persons to make an assessment for me of where we should begin looking for Dr Kelly; and the way they do that is to gain as much information as they can about the person who is missing, favourite haunts, favourite walks, that type of thing and they produced a list of probably half a dozen places that we should begin to look. So by about 7 o'clock I was beginning to get some sort of form to the search we were making.

PAGE: Ultimately by about 7.30 I had 30 police officers drawn in from other police areas. I had the resources on duty within that police area, which would have been another 10.

PAGE: I had the mounted branch on the way from Milton Keynes but they had not yet arrived.

PAGE: The mounted branch. Because they obviously give you the ability to cover ground very quickly. And I had asked for resources from the underwater search unit because of the proximity of the River Thames to the location.

PAGE: Yes.

PAGE: Yes, Harrowdown Hill to the best of my recollection was number 2 on their list.

PAGE: Yes, I asked the police search adviser to arrange for the area to be searched, and members of the South East Berks Emergency Volunteers and the Lowlands Search Dogs Association, who by this time had also joined us, were deployed to Harrowdown Hill.

PAGE: Yes, indeed, particularly where we call out the services of a police search adviser, because they work with the volunteer organisations quite regularly and they are extremely useful to us.

PAGE: I think within seconds of the information coming in to us but the time I have is that it was 9.20.

PAGE: I was in the briefing room at Abingdon police station.

PAGE: Yes, generally coordinating the effort. I perhaps ought to add that in the background we had established where Dr Kelly's offices were and I had asked for officers from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch to go to those offices (a) just to make sure he was not at work as it were and (b) to check the offices to see if there was any indication as to what may have happened to him.

PAGE: Yes, I did. I think there were three offices in various locations in London that were visited. Once we realised that Dr Kelly's body had been found, I then asked for items in those offices to be seized, any items relevant, which the officers did.

PAGE: They did.

PAGE: No, I did not.

PAGE: Well, from my perspective I appointed a senior investigating officer, a man who would, if you like, carry out the technical issues around the investigation. I met fairly quickly with my Chief Constable and we decided what levels of resourcing and what levels of investigation we should apply to these circumstances.

PAGE: We determined from the outset because of the attendant circumstances that we would apply the highest standards of investigation to this particular set of circumstances as was possible. I would not say I launched a murder investigation but the investigation was of that standard.

PAGE: Yes.

PAGE: Yes. We were very anxious, from the outset, to ensure the most thorough possible examination of the scene. I spoke to the Oxfordshire coroner, Mr Gardiner, and we agreed between us that we would use a Home Office pathologist, which is a very highly trained pathologist. It was also agreed with the senior investigating officer that we would use forensic biologists who are able to look at the scene and, in particular, blood splashes and make certain determinations from those in relation to what may have happened. As you say, a common approach path had been established; and it was determined that for that common approach path and for a distance of 10 metres either side and for a radius of 10 metres around Dr Kelly's body that we would carry out a fingertip search. It was also agreed that Dr Kelly's body would be left in situ so that the pathologist and the biologists could visit the scene with the body in situ to make their own assessment of the scene, which is not always the case but in this case we decided it would be wise to do so.

PAGE: Just to ensure that they could look at the environment and the surroundings and take in the full picture.

PAGE: The pathologist was Mr Nicholas Hunt.

PAGE: Yes, my Lord.

PAGE: I do not have the exact time, but I believe it was around midday.

PAGE: I have not with me.

PAGE: He did.

PAGE: Well, he describes finding Dr Kelly's body.

PAGE: And he describes the position of Dr Kelly's body; and initially he found a bottle of Evian water, partially filled. He found an open knife.

PAGE: Yes. And a wristwatch. Subsequently when the body was moved he found three blister packs.

PAGE: Of tablet packs.

PAGE: Coproxamol.

PAGE: One.

PAGE: 10.

PAGE: That is correct, my Lord.

PAGE: Again when the body had been moved he found Dr Kelly's mobile phone.

PAGE: My recollection is that when found it was off.

PAGE: There was a Barbour hat a short distance from Dr Kelly's head.

PAGE: Yes, there was a very thorough swabbing of the body at the scene. Samples of all blood splattering were taken.

PAGE: Samples of every pool of blood were taken. Samples of every stain of blood on Dr Kelly's clothing were taken. The items that I have mentioned, the knife, the Evian bottle, the watch, the hat, were all swabbed. The Evian bottle, the mobile phone, the watch were swabbed to establish whether there was any DNA present other than Dr Kelly's.

PAGE: He did indeed.

PAGE: The body was removed from the scene again from the best of my recollection at between 6.30 and 7 o'clock in the evening and the post-mortem started at 9 o'clock in the evening.

PAGE: He found some marks which he said were not defensive marks and were nothing other than he would expect to find in a normally exposed body as it were -- sorry -- in a normally active person.

PAGE: Defensive marks my Lord are marks where an individual may have defended themselves, so they may consist of -- if, for example, an individual is being attacked by a knife one might expect to find knife marks here where an individual has tried to defend himself.

PAGE: Or scratching or whatever.

PAGE: Yes, he found a number of incisions to Dr Kelly's wrist.

PAGE: His conclusion around cause of death was that it was due to blood loss from incisions made to Dr Kelly's wrist.

PAGE: A forensic biologist, I believe you will be hearing from one later --

PAGE: A Mr Green I think. Yes, Mr Rory Green.

PAGE: That is correct, my Lord.

PAGE: Essentially he was looking at the undergrowth around Dr Kelly's body.

PAGE: For blood splashing. Perhaps it is best to allow him to explain it himself but essentially he would be able to give a judgment as to what occurred at the scene from the pattern made by the blood splashes.

PAGE: The house was subject to a full search by search trained officers and by members of Thames Valley Special Branch. Their presence I felt necessary again because of Dr Kelly's background. Should we come across any documents of a secret nature, those officers are cleared to handle those documents. That is why they were there.

PAGE: Not at present, I have been in the past.

PAGE: I do indeed.

PAGE: 11th August 1993.

PAGE: The officer who came across it felt that the individual accompanying Dr Kelly in the photograph bore a resemblance to Andrew Gilligan.

PAGE: The photograph was checked by the Inquiry team who discounted it being Dr Gilligan.

PAGE: No. I mean, I have to say the officer acted with the best of intention. He saw it, he felt that it resembled Mr Gilligan and he seized it.

PAGE: Absolutely.

PAGE: A range of documents, but principally computer equipment and associated hardware, CDs, that type of thing.

PAGE: Well, there is a vast amount of equipment.

PAGE: I can, my Lord. If I can -- I will very quickly go through the technical details. We seized one NJN tower PC with a 6 gigabyte disk, 3.4 gigabytes of which had been used.

PAGE: On that particular machine, yes.

PAGE: I am advised by our computer technical people that of all the memory that we have seized from Dr Kelly's various computers --

PAGE: From all the computers, if we were to print it out it would produce a pile of paper twice as high as Big Ben.

PAGE: No, my Lord, we have not. What we have done is every disk in our possession we have interrogated using a number of key words which we felt would highlight any data that would be of interest to police inquiries.

PAGE: "Suicide", "despair".

PAGE: Yes, we have put in "Iraq".

PAGE: Yes.

PAGE: We have extracted a number of documents, e-mails and so forth.

PAGE: It was carried out on premises in Thames Valley, our technical premises which I will not disclose the location of, if you do not mind.

PAGE: A technical computer technician employed by Thames Valley Police as a forensic computer specialist.

PAGE: That is correct.

PAGE: In addition to the NJN tower PC, we seized a Palm M505 PDA.

PAGE: Personal Digital Assistant, one of the small hand-held computers, 12 megabyte disk, and everything had been used on that. We seized a Dell tower PC with a disk size of 55.9 gigabytes, 16.7 gigabytes of which had been used. We seized a Toshiba laptop with a disk size of 3.8 gigabytes, 1.6 gigabytes of which had been used. We seized a Dell laptop with a disk size of 9.3 gigabytes, 7.9 gigabytes of which had been used, and we seized a further Dell laptop with a disk size of 55.9 gigabytes, 6.1 gigabytes of which had been used. We seized one card-style laptop which was faulty and therefore we have been unable to access. We retrieved one hard-drive of 406 megabytes which has not been used, and we also, from the Ministry of Defence, seized a tower PC with a disk size of 3 gigabytes, 2.4 gigabytes of which had been used.

PAGE: We have taken statements from a range of people. The terms of our inquiry were to look back from the date of Dr Kelly's death and look particularly for contacts, correspondence, that may have had an impact on how and why he met his death.

PAGE: We have, in some detail.

PAGE: We looked at all telephones, all home telephones and his mobile telephone.

PAGE: I have to say that, going back to what I said earlier about being determined to be as careful as we could in terms of examination of the scene, and basing my response on that examination of the scene, I am as confident as I can be that there was no third party involvement at the scene of Dr Kelly's death.

PAGE: Because I cannot conceive of a way in which a third party could have been involved at that location in that environment without at least leaving some trace of their presence; and I have been unable to find any trace of any presence whatsoever.

PAGE: I can find no evidence of the involvement of a third party.

PAGE: I mean, again, in terms of the scene of Dr Kelly's death and the complete absence of anything that would suggest the involvement of a third party, I remain confident that he met his death at his own hand.

PAGE: "Many thanks for your thoughts and prayers. It has been a remarkably tough time. Should all blow over by early next week then I will travel to Baghdad a week Friday. I have had to keep a low profile which meant leaving home for a week. Back now. With best wishes and thanks for your support. David."

PAGE: That is correct.

PAGE: Yes. I think it would be fair to say that a number of our inquiries have been framed around that suggestion and maybe other interpretations that could be put on Dr Kelly's words and Dr Kelly's position and we have made extensive inquiries around all those e-mails.

PAGE: Yes.

PAGE: I have not personally.

PAGE: Yes, I beg your pardon.

PAGE: That is correct.

PAGE: Not as far as I am aware.

PAGE: I do not I am afraid.

PAGE: Hmm, hmm.

PAGE: They were indeed.

PAGE: I will indeed, my Lord.

PAGE: Not at present, my Lord.

MR MACDONALD: I am Stephen John MacDonald.

MR MACDONALD: I am Assistant Director on the central budget, security and safety for the Ministry of Defence.

MR MACDONALD: I provide security advice working to the director on the implementation of security policy. I am responsible for the day-to-day security of all staff in the MoD buildings in London.

MR MACDONALD: I am also with a small team of security officers that carry out internal investigations into lapses and breaches of security.

MR MACDONALD: I have been in my current appointment since November 2002. Prior to that I was the senior security adviser at the main headquarters in Abbey Wood, Bristol.

MR MACDONALD: I received a telephone call from the director --

MR MACDONALD: The director of security and safety.

MR MACDONALD: Informing me that a burn bag had been found in the Metropole Building with contents --

MR MACDONALD: The Metropole Building is a building of the Ministry of Defence on Northumberland Avenue.

MR MACDONALD: A burn bag is a paper sack into which either confidential or protectfully marked -- that is documents that have a security classification for disposal, that are placed prior to safe disposal.

MR MACDONALD: The director had informed me that a bag had been found in a third floor office in the Metropole Building that had been unsecured and unlocked and the contents of the bag included a document relating to David Kelly.

MR MACDONALD: No. Burn bags are not normally left out in offices. If there is any information inside them they should be locked away. Clearly security procedures had been not followed in this case.

MR MACDONALD: As a result of that particular activity, the Ministry of Defence Police had been called. They had actually taken the bag, the contents and the document into safe custody and they had sealed the room. That was not a normal procedure for a security lapse of that kind.

MR MACDONALD: No, it is a minor security occurrence.

MR MACDONALD: The security guard who found the bag and its contents, noting that David Kelly was mentioned in the bag and given the recent press profile and the activity that we had seen, that we had actually sealed the room with the Metropolitan Police, decided that merited the attendance of the MDP.

MR MACDONALD: Yes.

MR MACDONALD: It is normal for secret documents to be ripped before putting into such bags.

MR MACDONALD: This is what the security guard had seen.

MR MACDONALD: That is correct.

MR MACDONALD: They took the burn bag into safe custody and the next morning they handed it, I am told, to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch for the Metropolitan Police Special Branch to conduct an investigation.

MR MACDONALD: Later that day I was advised by a member of my staff that the Metropolitan Police had examined the contents of the bag and they had assessed that there was nothing likely to be significant for the Hutton Inquiry.

MR MACDONALD: At this stage my staff took no further action because given that the Metropolitan Police and the MDP were involved.

MR MACDONALD: I called for statements from the supervisor on duty on the 20th; and we did actually -- I did receive a copy of a security infringement report which is a short formal report.

MR MACDONALD: That is the security infringement report that I received.

MR MACDONALD: I received that on 22nd July.

MR MACDONALD: A member of my staff would have asked the branch security officer for that part of the building to conduct his or her own inquiries into that type of security lapse.

MR MACDONALD: I understand that the branch security officer spoke to members in the area by 23rd July and that it had been ascertained who had actually left out the bag.

MR MACDONALD: Well, the security investigation was still under way when, on 1st August, an article appeared in the Daily Telegraph alleging that a senior official had been caught hastily shredding documents, and a further article appeared on 3rd August in the Mail on Sunday alleging that a mysterious blonde had been found inside the MoD and had been removing documents.

MR MACDONALD: Yes, on 1st August I drafted a note to the joint chiefs of staff outlining what really happened in relation to the security lapse and the position of the internal inquiry. And given the press activity, I spoke with the press office and we deemed it necessary and appropriate to ask the Metropolitan Police for a copy back of the document.

MR MACDONALD: Yes.

MR MACDONALD: On receipt of the document, I actually spoke to a member of staff who had said that they had actually been responsible for the confusion that had been caused and who had left the bag out.

MR MACDONALD: The member of staff informed me that he was new to the department in which he worked, which was in fact the Iraq Secretariat.

MR MACDONALD: He had been assisting a colleague in the preparation of minutes. These in actual fact were an annex to the minutes of the Information, Campaign and Coordination Group.

MR MACDONALD: It is a paper that really sets out military and political issue developments in Iraq to be considered by the ICCG, both positive and negative.

MR MACDONALD: Yes, the member of staff explained to me that during a discussion on the role of the ICCG, that is the Information, Campaign and Coordination Group, he suggested to his colleague that David Kelly might be an issue to discuss, given the negative impact of his recent death upon the MoD; and at the same time jotted down the name on the annex to the minutes that the secretary had actually printed off for him. The conversation moved on in due course; but before it did his colleague pointed out to him that David Kelly's death was a domestic matter and not for consideration by the ICCG.

MR MACDONALD: Yes. After interviewing the individual, and I received reports from the secretary and the member of staff concerned, I produced a note for file and also sent a note to the tribunals inquiry not including the officers' names.

MR MACDONALD: That is what I have done.

MR MACDONALD: Yes. I can confirm that there was never any suggestion of any official, senior or otherwise, shredding documents which were relevant to the Inquiry, nor any unauthorised access to MoD property, and I have received no other reports of any documents relating to David Kelly being destroyed.

MR MACDONALD: No mystery blondes unfortunately.

MR MACDONALD: No.

MR JONES: It is Brian Francis Gill Jones.

MR JONES: I am a retired civil servant.

MR JONES: Before I retired I was a scientist, I am still a scientist, worked in the MoD since 1973. From about 1987 until I retired I was a branch head in the Scientific and Technical Directorate of the Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff, which is in turn part of the Defence Intelligence Staff, the DIS.

MR JONES: From 1987, yes.

MR JONES: I was responsible for all aspects of the management of the branch of scientists and engineers whose responsibility it was to analyse intelligence from all sources on various matters of interest to the Ministry of Defence.

MR JONES: Well, the branch I managed initially was one which covered a wide range of scientific and technical matters. Originally I am a material scientist by qualification.

MR JONES: Well, I qualified as a metallurgist with a Bachelor of Science degree and PhD. I then did research in material science for several years.

MR JONES: Both before and after I became a civil servant. When I moved into the DIS there was a small element of my branch, at that time, which covered chemical and biological warfare.

MR JONES: I did. I first met David Kelly at a management training course in about 1986, I think not long after he actually joined the MoD.

MR JONES: That is right.

MR JONES: None at all. Our first meeting was at that course, I think we were at one stage in the same syndicate group on that course. So I did chat to him at that time.

MR JONES: On taking up those particular duties I came into some contact with David Kelly who was then working at Porton Down.

MR JONES: At first it was fairly slight, but as interest developed into areas where he was an expert, it increased and so we then, from the late 1980s, for a while worked quite closely together, or at least David worked very closely with some of my staff and as a consequence I got to know him a good deal better.

MR JONES: He was at that stage primarily, as far as we were concerned, an expert in microbiology whose expertise we needed to use from time to time.

MR JONES: From some point I think in about 1989, maybe slightly earlier, various projects arose in which we increasingly needed expertise of the sort that David had. And as is fairly typical -- I mean there is nothing at all unusual in this -- arrangements were made for him to be cleared to see certain information that came to us and to study it when we thought that it was appropriate that he did so.

MR JONES: Yes. That description applies really to all highly classified material. Only those people who need to know certain things will see that information. I mean, it is a sensible security device and, for example, even those of us who worked within intelligence would only see intelligence as it related to our particular areas of interest.

MR JONES: Yes, maybe I should just clarify. His job at Porton Down was to do with biological defence. He had a background -- he was a microbiologist, that was his area of expertise. But he did have a background in biological defence in particular. Sorry, I have forgotten the detail of your question.

MR JONES: Yes.

MR JONES: That is right.

MR JONES: Very much. Yes, it was, yes.

MR JONES: It was; and I think one followed from the other, in a sense, that he had been involved in the Russian work and then very similar work was required in Iraq; and David was a very natural selection to do that work.

MR JONES: Professionally I got to know him quite well. We saw one another quite often. I would describe our relationship as a friendly relationship although I would not describe us as friends. We had little or no social contact outside of the work environment and not relating to work.

MR JONES: I was.

MR JONES: Not to my knowledge.

MR JONES: Yes. At some early stage we arranged that David could come regularly into the secure area which the DIS occupies, and I encouraged him to do so, and he had a pass that meant he did not have to be accompanied when he came in, so he could walk in, and I encouraged him to do that, to talk to my staff and talk to me.

MR JONES: Primarily it would be -- I mean, this sort of approach we used because the staff within the intelligence community is obviously very limited, we cannot know all that we need to know, so we need professional advisers from outside. So that sort of relationship was encouraged. We would consult with him. He would come in and chat to us about things he had spotted. It was the normal exchange, when those sort of relationships are developed.

MR JONES: Well, obviously Iraq was a -- was something -- we were always interested to hear what David said about Iraq. He was a considerable expert on Iraq, from his visits there. We also needed his advice, from time to time, on detailed microbiological matters, technical -- scientific, technical matters that came up in information we were looking at when perhaps we could not understand it fully and we needed to ask him, you know, if he could interpret, if he could tell us what he thought was going on.

MR JONES: I had some superficial sort of distant supervisory involvement. There were various papers being prepared through the summer of 2002, or the early part of 2002. Things then became rather quiet on that issue, and I can remember wondering, from time to time what had happened to the dossier. But --

MR JONES: It may have crossed my desk; but I did not focus on any detail in that document at that time.

MR JONES: Hmm, hmm.

MR JONES: Yes, there were. In about 1996 there was a fairly major reorganisation; and that involved drawing together the analysis, activities on chemical warfare, on biological warfare and on nuclear aspects into one branch.

MR JONES: I took charge of that branch when it was formed.

MR JONES: That is a term that is often applied to them, yes. I have some problems with the term myself.

MR JONES: "Weapons of mass destruction"?

MR JONES: Well, it is used to -- if it is used too loosely it is used to represent all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

MR JONES: That is a personal opinion, yes.

MR JONES: My personal opinion is that almost all -- almost all -- nuclear weapons truly fit this concept of being a weapon of mass destruction, that some biological weapons are perhaps reasonably described in that way because they could be used to produce very large numbers of casualties on the same sort of scale perhaps even as nuclear weapons, but there are many biological weapons that struggle to fit into that. Some are incapacitants for example rather than lethal.

MR JONES: An incapacitant is something in a weapon sense designed to make someone unable to conduct their duties rather than to actually kill them.

MR JONES: Exactly so.

MR JONES: I think chemical weapons almost struggle to fit into that category. There are certain agents and certain scenarios where I would think that chemical weapons truly are describable as weapons of mass destruction. Sorry, could I take a sip of water?

MR JONES: We are getting into considerable detail here. I think the sort of scenarios where I think that chemical weapons might be described as a weapon of mass destruction are where they might be used in enclosed spaces. An example might be the somewhat unsuccessful attempt to use them in that way by Aum Shinri-kyo on the Tokyo underground in the mid 1990s, where if large amounts of the nerve agent they tried to use had entered the atmosphere then many more people would have died. But it is rather more difficult to think of them in those terms really on the battlefield perhaps where to produce large numbers of casualties you need very large amounts of material.

MR JONES: No, I think personally I would struggle to make that particular scenario really fit into an equivalence of them facing a nuclear blast.

MR JONES: There may be. I mean, I think "weapons of mass destruction" has become a convenient catch-all which, in my opinion, can at times confuse discussion of the subject.

MR JONES: That is difficult. I do not think I was ever in a situation where it was discussed in quite those terms. I think it was quite a frequent comment from myself and my staff about particular issues, that it is perhaps not right to use that general term to describe something that is more specific.

MR JONES: Yes. I think I would struggle to describe either as a true weapon of mass destruction.

MR JONES: Yes.

MR JONES: Still within the Scientific and Technical Directorate. There were other groups within the DIAS that had responsibilities in the same subject areas.

MR JONES: Not before the dossier was produced, no.

MR JONES: There was one shortly afterwards. It came into effect in October, I seem to recollect; and at that time I was asked temporarily to take charge of a reorganised branch that was somewhat expanded, included other subjects of study as well.

MR JONES: That is right, yes.

MR JONES: No.

MR JONES: No. It was one of those things that you were -- you stayed curiously interested in whilst you busily get on with other things in your workload.

MR JONES: No, not really. If it was a job that came to the fore then we would deal with it. But we did have a lot of work on, as most people do.

MR JONES: Indeed.

MR JONES: I did. I went on holiday on 30th August.

MR JONES: And I returned to work on 18th September.

MR JONES: Not on mine personally; and I was not aware that anyone in the branch was working hard on it.

MR JONES: No, the situation had changed a great deal and on my return to work one of the first things that my staff told me was that the dossier had suddenly become very active and that they had been very busy working on the dossier, looking at several drafts and responding to drafts in very, very short timescales and it really had dominated their workload while I had been away.

MR JONES: In what terms?

MR JONES: Well, that was the mood certainly.

MR JONES: They were certainly higher pressures than would normally apply to any particular single piece of work, yes. It was exceptional in that regard.

MR JONES: Yes.

MR JONES: No, I did not. As you say, I was on leave and that is something that would have sort of been lost in the work that was going on while I was away that I never had time to return to and look at.

MR JONES: No, no. They were quite normal and natural questions that would arise in the preparation of any particular paper. The pressure I was referring to, I think, was the frequency of drafts that were coming on, and the fact that my staff were being pressed to get their comments back to the assessment staff or, you know, to the interface with the assessment staff very quickly indeed.

MR JONES: I did. On the day of my return, David was, as he often -- you know "often" is not the right word, but it was not unusual for me to encounter him in the office of one of my staff, sitting at a desk and either talking to them or looking at a paper or --

MR JONES: It may go for many weeks without him being in the branch. If there was a matter of particular mutual interest, if he had a question or a series of issues to discuss or we did with him, he could be there, you know, several times in a week.

MR JONES: There were, yes. There was another branch that dealt specifically with Iraq issues in relation to the sort of work that David did. It was a branch that focused on inspections in Iraq and that sort of thing; and he had a separate relationship with them.

MR JONES: I cannot say whether he had seen all of them. The impression I gained on my return, although such was the nature of the relationship it was not something I felt I had to ask about, was that he had looked at other drafts than the one -- I mean he was actually -- I discovered on 18th September, when I met him then, that he was actually looking at the latest draft at that time.

MR JONES: Yes.

MR JONES: I think he had a general interest. He had, I understand, provided information. I mean, he had a particular expertise about one section of that dossier and had made a contribution to it; and that really related to the work he had done from the early 1990s up to 1998 when the UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq.

MR JONES: At that point, I did. I asked him what he thought: what do you think of the dossier, David? You know.

MR JONES: He said he thought it was good.

MR JONES: There were, yes.

MR JONES: Well, maybe I can just explain that some of my staff had said that they were unhappy with all the detail that was in the dossier. My expert analyst on CW expressed particular concern. I had, I think, at the time I spoke to David, begun to look at his problems, to look at the bits of the dossier that he had problems with.

MR JONES: Well, at its simplest he was concerned that some of the statements that were in the dossier did not accurately represent his assessment of the intelligence available to him.

MR JONES: There was a process going on. I mean the preparation of the dossier was a process in which drafts were produced from our visibility by the assessment staff. They were circulated, given -- on a fairly narrow circulation I seem to recall, but to the experts for them to comment. There were several groups of experts in the Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff so there was a point of coordination that was not my branch.

MR JONES: No. No, it was an individual -- it was really an individual, but he belonged to a section in another directorate that dealt with proliferation issues.

MR JONES: I do not know the reason why he was asked to do it, but it was appropriate. Probably, at that time of the year, he was available to do it.

MR JONES: He belonged to the Defence Intelligence Staff and it was his job to coordinate the views of the various groups within the DIS and it was at that point there was the interface with the assessment staff.

MR JONES: Yes. And to return to the rather long answer, I am sorry, to your question, but this process involved those comments being sent back through this coordinating person to the assessment staff. That had been going on over several drafts. And the particular changes that were asked for had not been taken up.

MR JONES: That is correct.

MR JONES: That is right.

MR JONES: Some had, but there were significant ones that had not been accepted.

MR JONES: He was very concerned.

MR JONES: My Lord, they --

MR JONES: My Lord, they were about language but language is the means by which we communicate an assessment so they were also about the assessment, yes.

MR JONES: I mean, if I can just refer to a note I have here, because I wanted to be sure I was clear on this, so ... they were really about a tendency in certain areas, from his point of view, to shall we say over-egg certain assessments in relation particularly to the production of CW agents and weapons since 1998. Indeed, I mean, I guess that goes all the way back to the end of the Gulf conflict. And he was concerned that he could not point to any solid evidence of such production. He did not dismiss that it may have happened, and there was certain evidence that suggested that it could have happened, but he did not have good evidence that it had happened.

MR JONES: I think -- I think it is the difference between saying, for example -- making a judgment that the production of CW agent had taken place as opposed to that judgment being that it had probably taken place or even possibly taken place.

MR JONES: It was that degree of certainty in the judgments that were being made. I hope that helps.

MR JONES: Yes. Those are the things which we spend hours debating. They are very important in this business -- I mean, it depends on context and I cannot tell from what you have showed me there the context of those particular statements, so I could not comment on that. But the use of, you know, a "might" or a "may" does convey some uncertainty in the information you are trying to provide.

MR JONES: (Pause). Yes.

MR JONES: I mean, we write reports, we give presentations. I mean, I am sorry I am having difficulty with the question.

MR JONES: I think there was an impression that they were involved in some way.

MR JONES: (Pause). I think -- I mean, it is very, very difficult to interpret the views of people who feel they are under pressure and being pressed and worked very hard.

MR JONES: That is right. They will occasionally say: well, this is because of this reason and this is because of that reason and is that not a nuisance, to put it politely. I do not know what the foundation was, and I did not try to find out, for the belief of this other involvement. I mean it was one of those things. From my perspective this was a job that had to be done. As far as I was concerned, the important thing was that the intelligence or our intelligence assessments should be correctly represented in the process. And I really -- you know, the other things, as far as I am concerned, were a little -- were not much more than gossip, perhaps about that sort of thing. There was a task there. The task was being done in what appeared to me to be an entirely reasonable way at that stage.

MR JONES: Yes, I was. Yes.

MR JONES: We are really talking now about the very end of the production, the dossier production process, for most of which I was away.

MR JONES: But when I came back I looked at the information and had these concerns and, indeed, there was a suggestion, and I cannot remember how it came to be there, perhaps one of my staff mentioned it, that there was said to be additional intelligence that actually had it been available to us would have removed those concerns that we had.

MR JONES: I was.

MR JONES: I discussed the matter with my boss, my director.

MR JONES: Partly because it was suggested to me, I think, that he had seen it, he had seen that intelligence.

MR JONES: No, he had not. He told me that he had not seen the intelligence although he was also aware of its existence and had been contacted by a senior official from one of the other agencies and it had been suggested to him that the intelligence judgments that were being made in the dossier were in fact okay because of -- and they were supported by this additional intelligence.

MR JONES: No, it did not. I mean, it would not anyway. I mean, I would always have to put a caveat on a conclusion which was based on something I had not seen. I mean, that is --

MR JONES: So I told him that was the case and that really we, you know, would have to express a reservation on the particular language in the dossier because of that.

MR JONES: Yes.

MR JONES: No.

MR JONES: No, I do not.

MR JONES: Yes, I had some concerns about the 45 minute point myself; yes.

MR JONES: My concerns -- I will refer to some notes I have, again, if I may.

MR JONES: My concerns were that Iraq's chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities were not being accurately represented in all regards in relation to the available evidence. In particular, I had seen -- on the advice of my staff, I was told that there was no evidence that significant production had taken place either of chemical warfare agent or chemical weapons. We also had reservations -- I mean, this all relates to the 45 minutes and some of the detail on the 45 minutes that we had seen were causing us problems. Do you want me to ...?

MR JONES: I think there were -- the problems we had fell into three categories. I mean, firstly we had problems about the source. Indeed, as you have heard, the primary source was described as reliable and -- who had reported regularly in the past, I think.

MR JONES: Well, our concern was that what we were hearing was second-hand information.

MR JONES: He was not the originator of the information we heard; and I cannot recall knowing then as much as I know now about that secondary source. I mean, maybe we did.

MR JONES: He was certainly aware at that time or shortly afterwards that there were concerns over the 45 minute claim.

MR JONES: Yes, I mean -- yes, I think from contact with myself and people in my branch. I do not think that at that stage he would have seen the original reporting.

MR JONES: My recollection is that it was something that we could not automatically show to him; and I cannot recall that permission was asked for that material to be shown to him. So he did not -- he was not aware, I think, from reading the material. But he would have been aware of -- at some stage, whether before or after the dossier, that there was a problem with the sourcing, I think, just from chatting to us.

MR JONES: Yes, I had seen that report.

MR JONES: Yes. In fact they drew it to my attention on my return, as part of their briefing me on the problems they were having with the dossier, with the drafts of the dossier. I think it had actually arrived whilst I was on leave, you know.

MR JONES: Yes.

MR JONES: One of our concerns, yes.

MR JONES: (Pause). Yes. I mean, I think primarily one -- I mean, the starting position, then, would be the information provided by the agency that acquired the intelligence.

MR JONES: And the guidance that they provided.

MR JONES: And, as I recall, there was no mistake in that guidance that it was from a regular and reliable source, reporting information that he had been given --

MR JONES: -- by someone who was in a position to know such things.

MR JONES: Yes. I mean, I will leave the source now. There is more detail about our reasoning there.

MR JONES: But our second concern was then --

MR JONES: They go really I think into the detail of why we had concerns.

MR JONES: One of them was the way in which the information was reported did not give us any real feel that the -- certainly -- and I think there was some acknowledgement of this in the reporting, that the primary source, the source -- the well known source knew very much about the subject he was reporting on and so we were left wondering: well, did the secondary source know these sort of things? That was a little element of doubt in our minds then when we were doing the analysis. Then, of course, you know one has the whole series of questions about motivations and we even wondered, in discussing the issue, whether he might even have been trying to influence rather than inform. I mean, this is something that happens from time to time. And certainly I must say that when the collectors have suspicions about that, they do usually refer to their suspicions and they did not refer to them in this case. But these were all elements of doubt, in our mind.

MR JONES: The second category was the content of the information. I have already touched on that slightly but maybe I can expand a little. And this was that the information did not differentiate between whether these were chemical weapons or whether they were biological weapons; and that is an important matter.

MR JONES: Really because if one is thinking in terms of biological warfare agents that fall into this category of being reasonably described as weapons of mass destruction, then they would have to be live biological warfare agents.

MR JONES: The important point is that from the time of delivery to the time that they have an effect there is an appreciable delay. So the circumstances in which 45 minutes to deliver them would be fairly special circumstances where that 45 minutes mattered. So that was an issue, an issue that concerned us. And there was also -- that sort of pushed us to thinking perhaps we were talking about chemical weapons here. It is easy to put them together in a collective term, chemical and biological weapons is something that rolls off the tongue. But there was an element of doubt coming into our analysis on that. We would have looked, normally, for further definitions to feel really comfortable with a report of this sort as to which particular agents were involved, because as I have said, different agents behave in different ways. And the way in which they behave will relate to whether it is important that you can launch these things within 45 minutes.

MR JONES: Can I just correct my Lord? It is probably many hours to days rather than many weeks.

MR JONES: I think it could matter in circumstances where there was a concern on the part of the user that if he did not get these things off within 45 minutes they might be destroyed. But then we are into bigger areas there.

MR JONES: But these are things that cast doubt in our mind. That is what I am trying to explain, rather than ...

MR JONES: Well, there was a lack of detail on whether the agents, the weapons, what scenarios were being discussed. It was a fairly nebulous general statement that concerned us. But I mean at times one has to work with that sort of information in intelligence.

MR JONES: The third area was we felt that we did in fact lack the collateral intelligence that allowed us to add confidence, if you like, to this single source. I mean, that is part of the analysis process. One casts around to see whether information from other sources or of other types actually fits that information; and there were some reports on plans and logistics and you could say that the military experience might be there that matched such capabilities. But the sort of thing we would normally look for is -- I have mentioned before -- these things come together. The evidence of agent production and the absence of CW agent production was -- evidence of that worried us. We had not seen the weapons being produced. We had no evidence of any recent testing or field trials and things like that. So that all cast some doubts in our mind on that particular piece of intelligence. There is an important point to make, I think -- I mean it might be your next question.

MR JONES: The important point is that we at no stage argued that this intelligence should not be included in the dossier.

MR JONES: We thought it was important intelligence. I personally thought that the word used in the main body of the text, that the intelligence indicated this was a little bit strong but I felt I could live with that, but I thought that the other references to this intelligence in the dossier --

MR JONES: They were references, I think, in a conclusion in the executive summary.

MR JONES: And indeed in the foreword. I thought they were too strong.

MR JONES: Yes, I think we felt that it was reasonable to say that the intelligence indicated that this was the case; and I think I felt it was a reasonable conclusion to draw; but we did not think -- we did not think the intelligence showed it absolutely beyond any shadow of doubt.

MR JONES: Yes.